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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the content of eighteenth-century American and British 
portraits within the ideologically-expanding context of eighteenth-century British 
identity. It explores the ways in which Britons and Americans negotiated who they 
were and, consequently, their claims on society, in the era preceding and including 
the American Revolution. It does so for three reasons: to advance a more 
interdisciplinary approach to the study of American portraiture; to motivate further 
dialogue on the relationship between American and British portraits; and to invoke 
the potential for American portraits as documentary evidence of social history.
Through historical examination of philosophical influences informing the 
development of British narratives, Part One considers the contexts within which 
portraits were produced and the implications of those contexts for the interpretation 
and presentation of identity. Against this ideological backdrop, Part Two 
deconstructs the content of selected portraits by John Singleton Copley, Charles 
Willson Peale, Ralph Earl, William Hogarth, Allan Ramsay, Sir Joshua Reynolds and 
others in order to come to terms with contemporary perceptions of reality and identity 
vis-a-vis the dominant narrative.
Broadly speaking, American Revolutionary portraits suggest a standard for 
identity based on principles drawn from conflicting narratives. This standard 
intimates an effort to conflate the principal ideals of a dominant neo-Country 
narrative—those of natural progress, potentiality and virtue, for example—with 
Liberal and Reformed notions of autonomy, self-determination and industry that 
denied the doctrines of hierarchy, fixity and birth upon which the traditional ideals 
were said to depend. The results signaled a gap between British ideology and 
colonial experience visually manifest as conflicting perceptions of reality. Implicated 
in these conflicting perceptions was an alternative meaning of life whose suppression 
may have led, ultimately, to revolution.
xii
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2INTRODUCTION 
IMAG[IN]ING IDENTITY: SELF AS SUBJECT
And is not the fairest sight of all... for him who has eyes to see it, the 
combination in the same bodily form of beauty of character and looks to 
match and harmonize with it?
- Plato, ca. 375 BC1
Mirror, mirror, On the wall, Who is the fairest One of all?
- Jakob and Wilhelm Grimm, 18122
it is impossible... to prevent the Sale of Portraits and Looking Glasses.
- John Oakley, 17613
When the Wicked Queen sat down before her dressing mirror in the Brothers 
Grimm tale, Snow White, she instigated the negotiation of her own identity through 
engagement with two interested parties: the maker (the mirror); and the spectator (the 
voice behind the mirror). The subject beautified herself, the maker captured and 
framed her image, and the spectator proclaimed her the fairest—or not—of them all. 
Each participant was necessarily ‘interested’ in the outcome, for in the Wicked 
Queen’s identity resided their own relative one; her claim to “fairest of all” denied
1 See Plato, The Republic, trans. and intro. Desmond Lee (London: Penguin Books, (1955) rev. 1974), 
p. 105.
2 The Brothers Grimm, “Snow White and the Seven Dwarfs” (1812), in Fairy Tales from the Brothers 
Grimm, rev. Nicola Baxter (New York: Smithmark, 1997).
3 St. James’s Chronicle, April 25,1761, p. 3, quoted in David H. Solkin, Painting for Money: The 
Visual Arts and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century England (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1992), p. 180.
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their title to it, as well as any accompanying privileges. Herein resides the power of 
identity—and its threat to social order.
John Oakley’s allusion to an underlying link between mirrored and painted 
images suggests the possibilities attendant the imag[in]ing of identity in eighteenth- 
century Britain.4 For example, the classical narrative of Aristotle and Plato 
understood the internal and external selves to be complementary facets of a single 
whole, their common purpose the individual’s advancement towards a predetermined 
unity—the virtuous ideal. In this analysis, the internal self was understood as the 
essential self—one’s thoughts, feelings, and beliefs—, the external self the material 
form on “which these mental states bear.”5 The matter of the external self was thus 
understood to be a natural extension of the essence of the internal self and, so, a 
natural signifier of one’s virtues vis-a-vis the universal ideal.
By the late Middle Ages, manuals were being produced to instruct princes in 
the appropriate presentation of their persons at court. Prompted by an evolving self- 
consciousness, these manuals—aptly termed “mirrors”—reflected a need for guidance
4 Indeed, the medieval thinker, John of Salisbury (1115/20-1180), understood “imagines” to be 
likenesses of “the forms of material things.” (Copleston, II, p. 172) John Canfield suggests that the 
mirrored image were intended to represent a unified objectification of the immaterial and material self. 
Hence, identity, as “likeness,” was challenged to summarize a singular self. Nonetheless, as Claire 
Pajaczkowska reminds us, the challenges “likeness” posed undermined the certainty of a unified self, a 
circumstance which may have urged more concentrated efforts manifest, in part, in the development of 
portraiture. “Lacan’s concept of the mirror phase... offers the insight that the structure of the [visual] 
image is inherently connected to the subject’s desperate quest for imaginary unity...” (Pajaczkowska, 
pp. 103-108) See Frederick Copleston, A History o f  Philosophy, 6 vols, II (New York: Doubleday,
1993), p. 172; John V. Canfield, The Looking-Glass Self: An Examination o f Self Awareness (New 
York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 174-175; Claire Pajaczkowska, “The ecstatic solace of culture: self, not-self 
and other; a psychoanalytic view,” in Juliet Steyn, ed., Other than identity: the subject, politics and art 
(New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), pp. 103-108.
5 Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self: The Making o f the Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), p. 111.
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4in the construction of public personae.6 As Stephen Jaeger describes it, “Words, 
gestures, intonation, and facial expression all bear meaning, express policy—no act or 
gesture is random.... Conduct becomes so highly structured that life approaches art: 
the courtier is himself a work of art, his appearance a portrait, his experience a 
narrative.”7 This suggested that one’s external persona was no longer the implicit
o
expression of one’s internal self.
The intervening development of the mediaeval ‘mirror’, and the like evidence 
of self-fracturing resonant in Snow White, implied not only a mediaeval split in the 
relationship between the internal, private, essential self and its external, public, and 
material representation, but an evolving tension between them.9 As Taylor observes,
6 T. A. Sinclair writes: “For centuries monarchical rule of one kind or another had occupied the central 
position in political thought; .. .and above all how to build up what they called a ‘Mirror of Princes’ for 
the monarch to copy.” (Sinclair, in Aristotle, The Politics, pp. 16-17) Machiavelli, for one, urged 
“princes [to] .. .discover how to behave . . .[by] glanc[ing] at the looking-glass in which the lives of 
good men are reflected....” (Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 396) See T. A. Sinclair, in Aristotle, The 
Politics, trans. T. A. Sinclair, rev. Trevor J. Saunders (London: Penguin Books (1962), 1981), pp. 16- 
17; Niccolo Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. and intro. Bernard Crick, trans. Leslie J. Walker, S.J., 
rev. Brian Richardson (London and New York: Penguin Books (1970), 1998), p. 396.
7 C. Stephen Jaeger, The Origins o f Courtliness: Civilizing Trends and the Formation o f Courtly 
Ideals, 939-1210 (Philadelphia, 1985), p. 258, quoted in Bushman, p. 35
8 Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary (1786) defined “mirror” as both “A looking-glass; anything which 
exhibits representations of objects by reflection,” and a “pattern...; an exemplar; an archetype,” the 
latter of which draws on this medieval usage. See Samuel Johnson A Dictionary o f the English 
Language (London: Harrison & Co., 1786); Richard Bushman, The Refinement o f America (New York: 
Knopf, 1992), p. 33.
9 As Claire Pajaczkowska argues, “The satisfaction felt by achieving imaginary unity through the 
construction o f a merged ego and ego-ideal in visual representation is at the cost of the structured 
alienation of the self into divided identities o f observer and observed....” This, she continues, offers a 
valuable insight into the origins of the philosophical need for a ‘unitary’ subject and why, within the 
humanities, it has recently become possible and necessary to think of a ‘divided’ subject.” 
(Pajaczkowska, pp. 103-108) She goes on: “The metaphor of an ‘inner’ world has been suggested as a 
description [for the process of internalization that connotes] psychic reality... which has the advantage 
of implying a clear opposition between the supposedly physical, material nature of external reality and 
whatever is conceived as ‘mental’, psychological, emotional. Unfortunately, this convenient opposition 
is... distorting....” (Pajaczkowska, p. 103) As Baumeister explains it, sociological identities are 
“interpersonal” or “public” in being dependent upon “the roles of the person in relation to society at 
large and to other particular persons.” Such identities aimed to impress “in the minds o f others” one’s 
“particular traits or qualities.” (Baumeister, p. 153) By contrast, psychological identities depend on 
“the structure of values and priorities” evolving “out of the inner, or hidden, self.” (Baumeister, p. 171) 
By emphasizing the internal, private self, the psychological model privileged the individual; by
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the growing influence of the psychological (individual) self came at the expense of 
social standards and authority.10 With the advent of the divided self, the classical 
premise of a natural identity, bom of the complementary relationship between the 
internal and external self, was undermined. Identity became a means of reconciling 
the self with a narrative of coexisting others.11 Indeed, Snow White and the mediaeval 
Mirror suggest that, by the late Middle Ages, identity was no longer simply received
by the individual from society, but might rather be posited by the individual for
* • 12 society’s rejection or approval—it might be negotiated.
These developments implied a degree of individual autonomy and self- 
determination not found in ancient classicism. They also signaled the prospect of 
social fluidity and competition, pitting one person’s claims against another’s desires 
in a society where resources were shared and finite. This nurtured the development of 
individual self-fashioning that, in turn, expanded the demand for prescriptive 
literature. Like the mediaeval ‘mirror’, Baldassare Castiglione’s The Book o f the 
Courtier outlined the standards of courtly appearance and behavior for a Renaissance 
audience of upper-class persons.13 By the eighteenth century, the audience had
presenting the subject’s more public self, the sociological model privileged society. See Pajaczkowska, 
pp. 103-108; Canfield, pp. 173,205; Roy F. Baumeister, Identity: cultural change and the struggle for 
self{New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 153,170-171,246.
10 Taylor, pp. 163, 188,510.
11 Baumeister writes: “Identities exist only in societies, which define and organize them. Thus, the 
search for identity includes the question o f what is the proper relationship o f the individual to society as 
a whole....” See Baumeister, p. 7.
12 As Baumeister writes, “the search for identity includes the question of what is the proper relationship 
of the individual to society as a whole.” See Baumeister, p. 7.
13 Written between 1508 and 1516, The Book o f the Courtier was first published in Venice in 1528.
The first English edition was printed in London by Thomas Hoby in 1561. Providing an informal 
account of Italian courtiers engaged in after-dinner entertainment, it became a model—a Mirror—for 
the ideal courtier. See Count Baldesar Castiglione, The Book o f the Courtier, trans. Leonard Eckstein 
Qpdycke (New York: H. Liveright, 1929).
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6stretched to a British ‘middling’ sort.14
Over time, the balance-of-influence between the internal and external self 
shifted. If initially the historical shift from a unified to a divided self was marked by a 
sociological emphasis, in which identity was prescribed by the Public on the basis of 
external social factors, by the eighteenth century, it increasingly assumed a 
psychological one. Ultimately, the shift from a sociological to psychological identity 
signaled a changing relationship between the individual and society.15
This paper examines identity in eighteenth-century portraits within the context 
of these ideologically-expanding opportunities. That these opportunities were 
matched by a burgeoning demand for visual self-imagery suggests: first, that the 
physicality and legibility of painted images provided a recognized means by which 
individuals could claim and assert their identity;16 and, second, that this may have
14 With regard to the notion of a “middling” sort, the use of this term helps to distinguish between an 
expanding group of individuals whose improved economic circumstances separated them from the 
lower classes without defining them as a political group—i.e. a bourgeoisie. In speaking of her 
neighborhood, Samuel Richardson’s Pamela notes that “All the rest were but middling people, and 
traders, at best.” (Richardson, p. 166) These were distinct, too, from those “fine folks, who live upon 
their means.” (Richardson, p. 85) See Samuel Richardson, Pamela; or, Virtue Rewarded (1740), ed. 
Peter Sabor, intro. Margaret A. Doody (New York: Penguin Books, 1980), pp. 85, 166.
13 According to Taylor, the drift away from a sociological towards a more psychological identity was 
the consequence of an “historical evolution” effected by a shift in the balance-of-influence between the 
individual and customary authority. The resulting “new subjectivism,” as Taylor describes it, bore 
significant implications for identity. Once the formal self came to be understood as a by-product of the 
process of disengagement, objectification and rationalization—what Taylor terms “radical 
reflexivity”—, identity became a matter of rationalizing the external world in a manner beneficial to 
one’s attributes— in other words, o f imposing one’s own standards o f interpretation. This “new 
subjectivism,” Taylor writes, removed the mask o f objectivity supporting classical standards of 
comparison, giving “rise to the notion of a subject in its modem sense... whereby we place ‘within’ the 
subject... an order which is inseparably indexed to a personal vision....” See Taylor, pp. 163, 188, 
510.
16 As Jonathan Richardson argued, painting is a useful “means whereby we convey our Ideas to each 
other.... And thus it must be...accordingly esteem’d not only as an Enjoyment, but as another 
Language, which completes the whole Art of communicating our Thoughts....” (Richardson, p. 5) 
Hence, he adds: “Upon the sight o f a Portrait,” he wrote, “the Character... of the Person it represents 
[is]... apt to... be the Subject o f Conversation.” (Richardson, p. 16) See Jonathan Richardson, An 
Essay on the Theory o f Painting (London: printed by W. Bowyer, 1715), pp. 5-6, 16.
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7been a factor in the expanding market for portraits.17 This premise turns on the
assumption that paintings are social and linguistic constructions inscribed by a
narrative that functions to locate the individual within a visually-articulated social
context.18 On the one hand, then, coming to terms with a portrait’s content permits a
glimpse at the ideological context informing its making. On the other hand, coming
to terms with the ideological context of a portrait permits a glimpse at the social
implications attendant the resulting identity. As Locke aptly noted, “One who holds a
belief is ... engaged with, or operates from within, a specific social sy s t em.hence ,
“to comprehend a given ‘belief means to understand the system within which the
belief is... accepted.”19 Hence, as Edgar Wind has observed:
Portraiture shows this give and take... especially clearly. Attached to the 
painting of a portrait is a social situation, in which the artist has to come to 
terms with an attitude, that of his sitter, .. .that will often be supported by 
philosophical views.... Then there is the correspondence between the 
objectives of the painter and of the philosopher, the one aiming at the 
representation of individual man, the other enquiring into the nature of man, 
and both working in an intellectual climate which fostered speculation on the 
aesthetic and moral qualities of ‘the perfect man’. As a result, the historian is 
able to use the works of art of the period to illustrate the controversy about the
17 According to Ellen Miles, “About four times as many portraits were painted in the colonies between 
1750 and 1776 than in the first fifty years o f the century.” (Miles, p. 10) As Gibson-Wood notes: “The 
economic historian Peter Earle has analyzed how the London middle class spent the wealth they were 
accumulating in the period 1660-1730, and notes that, along with increased expenditure on fashionable 
clothes and comfortable furnishings, ‘another feature o f middling homes was the huge increase in 
pictures, ornaments, and bits and pieces as the period goes on’. We know this largely through the 
detailed inventories of household goods that were routinely made on the death of London citizens....” 
Spawned by a growing popularity and audience for connoisseurship, the evidence of inventories 
suggests that “by the time Richardson was writing pictures were a common feature in the homes of 
tradesmen and craftsmen, in both London and the provinces, and that a dramatic rise in the frequency 
of ownership had occurred between 1695 and 1715.” (Gibson-Wood, pp. 14-17, 200) For a discussion 
of this development, see Ellen G. Miles, “Introduction,” in The Portrait in Eighteenth-Century America 
(Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1993), p. 10; Carol Gibson-Wood, Jonathan Richardson: 
Art Theorist o f the English Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 14-17,200.
18 As Brilliant describes it: “.. .the artistic definition of identity would seem to be the focus of that 
visual processing of information needed to bring together the various ingredients that constitute the 
basis of identification.” See Richard Brilliant, Portraiture (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1991), p. 14.
19 Canfield, p. 132.
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idea of Man and to find the conflict of views concerning human nature
20reflected in the pictorial representations of particular human beings.
This paper considers the ways in which Britons and Americans negotiated 
who they were—and, consequently, their claims on society—by examining the ways 
in which their portraits supported, challenged, or manipulated the dominant narrative 
through the use—and misuse—of inherited visual languages. Putting aside more 
conventional interpretations of portraiture—as souvenirs of family and friends, 
displays of economic condition, and evidence of ancestral lineage—, it aims to 
recover the language and context of eighteenth-century image-making as a means of
coming to terms with the intent of Americans and Britons as they conceptualized and
21negotiated their identities.
To this end, the paper has been divided into two parts. Part One explores the 
narrative contexts within which portraits were produced and the implications of these 
narratives for the interpretation and presentation of identity. Chapter I considers 
“narrative” as a structure for ‘meaning-making’, the foundations of classical 
narratives, differences between theoretical and empirical narratives, and their 
significance for the evaluation of identity. Chapter II sketches the body of 
philosophical ideas informing the narratives of the pre-modem period, from
20 Edgar Wind, Hume and the Heroic Portrait: Studies in Eighteenth Century Imagery, ed. Jaynie 
Anderson (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), pp. 3-4.
21 This paper relies heavily on the excellent work of others in researching and identifying such criteria 
as maker, date, materials, condition, and biographical information. Its highly interdisciplinary 
approach is a natural outgrowth o f current trends in British art history applied, less characteristically, to 
American art. As Ellen Miles aptly notes, the portrait genre has excited less attention among American 
scholars than the single image and the monograph, noteworthy exceptions being the work of Richard 
Brilliant and Joanna Woodall. See Ellen G. Miles, “Introduction,” in Painting and Portrait Making in 
the American Northeast, ed. Peter Benes, vol. 19 (Boston: Boston University and The Dublin Seminar
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9Augustine to Machiavelli. Chapter III addresses the ideological polarities plaguing 
seventeenth-century Britain—arising, for example, from the economic and political 
pressures accompanying commercial expansion and the collapse of monarchy—and 
the struggle to squeeze them into a civic humanist paradigm. Finally, Chapter IV 
examines the implications of these developments for eighteenth-century British 
narratives and identities.
Part Two focuses on a few of the most illuminating portraits produced in the 
eighteenth century. It begins by outlining the influence of British ideology on the 
interpretation of art, technique, and the stature of portraiture and portrait-painters. 
Chapter VI continues with a narrative deconstruction of John Singleton Copley’s 
Major Hugh Montgomerie. Finally, borrowing on an observation of Aristotle—that 
how something is said bears direct relation to what is being said—, Chapter VII 
examines American Revolutionary portraits within the context of British ideological 
and aesthetic conventions.22 For all its obvious challenges, the goal of this study is 
three-fold: to advance a more interdisciplinary approach to the study of American 
portraiture; to motivate further dialogue on the relationship between American and 
British portraits; and to invoke the potential of American portraits as documentary 
evidence of social history. To this end, a concluding chapter considers the 
implications of eighteenth-century American portraits for our understanding of the 
American Revolution.
for New England Folklife Annual Proceedings, 1994) For examples of this approach in British art 
scholarship, see Marcia Pointon, David Solkin and John Barrell.
22 As Aristotle aptly noted, “it is not enough to know what we ought to say; we must say it as we 
ought.” See Aristotle, The Rhetoric, in The Rhetoric and the Poetics of Aristotle, trans. W. Rhys 
Roberts, intro. Edward P. J. Corbett (New York: Random House, Inc. (1954), 1984), p. 164; George
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Campbell, Philosophy o f Rhetoric, in The Scottish Enlightenment: An Anthology, ed. Alexander 
Broadie (Edinburgh: Canongate Classics, 1997), pp. 685-694.
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PART ONE
CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY: THE CONTEXT 
CHAPTER I 
THE NARRATIVE OF IDENTITY
Modem scholars have convincingly argued that identity is a social 
construction; through language, society provides the narrative parameters within 
which—or against which—identities are assumed and negotiated.1 However, as 
“perception”—how one understands “reality” and one’s place within it—, is prone to 
relativism, so conflicting perceptions risk narrative crisis.2 The result is identity 
crisis—what Taylor describes as “an acute form of disorientation, which people often
1 See Roy Baumeister, Identity: cultural change and the struggle for self (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), p. 15; John V. Canfield, The Looking-Glass Self: An Examination o f Self- 
Awareness (New York: Praeger, 1990) p. 135; Charles Taylor, Sources o f the Self: The Making o f the 
Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), pp. 28, 35,40, 47-49, 286-289.
2 See Thomas Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 75, 5, in St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and 
Ethics, trans. and ed. Paul E. Sigmund (New York: W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1988), p. 34; 
Greg Dening, “Texts o f Self,” in Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections on Personal Identity in Early 
America, Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel, and Fredrika J. Teute, eds. (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, 1997), p. 
159; Trevor Saunders, introduction to Plato, The Laws, trans. and intro. Trevor J. Saunders (New York: 
Penguin Putnam, Ltd., (1970) 1975), p. 25; Roland Barthes, Empire o f Signs, trans. Richard Howard 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), p. 6; quoted in Gange, “Beyond Identity? The beyond in Beyond 
Japan,” in Other Than Identity: the subject, politics, and art, Juliet Steyn, ed (New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1997) p. 205; John Gange, “Beyond Identity? The beyond in Beyond Japan,” in 
Other Than Identity: the subject, politics, and art, Juliet Steyn, ed (New York: Manchester University 
Press, 1997), pp. 204-205; Canfield, The Looking-Glass Self, p. 135; David Hume, Treatise o f Human 
Nature (1739) (Amherst, New York: Prometheus Books, 1992), p. 108; John Locke, An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding (1690), ed. Roger Woolhouse (New York: Penguin Putnam, Inc., 
1997), pp. 155, 363-371,437-453; Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651), ed. C. B. MacPherson (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 105, 112; Frederick A. Copleston, A History of Philosophy (New 
York: Doubleday, 1993), V, pp. 101-107.
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express in terms of not knowing who they are, but which can also be seen as a radical 
uncertainty of where they stand.”
Broadly speaking, ancient classicism embraced two forms of reality, each 
conditioned upon a different kind of knowledge and each conducing to a specific kind 
of narrative.4 Where reality implied a metaphysical realm of eternal existence 
informed by universal truths, and the meaning of life was understood to derive from a 
theoretical comprehension of nature’s ‘first principles’, the resulting narrative was 
theoretical—classical theoretike—, employing intellectual contemplation to arrive at 
the fixed standards of natural law and civic life.5 By contrast, where reality implied a 
physical realm of temporal history informed by sensory knowledge, and the meaning 
of life was confined to a cumulative understanding of one’s particular experience, the 
resulting narrative was practical—classical praktike—-, employing observation to 
arrive at the fluid standards of human convention.6
J Taylor, p. 27.
4 Aristotle described three kinds of knowledge: theoretical knowledge, equated with philosophy and 
wisdom, “in which knowledge as such is the end in view”; empirical knowledge (practical); and a 
middle kind of “poetical knowledge” or art, which “has to do with production and not with action as 
such....” (Copleston, I, p. 277) As Saunders suggests, Aristotle’s endorsement of philosophical 
knowledge presupposed not only that pure truth or wisdom existed, but that it was intelligible. Socrates 
and Plato had shared this belief. Moreover, all three had used this principle to distinguish theoretical 
and prescriptive narratives from empirical and “descriptive” ones. See Saunders, introduction to 
Aristotle, Politics, T. A. Sinclair, trans., Trevor J. Saunders rev. (London: Penguin Books (1962),
1981), pp. 19, 37; Desmond Lee, introduction to Plato, Republic, Desmond Lee, trans. and intro. 
(London: Penguin Books, (1955) rev. 1974) p. xxxiii; Copleston, I, pp. 143, 149,277.
5 According to Aristotle, the highest form of knowledge “deals with the first principles and causes of 
things, and so is universal knowledge in the highest degree.... [This] is the science which is furthest 
removed from the senses, the most abstract science.” (Copleston, I, p. 288) The primary methodology 
of theoretike was contemplation, though Aristotle conceded the need for observation. As Sinclair 
observes, theoretical narratives were “regarded as truly philosophical and truly scientific... [for being] 
based on theoria, observation plus contemplation.” (Sinclair, in Aristotle, The Politics, pp. 14-15) See 
Copleston, I, pp. 205-206, 288; Sinclair, in Aristotle, The Politics, pp. 14-15.
6 According to T. A. Sinclair, “the distinction between theoretike and praktike was not at all the same 
as between theory and practice. They were two separate branches of knowledge, not two different ways 
of dealing with knowledge.” See Sinclair, in Aristotle, The Politics, pp. 14-15.
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In fact, theoretical narratives recognized both forms of reality, but ranked the 
metaphysical and eternal above the physical and temporal according to the hierarchy 
of knowledge; as that which attained universal truth was necessarily superior to that 
which arrived at particular ones, so a reality and identity premised on metaphysical 
knowledge was necessarily higher than a reality and identity premised on physical 
data.7 Extrasensory reality thus came to be associated with truth and “Being,” the
O
“final cause” or end—presumed “Good”—towards which man naturally progressed. 
By the same token, sensory reality became affiliated with ignorance and “Becoming,” 
the imperfect activity of temporal life.9
7 Both Plato and Aristotle recognized two realms of existence: “the realm of change and appearance, 
the everyday, physical world in which we live; and the realm of the forms, a realm of eternals and 
absolutes.” (Lee, introduction, Republic, p. xxxix, and Copleston, I, p. 327) As Lee describes it, the 
realm of “unchanging forms, which are the objects o f the philosopher’s knowledge, are what is 
ultimately real. The world perceived by the sense, the world o f change, though not unreal, has a lower 
status ontologically than the realm of forms....” (Lee, p. 205) Though Aristotle’s interpretation of the 
two realms differed from Plato’s—for example, he opposed Plato’s location of the soul in the external 
realm of the intelligences on grounds that it precluded the achievement of self-actualization, which 
required that the body be united with the soul so that it participated in the Universal Mind of truth—he 
did not deny the two realms of existence or their separate modes of intelligence; as Copleston writes: 
“Reason is the highest faculty of man, and theoretical contemplation is the highest activity o f reason.” 
(Copleston, I, pp. 348-349). See Lee, introduction to Plato, Republic, p. xxxix; Plato, Republic, pp. 
149-164,205, 260; Copleston, I, pp. 112, 151-155, 163-206,327-329, 348-349; Plato, Laws, pp. 434, 
519; Plato, Republic, pp. xxxix, 149-164,205, 260; Sir David Ross, Aristotle, John L. Ackrill, intro. 
(Routledge: London and New York, (1923) 1996), p. 77.
8 For Aristotle, the end for man was the fulfillment of potentiality, a self-actualization that Plato 
described, similarly, as a “unity with oneself’ arising from one’s comprehension o f the Ideas and one’s 
place within them. Moreover, the state was the proper venue for this progress; as Aristotle described it, 
“while the state came about as a means of securing life itself, it continues in being to secure the good 
life.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 59) As a consequence of this, Sinclair notes, “Aristotle was saddled with 
...the notion that whatever is good is according to nature” and, inversely, that whatever is natural is 
necessarily good. (Sinclair, in Aristotle, The Politics, p. 21) See Aristotle, The Politics, translated by 
T. A. Sinclair, revised and re-presented by Trevor J. Saunders (New York and London: Penguin Books 
(1962,1981), 1992), p. 21; Aristotle, Politics, pp. 21, 56-59, 187, 439; Aristotle, The Rhetoric, in The 
Rhetoric and the Poetics o f Aristotle, W. Rhys Roberts, trans,, Edward P. J. Corbett intro. (New York; 
Random House, Inc. (1954), 1984), pp. 37-38; Plato Republic, pp. 58-65, 138-139, 142-147, 161; 
Plato, Laws, p. 121, 124-126; Taylor, pp. 115-116, 121; Ross, p. 76; Copleston, I, pp. 216, 160-162, 
260-261.
9 Copleston writes: “Socrates tries to show that the objects of perception are, as Heraclitus taught, 
always in a state of flux: they never are, they are always becoming.’' (I, p. 144) This supported the 
Aristotelian premise that “nature makes nothing without some end in view, nothing to no purpose”—  
i.e. “Becoming” was necessarily a stage in the process towards “Being.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 79) In
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Ultimately, the theoretical narrative was teleological and evolutionary; man, it 
suggested, began in a state of nature and, through the virtuous improvement attendant 
intellectual enlightenment, was naturally advanced from a mechanical to a 
philosophical condition, from a savage to a civic and, ultimately, to an ideal state of 
“happiness” and “independence.”10 In this analysis, the gap between one’s 
‘potentiality’ and ‘actuality’ was gradually reduced by an innate motivation towards 
“self-realisation” that occurred as part of man’s natural social development. In other 
words, as the relationship between society—the state or polls—and the individual was 
deemed complementary to nature, so society was deemed the natural venue for “self- 
actualization.”1 1 Moreover, as society was deemed the natural venue of the
general, godliness was the height of a descending scale of lesser virtue; as Plato described it, “God ... 
is pre-eminently the ‘measure o f all things.” Hence, those who inspired good in others assumed the 
heroic stature of Great Men (Guardians) responsible for guiding society. (Plato, Laws, pp. 175-176, 
195-196; Plato Republic, pp. 14, 77-78) However, Aristotle and Plato entertained slightly different 
interpretations of the relationship between Being and Becoming; whereas Plato interpreted the 
realization of potentiality as a “unity with oneself’ arising from the recovery of divine Ideas, and 
perceived this as occurring within the spiritual realm, this separation between the spiritual and material 
realms presented difficulties for Aristotle: how did one reunite with an inaccessible soul? He thus 
relocated the universal element of man—his soul or ‘active intellect’—within his temporal matter—his 
body. This required a rethinking o f the relationship between Being—divine—and Becoming—  
temporal. Ultimately, Aristotle recast Being as natural rather than divine; each living thing has “an 
innate and natural tendency towards its own full evolution.” (Copleston, I, p. 313) By this means, “the 
development from a state of potentiality to one of actuality” precluded the need for metaphysical 
revelations. (Copleston, I, p. 325) This difference between the two theorists informed variations in 
mediaeval scholarship. See Plato, Laws, pp. 175-176, 195-196; Plato, Republic, pp. 14, 77-78; 
Aristotle, Politics, p. 79; Taylor, pp. 115-116, 121; Baumeister, pp. 248,251; Copleston, 1, pp. 144, 
209,313,325.
10 As Aristotle described it: “Generally, of course, it is the good, and not simply the traditional, that is 
aimed at....” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 138) “This end,” he later wrote, “is happiness and its 
constituents”—i.e. “prosperity combined with virtue; or... independence of life....” (Aristotle, The 
Rhetoric, pp. 37-38) See Plato, Republic, pp. 56,58-59, 63-69,71-78; Plato, Laws, p. 162; Aristotle, 
The Politics, pp. 138, 187; Aristotle, Rhetoric, pp. 37-38; Copleston I, pp. 335, 338-339, 343; Taylor, 
pp. 278-279.
n According to Aristotle “the state... exists by nature.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 55) Plato concurred; as 
Lee writes, “society, with its regulations, is a ‘natural’ growth....” (Plato, Republic, p. 56) Indeed, 
Copleston adds, “human life is not lived out... apart from Society and the State, nor is man a being 
entirely apart from nature....” (Copleston, I, p. 199) Hence, Saunders notes, “‘Nature’ seems to carry 
strong social and political imperatives.” (Saunders, in Aristotle, Politics, p. 186) See Aristotle,
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individual, so that which advanced the ‘good’ of society was presumed to advance the
12‘good’ of the individual—hence the origins of “common good.”
In theory, then, advocates of theoretical, classical narratives endorsed fixed 
moral codes that rationalized and ordered society according to a prescribed set of
• • 13values and beliefs that deemed the ‘common good’ natural, attainable, and ideal. 
Within this context, one’s identity became the measure of one’s virtue—one’s 
capacity and inclination to advance the common good prescribed by the fixed moral 
principles of eternal law intelligible through contemplation. Because this capacity 
and inclination were affiliated with disinterested independence—with leisured self- 
sufficiency—those whose circumstances permitted of virtue—i.e. those not dependent 
on commercial or domestic activities for material sustenance—assumed the highest 
identities.14
Politics, pp. 39, 55; Plato, Republic, p. 56; Copleston, I, pp. 199, 320, 351; Saunders, in Aristotle, 
Politics, p. 186.
12 Both Plato and Aristotle interpreted the good to mean the simultaneous advancement o f the 
individual and the state. Copleston writes: “in [Aristotle’s] eyes the end of the State and the end of the 
individual coincide, not in the sense that the individual should be entirely absorbed in the state but in 
the sense that the State will prosper when the individual citizens are good, when they attain their own 
proper end.” (Copleston, I, p. 357) Consequently, as Plato wrote: “The object o f our legislation ...is 
not the special welfare of any particular class in our society, but of the society as a whole; ... its 
purpose ... is not to leave everyone to please himself, but to make each man a link in the unity of the 
whole.” (Republic, p. 263) Thus Sinclair observes, “the subject of political philosophy, or politike, 
embraced the whole o f human behaviour.... It was the aim o f political philosophy to establish 
standards of social behavior.” (Saunders, in Aristotle, The Politics, pp. 26-27) See Plato, Republic, p. 
263; Sinclair, in Aristotle, Politics, pp. 26-27; Copleston, I, p. 357. For Aristotle’s discussion of the 
best states, see Politics, pp. 379-393,401-426,439-444.
13 According to Trevor Saunders, the “guiding principles” of this approach were as follows: “(a) That 
certain absolute moral standards exist, (b) That such standards can be, however imperfectly, embodied 
in a code of law. (c) That most o f the inhabitants of the state, being innocent of philosophy, must never 
presume to act on their own initiative in modifying either their moral ideal or the code o f laws which 
express it; they must live in total and unconditional obedience to the unchanging rules and regulations 
laid down for them by the legislator.” See Saunders, introduction to Plato, Laws, pp. 28-29.
14 Plato described three kinds of men: Guardian-Rulers, a citizen class characterized by “a 
philosophical disposition and a love o f learning” (Plato, Republic, p. 69); Auxiliaries, a citizen-military 
whose “function is ‘to assist the Rulers in the execution of their decisions’” (Lee, in Plato, Republic, p. 
121); and a ‘ Third Class ’ of non-citizens whose function “is to provide for the material and economic 
needs of the community”—i.e. Lee writes, “Their virtue is obedience....” (Lee, in Plato, Republic, p.
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The symbiotic relationship between the individual and society ensured that 
“citizenship” assumed a central role in the classical evaluation of identity; classical 
citizenship distinguished the independent, wise, and virtuous from the dependent, 
ignorant and self-interested.15 However, precisely because citizenship meant political 
action on behalf of the public good, because this good was deemed intelligible only to 
those with a knowledge of ‘first principles’, and because this knowledge was deemed 
accessible only to those whose virtue made them capable of disinterested reason, 
citizenship was confined to leisured—and, so, educated—men.16 By this means—i.e. 
1) the subordination of the individual to the state; 2) the privileged position of the 
state in the attainment of actuality; 3) the correlation between actuality and reason; 4)
xli) Though potentially wealthy, the Third Class suffered from its affiliation with money; according to 
Aristotle, there were three ways o f accumulating property, one natural (farming), one neutral 
(bartering), one unnatural (profit-making). This last was equated with “illiberal” leanings “unfit for the 
free man.” (Copleston, I, p. 335) They were thus excluded from classical citizenship. As Aristotle 
wrote, “citizens are a particular class of men, to which no one who is constantly engaged in commercial 
or manual labour can belong, at any rate in the ‘best’ state. Such people simply do not have the time 
and opportunity to fulfil the essential function of a citizen, to rule (while holding office) and to be ruled 
by turn....” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 183) Plato concurred. See Plato, Laws, pp. 23-24, 137, 349; Plato, 
Republic, pp. xli, 56,69,121, 139, 207,228, 239,243, 247-248,260-283; Aristotle, Politics, p. 183; 
Copleston, I, pp. 108, 335.
15 The classical standard o f identity was deeply entangled with the definition of citizenship. See 
Copleston, I, p. 108.
16 The function of politics was to translate the fixed moral order into a fixed code of laws, a task suited 
only to those o f the greatest wisdom and virtue. As Saunders notes, anything less than this risked 
“moral relativism and the abandonment o f the absolute standards to which Socrates’ questioning had, 
for Plato [and Aristotle], pointed the way.” (Saunders, introduction to Plato, Laws p. 27) Sinclair adds: 
“Alongside the strong ethical bias in political philosophy went a sense of the need for fixing standards. 
An ethical code had to be embodied in a code of law, and this code of law in turn described the whole 
framework o f the social and political system and the moral standards under which the citizens were to 
live, and for which the Greek word was politeia, usually translated by Constitution.” (Sinclair, in 
Aristotle, The Politics, p. 26) Consequently, Plato concluded, “no citizens who suffer from... ignorance 
should be entrusted with a degree o f power,” (Plato, Laws, p. 137) for “there are some who are 
naturally fitted for philosophy and political leadership, while the rest should follow their lead ....” 
(Plato, Republic, p. 207) See Saunders, in Plato, Laws, pp. 27-29; Plato, Laws, pp. 137, 526, 528;
Plato, Republic, p. 207; Sinclair, in Aristotle, Politics, p. 26.
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and the resulting emphasis on reason as the medium of virtue and, therefore, the
• IThighest standard of citizenship—, reason became the pivot on which identity turned. 
Significantly, the classical term for the wise and virtuous man was ‘aristocrat’; 
as ‘aristocracy’ was esteemed the best form of political constitution—the best means
♦ * 18of ordering society—, so the aristocrat was esteemed the best kind of citizen. Those 
constitutions which embraced lower standards of citizenship were thus interpreted as 
something less than ‘best’; the risk of democracy, for example, which granted 
citizenship to non-‘aristocrats’, was that it permitted men without wisdom to hold 
public office, thereby sacrificing statesmanship (the just rule of citizen-equals) for 
mastership (power in the pursuit of self-interest) to the detriment of good.19 On this
17 Plato and Aristotle argued that true knowledge was absolute and unchanging. It was, therefore, an 
appropriate and fixed measure o f human value. Thus, the capacity for theoretical wisdom became a 
measure of one’s capacity for universal virtue and the attainment o f wisdom became a reflection of 
one’s progress towards the ideal. But Aristotle also believed—as did Socrates before him—that 
individuals were complementary in this regard and, hence, that there was a necessary and harmonious 
inequality of virtue among members of a state. It was this which lent credence to the principle of social 
hierarchy. See Aristotle, Politics, pp. 93,95; Copleston, I, pp. 216,218.
18 According to Aristotle, the name “aristocracy... is justly given only to that constitution which is 
composed of those who are ... best in virtue.... For only [in this] ... type of aristocracy are good man 
and good citizen one and the same....” See Aristotle, Politics, p. 257.
19 As Aristotle described it, statesmen rule “men who are free, and similar in birth,” (Politics, p. 182) 
whereas the “rule of master over slave is exercised primarily for the benefit of the master and only 
incidentally for the benefit of the slave....” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 188) In general, Aristotle defined 
three ‘good’ and three ‘bad’ constitutions according to “three grounds for claiming equality 
[citizenship] in a constitution”: “freedom, wealth and virtue (a fourth claim, called ‘good birth’, arises 
out of the two last of these three, for good birth is wealth plus virtue going back to one’s forebears).” 
(Aristotle, Politics, p. 160) Good constitutions were those which sought the common good and 
included monarchy (which granted citizenship and, so, sovereignty to a virtuous one, though it could 
vary in type), aristocracy (which granted citizenship and sovereignty to a virtuous few), and polity, 
which granted citizenship and sovereignty to a middling group whose combined attributes 
approximated the virtuous mean. In the absence of virtuous men, Aristotle supported polity as the most 
conducive to the ideal because it located a moderate amount of wealth in the hands of a large number of 
persons, thereby combining elements of oligarchy and democracy (wealth and numbers) while 
defending against the tyrannical tendencies of each. Bad constitutions were similarly structured, but 
were motivated by interest rather than good; tyranny promoted the interests of one man, oligarchy of 
wealthy men, and democracy of unpropertied men. As Aristotle wrote, “only with the arrival of 
extreme democracies have workmen attained to participation in office.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 181)
Like Aristotle, Plato endorsed monarchy or aristocracy as most conducive to the ideal state, rejecting 
“timarchy,” oligarchy, democracy and tyranny as destructive factions that undermined social stability.
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premise, the classical social hierarchy descended from the philosopher-prince to the 
manual laborer.
Theoretical narratives thus suggested that empirical knowledge of sensory 
experience was valuable only insofar as it nurtured the human behavior prescribed by 
theoretical ideals. Politics, for example, a science derived from the evidence of 
human experience, was ‘good’ only insofar as it served the ideals of a metaphysical 
reality; it was not in itself meaningful—i.e. the proper foundation for a narrative 
‘meaning of life’—but rather an instrument for procuring a meaningful life. Of 
course, all facets of life were necessarily implicated in this doctrine; identity, for 
example, became a theoretical prescription, rationalized and articulated by a ‘natural’
' j  j
elite for receipt by the individual. Perhaps for this reason, alternatives emerged to
For further discussion, see in particular Aristotle’s Politics, pp. 80-89,119, 125-129,150, 153-154, 
157-158, 177, 181-182, 188, 190-206, 210, 216-232, 235, 237, 239,245,251, 259-260, 274-275, 295- 
356, 367-385, 391-401,426-439; Aristotle, Rhetoric, pp. 8, 50; Plato, Republic, pp. xvi, 202-203,216, 
228,235, 262, 293; Plato, Laws, pp. 55, 82, 142-144, 147, 149,157,212-214, 229-230, 327, 349, 449- 
452,457-459. For a discussion o f statesmanship, see in particular Aristotle’s Politics, pp. 395-6, 399- 
401; Aristotle, Rhetoric, pp. 8, 50; Plato, Laws, p. 82.
20 Hence, Copleston writes, although Aristotle began his Metaphysics with the claim that ‘“All men by 
nature desire to know’...,” he continued by recognizing “different degrees o f knowledge,” ranking “the 
man who seeks knowledge for its own sake above him who seeks for knowledge o f some particular 
kind with a view to ... some practical effect.” (Copleston, I, p. 287) As Aristotle wrote, “no two of us 
are bom exactly alike. We have different natural aptitudes, which fit us for different jobs.” (Aristotle, 
Politics, p. 59) Plato concurred: “the man naturally fitted to be a shoemaker, or carpenter, or anything 
else, should stick to his own trade....” (Plato, Republic, p. 161) Hence the premise of social order; as 
“men differ in intellectual and physical capacities and are thereby fitted for different positions in 
society,” so they will enjoy varying levels of virtue and independence. (Copleston, I, p. 352) As a rale, 
Plato explained, “only a small part o f mankind—a few highly-educated men of rare natural talent—is 
able to steel itself to moderation when assailed by various needs and desires....” (Plato, Laws, p. 457) 
Hence, as a tradesman should never participate in politics, so “a gentleman must never participate in 
trade....” (Plato, Laws, p. 459) On these grounds, Plato sought to make land inalienable. (Plato, Laws, 
pp. 449-452) While both Plato and Aristotle emphasized reason as the highest standard of identity, 
Aristotle was wary o f accepting Plato’s emphasis on birth, fearing it granted too much power to 
unproven men. (Aristotle, Politics, p. 153) Ultimately, however, the relationship between birth, wealth, 
and reason confined classical citizenship to the landed classes. See Aristotle, Politics, pp. 58-59, 153, 
169; Plato, The Republic, pp. 161, 261-262; Plato, Laws, pp. 449-452, 457-459; Copleston, I, pp. 287, 
352.
21 Theoretical narratives were concerned with the individual only insofar as the individual participates 
in the universal human ideal. As a result, “the most exact description of each individual will be a
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
19
challenge the intelligibility and credibility of universal truths and fixed standards,
« •  22 undermining the influence of theoretical narratives.
Historians have persuasively argued that the dominant narrative of eighteenth- 
century Britain derived from a classical concern to render human existence intelligible 
and meaningful in universal and fixed terms.23 Ultimately, however, British 
neoclassicism represented the selective quilting of Aristotelian and Platonic ideas 
with those of Christianity and science. This blending resulted in ambiguities and 
inconsistencies that subjected the dominant narrative to manipulation, criticism and 
rejection. The greatest risk came from empirical and ‘convention’ narratives—those 
which denied the intelligibility of metaphysical reality and premised knowledge on 
sensory experience, challenging the credibility of social prescription.24 Locke, for
special description ofhis virtue.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 179; Copleston, I, p. 292) Identity was thus 
assigned according to different “grades of being” deduced from the relationship between “potentiality 
and actuality.” (Ross, Aristotle, pp. 77, 129,246) Moreover, any “interference” or “interchange” in 
this structure was deemed “the worst o f evils.” (Plato, Republic, p. 146) See Aristotle, Politics, p. 179; 
Plato Republic, pp. 146-147; Ross, pp. 77,129, 246; Copleston, I, pp. 308-309.
22 Significantly, these narratives borrowed, in part, from Aristotle; as Copleston remarks, “it is arguable 
that Aristotle’s ‘empiricism’ was one of the influences which gave rise in the fourteenth century to lines 
of criticism which tended to undermine the metaphysical systems which had themselves been built on 
Aristotle’s ideas.” (See Copleston, III, p. 417) See Copleston, I, pp. 261,266-267,281, and III, p. 417.
23 As Copleston observes, “After its first beginnings in Asia Minor, Greek philosophy pursued its 
course of development until it flowered in the two great philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, and later, 
through Neo-Platonism, exercised a great influence on the formation o f Christian thought.” (Copleston, 
I, p. 10) J. G. A. Pocock has traced this influence from Machiavelli to James Harrington in The 
Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), Politics, Language and Time: Essays on Political 
Thought and History (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, (1971) 1989) and Virtue, Commerce, and 
History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, (1985) 1995). For a discussion of the development of Greek and Roman 
thought, see Copleston, A History o f Philosophy. Volume I: Greece and Rome—From the Pre- 
Socratics to Plotinus (New York: Doubleday, (1962) 1993).
24 See Hobbes, Leviathan (1651) and Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690). In 
very different ways, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke each challenged the credibility of the neo­
classical narrative. For example, while Hobbes denied the natural origins of society and presented it, 
instead, as the product of interest, Locke, while holding fast to the principle of natural law, denied the 
intelligibility o f universal truths in the absence of revelation (though he did allow for the notion of 
mathematical certainty) and, consequently, denied the existence of fixed universal standards. By 
making knowledge the by-product of sense-experience and, hence, the meaning of life a self­
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example, condemned theoretical narratives and customary authority as instruments of 
power politics. As he described it,
it was of no small advantage to those who affected to be masters and teachers, 
to make this the principle ofprinciples, that principles must not be questioned: 
for having once established this tenet, that there are innate principles, it put 
their followers upon a necessity of receiving some doctrines as such; which 
was to take them off from the use of their own reason and judgement, and put 
them upon believing and taking them upon trust... in which posture of blind 
credulity, they might be more easily governed by, and made useful to some 
sort of men, who had the skill and office to principle and guide them.... 
Whereas had they examined the ways, whereby men came to the knowledge of 
many universal truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of
• 25men, from the being of things themselves....
Alternative narratives were not new to the modem period; indeed, Socrates, 
Plato and Aristotle had condemned the moral relativism of the Sophist tradition as the 
ignorant by-product of inferior minds and methodologies.26 However, as theoretical
determined capacity of all men, Locke leveled the intellectual playing field, making moral virtue—the 
proper pursuit o f all men—a universal privilege. See Woolhouse, introduction to Locke, An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, pp. xi-xii.
25 See Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, in Woolhouse, p. 106. Locke was highly 
critical of the Scholastics and, in particular, the Aristotelian theory o f ‘first principles’ or “maxims” 
from which certain truth might be deduced. According to Copleston, this affected Locke’s notion of 
general and particular ideas; “since universality and generality are not attributes o f things, which are all 
individual or particular, but of ideas and words... it is the mind which observes... likenesses among 
particular things and uses them as the occasion to form general ideas.” (Copleston, V, p. 105) This 
distinguished Lockean general ideas from those of Aristotelian “abstraction,” which recognized general 
essences in particular things and, so, granted a concrete source for universal ideas. See Locke, An 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 59, 564, 576-577; Woolhouse, introduction to Locke, 
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. xv; Copleston, V, pp. 73-78, 101-107.
26 For practical purposes, the Sophists—including Protagoras, Prodicus, Hippias, and Gorgias—  
employed an empirical, inductive method to explain human behavior—i.e. for “the art and control of 
life.” (Copleston, I, pp. 82-83) Consequently, Copleston notes, “ Socrates considered ... the Sophists 
... superficial thinkers who merely adopted and reflected the prejudices of society at large....” 
(Copleston, I, p. 20) Moreover, Saunders writes, Aristotle’s “repeated emphasis ... on the state’s being 
‘natural’ suggests ... the polemical purpose o f refuting those who believed that the state was an 
‘artificial’ or a ‘conventional’ creation.” (Saunders, in Aristotle, Politics, p. 56) Significantly, 
empirical narratives challenged the classical distinction between liberal and illiberal men; whereas 
Aristotle distinguished between liberal (theoretical) and illiberal (practical) thinkers, Locke conflated 
the two forms of knowledge into one. (Aristotle, Rhetoric, pp. 139-140) See Saunders, introduction to 
Aristotle, Politics, pp. 26, 56; Aristotle, The Rhetoric, pp. 139-140; Copleston, I, pp. 20, 82-83,219; 
Saunders, introduction to Plato, Laws, pp. 20-24. For a further discussion of the Sophists, and their
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narratives came under pressure to reconcile gaps between theory and practice, the 
opportunity for alternatives increased. For example, if in theory the capacity for 
public office turned on a capacity for civic virtue (as measured by disinterested 
reason), in practice it turned on a capacity for leisure. In the absence of state 
subsidies, virtue became conflated with a leisured independence conditioned upon 
birth and wealth.27 As a result, the relationship between virtue and independence was 
inverted; whereas in theory one’s independence was a measure of one’s virtue, in 
practice one’s virtue was a measure of one’s independence. In the end, men of birth 
and wealth were presumed more virtuous—more “aristocratic”—than those of modest 
birth and property. Ultimately, it was this conflation between virtue and leisure which 
made the classical standard for identity so complementary to the objectives of a later 
generation of British elites: the model classical citizen was the well-to-do 
gentleman.28
Significantly, empiricism’s denial of intelligible fixed truths implied a like 
denial of absolute standards. This suggested not only that identity was artificial, fluid,
condemnation by Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, see Copleston, I, pp. 20, 82-95, 98,104-105,243, 111- 
112, 342,351-352,357.
27 Aristotle did not ignore the relationship between birth, wealth, and reason, for, as he wrote, the 
“upper groups will always be superior in education and ability....” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 194) Rather, 
he insisted that “something more is needed besides: I mean justice, and the virtue that is proper to 
citizens.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 208) This required a particular kind of leisure; unlike “play,” which 
“belong[ed] rather to the sphere of work,” leisure was an “elevated” intellectual activity “worthy of 
free men.. .’’(Aristotle, Politics, pp. 456-457) As Plato similarly described it, leisure was “a life devoted 
to the cultivation of every physical perfection and every moral virtue....” (Plato, Laws, p. 297) Hence, 
Aristotle concluded, “the virtue of a citizen cannot be ascribed to everyone, nor yet to free men alone, 
but simply to those who are relieved of necessary tasks.” (Aristotle, Politics, p. 184) See Aristotle, 
Politics, pp. 194, 208,454-476; Aristotle, The Rhetoric, p. 48; Plato, Laws, pp. 297, 327; Niccolo 
Machiavelli, The Discourses, ed. and intro. Bernard Crick, trans. Leslie J. Walker, rev. Brian 
Richardson (New York: Penguin Books (1970), 1998), p. 451.
28 Indeed, Saunders suggests, “gentleman” and “citizen” were interchangeable; “The chief aim of a 
gentleman’s, that is, a citizen’s education is to enable him to enjoy his intellectual and artistic faculties 
to the full, to live a life o f ‘virtue’ and o f ‘leisure’....” See Aristotle, Politics, p. 455.
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and distinct from an ‘authentic’ singular self—a circumstance which conduced to the 
mediaeval split between the internal and external self—but, more radical still, that it
• • 29  *was bom of—and conditioned upon—relative social interests. Such a suggestion 
was not without risks. Indeed, William Hogarth’s The Painter and his Pug (Fig. 1-1; 
1745; oil on canvas, 35-7/16 x 27-1/2 inches; Tate Britain) hints at the implications 
attendant social relativism. His portrait-within-a-portrait format uses spatial 
juxtapositions—that between the ‘fictional’ portrait and the ‘real’ Pug, for example— 
to highlight the specious nature of imag[in]ed realities and identities. One has only to 
compare the viewer’s space with Trump’s to know that the pug’s space, too, is ‘false’ 
and our own position uncertain.
29 See Andrew Benjamin, “Figuring self-identity: Blanchot’s Bataille,” in Other than identity: the 
subject, politics and art, ed. Juliet Steyn (New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 9.
30 Plato described this as being “deceived in one’s own mind about realities,” a condition attendant 
convention narratives, which made men “the victim of falsehood and ignorance.” (Plato, Republic, p. 
79) As David Bindman notes, Hogarth’s portrait-within-a-portrait “conceit points wittily to the paradox 
inherent in the painting of reality.” (Bindman, Hogarth, p. 151) As Bindman likewise adds: “The threat 
of a Scottish invasion in 1745 also encouraged defiant displays o f patriotism, and it is surely significant 
that the great self-portrait painting, The Painter and his Pug (Tate Gallery), should be dated to the 
same year. Hogarth rests his Active portrait on volumes by great English authors, Shakespeare, Milton 
and Swift, though he omitted these names in the engraving (no. 23). In fact, only the last could be 
considered a major influence on his work to date, so his claim to an exclusively English literary 
ancestry should be treated as little more than patriotic rhetoric.” (Bindman, Hogarth and his Times, pp.
47-48) See Bindman, Hogarth (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), p. 151; Bindman, Hogarth 
and his Times (London: British Museum Press, 1997), pp. 47-48; Plato, Republic, pp. 79-80, 85-86.
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Hogarth’s image is useful for two reasons. On the one hand, it reminds us that
the implications of social relativism dogged civic humanism well into the modem
period; as Baumeister notes, “rejection of the legitimacy of the traditional, stable
political and social order led to a troubled recognition of the pervasive conflict
1 1
between the individual and society.” On the other hand, however, it suggests an 
awareness of the problems attendant these narrative inconsistencies. It was this 
awareness that invited the development of alternative narratives. But it was also this
31 Baumeister, p, 59. For Plato, any “division of purpose” caused people to “wrong each other” and to 
erode the justice upon which a harmonious and stable society depended. Hence, once empirical 
narratives permitted the individual to define his own purpose, conflict was inevitable. See Plato, The 
Republic, p. 38.
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awareness that nurtured the development of alternative narratives supportive o f more 
desirable identities,3Z The result was instability; as identities were most stable when 
the relationship between ideology and experience was deemed natural and ‘fixed’, so 
they lost that stability when the standards of reality became mutable and uncertain.
As Horn mi K. Babba suggests, imperial powers were particularly vulnerable; 
governed by narratives supportive of inequality, they struggled to defend their
33narrative legitimacy in the face of opposing pressure.
Perceptions of the origin, purpose, and end of society thus affected the 
interpretation of identity. Once gaps emerged between perception and prescription, 
once language was used to ‘name’ and, so, ‘define’ an alternative reality, there arose 
new opportunities for describing the self.34 All of this bore relevance for portraiture; 
as Richard Brilliant aptly notes: “Conflicting views on the nature of personal identity 
have confounded the very concept of the portrait as a significant genre of 
representation because they affect the answer to a basic question presented by art 
works of this kind: ‘Who is the who that is being represented?”’35
32 This occurred, Baumeister argues, because people “began to be chronically dissatisfied with the 
identities society had given them.” See Baumeister, p. 170.
Inequality was characteristic of imperialism, which was fueled by the demand for property and, as 
Rousseau observed, “nascent inequality” is one of “the main effects o f property.” (Rousseau, A 
Discourse on Inequality, p. 119) According to Homi K. Bhabha, in colonial identity-making, ‘fixity’ 
functions to order individuals according to their ‘differences’. This has the advantage of subverting 
differences to the interests of the colonizer. See Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations 
o f Inequality among Men (1755) (New York: Penguin Putnam Inc., 1984), p. 119; Homi K. Bhabha, 
“The other question,” Screen, 24 (6), Nov.-Dee. 1983, p. 23, quoted in Gange, “Beyond Identity? The 
Beyond in Beyond Japan,” p. 209; Taylor, p. 20.
34 Once experience no longer corresponds with received ideas, or received ideas no longer complement 
practice, practices or ideas are modified. As Benjamin notes, this “necessitated... another thinking of 
identity....” (Benjamin, “Figuring self-identity,” pp. 28-29) See Benjamin, “Figuring self-identity,” pp. 
9-10, 16, 28-29; Canfield, p. 1-10, 32; Taylor, pp. 204-205.
35 See Brilliant, Portraiture, pp. 13-15. Whereas Aristotle described “Character” as the moral matter of 
the individual—as that which “makes us ascribe certain moral qualities to the agents”—and, hence, as 
the signifier o f moral quality, Baumeister highlights contemporary ambiguities: “The differing usages
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For Plato and Aristotle—who deemed society the natural venue of self- 
actualization, who considered identity a singular representation of the individual’s 
virtue vis-a-vis the final, universal ideal and, so, as a measure of one’s location on the 
road to perfect virtue, who held virtue and vice as properly represented by modes of 
painting as by modes of government, and, hence, for whom each type of government 
necessarily endorsed accompanying aesthetic standards—, the ‘best’ portrait was the 
aesthetic complement to the aristocratic ideal; lesser minds, with their more limited 
understanding of reality, necessarily embraced inferior forms of government and 
inferior aesthetic standards.
Ultimately, then, classicism endorsed parallel social and stylistic hierarchies: 
as society descended from the virtuous and intellectual aristocrat to the interested and 
ignorant laborer, so portraiture descended from the philosophical to the mechanical, 
from the general to the particular, from the beautiful to the ugly—from the heroic to
■27
the graceful to the conversational to the comic. In the end, a portrait’s success
of the term ‘identity’ by social scientists reflect an imprecise understanding of identity even among 
researchers.” (Baumeister, Identity: Cultural Change and the Struggle for Self, p. 3; Aristotle, The 
Poetics, in Corbett, p. 231) See Aristotle, The Poetics, in The Rhetoric and the Poetics o f  Aristotle, ed. 
W. Rhys Roberts, intro. Edward P. J. Corbett (New York: Random House, Inc. (1954), 1984), pp. 231, 
242; Baumeister, p. 3.
35 Thus, Saunders writes, “‘correct’ artistic standards” demanded that “art should portray ‘good’ men 
attractively and ‘bad’ men unattractively.” (Saunders, in Plato, Laws, p. 83) As Plato described it (and 
Reynolds later observed), those styles based on ornament and variety were symptomatic of ignorance. 
(Plato, Laws, p. 109) A true knowledge of art thus required an education in Taste— in the virtuous 
standards of truth. In the end, it was assumed, only the aristocrat might judge. For a further discussion, 
see Aristotle, The Poetics, pp. 224-225; Aristotle, Politics, p. 224; Plato, Laws, p. 83, 154; Copleston,
I, pp. 200, 259-260.
37 The hierarchy of styles was informed by the need to fix the standards of virtue and vice through 
visual standards of beauty. “That Plato regarded beauty as objectively real, is beyond all question... [;] 
all beautiful things are beautiful in virtue of their participation in the universal Beauty.... The obvious 
consequence of such a doctrine is that there are degrees of beauty... [;] beautiful things will 
approximate more or less to this objective norm.” (Copleston, I, p. 254) Although Aristotle says that 
the beautiful is not the same as the good, it is clear that both derive from a rational love o f truth—from 
“order and symmetry and definiteness.” (Copleston, I, p. 359) The result was a classical standard of 
ideal beauty complementary with the standards of reason and virtue. This was likewise supported by
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turned on its proper rendering of ‘correct’ narrative principles.38 Hence the origins of 
the “grand-style” portrait as the visual metaphor of the neoclassical identity. 
However, by the eighteenth century, the content and context of portrait images was 
being informed by a rich legacy of philosophical opinions.39 The next three chapters 
will examine their influence on developing British narratives.
Augustine. (Copleston, I, p. 360) See Copleston, I, pp. 254,359-360; Augustine, The Nature o f the 
Good, 3, and The True Religion, 30.55-56, in The Essential Augustine, ed. Vemon J. Bourke 
(Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1964-1974), pp. 49, 134.
jS On this premise there emerged a hierarchy of styles descending from the heroic to the indecent. For 
Plato, the hierarchy ran from the “pyrrhic” style, divided into the “heroic” and the “graceful”—a style 
taken up in the eighteenth century by Richardson, who called it “greatness” and “grace”—to the comic, 
what Aristotle described as the lower “iambic” style of “life” and “conversation.” (Plato, Laws, p. 307; 
Aristotle, Poetics, pp. 227-228,258) Significantly, however, Plato and Aristotle understood different 
interpretations of imitation: for Plato it was mimetic and, therefore, mechanical; for Aristotle, it was an 
abstraction and, therefore, philosophical. Hence a portrait likeness might represent either the universal 
or the particular and, thereby, reflect a higher or lower ideological standard. (Copleston, vol. I, pp. 
360-362) See Plato, Laws, pp. 83-84, 108, 307-308; Aristotle, The Poetics, pp. 227-228,258,260; 
Copleston, I, pp. 360-368; Jonathan Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting (London, 1715), 
pp. 161-163, 175, 177; Carol Gibson-Wood, Jonathan Richardson: Art Theorist o f the English 
Enlightenment (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 163, 169-171.
39 The eighteenth-century artist-theorist Jonathan Richardson, for example, although he did not assume 
a high level of art knowledge among his readers, did intend his work for “a literate public that was 
abreast of current British philosophical and theological” writings, “particularly the writings of John 
Locke and his followers.” (Gibson-Wood, p. 181) Indeed, Gibson-Wood argues, Richardson’s writings 
suggest not only his own “familiarity with the fundamentals o f Lockean philosophy, which had by 1715 
been popularized by writers like Addison,” but “his expectation that his readers were likewise 
informed.” (Gibson-Wood, p. 147) See Gibson-Wood, Jonathan Richardson, pp. 147, 181.
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CHAPTER II 
NARRATIVE CONFLICTS
Eighteenth-centuxy British narratives included a selective blending of ancient, 
mediaeval, Renaissance and early modem theories. The purpose of the next three 
chapters is to indicate the scope of narrative possibilities which arose from this 
blending and their relevance for the imag[in]ing of identity in eighteenth-century 
Britain and America. In order to provide for a richer deconstruction of eighteenth- 
century portraits in Part n, these chapters give particular attention to those ideas 
thought to have dominated the period.
According to Frederic Copleston,1 the post-ancient period was marked by a 
classical revival that is best understood in two parts: a pre-Aristotelian phase, based 
primarily on the neo-Platonism of Roman Patriarchs like St. Augustine;2 and an 
Aristotelian phase, in which the writings of Aristotle were assimilated into Christian 
thought in tandem with ideas from Islamic and Jewish thinkers.3 Although
1 These chapters draw heavily on the writings of Frederick Copleston, whose nine-volume history of 
philosophy provides an excellent foundation for interpreting the primary documents of various periods. 
The first six volumes have been used in this paper. See Copleston, A History o f Philosophy, volumes I- 
VI (New York: Doubleday, 1993)
2 Baumeister writes, “Political historians generally agree that medieval social theory was wholly 
dominated by Augustine’s views.” (Baumeister, p. 52) See Baumeister, p. 52; Copleston, II, pp. 9-10; 
and The Essential Augustine, ed. Vernon J. Bourke (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Co., 1964- 
1974).
3 The introduction of Aristotle’s work marked the beginning of the second phase of mediaeval 
philosophy, which witnessed a shift in the balance-of-influence between theology and philosophy, to
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Augustinian neo-Platonism continued to provide the foundation for mediaeval 
philosophy, the introduction of Aristotle’s writings complicated its legacy. In the end, 
classicism continued to provide a structure and language for the organization and 
articulation of Christian thought, but the influence of its content varied considerably, 
often to contrary ends.
In general, medieval thought was based on a selective interpretation of neo- 
Platonism, which provided an effective conduit for advancing Christian beliefs.4 For 
example, both Plato and Augustine regarded soul and body as distinct and separate 
elements, the rational, immortal, and spiritual soul guiding the sensitive, mortal, and 
material body during historical, temporal life.5 In addition, however, by bending and 
extending the parameters of neo-Platonism, Plato’s perfect, impersonal Good became 
the point-of-departure for explaining Augustine’s perfect and personal God; on 
grounds of Plato’s necessary perfection, manifest in his exemplary Form of the 
Good—that from which the essence of goodness found in lesser forms necessarily 
emanated—, Augustine could defend the notion of a necessarily perfect Being—that 
by whom all lesser beings are lovingly created and on whom those beings necessarily 
depended.6 This served as the foundation for Augustine’s Holy Trinity, a single God
the latter’s advantage. In general, Aristotle’s writings were integrated into the university system by the 
mid-thirteenth century. Copleston refers to this period as one of “constructive synthesis.” (Copleston, 
II, p. 9) See Copleston, II, pp. 9-10,208,211, and III, pp. I, 414.
4 Copleston, II, pp. 1, 5-6, and ID, p. 7.
5 Lee concludes, it is “the general philosophical and religious conviction o f the Republic that the 
temporal is only the shadow of the eternal, and that the human soul is responsible not simple to itself 
but to God.” See Lee, in Plato, Republic, p. xl.
6 As Augustine writes, “The highest good... is God.... All other good things are only from Him....” 
(Augustin, The Nature o f the Good, I, in Bourke, p. 48) Indeed, Lee notes, “The vision of the form of 
the good is not entirely dissimilar to what others have called the vision of God.” (Lee, introduction to 
Plato, Republic, pp. xxxix-xl) In keeping with Plato, Augustine understood God/ goodness to have 
created society by way of rationes seminales, original “seeds” or ideas. {Literal Commentary on 
Genesis, IX, 17.31, and IV, 3.7, in Bourke, pp. 103-105) As Bourke describes it, these seeds were
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composed of three persons: the Godhead or Father, source of the Divine Ideas or 
Essences—the rationes seminales of universal truth;7 Christ (the neo-Platonic Nous) 
or The Word (Logos), by which the divine ideas were impressed on the human soul; 
and the Holy Spirit or Grace, the medium of final cause—that eternal happiness/ 
goodness (as opposed to temporal classical virtue) manifest in reunion with God.9
The Augustinian narrative thus blended the philosophy of Platonism with the 
theology of Christianity, subordinating the reason of the former to the revelation of 
the latter in a manner conducive to lower (temporal and active) and higher (eternal 
and contemplative) realities.10 Significantly, however, this dual reality—one natural,
informed by three principles which guided the “development and movement of living things”: measure, 
affiliated with mind and being; number, “a sort of metaphysical determinant”; and weight, that which 
propels natures towards their “appointed ends.” (Bourke, p. 99) For further discussion on the 
relationship between God and the Good, see Augustine, The Nature o f the Good, 1-25, in Bourke, pp.
48-57; Copleston, I, pp. 190-193, 350.
' Augustine refers to Plato’s Ideas as the “primary forms” or “immutable reasons of real things... 
contained in the divine intelligence.” He adds: “these primary reasons... are true because they are 
eternal...; and it is by participation in these that whatever exists is produced, however its way of 
existing may be.” (Augustine, Eighty-three Different Questions, 46.2, in Bourke, pp. 62-63) These are 
comparable to Augustine’s rationes seminales—what Copleston calls “germs of things or invisible 
powers or potentialities, created by God in the beginning... and developing into the objects of various 
species by their temporal unfolding....” (Copleston, II, p. 76) These “essences or rationes of things are 
present in the divine mind from all eternity as the divine ideas... [;] in the De Ideis he explains that the 
divine ideas are ‘certain archetypal forms or stable and unchangeable reasons of things, which were not 
themselves formed by are contained in the divine mind eternally and are always the same... ’
(Copleston, II, p. 73) See Copleston, II, pp. 73, 76, and III, pp. 49-50; Augustine, On the Trinity, III, 
8.13, and Eighty-three Different Questions, 46.2, in Bourke, pp. 62-63, 102-103.
8 Augustine, On Psalm 32, Serm. 3, 16, in Bourke, p. 152. According to Copleston, “This exemplarist 
doctrine was, of course, influenced by neo-Platonic theory, according to which the Platonic exemplary 
ideas are contained in Nous, though for Augustine the ideas are contained in the Word, who is not a 
subordinate hypostasis, like the neo-Platonic Nous, but the second Person o f the Blessed Trinity, 
consubstantial with the Father. From Augustine the doctrine of exemplarism passed to the Middle 
Ages....” See Copleston, II, p. 73.
9 Augustine, On Admonition and Grace, 2.3, in Bourke, p. 176. For Augustine, grace was the agent by 
which free will was transformed into pure liberty, the commitment to goodness without evil that arose 
from a love of God. This required faith. Thomas Aquinas shared Augustine’s interpretation of perfect 
happiness and freedom as arising from a knowledge and union with God. See Augustine, Retractions,
I, 9.2-4, On the Grace o f Christ, 26.27, City o f God, XXI, 15-16, Enchiridion, 30-32, in Bourke, pp. 
175-183; Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, I-II, Qu. 3,8, in Sigmund, p. 42; Copleston, II, pp. 31-39, 
42-43.
10 Augustine wrote: “the study of wisdom consists in action and contemplation, so that one part of it 
may be called active, and the other contemplative—the active part having reference to the conduct of
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material and temporal, the other supernatural, spiritual and eternal—was joined with a 
Christian narrative of Fall and Redemption that nurtured the specter of moral duality: 
a post-Fall ethic based on the imperfection of civil society; and a post-Redemption 
ethic based on the goodness of eternal life. Christianity thus complicated the balance- 
of-influence between the individual and society. As the relationship between 
individual and State was subverted to the relationship between individual and God, so 
the classical emphasis on public virtue in the civic sphere was properly 
subordinated-—at least in theory—to the Christian emphasis on private goodness in 
the realm of salvation.11
This shift in the balance-of-influence between the individual and society 
implied a like shift in the proper context for identity. As the individual was made
life, that is, to the regulation of morals, and the contemplative part to the investigation into the causes 
of nature and into pure truth....” (City o f God, VIII, 4; in Bourke, p. 136.) On Plato’s example, 
Augustine defined three kinds of philosophy: moral philosophy, “chiefly occupied with action”; natural 
philosophy, “of which the object is contemplation”; and rational philosophy, “which discriminates 
between the true and false.” (Augustine, City o f God, VIII, 4, in Bourke, p. 136) He did not 
acknowledge a metaphysical realm in the Aristotelian sense of an extra-physical reality, but he did 
define three realms of existence—divine, psychic and corporeal. Man occupied the middle realm, 
between the realm of eternal truth and goodness and temporal ignorance and privation. It was up to 
each man to choose his direction—to look upward towards the divine or downward towards 
corporeal—sinful—life. Thomas Aquinas made a similar observation. See Augustine, Questions for 
Simplicianus, I, 2.18, Letter 18, to Coelestinus, City o f God, VIII, 4-6, in Bourke, pp. 43-45, 58-60, 
136; Aquinas, The Summa Against the Gentiles, Book III, Chapters 3 ,25,27, 32, 37, 48, in Sigmund, 
pp. 6-8; Copleston, II, pp. 428-429.
11 Augustine’s emphasis on sin as the background of human society after the Fall led him to cast 
temporal life in negative terms, its only goodness arising from Christ’s sacrifice for man’s salvation.
For Augustine, the purpose of civil society was to protect the individual from the sins of others until 
salvation was attained. This caused him to make a more marked distinction between the secular and 
sacred spheres than had the ancients. Plato and Aristotle looked upon temporal society as an integral 
part of man’s advancement towards eternal goodness and potentiality and, therefore, as in itself ‘good’. 
It also permitted certain inconsistencies in his thought to stand as dualities rather than conflicts. For 
example, Augustine accepted that a hierarchical order was necessary in the secular realm in order to 
maintain peace and stability, but he did not consider such distinctions divine in origin. While Plato had 
recognized that temporal society fell short of the ideal, even though the laws of the ideal necessarily 
informed temporal life, Augustine believed that divine laws—and, so, the ideal—were suited to man 
only after salvation. As a result, the principles informing the ideal were not necessarily applicable to 
man’s temporal state. Nonetheless, Augustine’s position on natural equality provided important 
material for later Reformed Christians. See Taylor, pp. 47-49; Plato, Republic, p. 188.
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responsible for his own self-realization, so he became the agent of his own goodness. 
Hence the Christian emphasis on ‘will’ as the highest faculty of the human soul.12 
As Augustine explained it, though the will was naturally directed towards the good, it 
required the voluntary action of the individual to nurture its progress, an action 
compatible with the higher ideals of reason impressed upon man by God.13 This 
made the individual an agent in his own identity.
In practice, however, the potential for individual self-determination was 
tempered by the implications attendant the Fall and the need for a well-governed 
State.14 For Augustine, if the totality of individuals in the State governed themselves 
according to those temporal virtues conducive to eternal good, society would attain 
happiness, but if the people succumbed to worldly desires, society would suffer from 
privation and evil. Hence, the Christian State was rightfully ordered—and its people 
aptly judged—according to intelligible eternal standards informing man’s final, 
supernatural end.15 Indeed, Augustine’s belief in harmonious order, coupled with his
12 According to Augustine, our progress towards perfection comes from God’s gift of free will received 
at the time o f Creation. Although all men are naturally inclined towards the good—the final cause 
towards which they are divinely directed—, the determination to act on one’s reason, and thereby 
advance that inclination, was a matter of will. Combined with faith—itself motivated by will—, will 
paves our progress “from the temporal to the eternal.” (Augustine, The True Religion, 24.42, in 
Bourke, p. 32) See Augustine, On the Spirit and the Letter, 34.60, City o f God, V, 9, XII, 6, and XIV, 
6-7, The True Religion, 24.42,29.52-53, in Bourke, pp. 22,32, 60-62, 132-133, 158-160; Copleston,
II, pp. 85-86,285, 288-291.
13 Sin is likewise voluntary. As Copleston explains, man must choose to follow the way of God or, 
alternatively, choose not to; “The will is free to turn away from the immutable Good and to attach itself 
to mutable goods....” (Copleston, II, p. 82) See Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, II-U, Qu. 64,8, in 
Sigmund, p. 81; Copleston, II, p. 82.
14 As the proper end of human life is eternal salvation, so the proper end of temporal society is the City 
of God. In both cases, the pursuit of happiness is the pursuit of goodness—the pursuit of God. See 
Augustine, Confessions, 20.29, The True Religion, 7.13, and City o f  God, XIX, 23-24, in Bourke, pp. 
209-211; Copleston, II, 87-90.
15 According to Augustine, God is the highest standard by which all else is judged; He is “the highest 
good.” See Augustine, The Nature o f the Good, 22, in Bourke, p. 55.
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fear of social instability, resulted in his support for fixed social ranks.16 The 
implications of self-determination nonetheless remained (however dormant).
Although Augustine restricted self-determination to the eternal sphere, thereby 
lim iting its implications for civic identities, he planted the seed for a later generation 
of Reformed thinkers.17
The duality of Augustine’s narrative—its notion of separate higher and lower 
realms—continued to characterize the philosophy of his followers.18 And although it 
did not, of necessity, point to moral duality, the credibility of a single, fixed moral 
standard depended on certain assumptions. Augustine assumed that, by virtue of the 
rationes seminales impressed on the human soul during Creation, the eternal 
standards governing perfect goodness were temporally intelligible through internal 
contemplation and, therefore, that man might reason the fixed standards of 
harmonious order informing society and, by extension, the standards of human virtue 
and identity. In fact, the intelligibility of eternal laws informing final cause was 
essential to Augustine’s theory insofar as it was through divine illumination of this
16 Baumeister writes: “The medieval Christian believed the social hierarchy to be fixed and legitimate. 
St. Augustine had written that God assigned to each person a definite place in the community.” 
(Baumeister, p. 52.) This supported the notion o f harmonious order; according to Augustine, proper 
ranks “tend in the divine providence to that end which is embraced in the general scheme of the 
government of the universe... producing that which was designed to be their result.. . (Augustine, City 
of God, XII, 4, in Bourke, p. 101) See Augustine, City of God, XII, 4 and XIX, 13, in Bourke, pp. 101, 
216-218.
17 In theory, Augustine opened the way for a self-determined identity; that the capacity for truth was 
equal among men, that grace was the true mark of privilege: both opened the way for the lowest bom to 
assume the highest ranks of identity. In practice, however, “the earlier medieval concept of virtue 
[which] included fulfilling the tasks and duties o f one’s station in society... [meant] the person was 
equated with the social roles...[and, therefore,] in order to fulfill one’s potential, one had to do the 
tasks assigned by society to him or her.” See Baumeister, p. 56.
18 Roger Bacon, for example, distinguished two kinds of moral philosophy, one governing the actions 
of men in relationship with other men, and one governing the actions o f men in their relationship with 
God. See Copleston, II, p. 447.
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intelligence that man came to know the existence of God.19 On these grounds, a 
singular perfect goodness linking temporal with eternal became the necessary 
corollary of a singular perfect reason linking man with God. By the same token, that 
which was less than good reflected the absence of reason—the sensory instincts 
belonging to a lower realm of existence.20 In the end, Augustine crafted a hierarchy 
of morality and intelligence in which identity was necessarily implicated: as morality 
ascended from interest to virtue, as knowledge ascended from the particularities of 
sensory experience, to the speculations of reason (scientia), to the authority of 
‘wisdom’, so too did the individual ascend from ignorance and vice to wisdom and 
virtue.21
Ultimately, then, the standards shaping identity and social order turned on the 
relationship between knowledge and virtue. As long as knowledge—the by-product 
of contemplation and divine illumination—and virtue—the by-product of divine 
goodness—were deemed perfect corollaries, knowledge was the necessary standard of
19 Augustine, On Free Choice, II, 39-41, Confessions, VII, 10.16-11.17, in Bourke, pp. 124-128. One 
had to be “illuminated” by the divine light in order to see the truth impressed on the human soul during 
Creation. In the process, one came to know the existence o f God. Later Christian thinkers responded 
differently to Augustine’s doctrine of illumination. See Copleston, II, pp. 63-65, 68.
20 Copleston, II, pp. 381, 398-402,405,407-411, and III, pp. 104-106.
zl As Copleston remarks, “There is one true ‘philosophy’ or wisdom, which is attained adequately only 
through Christian revelation, though Greek philosophers divined something o f the truth.” (Copleston,
II, p. 19) On this premise, Augustine conceived of an a priori access to virtue in the form of 
illumination, “that natural light by which [the mind] can recognise truth and rectitude;” illumination is 
the means by which the soul “apprehend[s] ...the rationes aeternae [which] are ... in fact identical with 
the Word of God.” (Copleston, II, p. 288-289) This is the higher reason of sapientia derived from faith- 
based illumination. As Augustine described it, one has to think in order to believe, but one also has to 
believe in order know God. Ultimately, Augustine described three levels of understanding in terms of 
an ascending order of vision: the sensory (sight); the spiritual (image); and the intellectual 
(understanding). Aquinas likewise distinguished between speculative and practical reason, the former 
conducing to the understanding of first principles, the latter to good judgments. Aquinas also spoke of 
light, but he confined its purpose to the vision of God. See Augustine, On the Trinity, XV, 12.21, 
Predestination o f the Saints, 5, On Free Choice, II, 6, The True Religion, 3.3, Literal Commentary on 
Genesis, XII, 6.15, 31.59, in Bourke, pp. 19, 22-23,25, 34,47-48, 53, 93-94, 97; Aquinas, Summa
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identity—of virtue.22 By the twelfth century, however, a growing uncertainty about 
the nature and lim itation s of human knowledge was undermining this standard. This 
surfaced as a debate over particular and universal ideas: how is the knowledge of 
particulars (which exist outside the mind as material things) translated into a 
knowledge of general principles (which exist inside the mind as universal concepts) 
and, indeed, can universal concepts be said to exist if they have no objective existence 
in reality?23 This raised doubts about the nature and extent of human knowledge: was 
certain truth, in fact, intelligible by any means other than revelation? And, if not, if 
internal contemplation could not yield even a handful of certain truths, on what 
grounds could one claim the perfect link between knowledge and virtue? Such
24questions threatened the standards of identity and social order. For example, was 
there a difference between civic virtue—the public attribute of the temporal sphere— 
and goodness—the private attribute of the eternal sphere? Could the public virtues of 
the civic man be said to reflect the personal virtues of the good Christian?25 And, if
Against the Gentiles, II, 53, The Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 79,12, and I-II, Qu. 62, 3, in Sigmund, 
pp. 9, 35-36; Copleston, II, pp. 19,48-51, 225,288-289, III, pp. 5-7.
22 According to Copleston, the ascending stages o f the soul, from the vegetative to the sensitive to the 
intellectual state—the latter being composed of a lower, sensory aspect and a higher, intelligible 
aspect—and ultimately to the will, represented “different potentialities’ in the progress from nature to 
grace. According to Lee, the elision between knowledge and virtue had roots in the Greek definition of 
‘wisdom’, which “had a strong ethical meaning.” (Lee, introduction to Plato, Republic, p. xv) See 
Copleston, II, p. 427; Lee, in Plato, Republic, p. xv; Ross, Aristotle, p. 76.
23 “In other words,” Copleston continues, “objects outside the mind are individual, whereas concepts 
are general, universal in character, in the sense that they apply indifferently to a multitude of 
individuals. But, if  extramental objects are particular and human concepts universal, it is clearly of 
importance to discover the relation holding between them... [;] if these terms have no foundation in 
extramental reality,... science is an arbitrary construction, which has no relation to reality.”
(Copleston, II, p. 139) See Copleston, II, pp. 139, 150-151, 153, 389.
24 As God creates man according to His universal idea of man, so likeness becomes the expression of 
this idea. For example, Copleston writes, “The likeness of humanity is abstracted from individual men, 
and this likeness, considered by the mind, is the idea of the species....” (Copleston, II, p. 138)
25 According to Aquinas, “every human act that is good or bad is meritorious or lacking in merit in 
relation to God by virtue o f the act itself,” not “in relation to the political community.” (Aquinas, 
Summa o f Theology, I-II, Qu. 21,4, in Sigmund, p. 43) Machiavelli’s Prince and Discourses, on the
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not, was the personal worth of the good Christian made manifest in the character of 
the civic man and, if so, how?
If the first phase of mediaeval thought envisioned a universal reality made 
fully intelligible by divine Grace and partially intelligible by philosophical 
contemplation, the second phase witnessed a more neo-Aristotelian interpretation of 
revelation and reason.26 Whereas Augustine had argued that certain truth was 
possible only by a divine illumination of the rationes seminales—the seeds of reason 
implanted in man for his contemplation during his progress towards perfect 
goodness—, and, hence, insofar as God was the only source of “illumination,” His 
was the only active intellect, Aquinas, accepting the Aristotelian interpretation of the 
human intellect, granted man both active and passive intellectual capacities.27 On the
other hand, wholly dispensed with Christian virtue as unsuited to the political sphere. As Pocock 
described it, “There is one theological problem here, and one philosophical. Does the republic 
substitute itself for Christ’s kingdom, thus subverting the existence of any church distinct from political 
society? Both Hobbes and Harrington seem to have looked on Christ as returning to restore the 
theocracy God had exercised in Israel.... For Hobbes the political form o f this theocracy had been 
monarchy, but for Harrington it had been a republic....” (Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The 
Commonwealth o f Oceana, p. xxii) See Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-1I, Qu. 21,4, in Sigmund, p. 
43; Pocock, introduction to James Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, in The Commonwealth 
o f Oceana and a System o f Politics (1656), ed. J. G. A. Pocock (New York: Cambridge University 
Press (1992), 1999), p. xxii; Grafton, introduction to Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, intro. Anthony 
Grafton, rev. George Bull (London and New York: Penguin Books, (1961) 1999), p. xxi; Crick, 
introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 63; Machiavelli, The Discourses, Disc. 111.28, in Crick, 
p. 482.
26 According to Copleston, the influence of Augustinian neo-Platonism was extended into the Middle 
Ages by thinkers like Boethius, whose De Consolatione Philosophiae distinguished between the 
dogmatic theology of neo-Platonic revelation and the natural theology of Aristotelian philosophy. By 
the ninth century, Charlemagne was encouraging the establishment of monastic schools structured 
around Aristotle’s seven liberal arts. According to Copleston, John Scotus produced “the first great 
system of the Middle Ages” based on a reconciliation of “the categories and modes of thought and 
ideas which former writers had bequeathed to him...[J moulding them into a system.” (Copleston, II, p. 
112) See Copleston, II, pp. 101-133.
2' Unlike Plato, who located the soul in the realm of the intelligences external to the body, Aristotle 
located the soul in man and made the “active intellect” the source of human progress. (Copleston, I, p. 
331) Drawing, in part, on Plato, Augustine argued that “the soul is illumined, in order that it may see 
and truly understand everything, either in itself or in the light. For the light is God himself, whereas the 
soul is a creature; Yet, since it is rational and intellectual, it is made in His image.” (Augustine, Literal 
Commentary on Genesis, XII, 31.59, in Bourke, p. 97) Aquinas also spoke of light, but he confined its
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one hand, the “passive” intellect received the particularities of a material object as a 
sensory experience and, transmitting that reception to the mind, created a visual 
image or “likeness.” On the other hand, this likeness might be received by the 
“active” intellect, which translated the image into a universal idea from which axioms 
might ultimately be deduced—axioms which, when combined, fostered our 
knowledge of universal reality and efficient cause. By this means, Aquinas 
transformed universal ideas into the potential by-product of the active intellect’s 
abstraction of co m m on essences in particular things.28 On the one hand, this served 
to relocate the soul in the body—a circumstance indicative of the philosophical shift- 
in-influence from Plato to Aristotle—and, thereby, to make man a ‘whole’ and 
autonomous—if imperfect—being. On the other hand, by shifting the emphasis from 
contemplation and illumination to observation and contemplation, it served to restore 
the link between knowledge and virtue: the closer the individual approached to
7 Q
perfect knowledge the closer he approached to perfect goodness.
purpose to the vision of God. (Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, II, 53, in Sigmund, p. 9) Thomas 
Aquinas located the source of divine light directly in the intellect and, thereby, deemed the theory of 
illumination redundant; according to Aquinas, who adopted an a posteriori method of reasoning, the 
existence of God might be proved in five ways: by “the argument of motion,” which Aristotle employed 
in the form of Unmoved Mover, “from the nature of an efficient cause,” which derived from Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics, V, 2; on the basis o f “possibility” and “necessity”; on the principle o f gradation—there 
being a lower, there must be a highest; and on the evidence o f “order... in the universe.” (Aquinas, The 
Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 2,3, in Sigmund, pp. 30-32) See Copleston, I, p. 331, and II, p. 225; 
Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis, XII, 31.59, in Bourke, p. 97; Aquinas, Summa Against the 
Gentiles, II, 53, The Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 2,3, in Sigmund, pp. 9. 30-32.
28 According to Aquinas, “The human intellect... is able to know the form that exists individually in 
corporeal matter... by abstracting the form from individual matter as it is represented by sensory 
images.” (Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 85,1, in Sigmund, p. 36) Hence, he continues, “to 
understand humanity apart from individual conditions, that is, .. .to universalize it, humanity must be 
perceived by the intellect as the likeness of the typical nature, not o f the individual men.” (Aquinas,
The Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 85,2, in Sigmund, pp. 36-37) See Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, 
I-I, Qu. 85,1-2, in Sigmund, pp. 36-37; Copleston, II, pp. 189-190, 197-199, 201-204, 389-390.
29 As Aquinas wrote, “since all knowledge that a person has about a thing is based on his understanding 
of its substance (according to the Philosopher [Aristotle]...), in this life all knowledge that is in our
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As a result of Aristotle’s influence, St. Albert the Great (1206-1280) and, 
more notably, St. Thomas Aquinas broke from Augustine, emphasizing empirical 
observation as a necessary component of reason.30 While Aquinas, too, believed that 
morality and reason were informed by eternal law, he added the intermediary context 
of natural law, discernible to man through his participation in, and observation of, the 
external world.31 This was to relocate the source of “realism.” Whereas Augustine’s 
neo-Platonist realism cautioned against the subjective, fluid and, ultimately, imperfect 
knowledge bom of sensory experience,32 and endorsed internal contemplation as the 
proper method for attaining wisdom,33 Aquinas’s neo-Aristotelian realism, while 
continuing to privilege philosophical contemplation as the medium of higher reason, 
grounded knowledge in sense-perception.34
In general, then, a more external and secular approach to the understanding of
intellects originates in the senses.” See Aquinas, The Summa Against the Gentiles, I, 3, in Sigmund, p.
3.
30 Copleston, n, pp. 293-300, 303-306, 310-311.
35 Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, 1-13, Qu. 100, 1, in Sigmund, p. 58. According to Aquinas, 
“Rational creatures... participate in eternal reason in that they have a natural inclination to their proper 
actions and ends. Such participation in the eternal law by rational creatures is called the natural law.” 
(Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, I-I I, Qu. 91, 2, in Sigmund, p. 46) For a further discussion on 
eternal, natural, human and divine laws, see Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, l-II, Qu. 91-109, in 
Sigmund, pp. 46-60.
Augustine calls this process o f internal gazing as seeing “the truth within your own heart.” 
(Augustine, On Free Choice, II, 4; in Bourke, p. 23) As Copleston writes, “Augustine assumed, with 
Plato, that the objects of true knowledge are unchanging, from which it necessarily follows that 
knowledge of changing objects is not true knowledge.” (Copleston, II, pp. 56-57) Sensory knowledge 
was less useful for contemplation because more likely to deceive. See Augustine, On Free Choice, II,
4, On the Trinity, XII, 14.22-15.25 and XV, 12.2, City o f God, VIII, 6, Confessions, 17.23, in Bourke, 
pp. 23, 36-37, 59, 130-131; Copleston, II, pp. 55-61.
33 While holding that the end o f temporal life was eternal life, and that the moral codes of society were 
necessarily prescribed by the eternal laws of God, Augustine did not ground these beliefs in evidence 
drawn from nature. And it was not that God impressed the soul with the standards of truth themselves 
(the ideogenetic viewpoint), or even with a vision of God from which such standards might be deduced 
(the ontological viewpoint), but simply with the necessity of their existence. See Copleston, II, pp. 64, 
71, 139-142, 392, and III, p. 50.
34 Copleston, II, pp. 55-56.
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reality went hand-in-hand with the growing influence of Aristotle and his alternative 
theory of human intellect. Combined, the effect was to generate an alternative 
interpretation of classicism. In general, although all continued to advance those 
fundamental positions consistent with Augustine, Plato and Aristotle—the 
intelligibility of reality, for example, and the notion of a necessary state of perfection 
towards which man progressed and in conformity with which he was necessarily 
designed—, they differed where their mentors likewise differed—as in the 
relationship between body and soul, existence and essence, matter and form, faith and
O f
reason, contemplation and observation, nature and God.
These differences were reflected in the various schools of thought that 
emerged in the thirteenth century.36 For example, whereas the more neo-Platonic 
Augustinians of the Franciscan school continued to locate knowledge in the 
contemplation and illumination of rationes seminales impressed on the human soul 
during Creation, the more neo-Aristotelian Augustinians of the Dominican school 
located knowledge in the observation and contemplation of the external evidence of 
the natural world.37 Similarly, whereas Augustine and the Franciscans adopted a neo- 
Platonic position, holding body/ matter/ existence and soul/ form/ essence to be
35 Copleston, II, p. 424.
36 Initially, Copleston writes, “the prevailing philosophy... was derived from Platonism... and... the 
Platonic tradition continued for long to dominate Christian thought from the philosophic viewpoint.” 
(Copleston, II, p. 14) By the thirteenth-century, however, Augustinianism could be divided into two 
major schools whose differences were informed by a more Platonic or Aristotelian bias. Essentially, 
Franciscans like St. Bonaventure stressed a neo-Platonic tradition whereas Dominicans like St. Albert 
the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas emphasized an Aristotelian view of knowledge. This gap was 
narrowed at the end of the thirteenth century when John Duns Scotus established a neo-Franciscan 
tradition more complementary with Aristotelianism. In general, then, although other schools of thought 
continued to exist, thirteenth-century Scholasticism was dominated by a neo-Aristotelian reconciliation 
of Augustinian and classical influences. See Copleston, II, pp. 14, 213-217,242-243, 245-246,460- 
475.
37 Copleston, III, pp. 416, 418.
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separate entities, the soul or “form” being “pure potentiality” in containing the 
essence of human perfection, the Dominicans sided with Aristotle who, supporting 
the unity of body and soul, concluded that matter, as the medium of change and 
motion, was the primary instrument of self-realization/8 Finally, against Augustine, 
who deemed human society a negative consequence of the Fall, neo-Aristotelian 
Thomists emphasized the positive role of society in the attainment of good, making
* * 39the narrative of Christianity more complementary with classicism.
Thus, by the thirteenth century, a more critical and empirical approach was 
shaping the analysis of knowledge and reality.40 This effected a slightly different 
interpretation of identity: whereas the neo-Platonism of Augustine and the 
Franciscans suggested soul/ form/ essence to be the proper context of being and, so, 
made virtue the by-product of internal contemplation—insofar as the spiritual realm 
of the intelligences was the proper context for understanding the eternal relationship 
between man and God41—, the Dominicans inquired after body/ matter/ existence as
38 Hence Aristotle’s definition of the Unmoved Mover. As Aquinas likewise described it, “the human 
soul needs bodily organs to derive its knowledge from bodily things.” (Aquinas, Summa Against the 
Gentiles, III, 81, in Sigmund, p. 10) By contrast, Augustine held the external soul to move the body 
towards knowledge. (Augustine, Literal Commentary on Genesis, VIII, 20.39, in Bourke, pp. 63-64) 
See Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, III, 81, in Sigmund, p. 10; Augustine, Literal Commentary 
on Genesis, VIII, 20.39, in Bourke, pp. 63-64; Copleston, III, p. 29; Bourke, pp. 67-68.
39 Like Aristotle, Aquinas believed that “man is by nature a political and social animal.” (Aquinas, On 
Kingship, Ch. 1, in Sigmund, p. 14) Society was thus the context for good. But he added to this 
classical vision a Christian emphasis on eternal life: “Now, because the man who lives the life of virtue 
is destined for a higher end which is, as we have said, the enjoyment of the divine, this must also be the 
final end of human society. The final end of organized society then is not [merely] to live the life of 
virtue but through a life of virtue to attain the enjoyment of God.” (Aquinas, On Kingship, Ch. 14, in 
Sigmund, p. 27) See Aquinas, On Kingship, Ch. 1, 14, in Sigmund, pp. 14,27.
40 Like Aristotle before them, the thirteenth-centmy philosophers were more moderate ‘realists’ than 
Augustine had been, basing knowledge of reality on contemplation bom of sense-experience. This 
helped distinguish philosophy from theology. See Copleston, III, pp. 2-3.
41 On the one hand, Franciscans like St. Bonaventure envisioned a unified and harmonious reality 
hierarchically ordered according to the relationship between God and His created beings. Although 
each being was considered equal in essence—its divine origin—, it was necessarily ‘higher’ or ‘lower’ 
by virtue of its capacity for intellectual and moral truth—i.e. its temporal capacity for contemplation
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the proper context for being, making virtue, at least in part, a by-product of action 
insofar as nature was the proper context for understanding the relationship between 
man and God.42 This advanced the role of empirical science as a point-of-departure 
for theological, philosophical and, ultimately, scientific inquiry.43
According to Paul Sigmund, St. Thomas Aquinas was the most influential 
philosopher of the mediaeval period.44 He brilliantly blended Aristotelian and 
Christian doctrines into a credible synthesis that made classicism and Christianity 
compatible,45 reconciling their different visions of society, their different emphases on 
reason and faith, and their different perceptions of the relationship between man and 
God.46 The results were a more moderate realism based on natural law and the
and illumination. (Copleston, II, pp. 271-272,291) This capacity informed the difference between man 
and animals, for example, but it also informed distinctions among men: the more the individual turned 
inward and employed his will to seek out and ascend the scale of goodness towards which his soul was 
naturally directed, the closer he ranked to God and the higher he ascended in the hierarchy of beings. 
(Copleston, II, pp. 266-270, 273, 279) Aquinas shared this vision of universal order based on 
intelligence. (Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, II, 81, in Sigmund, p. 11) A similar idea is found 
in St. Paul’s letter to the Corinthians. ( I Corinthians 12:4-13) See Copleston, II, pp. 266-273,279,
291; Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, n, 81, in Sigmund, p. 11; I Corinthians 12:4-13.
42 Sigmund writes: “Aristotle described a world in which matter and motion were eternally derived by 
inflexible necessity from the potentiality of ‘prime matter’ by a ‘First mover’ whose essential 
characteristic is the uncaused activity o f reason (pure act). Man was described by Aristotle as a 
composite of bodily matter and a rational soul that was its form.” (Sigmund, introduction to Aquinas, p. 
xviii) As Aristotle deemed the First Mover “pure act,” so the active life—what Augustine described as 
the “regulation o f morals” as opposed to “the contemplative part” concerned with “the investigation 
into the causes o f nature and into pure truth....”—became an essential component of Aristotelian 
virtue. (Augustine, City o f God, VIII, in Bourke, p. 136) See Sigmund, introduction to Aquinas, p. 
xviii; Augustine, City o f  God, VIII, in Bourke, p. 136; Copleston, II, pp. 308-309.
43 As Aquinas wrote, “Our natural knowledge begins from the senses. Therefore our natural knowledge 
can only extend as far as it can be led by the objects of the senses.” (Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-I, 
Qu. 12, 12; in Sigmund, p. 32) It is for this reason that a knowledge of God is not possible without 
divine intervention. St. Thomas “recognized the rights and position of philosophy as a rational study 
distinct from theology.” (Copleston, III, p. 415) See Copleston, II, pp. 6-7, 83, and III, p. 415; 
Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 12,12, and I-II, Qu. 62, 3, in Sigmund, pp. 32 and 43.
44 Sigmund, introduction, St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics (New York: W. W. Norton and 
Company, Inc., 1988), p. xiii.
45 Sigmund, introduction, pp. xviv-xix.
46 See Aquinas, The Summa Against the Gentiles, I, 7; in Sigmund, p. 4. See also Sigmund, 
introduction, p. xix.
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elevation of philosophy into a distinct discipline.47 Indeed, by grounding social 
relationships in natural laws made newly accessible by observation, Thomism allowed
48for the examination and resolution of social issues without theological intervention. 
This paved the way for an autonomous, secular State.49
In the end, then, Augustine’s legacy became linked with conflicting 
interpretations of knowledge and virtue and their varying methodologies: while 
Augustine and the Franciscans deemed knowledge to move from efficient to final 
cause—our knowledge of God thus being the point-of-departure for our knowledge of 
the world50— and, therefore, endorsed an a priori method based on internal 
contemplation, St. Thomas and the Dominicans, while admitting man’s implicit 
knowledge of God, located the source of that knowledge in internal contemplation of
47 Both Aristotle and Aquinas argued “for an order and purpose in nature and man that can be 
determined by the study of their structure and development.. . Moreover, whereas the Platonists 
“argued for the real existence of universal Ideas or Forms, apart from individual things,” Aristotle and 
Aquinas argued only for the existence of individual things, from the essence of which universal ideas 
might be abstracted. See Sigmund, introduction, pp. xix-xx.
48 As Sigmund writes, Aquinas crafted “a vision of an objective and purposive order of justice in the 
universe in which reasons and purposes can be found for what we observe in the external world, in 
society, and in man.” (Sigmund, introduction, p. xxvi) Sigmund adds: “Aquinas shares with his mentor, 
Aristotle, a belief in the human capacity to identify goals, values, and purposes (‘teleology’) in the 
structure and functioning of the human person that can provide the basis of a theory of ethics.... His 
Christian belief in the providence o f God and his Aristotelian doctrine of teleology combine to 
convince him that life has meaning, and that that meaning is, at least in part, available to human 
reason.” (Sigmund, introduction, pp. xxvi-xxvii.) See Sigmund, introduction, St. Thomas Aquinas on 
Politics and Ethics, pp. xxvi-xxvii; Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, II, 2-3, 25, in Sigmund, pp. 
6-7.
49 Sigmund, introduction, p. xxi. Whereas Augustine was skeptical of man’s will and capacity to 
pursue virtue in the social sphere—Augustine interpreted temporal history as a battle between the will 
of the Church (goodness) and the will of the State (interest)—, Aquinas adopted the Aristotelian vision 
of progress as the natural course of society.” (Sigmund, introduction, pp. xiii-xiv.) He explains: “The 
teleological outlook o f Aristotle is used to fashion a rational philosophical basis for the Christian belief 
in a purposive and loving Creator. Their combination leads Aquinas to look for an order and harmony 
in human society, politics, and ethics that is free of contradiction, although not of tension....”
(Sigmund, introduction, p. xxvi) See Augustine, City o f God, XIX, 17, and On Psalm 64, 2, in Bourke, 
pp. 203-205; Copleston, II, pp. 289-291; Aquinas, The Summa o f Theology, I-II, Qu. 92,1, in Sigmund, 
p. 47; Sigmund, introduction, St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics, pp. xiii-xiv, xxii, xxvi.
50 Copleston, II, p. 253.
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the external world, thereby endorsing an a posteriori method that moved from the 
evidence of final effect back to efficient cause—from Nature to God.51 This required 
that some element of God—the perfect universal—exist in the material world for 
mental detection. Hence the Thomist emphasis on the real existence of common
* 52essences in particular things.
This difference bears relevance for the study of portraiture. In the study of 
portraits, the issue of knowledge is reflected in the issue of “likeness.” Among 
Thomists, “likeness” was understood to be an expression of the universal idea 
contained in the common essences found in particular things. Franciscans, on the 
other hand, while not denying that “likeness” might capture similarities among things, 
rejected any necessary correlation between these similarities and universal ideas, since 
all sensory knowledge is necessarily singular and, so, particular.53 The importance of 
this difference rests in its intellectual implications for the meaning and value of 
likeness. Among those who subscribed to the Thomist view, a “likeness” might be 
said to advance human knowledge and, so, goodness, by providing an audience with 
universal truths about reality. Among Franciscans, on the other hand, a “likeness” 
might provide little more than the subjective rendering of a particular experience.54 In
51 Aquinas distingui shed this form of knowledge from the perfect truth of revelation acquired upon 
knowledge of God. But man is given “a certain foretaste” of such knowledge by the first principles of 
nature—those which his natural reason recognizes as self-evident and those deduced from self-evident 
principles. See Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, I, 3 and 8, IV, 54, in Sigmund, pp. 3, 5, 12.
52 Copleston, II, pp. 253,258-260, 309-310, 325, 336-346. Augustine and the Franciscans argued that 
universal ideas have only a conceptual existence, without foundation in reality. St. Bonaventure, for 
example, though he differed from Augustine in admitting sensory objects as a source of passive 
sensation, defended the interior source of eternal truth. See Copleston, II, pp. 250-258, 283-284.
53 As Copleston writes, “One can speak of abstracting something ‘common’ from things, if one means 
that one can consider things according to their likeness to one another. But the universality of the 
concept... is superimposed by the mind....” See Copleston, III, pp. 39-40.
54 According to Augustine, likenesses are but images o f memories based on experience—real or 
imagined. See Augustine, Confessions, X, 8.14, in Bourke, p. 79; Copleston, III, pp. 29-33.
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theory, then, whereas a “general” likeness could be interpreted as more valuable than 
a “particular” likeness, insofar as the general expression of a subject might be said to 
equate with a general knowledge of its species and, so, with a knowledge of its 
potentiality and final cause, such an argument would bear relevance only among those 
who subscribed to the intelligibility of reality and located the source of that 
intelligibility in the reasoned contemplation of sense-experience.55
Significantly, this appears to have been the case in Britain.56 Even the 
Franciscan Roger Bacon (d. circa 1292) emphasized the importance of sensory 
observation.57 Indeed, the writings of Roger Bacon mark a stage in the development 
of neo-Franciscan thought that culminated in the consensus of John Duns Scotus (c. 
1265/6 - 1308). Endorsing an Aristotelian view of knowledge, Scotus defended 
scientific demonstration based on observation and experiment as the only method for 
proving God’s existence in the absence of revelation, thereby advocating the a 
posteriori approach endorsed by Thomism in matters of philosophical inquiry.58 At 
the same time, however, while rejecting the Augustinian doctrines of rationes 
seminales and divine illumination, Scotus denied any extramental foundation for 
universal concepts, thereby undermining the value of likeness.59
55 According to Copleston, for example, Francis Suarez endorsed the Thomist theory o f abstracted 
likeness, but whereas neo-Aristotelians understood individuality to derive from distinctions of matter 
(body), Suarez perceived them to derive from differences of form (soul). See Copleston, III, pp. 360- 
361,366-367. For further comparison between Suarez and Thomas, see Copleston, III, pp. 376-378.
56 According to Copleston, the Oxford University curriculum represented “a characteristic mingling of 
the Augustinian tradition with ‘empiricism’....” See Copleston, II, p. 212.
57 Copleston, n, pp. 228-231, 236-238, 442-448, and III, pp. 182-196.
58 Copleston, II, pp. 454, 519-523.
59 Copleston, II, pp. 475, 483, 488, 491, 497, 499, 510-512, 517. For more information about John 
Duns Scotus, see Copleston, II, pp. 476-551.
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In the end, although the debate between the Franciscans and Dominicans60 
was largely theoretical—insofar as the disciplinary distinctions between theology and 
philosophy engendered in the work of Dominicans like Aquinas in no way denied the 
supremacy of revealed truth or fundamental tenets like the intelligibility of reality, the 
necessary relationship between eternal and moral laws, and the necessary perfection 
of the eternal end for which man was divinely intended—, their differences forged a 
gap between philosophy and theology that affected the perception of human intellect 
and identity. Over time, a more critical understanding of the relationship between 
truth—the by-product of wisdom—and reason—the medium of knowledge— 
undermined the credibility of an intelligible supernatural reality; whereas strict 
Franciscans continued to perceive knowledge as deriving from an internal 
contemplation and illumination of the rationes seminales impressed on the human 
soul during Creation, and neo-Aristotelian Dominicans and neo-Franciscan Scotists 
continued to hold that a limited knowledge of reality might derive from a reasoned 
understanding of the external world—neither group denying the primacy of 
contemplation or revelation—, the way was opened for more radical interpretations.61 
Indeed, the neo-Aristotelian emphasis on sensory experience invited a critique of
60 Not all Dominicans were Thomists; some, for example, like James of Metz, held form—rather than 
matter—to be the “principle of individuation,” thereby aligning with the Franciscans. See Copleston, 
III, p. 24.
Dl The Dominican hierarchy of knowledge informed the thought of later philosophers. Machiavelli, for 
example, wrote: “There are three kinds o f intelligence: one kind understands things for itself 
[knowledge], the second appreciates what others can understand [customary authority], the third 
understands neither for itself nor through others [ignorance].” (Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 75) See 
Machiavelli, The Prince, p. 75; Copleston, II, pp. 545-546, 548-550.
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realism that inverted the relationship between contemplation and observation, with
62important implications for identity.
As the interpretation of reality came increasingly to turn on a question of 
knowledge, the Scholastic consensus of the late thirteenth century was weakened. In 
general, Scholastics continued to recognize a realist hierarchy of knowledge 
descending from theology (wisdom based on revealed truths), to philosophy 
(knowledge based on reasoned observation and deduction), to physical science
•  • ■ 63(knowledge based on demonstration—hypothesis and experiment—and induction). 
And this continued to guide their realist interpretation of virtue and identity. Since 
knowledge was the medium of goodness—the final state of eternal happiness and 
perfection (beatitude)—, and the value of the individual turned on his contribution to 
the good life, a contribution dependent upon knowledge, those with claims to a higher 
knowledge of reality were necessarily more virtuous—and, therefore, superior—to 
those without such claims.64 But by the fourteenth century, a nominalist movement 
led by the Franciscan, William of Ockham, was challenging the credibility of
62 For a discussion o f this difference, and its influence on St. Thomas Aquinas, see Copleston, II, pp. 
328-334, 375-376, 385-386. The heightened emphasis on empirical studies can be attributed, in part, 
to the evolution of science and mathematics with which William of Ockham and the nominalist 
movement was affiliated. According to Copleston, “Already in the thirteenth century... we can see the 
beginning of a scientific investigation of Nature.” (Copleston, III, p. 422) See Copleston, III, pp. 15-16, 
420-422.
63 Copleston, II, p. 325, and III, p. 419.
64 Aquinas described three levels o f happiness and goodness: pleasure, affiliated with corporeal desire 
and ignorance; virtue, affiliated with civic goodness and reason; and truth, affiliated with divine 
wisdom and pure happiness. One’s identity thus turned on one’s will and capacity to attain ever-higher 
levels. (Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, II, 63, in Sigmund, pp. 9-10) As inequality was an 
effect of will, so society fell into a natural order “based on different duties and functions” in which 
superior persons ruled inferior ones. (Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 96, 3-4, in Sigmund, p. 
38-39) However, because Aquinas conditioned a “good life” on two things—“to act in accordance 
with virtue” and “a sufficiency of the material goods that are necessary for virtuous action”—will 
became a complement to landed leisure. (Aquinas, On Kingship, 15, in Sigmund, p. 29) The end result 
was three social classes: nobility, gentry and commons. (Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 108,2,
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Scholastic realism.65 Ockham’s insistence on the liberty of the divine will, which 
implied the possibility of arbitrary laws and standards, and his rejection of the 
necessary relationship between eternal and natural laws, advocated only two types of 
knowledge: revealed truth and demonstrated fact.66 On the one hand, this was to 
complicate—if not deny—the necessary link between knowledge and virtue; if 
metaphysical knowledge were a matter of divine will, and virtue a matter of human
67will, upon what might virtue be based and by what standards measured? On the 
other hand, by subverting the authority of philosophy to the interests of science and, 
by extension, the place of the philosopher to the place of the scientist, the conditions 
upon which one might acquire knowledge and, so, ascend the scale of human value, 
were made more inclusive.
In denying the relevance of philosophy to knowledge, in confining knowledge 
to revealed truth and demonstrated fact, nominalism upset the balance-of-influence 
between theoretike—the realm of philosophy—and practike—the realm of science—
in Sigmund, p. 41) See Aquinas, Summa Against the Gentiles, II, 63, Summa o f Theology, I-I, Qu. 96, 
3-4, and 108,2, On Kingship, 15, in Sigmund, pp. 9-10,29,38-39,41.
65 According to Copleston, nominalism twisted Aristotelianism: “questions which were formerly treated 
as metaphysical questions are treated primarily as logical questions.” (Copleston, III, p. 12) Petrus 
Aureoli, who rejection the material foundations of universal ideas, marked a stage in the development 
of nominalism. (Copleston, III, pp. 41-42) See Copleston, III, pp. 12,41-42.
66 According to Copleston, William of Ockham recognized two kinds of science: physical science, 
which deals with real things and effects ‘first terms’; and rational science or logic, which deals with 
terms and concepts. Since only real, material things exist—as Aristotle and the Thomists likewise 
believed—physical science must serve as the rightful foundation for logical science. Hence, 
observation and demonstration must properly precede metaphysical contemplation or rationalization. 
Physical science thus became affiliated with two forms of knowledge: certain truths based on analytical 
propositions—i.e. self-evident principles that cannot be contradicted—; and uncertain facts, based on 
repetitive cause and effect. This was to deny the a priori approach of traditional Franciscan thought. 
See Copleston, II, p. 323, and III, pp. 11-14,41-42, 59-60,69, 91-92, 101, 125-126, 151-157, 166-167.
67 Aristotle and Plato understood the meaning of life to be the attainment of good and identity to be the 
measure of one’s contribution to this end—one’s virtue. In general, Augustine also understood the end 
of human life to be the achievement of Good and the standard of individual worth to be virtue, but he 
took the classical position one step further by making this virtue a matter o f ‘will’; by virtue o f our will,
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and the balance-of-authority between the ‘higher’ standards of theoretike—those 
based on eternal, natural laws—and the ‘lower’ standards ofpractike—those based on 
convention and experience.68 Fundamental tenets were affected, including the 
necessary relationship between divine and human intellect (the latter an imperfect 
image of the former), the necessary relationship between divine and human will (the 
latter an imperfect complement to the former), and the principle of perfection as 
necessarily informing the foundations of law and virtue, the intelligibility of reality, 
the theory of potentiality and, by extension, the standards of social order and 
individual identity.69
Indeed, having located the standards of human life in the evidence of 
particular experience, nominalism upset the traditional social order. Whereas St. 
Thomas had deemed the common man too preoccupied with labor to indulge in the 
contemplation essential to truth and, consequently, made the common man dependent 
on a leisured—disinterested and self-sufficient—elite, nominalism suggested that the 
leisured intellectual was no better a source of truth than the common observer.71 At 
the same time, its denial of theoretical truth invited the common man to narrate a 
reality and identity suited to his particular experience, regardless of customary
in tandem with Grace, we have the capacity to progress from ignorance “to true self-knowledge.” 
(Taylor, pp. 135-139) See Taylor, pp. 116, 135-139.
68 Copleston, III, pp. 21-22. As Copleston notes, the result was a new emphasis on empiricism and the 
reality o f everyday life; although “Renaissance scientists ... [were] interested primarily in knowledge 
for its own sake... [,] new scientific discoveries and the opening up o f the new world naturally 
suggested a contrast between a knowledge of nature... for man’s benefit, and the older abstract 
discipline which seemed devoid of practical utility.” See Copleston, III, p. 21.
69 Copleston, II, pp. 398-400,407-411, and III, pp. 48-49,421.
70 Copleston, III, pp. 420-422, 425.
71 As Copleston writes: “By making the moral law dependent on the free divine choice [Ockham] 
implied... that without revelation man can have no certain knowledge even of the present moral order 
established by God.” See Copleston, III, pp. 14 -15; quoted from p. 14.
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authority.72 This was not without risk. Once individuals became persuaded they 
could shape narratives and identities beyond the parameters of a socially-defined 
subjecthood, the social order became subject to ‘false’ standards at the risk of 
instability.73 In the end, those who held eternal laws to be unintelligible severed the 
link between eternal standards and temporal life, opening the way for moral fluidity 
and a more subjective interpretation of identity.74 As Frederic Copleston writes, “a 
new age for man was beginning.... And [it]... favoured the growth of 
individualism.”75
The second phase of mediaeval thought was thus characterized by a move 
from consensus to criticism. By the fourteenth century, the realist consensus of the 
“old” schools—those which retained the legacies of St. Thomas (The Thomists or 
Dominicans), Duns Scotus (The Scotists or, more loosely, the Franciscans), Giles of 
Rome (the Hermits of St. Augustine) and Henry of Ghent—was being challenged by 
those who denied the intelligibility of universal truths in the absence of revelation.76 
In denying the credibility of realism, nominalism weakened the customary 
foundations for evaluating identity: whereas most mediaeval thinkers had come to
72 Benjamin, “Figuring self-identity,” in Steyn, pp. 16-17. As Benjamin describes it, once the 
“questioning” began, it invited “the abeyance of conventional and therefore traditional forms of identity 
thinking,” undermining “the traditional linkage [between]... self and identity.” See Benjamin, 
“Figuring self-identity, in Steyn, p. 16.
73 John Canfield describes ‘false’ identities as mere summations of “what the self-image images,” 
effected by a ‘false’ consciousness. (Canfield, p. 134) Among theorists as dissimilar as Locke, 
Shaftesbury, and Rousseau, a society composed of false identities was considered to be dangerous, for 
false identities signaled false realities, the foundation of instability and corruption. See Canfield, p.
134; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, p. 193; Taylor, pp. 21, 159-161; Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment, pp. 464-6, 495-6, 538.
74 For Augustine and his followers, moral laws were fixed, based on the intelligible standard of 
goodness. This was not necessarily the case in the modem period. See Augustine, Moral Behavior of 
the Catholic Church, 5-8, in Bourke, pp. 155-158.
'5 Copleston, III, pp. 18-20; quoted from p. 19.
76 Copleston, II, pp. 9-11, 435-440.
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endorse the Aristotelian description of man as a social animal and society as the 
natural inclination of human potentiality, nominalism rejected such claims on grounds 
of divine liberty, which entitled God to any agenda, however inconsistent with the 
demands of human reason; whereas most mediaeval thinkers had come to perceive the 
rise of civil society as occurring, first, for purposes of mutual preservation and, 
ultimately, for purposes of higher good, nominalism reclaimed the Augustinian tenor 
of self-interested preservation; whereas most mediaeval thinkers had come to believe 
that political authority was properly vested in the people and the purpose of 
“compact” was to effect a natural and harmonious balance between government and 
governed, the “natural rights” retained by the individual being justly balanced by the 
necessary powers of a sovereign authority, nominalism opened the way for a more 
arbitrary understanding of compact—i.e. for individual rights and sovereign authority 
to become “social conventions” without foundation in natural law.77
Indeed, nominalism changed the relationship between nature, man, society, 
and God, recasting the State in Augustinian terms, conducive to more radical 
convention narratives—those based not on a natural proclivity towards the good, but 
on a need to protect against evil.78 At the same time, it elevated the role of empirical 
observation at the expense of contemplation. In the end, two competing narratives 
emerged, each endorsing different combinations of classical and Christian doctrine:
77 Copleston, III, pp. 312-315. Joannes Althusius provided perhaps the first “clear statement o f the 
contract theory” in which “a contract lies at the basis of every association or community of men.” 
(Copleston, III, p. 327) However, unlike Jean Bodin, Althusius argued that individuals necessarily 
retained their natural authority in the act of compact, a point which linked him to Locke rather than 
Hobbes. As Copleston explains it, because contract is sanctified by its roots in natural law, according 
to divine authority, “sovereignty rests always, necessarily and inalienably with the people.” See 
Copleston, III, p. 327.
78 Copleston, III, pp. 111-113, 116-118, 173, 179-180.
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on the one hand, a moderate realist narrative supported a neo-Aristotelian correlation 
between knowledge and virtue characterized by a traditional Christian ethic and an 
interest in empirical observation as the point-of-departure for higher reason; on the 
other hand, a nominalist narrative subverted the neo-Aristotelian correlation between 
knowledge and virtue to an Augustinian pessimism and a secondary interest in 
scientific methodology.
In part, these developments reflected the growing influence of science on 
society and narrative. The emerging perception of nature as whole in and of itself 
and, so, as intellectually accessible in the absence of revelation inclined attention 
away from the eternal realm of theological contemplation towards the temporal realm 
of scientific observation.79 As nature became the complement to science—their 
relationship reflected in the popularity of mathematics—, traditional religion lost 
ground to deism and contemplation lost ground to observation.80 At the same time, as 
knowledge became more inclusive, the opportunities for individual agency in 
narrative and identity increased. This influence persisted during the early modem 
period: as observation and induction informed modem British empiricism, so 
mathematical deduction shaped Continental rationalism.81
79 Copleston, III, pp. 248-250. For an overview of the arguments engaged in this development, see 
Copleston, III, pp. 250-289.
80 Copleston, III, pp. 289-291. As Copleston describes it, deism “brings in God simply as an 
explanation of the origin of the mechanical system.” (Copleston, III, p. 289) See Copleston, III, pp. 
275-276,289.
81 Science informed the development of two strains of thought: continental rationalism, led by Rene 
Descartes (1596-1650) in France; and British empiricism, led by Francis Bacon (1561-1626) in 
England. For a discussion of these developments, see Copleston, III, pp. 290, 300, IV, pp. 1, 13-33, 37- 
38, 55-62, 396-403,427-433, and vol. VI, pp. 405-415.
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In part, too, the criticism motivating the nominalist movement was bom of the 
tensions between Church and State.82 Similar conditions affected the Renaissance 
period. Machiavelli’s Prince, for example, defended absolute monarchy and secular 
interests in the interest of political stability.83 Indeed, faced with Florentine political 
turmoil from 1494 to 1530, Machiavelli crafted a political discourse that undermined 
the authority of traditional realist narratives. Not only did it counsel princes to 
privilege power above virtue,84 it dismissed with the principle of moral continuity, 
forging a separate ethic for political society than that ascribed to eternal life—one 
based on civic virtue (per human reason) the other based on moral goodness (per 
divine wisdom).85 As Bernard Crick writes, “Here we are, for the first time, on the 
edge of the relativity of morals; and there is a case... for seeing Machiavelli rather
q/ :
than Montesquieu as the first master of political sociology.”
The influence of Machiavelli’s Prince is resonant in Hobbes’s Leviathan, 
which was likewise motivated by contemporary political tensions and the demands of 
a commercial experience.87 Indeed, the political absolutism of Machiavelli’s
82 Machiavelli wrote in The Discourses: “It is the Church that has kept, and keeps, Italy divided.” 
(Machiavelli, Discourse 1.12, in Crick, p. 145.) For a full discussion of Machiavelli’s concerns, see 
Discourse 1.12, in Crick, pp. 142-146; Copleston, III, pp. 346-347.
83 Anthony Grafton, introduction, in Macchiavelli, The Prince, pp. xiii-xxviii. See also Copleston, III, 
pp. 21-23, 111, 117-118, 173.
84 Machiavelli wrote: “a man who wants to act virtuously in every way necessarily comes to grief 
among so many who are not virtuous. Therefore if a prince wants to maintain his rule he must be 
prepared not to be virtuous....” (Machiavelli, The Prince, pp. 49-50) See Machiavelli, The Prince, pp. 
19, 30-50, 56-58; Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse 1.32, in Crick, p. 188.
85 As Crick describes it, Machiavelli recognized two moralities, “the morality of the soul and the 
morality of the city,” which coexisted in tension. (Crick, introduction, p. 65) This observation 
undermined the classical theory o f virtue, which presumed a single moral standard operating towards 
potentiality. See Crick, introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, pp. 28, 33-34, 63, 65-67.
86 Crick, introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 28.
87 Indeed, what is significant about Machiavelli’s perspective is that his notion of gentlemen is not 
based on landed birth and leisure but on positive productivity. Venetian “gentlemen,” he wrote, were 
gentlemen in name only, “for they do not derive any considerable income from estates: their great
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Prince—and the self-preserving negativism of Augustinian nominalism helped 
make credible both the practical absolutism of Hobbes’s Leviathan and the theoretical 
absolutism informing the ‘divine right of kings’.88 Yet political absolutism was, in 
general, short-lived. Over time, the principle of individual rights—of the people’s 
natural authority and the sovereign’s natural duty—, and the neo-classical perception 
of society—as the by-product of a divine and natural inclination among men to 
compact, first, among themselves and, second, between themselves and a legislator—, 
were reasserted with greater force.89 In the end, the influence of Machiavelli’s Prince 
was exceeded by his Discourses, whose practical republic appeared a modem update 
on neo-Aristotelian realism.90
In fact, Machiavelli’s republic represented an unusual blending of theoretical 
principles and practical expediency.91 As Crick observes, the conditions it invoked 
reflected an urban bias not found in traditional Aristotelian narratives. Indeed, a
wealth is based on merchandise and movable goods.” (Machiavelli, Discourse 1.55, in Crick, p. 247)
As Crick observes: “Here is a bourgeois assumption, indeed ...[;] property... has a dynamic of its own: 
it is the duty of men -  just as John Locke was to argue -  to use and improve it.” (Crick, introduction to 
Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 39) But Machiavelli was not consistent on this point, for he also 
advocated poverty as a means of de-emphasizing the connection between property and virtue. 
(Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse 111.25, in Crick, p. 475) See Crick, introduction to 
Machiavelli, The Discourses, pp. 39; Machiavelli, Discourse 1.55 and 111.24, in Crick, pp. 245-247,
475; Grafton, introduction to Machiavelli, The Prince, p. xxiv.
88 Copleston, HI, pp. 311-312.
89 Copleston, III, pp. 347-348.
90 Machiavelli’s Discourses were probably begun, at least in thought, by 1513, when he wrote the 
Prince. The two works appear as bookend manuals for alternative political conditions. Yet, even when 
he was writing the Prince, he was casting himself in the guise o f humanist; a letter to Vettori records: 
“When evening comes, I return to my home, and I go into my study; and on the threshold, I take off my 
everyday clothes, which are covered with mud and mire, and I put on regal and curial robes; and 
dressed in a more appropriate manner I enter into the ancient courts of ancient men...; and there I am 
not ashamed to speak to them, to ask them the reasons for their actions; and they, in their humanity, 
answer me...: I become completely part of them.” See Machiavelli, Letter to Vettori, quoted in 
Grafton, introduction to Machiavelli, The Prince, p. xix.
91 Machiavelli’s methodology is a posteriori, based on practical experience as well as theoretical ideals. 
See Crick, introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, pp. 48-49.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
53
traditional emphasis on custom and civic virtue was joined with the authority of town 
over country, “a large middle class,” and the institutional participation of commoners 
in politics.92 Coupled with his concession to “flexibility,” Machiavelli’s narrative
* • 93anticipates the commercial humanism of eighteenth-century Britain. Moreover, 
while endorsing common good as the end of society, Machiavelli makes the means by 
which it is attained less fixed than traditional neo-Aristotelian narratives. Indeed, in 
the interest of social stability, not only does he make the three “powers” or estates of 
Aristotelian theory more fluid in both character and authority, he advocates a 
controlled tension between nobility and common as essential to the security of 
liberty.94 The sum effect was to alter the nature of republican identity. While 
continuing to highlight the heroic virtue attendant active civic life, Machiavelli 
emphasized the singular talents of distinguished elites—“Great Men” or “Catos”—as 
opposed to a body of citizen-equals.95
92 Crick, introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 41. Machiavelli’s emphasis on a large middle 
class, like Aristotle’s endorsement of polity, was intended as alternative to democracy or oligarchy.
See Crick, introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, p. 43.
93 As Crick writes, Machiavelli’s republic suggested “that civilization itself—morality, civic spirit, 
learning, art, science and commerce -  was a product of city life...”— not country life. See Crick, 
introduction to Machiavelli, The Discourses, pp. 43, 536 (Note 34).
94 For example, circumstances that require absolute rule may call on the estate o f kingship. See Crick, 
in Machiavelli, The Discourses, pp. 30, 34, 534 (Note 27); Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse 1.4, 
1.9,1.17, in Crick, pp. 113, 132, 159.
95 Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse III. 1, in Crick, p. 386-389. The ideal legislator was 
celebrated in the person of Cincinnatus, a virtuous Roman citizen called on to serve as a military 
dictator in order to save Rome from defeat. Having completed his public task, Cincinnatus returned to 
his farm and resumed his place as a private citizen—a prime example of the “ruled and be ruled” ethic 
extolled by Aristotle. Still, Machiavelli’s legislators are “great men”—as opposed to citizen-equals. 
They “rise above the rank and file” to govern the natural tensions between the upper and lower classes. 
A similar position was held by Polybius and Aquinas. As Thomas Aquinas described it: “the best 
constitution for a city or kingdom is one in which one person rules in accordance with virtue, and under 
him there are others who govern in accordance with virtue.... This was... the government established 
by divine law.” (Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-II, Qu. 105, 1, in Sigmund, p. 59) See Machiavelli, 
The Discourses, Discourse 1.2, III. 1,111.25,111.34, and Crick, introduction and Notes 2, 8, 14, in Crick, 
pp. 24-25, 27-28, 110, 386-390, 475-476, 497, 529-531; Aquinas, Summa o f Theology, I-II, Qu. 90,3  
and 91, 1-4, Summa Against the Gentiles, IV, 76, On Kingship, 1-15, in Sigmund, pp. 13-29, 45-47.
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Although the endorsement of republican ideals—however much modified-— 
implied a rejection of convention theories and a general belief in natural law as the 
proper basis for society—for interpreting sovereign authority and individual rights, for 
example—, alternative narratives continued to coexist, often to conflicting ends.96 
Machiavelli’s version of the classical republic, for example, subverted the private and 
domestic to the public and civic, Christian goodness to pagan virtue. By contrast, 
Northern Renaissance narratives tended to subvert public to private, heroic virtue to 
Christian goodness. Indeed, while both sides acknowledged the necessary role of 
sense-perception in the development of knowledge—even self-knowledge—, and 
both accepted the principle of perfection as the final cause and necessary standard of 
human life—each an indication of Aristotle’s expanding influence—, the Northern 
Renaissance placed greater emphasis on the internal individual, thereby effecting a
• 07different relationship between the individual and society.
Beginning around 1536, when John Calvin argued that an individual’s worth 
was a measure of his Christian goodness in the temporal realm, the Protestant 
Reformation initiated an ‘ethic of ordinary life’ that, in complement with the 
expanding marketplace, turned attention towards the private man in the social
no
sphere. This conflicted with traditional distinctions between public and private 
men—the former an essential feature of the virtuous republic, the latter a metaphor
96 Copleston, III, pp. 207-220, 227-228,273-274,348-349.
9' In general, the Italian Renaissance was characterized by a renewed interest in classical literature for 
purposes of improving man and society. In Northern Europe, this interest was wed with demands for 
moral and social reform. See Copleston, III, pp. 223,225,228, 322-324, 329-332, 335-344.
98 The “key point,” Taylor writes, “is that the higher is to be found not outside of but as a manner of 
living ordinary life,” and this ethic, he adds, fostered “anti-elite” sentiments, a key influence in the 
development of a “bourgeois” ideology. See Taylor, pp. 13-14,23, 211; John Calvin, Institutes o f the
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99for patronage and corruption—, recasting the private man in Christian terms. In 
fact, however, the emerging influence of ‘ordinary life’ was indicative of a changing 
social and political environment caused, at least in part, by three interlocking trends: a 
growing uncertainty about customary authority and the possibility of intelligible truth; 
a corresponding uncertainty about the credibility of social prescriptions; and a 
consequent emphasis on the secular realm as the only ‘knowable’ sphere of human 
existence.100
The possibility that truth was unintelligible prior to revelation freed Reformed 
Christians from the natural and fixed standards to which more orthodox Christians 
were subject. As Baumeister suggests, people became conscious of their two selves, 
one public and external, the other private and internal.101 As a result, he writes, they 
“gradually ceased to equate the individual with the individual’s [birth-Jplace in 
society, and they ceased to feel that the person was morally obligated to fulfill the role
Christian Religion (1536), trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Co., (1989) 2001).
99 As Machiavelli described it, only public citizens benefited society. However, Baumeister notes, 
“dramatic social changes at the end of the Middle Ages” witnessed “the spread of religious dissent and 
a great increase in social mobility ....” By the sixteenth century, he goes on, there was an awareness of 
a “self not directly visible in social actions and roles.” (Baumeister, pp. 30-45) See Baumeister, pp. 30- 
45; Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse III. 28, in Crick, p. 482.
100 According to Roy Baumeister, the “transition from the medieval to the early modem period included 
two developments important for identity. First, the Protestant Reformation divided the educated classes 
over the correct interpretation of Christian truth. As a result, instead of being a firm basis for identity, 
Christian belief became itself somewhat problematic.... Second, social mobility made it quite possible 
to change one’s rank in society, at least to some extent. Thus, one major component of identity (social 
rank) came to depend on individual achievement rather than on passive assignment.” See Baumeister, 
p. 57; Plato, Laws, pp. 277-278, 284-289.
101 As Baumeister observes, “The ‘inner self does not really exist. It is a useful concept for describing 
important parts of human experience and behavior.... [However, as] the contents o f the inner self are 
essentially contents of meaning," in the absence of a universally-convincing narrative, the context of 
meaning was lost. (Baumeister, p. 164) Hence, the Reformed Christian turned inward to discover his 
own “purpose and meaning” for life. (Baumeister, p. 171) See Baumeister, pp. 56-57, 164, 171.
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assigned by society.”102 The effects were resonant in the accompanying shift from 
sociological to psychological identities. As the individual was made responsible for 
his own salvation and was thus charged with determining his own ‘meaning of life’, a 
wedge was forged between the individual and the community manifest in a 
philosophical isolation between man and his world.103 Over time, morality and 
identity assumed a new fluidity as a secular Christian ethic emerged disengaged from 
the civic ideals of neo-Aristotelian politics and the universal authority of Augustinian 
realism.104 The result was a division between the public/ external and private/ 
internal self resonant, for example, in the spatial segregations of Renaissance
insportraiture.
All this rested uneasily with classicism.106 Although classical principles 
continued to inform the dominant ideology, the ‘internal self nurtured by the
102 On the one hand, Baumeister writes, “the decline of Christian moral and political views erased the 
requirement that the individual be content with his lot in society....” (Baumeister, p. 56) On the other 
hand, the absence of fixed standards made it essential that “each identity ... contain an inner structure 
of values and priorities” to guide its subject. (Baumeister, p. 164) As a result, “the concept of person 
was separated from the concept of his or her place in the social structure.” (Baumeister, p. 57) This 
conduced to the Puritan vision of two selves—one private and internal, one public and external.
Indeed, Baumeister notes, “It is likely that the two developments were related.” (Baumeister, p. 171) 
See Baumeister, pp. 15, 30-45, 53, 56-57, 164, 171, 246.
103 As Baumeister writes, “Medieval attitudes lacked... emphasis on individuality.... A main reason for 
the relative indifference to individuality was the firm medieval faith in Christianity.... Salvation ... 
was collective.... In the twelfth century, however, this seems to have changed.... The later medievals 
expected the archangel to evaluate your soul based on what you did during your life.... This shift... 
put the all-important issue of salvation in individualistic terms.” See Baumeister, pp. 30-45.
104 Against traditional Christian and classical narratives, the Reformed ethic of ‘ordinary life’ privileged 
the private individual in the secular world. As Baumeister observes, “Morality survived as a set of rules 
about right and wrong, but morality was no longer the means used for fulfilling one’s potentiality.” See 
Baumeister, pp. 56-57.
105 By the Renaissance, a growing awareness of individual autonomy was made manifest in portraiture 
through the compositional, linguistic, and psychological devices of space, gesture, brushstroke, and 
color. “This freeing of nature from the iconographic tradition,” Taylor writes, “also carries 
consequences for the place of the subject.... There is a new distance between subject and object, and 
they are clearly situated relative to each other....[—space] ‘at one and the same time objectifies the 
object and personalizes the subject’.” See Taylor, pp. 200-202
106 Plato’s insistence on the divine and fixed nature of morality was a conscious refutation of the moral- 
relativism of convention theories. See Plato, Laws, pp. 408-409, 416-424, 516.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
57
Reformation urged an individual autonomy and self-determination that undermined
* •  107the ‘fixed’ social and political structure advanced by neo-Aristotelian realism. The
result was a paradoxical blending of individualism and neo-Aristotelian realism in 
which the principle of individual agency coexisted with the principle of universal 
perfection.108 On the one hand, men were taught that the evaluation of civic virtue 
and social identity was informed by fixed, natural standards of goodness grounded in 
eternal laws. On the other hand, they were increasingly encouraged, within this 
context, to advance and improve themselves according to their independent 
evaluation of those standards. The result was a constant renegotiation of one’s
|  r iQ
identity and social place. In the end, the Reformation’s dissent from customary 
authority permitted the autonomous and self-determining individual to surface as the 
agent of his own identity.110 As Baumeister explains it, the gain in individual agency 
that resulted from the Reformation’s dissent from orthodox standards granted the 
individual “more latitude for defining himself’ according to his own “sense of 
personal potential.”111
107 Baumeister concludes: “By the eighteenth century, “persons could be permitted to choose their own 
forms of potential to try to fulfill.... A person’s potentiality thus became an unknown instead of a fixed 
and known quantity.” See Baumeister, pp. 56-57.
108 Copleston, III, pp. 242-243.
109 As Crick notes, “What is decisive to Machiavelli, as to Shakespeare, is the interplay between the 
two presumed forces of character and circumstance, not the fixity of either. If he had meant to say that 
human nature is everywhere the same, in a strong rather than a weak sense, then he would, presumably 
have laid out schematically what types o f human nature there are, or what basic humours. Plato had 
done so, and the Mediaeval allegorists.” See Crick, in Machiavelli, The Discourses, Note 72, p. 544.
110 Taylor, p. 21; Baumeister, pp. 168,252.
111 Baumeister, p. 171.
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CHAPTER III 
THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD
Persona in latine signifies the disguise, or outward appearance of a man, 
counterfeited on the Stage; and sometimes more particularly that part of it, 
which disguiseth the face, as a Mask or Visard.... So that a Person, is the 
same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to 
Personate, is to Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth 
another, is said to beare his Person, or act in his name....
- Thomas Hobbes, 16511
Empirical science, practical politics and Reformed Christianity continued to 
influence the development of British neo-classicism well into the early modem 
period.2 In the seventeenth-century, a growing emphasis on politics and the proper 
distribution of political authority brought the relationship between the individual and 
society to the fore. On the one hand, in a nod to Machiavelli, Royalists like Lord 
Halifax urged the authority of a single sovereign on grounds that commoners lacked 
the capacity for disinterested virtue essential to social stability and public good; the 
King (supported by the House of Lords) was thus the best means of protecting society 
from the dangers attendant human power relations.3 On the other hand,
1 “A PERSON,” he goes on, “is he [to whom]... words or actions are ...attributed, whether Truly or by 
Fiction.” See Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Form and Power o f a Commonwealth, Ecclesiastical 
and Civil (London, 1651), p. 217. Hobbes’s philosophy was outlined in three works: De Cive (Paris, 
1642), De Corpore (1655) and De homine (1658.) See Copleston, V, p. 2.
2 Copleston, IV, pp. 4-10.
3 According to an anonymous essay, “Observations Upon a late LIBEL, called A Letter from a Person 
o f Quality to his Friend, Concerning the King’s Declaration, &c.,” attributed to George Savile, 1st
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Parliamentarians like the first earl of Shaftesbury advanced the House of Commons as 
the best means of preserving the natural rights of the individual in the interest of 
public good.4
In 1642, Charles I responded to Parliamentarian demands for a more 
‘balanced’ government with his Answer to the Nineteen Propositions o f Both Houses 
o f Parliament. This document stands as testimony to the influence of republican 
principles on British politics, but it also serves as a reminder of the various forms a 
republic might take; it described a ‘mixed monarchy’ that wed the principles of 
‘hierarchy’ and ‘republic’ into a Polybian-Machiavellian variation on Aristotle’s 
‘mixed’ government, transforming the Aristotelian distinction between one
Marquis of Halifax, the claims of the Country nobles were exaggerated. In defense of the Court, the 
author notes the “Excesses of the Commons,” which had resulted in hostility between the two Houses 
of Parliament. But he also highlights the self-interested motivations o f the Letter writer: they “would 
be glad, instead of being a little men as their Neighbors, to gain that superiority which Nature denied 
them.” (“Observations,” p. 2) In this, “the Misleaders” went on, they recall the Long Parliament of the 
Commonwealth period, insofar as “they would have... a House o f Commons that may do what they 
will, and as long as thy will, that is for ever,” without the consent o f Lords and King. (“Observation,” 
pp. 2, 5, 8) This exceeds even the hopes of “our Modem Plato”—i.e. the first Earl of Shaftesbury. See 
Anonymous, “Observations Upon a late LIBEL, called A Letter from a Person o f Quality to his Friend, 
concerning the King’s Declaration, &c.,” (1675) (London: printed for C. Mason, 1681), pp. 2, 5, 8.
4 In A Letter from a Person o f Quality, To His Friend in the Country, attributed to the first Earl of 
Shaftesbury, the writer outlines contemporary concerns raised by the recent sitting of the House of 
Lords: the effort to solidify a “Cavalier Party” in disregard of the “Country Lords;” the effort to solidify 
unalterably the government of the Church, “and so Tacitely owned to be of Divine Right;” and the 
declaration o f a “government absolute and Arbitrary,” in which Parliament is reduced to a fund-raising 
and administrative arm of the legislature—“to pass such laws, as the Court and Church shall have a 
mind to....” (Anon., Letter from a Person o f Quality, pp. 1,2, 6) Hence, he argues, he “Cavalier 
Party” proposes a “divine Institution.... Nay what is worse, they have truckt away the Rights and 
Liberties o f the people in this,... that they might be owned by the Prince to be Jure Divino, and 
maintained in that Pretention by that absolute power and force....” (Anon, Letter from a Person of  
Quality, p. 34) Against this platform, the “Old English Lords” support “Magna Charta” as the premise 
of English liberties and “humane Laws:” it “says, Our Kings may not take our Fields, our Vineyards,
our Com, and our Sheep ” (Anon., A Letter from a Person o f Quality, p. 34) As likewise
communicated in A Letter from a Friend, to a Person o f Quality: In Answer to A Letter from a Person 
of Quality to his Friend; about Abhorers and Addressers, attributed to John Locke, the position of the 
‘Country Lords’ was heralded as a defense of the people’s rights and liberties and the “Protestant 
Religion,” in which light, the Church of England was held to be “the best Reformed Church.” (Anon, A 
Letter from a Friend, to a Person o f Quality, p. 1). See A Letter from a Person o f Quality, To His 
Friend in the Country (London: printed in 1675), pp. 1, 2, 6, 33-34; A Letter from a Friend, to a 
Person o f Quality (London: printed for T. Davies, 1682), p. 1.
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(monarchy), few (aristocracy) and many (polity) into a ‘balanced’ authority 
combining three estates—king, nobility, and people—, each bearing its own form of 
virtue—security, wisdom, and liberty—and, consequently, each bearing a legitimate 
claim to political authority.5 Indeed, the ready manipulation of classical principles 
permitted their assimilation into all kinds of agendas. As Machiavelli suggested, a 
republic might conduce to hereditary hierarchy or social equality, to a philosopher- 
prince or a republican citizen.5 Similarly, it might exclude the commercial classes 
from political authority or defend their claim to virtue, might make them gentlemen of 
‘title’ or deny such title on grounds of birth—thereby setting or bending the standards
*7
of Public identity.
5 According to Pocock, His Majesty's Answer to the Nineteen Propositions o f Both Houses of 
Parliament, written in August 1642 by advisors to the Charles I, was a key document in the 
development of republicanism. It described an English parliamentary monarchy that was ‘republican’, 
Pocock argues, “in the sense that it was Polybian, ... a mixed government in which monarchy, 
aristocracy and democracy combined to balance one another... [and] check the degenerative tendency 
of each.” (Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, 
pp. xiii-xiv) Borrowing on the writings of Machiavelli, as Harrington explained it: “the senate 
proposing, the people resolving, and the magistracy executing, whereby partaking of the aristocracy as 
in the senate, of the democracy as in the people, and of monarchy as in the magistracy, it is complete.” 
(Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, p. 25) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 355- 
358, 377, 421; Taylor, p. 195; Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 23-24, 38, 65-66, 234, 
237; Harrington, A System o f Politics, pp. 280-281; Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The 
Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, pp. xiii-xiv.
6 As Aristotle and Harrington described it, a “citizen”—as opposed to a “servant”—was a “freeman,” 
one “that can live upon his own” and, hence, claim title to independence. (Harrington, A System o f  
Politics, p. 269) Likewise, a nation of independent men was a nation of citizens whose “government 
may [possibly] be democracy,” but was so necessarily. By contrast, a nation composed of independent 
and dependent men, citizens and servants, was o f necessity “either monarchy or aristocracy.” 
(Harrington, A System o f Politics, p. 270) For both Aristotle and Harrington, independence required 
landed wealth. This was not the case with Machiavelli, whose legislators came from an active and 
productive urban elite. See Harrington, A System o f Politics, Pocock, ed., pp. 269-270; Harrington,
The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 67-71; Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse 1.55, in Crick, p. 
247.
7 Both Plato and Aristotle condemned the participation of commercial men in the civic sphere on 
grounds that their pursuit of money led to their easy corruption. Harrington adopted a similar position. 
Thomas Aquinas likewise objected to profit-making and money-lending, but deemed rents and leases, 
which provided a material good in the exchange for money, acceptable. He also acknowledged that 
commercial profits could be used frugally to good ends. In this way, he invited the development of a 
commercial ethic. Machiavelli, by contrast, praised the productivity of merchants and condemned the 
idleness o f  leisured gentry. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 387-388; Machiavelli, The
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The intellectual and psychological foundations for political change were thus 
already in place when Britain faced the collapse of monarchy.8 As Pocock describes 
it, Englishmen had already begun to “restate the terms on which [they] as civic beings 
lived with one another.”9 Because of this, Cromwell’s soldiers could cast themselves 
as public defenders of individual “rights and liberties,” invoking a narrative 
conducive to republicanism.10 However, as the pragmatic absolutism of 
Machiavelli’s Prince was balanced by the republican ideals of his Discourses, so the 
development of British philosophy witnessed harsh dichotomies of opinion. Indeed, 
the polarities informing Machiavelli’s Prince and Discourses were resonant in the 
writings of Thomas Hobbes and James Harrington. As Hobbes defended a single 
sovereign authority and the sacrifice of individual liberties in the interest of social 
stability, so Harrington defended a republic of citizen-freeholders in which individual 
liberties were preserved in the interest of progress and virtue.11 Their work thus 
stands as useful evidence of the conflicting influences informing seventeenth-century 
narratives.
I. The Royal Subject: Thomas Hobbes
Discourses, Discourse 1.55, in Crick, p. 247; Plato, Republic, pp. 6-7; Plato, Laws, pp. 159, 162; 
Aguinas, The Summa o f Theology, II-II, Qu. 77,4 and Qu. 78, 1, in Sigmund, pp. 73-74.
8 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 335, 339-341, 351, 355, 372, 377.
9 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 348,
10 These rights and liberties included those which belonged to the individual’s ‘first’ nature—Locke’s 
life and liberty—and those which were bom of society—concerned primarily with property. The 
question was: how much of the individual’s ‘first’ rights transferred with him into the social state? See 
Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 367, 395, 428-429; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 374-376.
11 Like Machiavelli, Harrington emphasized the importance of custom in the founding of a republic. 
Unlike Machiavelli, however, he linked this custom with land. See Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment, pp. 376-377.
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Like Ockham and Machiavelli before him, Hobbes’s philosophy was 
pragmatically influenced by the political conditions plaguing contemporary Britain. 
Faced with civil-war tensions, he searched for a political science consistent with 
natural law—“a basic hypothesis about the nature of things, which could embrace the 
actions of men in society and their relations with each other.”12 Concluding that 
power was the central ingredient of social engagement, he set out to know the 
appropriate distribution of power in society, ending with an endorsement of absolute 
sovereignty.13 This was the topic of his controversial and popular Leviathan (1651).14
In framing this natural law of social relations, Hobbes employed both 
empiricism and rationalism. Indeed, his theory borrowed widely from nominalism, 
science—particularly from a mechanistic view of Nature—, and even Augustine.15 
For example, while denying the intelligibility of divine reality, he nonetheless 
supported a harmonious natural order. At the same time, he deemed society the by­
product of convention rather than nature. Finally, unlike Aristotle, who understood 
motion to be an externally-motivated pressure towards potentiality, Hobbes, a 
Reformed Christian, located the source of motion internally, explaining external 
motion as an effect—rather than cause—of highly competitive, acquisitive, and
12 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 10,27. By such means, as Copleston describes it, “the rules o f conduct and 
of political life”—i.e. “moral philosophy”—might be known. See Copleston, V, p. 3.
13 Hobbes describes two types of power, one based on natural attributes—intellectual or physical 
prowess, for example—the other on material goods. Competition turns on the distribution of these 
powers. It was thus necessary to control them in the interest of social stability. The best means of 
doing so, he concluded, was by way of monarchy. See Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 150; MacPherson, 
introduction to Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 33-35, 37; Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The 
Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f  Politics, pp. xiv-xv.
14 MacPherson, in Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 13,21, 23-24, 727-728.
15 MacPherson, introduction to Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 21; Copleston, IV, pp. 25-26, V, pp. 5, 16-20.
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interdependent human desires mutually acting upon one another.16 This removed 
knowledge from the exclusive hands of a natural intellectual elite and made it the 
inclusive by-product of individual will and human industry.17 At the same time, it 
made identity and social order the effect of social interests rather than naturally fixed 
standards—“not absolute, but a thing dependent on the need and judgement of 
another.”18 The same was true of morality.19
Ultimately, Hobbes posed that society was an artificial convention bom of 
selfish interests manifest in the individual drive for power, the stability of which 
depended on a Prince-ly absolutism. As the most stable society was one in which 
power-relations were managed for the benefit of all, Hobbes supported legal 
monarchy—as distinct from (absolute) kingship—as least likely to dissolve into 
conflict.20 His primary objective was to remove the self-interested individual—the 
subject—from political authority until such time as virtue was cultivated; only then 
might a subject assume the authority of a citizen.21
16 As MacPherson describes it, Hobbes’s ‘Theory of Human Nature in Society’ began with the principle 
that ‘“Men are moved by appetites and aversions’.” (Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 30) A similar premise 
informed Mandeville’s theory. See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 19-20,28-32,43, 85-87, 118-119, 192- 
193,201-214; Bernard Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees (1723), ed. E. J. Hundert (Indianapolis: Hackett 
Publishing, Inc., 1997).
17 As Hobbes wrote, “Reason is not as Sense, and Memory, borne with us; nor gotten by Experience 
onely; as Prudence is; but attayned by Industry....” (Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 115) He thus set out to 
devise a method of reasoning. See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 16-18, 21, 26-27, 85-87, 94, 105, 110-112, 
115, 682, 688-691; Copleston, V, pp. 3-4, 10-24, 30-31.
18 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 151-152.
19 As Copleston concludes: “it is the appetites and aversions of the individual which determine for him 
what is good and what is evil.” See Copleston, V, pp. 28-31; quoted from p. 31.
20 Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 24, 37, 41-42,44-45, 48, 50, 52-54, 56, 62, 94-95, 99,227-228,241-243, 
295-299, 312, 314-316, 322, 330, 334-335, 372, 376-377, 390, 395-396, 399,405,407,425-426,448, 
469,478,498, 512, 520, 522, 524-525, 545-547, 549, 567, 575, 609-611, 613, 615, 623-627,632, 
704-708,711-712,717-719.
21 Hobbes’s theory was neither the celebration of ‘private vices’ nor the redefinition of ‘Good’ to be 
found in Bernard Mandeville’s Fable o f the Bees. Rather, it was a reflection of his cynicism. Hobbes 
believed that human corruption was too pervasive to permit a “limited benevolence” to serve as the 
foundation of society. For this reason, he crafted a socio-political structure that managed the negative
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In fact, Hobbes was less at odds with Plato and Aristotle than his criticism 
might suggest. Both Plato and Aristotle had recognized the unlikely probability of 
philosophical virtue arising with generational regularity and consequently endorsed 
the rule of law. Recognizing, too, that laws were only as good as the men behind 
them, Aristotle emphasized the lesser, heroic virtue of the citizen as opposed to the
higher, intellectual virtue of the philosopher. Moreover, like Hobbes, both
• 22philosophers endorsed education as the means of cultivating reason and virtue.
Significantly, however, Hobbes’s rejection of a ‘natural’ aristocracy in whom
society might be safely entrusted reflected not only his cynicism, but the influence of
Reformed Christianity, which defended mankind’s universal capacity for reason and
virtue. As Hobbes described it:
Nature hath made men so equall, in the faculties of body and mind; as that 
though there bee found one man sometimes manifestly stronger in body, or of 
quicker mind then another; yet when all is reckoned together, the difference 
between man, and man, is not so considerable... P
impact o f competitive instincts through the control of social relations. See Leviathan, pp. 189-192, 
262-264,267-273.
22 Hobbes’s rejection of the classical narrative should not be misunderstood as a rejection of classical 
values: he was an admirer of human virtue, a believer in divine plan, and an advocate of improvement 
through intellectual refinement; he privileged reason—a consequence of general knowledge—over 
prudence—the effect of particular experience—and encouraged philosophical inquiry over book- 
learning; he recognized leisure as a necessary precondition o f philosophy and placed the security of the 
commonwealth on the opportunity for intellectual development; he was an advocate of divine law, 
premised moral virtue and philosophy on its doctrine, and believed that civil laws should follow their 
example. What Hobbes rejected was the realist theory o f intelligible natural progress and its pendant 
standards of identity and social order. As a result, he dismissed with the presumption that a noble-born 
elite could lead society towards perfection. Until such time as men were capable of controlling their 
passions, until such time as society had nurtured the kind o f virtue upon which civic leadership might 
be based, until such time as society had proven itself to be guided by the moral goals of divine 
goodness, the influence o f interest was too great to risk civic order. See Hobbes Leviathan, pp. 37,
162, 168, 173, 178-179, 216, 369, 388, 682-687, 697-699, 726-727.
23 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 183; Copleston, V, p. 32.
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This belief in the commonality of human nature squared with his argument 
about social relations; so equal were men in their ambition for power that they needed 
social compact for their mutual interest and preservation.24 It also supported his claim 
to legal equality and the Reformed emphasis on human will: as men were made equal 
by their natural capacities so they were made unequal by their will.25 On these 
grounds, identity and authority—at least in theory—became matters of ‘will’ rather 
than birth: even the mechanic might aspire to the philosopher.
Ultimately, then, Hobbes’s vision of power as the basis of social relations 
informed a self-determined interpretation of identity. But it also advanced the divided 
self suggested by Augustinian duality. As Hobbes described it, identity was an 
external ‘Face’ or ‘Persona’ assumed by the individual following his engagement with 
society; it was not a reflection of his inner self.26 Moreover, an individual’s “Value," 
he wrote, was dependent upon the “Price” of his “Power”—his rate-of-exchange in
* 27  *the civic sphere. This was remarkable not only for being at odds with the dominant 
neo-Aristotelian narrative, but because, while invoking the principle of a divided self, 
Hobbes subverted identity to the forces of the marketplace. In other words, having 
rejected the intelligibility of a classical narrative based on natural progress and fixed 
standards, he turned to the marketplace for an alternative means of evaluating
24 “From this equality of ability, ariseth equality o f hope in attaining o f our Ends” and, so, competition. 
Hence the need for social controls. See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 27, 160, 184-188,194-195, 198-199, 
202, 208,211; quoted from p. 184..
25 Taylor, pp. 124, 141-145, 147-156; Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 58-59.
26 Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 217. Samuel Johnson’s Dictionary defined ‘external’ as “having the 
appearance but not the essence” of a thing. See Johnson, Dictionary (London, 1786).
27 Hobbes explained, “The Value, or WORTH of a man, is as of all other things, his Price; that is to 
say, so much as would be given for the use of his Power....” See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 151-152.
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individual value.28 The effect was to bridge the gap between Reformed theory and 
commercial experience. It was also to make identity more fluid and relative.
Hobbes’s use of commercial language in the evaluation of identity signaled a
29changing balance-of-influence between contemporary political and economic forces. 
As Taylor notes, these developments held particular appeal for “artisan and merchant 
classes which were becoming conscious of their new achievements and aspiring to a 
new dignity and influence in society. The appeal was all the greater in that their
• •  •  30religious faith also stressed the value of work and the equal dignity of all callings.” 
But the social and political aspirations of commercially-engaged individuals were also 
being addressed in the demands for legal equality that accompanied the development 
of the marketplace.31 As James Harrington put it, a drive for legal equality reinforced 
the ambitions of industrious commoners, who sought not social parity but legal access 
to identities and ranks formerly reserved for the hereditary elite: “Industry of all 
things is the most accumulative,” he wrote, “and accumulation of all things hates
28 Hobbes is remarkable for suggesting that social civility and common good might be compatible with 
modem commerce, but even more so for suggesting that the market provided the only “moral basis for 
establishing the value of anything.” See MacPherson, introduction to Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 51; 
Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 75, 717-718.
29 MacPherson, introduction to Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 47-48, 50, 54-62; Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 127, 
228-239,274,277.
30 Taylor, p. 231. By this time, Baumeister writes, “the person [had become] an individual unity with a 
separate existence independent of place in society.” (Baumeister, Identity, p. 41) See Taylor, pp. 211, 
231; Baumeister, p. 41.
il The demands of the marketplace—the equality of exchange relations—necessitated that contracting 
individuals have equal legal rights, otherwise exchange values would be biased; as MacPherson writes, 
the motivation to engage in commerce and finance “could operate only if men were equally free, had 
equal legal rights to use or offer their powers in the market.” See MacPherson, introduction to Hobbes, 
Leviathan, pp. 58-59.
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levelling....”32 The result—at least in theory—was a modem social hierarchy based 
on inequalities of will (reflected by industry) rather than birth.
II. The Republican Citizen: James Harrington
In response to Hobbes’s Leviathan (1651), the collapse of monarchy, and the 
problems of Cromwellian mle, James Harrington crafted the Commonwealth o f  
Oceana (1656). Pocock calls it a “moment of paradigmatic breakthrough” insofar as 
it propelled the ideals of “civic humanism and Machiavellian republicanism” to the 
forefront of British philosophy.33 In an Anglo-Protestant nod to Machiavelli’s 
Discourses, Harrington’s Oceana provided Britons with an alternative answer to the 
collapse of monarchy: a stable government based on the ‘ancient’ principle of natural 
right, as distinct from natural law.34
Harrington’s theoiy of natural rights was important for suggesting both the 
primacy of the individual in the state of nature and the virtuous foundations of 
society. On the one hand, he made natural rights an inalienable asset of the 
individual, thereby suggesting that liberty and autonomy were as essential to the
32 Harrington continues: “the revenue therefore of the people being the revenue of industry, though 
some nobility... may be found to have been levellers, yet not any people in the world.” See 
Harrington, A System o f Politics, p. 277.
" Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 384. As Pocock explains it, “There is a real sense in which 
republican theories were a consequence, not a cause or even a precondition, of the execution o f the 
King and the temporary abolition of the monarchy.” (Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The 
Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System ofPolitics, p. xi.) See Harrington, The Commonwealth of 
Oceana, pp. 53,60-62; Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth o f  Oceana and A 
System o f Politics, pp. vii-xii, xv; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 384,421.
34 By contrast, Hobbes had argued that, in contracting a sovereign authority, one relinquished one’s 
natural rights and received back only those liberties complementary to the civic good. It was therefore 
not natural rights but natural laws which followed man into society—notably the Lex Naturalis o f self- 
preservation. See Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 189.
35 Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, p. xii.
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social narrative as preservation. This led him to represent natural rights as the proper 
foundation of political authority and citizenship.36 On the other hand, in suggesting 
the natural foundations of society, Harrington drew on the Aristotelian doctrine of 
natural progress. The combination led Harrington to conclude, first, that equality was 
the natural promise of all people and, second, that the proper function of government
* 37was to secure the natural rights of the individual from negative social interests.
In describing the function of government, Harrington employed a language of 
“ancient” and “modem” prudence. According to Harrington, when government 
shifted its attention from natural rights and the common good to property and interest, 
it neglected reason—the “goods of the mind”—and came under the influence of 
“Fortune.”38 This regression from the conditions of truth and goodness was equated 
with ‘modem’ prudence. In order to restore society’s proper balance, it was necessary 
to re-institute ‘ancient’ prudence—the reason and ‘liberty’ of the ‘Ancient’ 
constitution. ‘Balance’, then, was a consequence of the relationship between rights
36 The result, as Pocock describes it, was a doctrine “in which ...man the political animal was by nature 
a citizen and not a subject....” See Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana 
and A System o f Politics, p. xii.
J/ Although not a Leveller himself, Pocock writes, “in Oceana he seems to accept an enlargement of the 
voting population as extensive as most Levellers desired.” (Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The 
Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f  Politics, p. viii) Yet, Harrington’s defense o f citizenship 
was “universal” only insofar as it applied to independent men—those who had attained a landed self- 
sufficiency. Hence his insistence on agrarian laws as the best means of keeping the rule of interest at 
bay, a position he shared with Machiavelli. See Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The 
Commonwealth o f Oceana, p. viii; Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 3-4, 13-15.
38 As Pocock describes it, the “history o f property moved men into and out o f the dictatorship of 
fortune.” See Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System of  
Politics, p. xxi.
^  Whereas ancient prudence guarded against the corruptive forces of self-interested men through the 
balanced influence o f three estates, whereas ‘ancient prudence’ ensured that all ‘independent’ 
commoners were granted the rights of citizenship supportive o f “LIBERTAS”, ‘modem prudence’ (and 
its alternative government) was “an art whereby some man, or some few men, subject a city or a nation, 
and rule it according unto his or their private interest; which... may be said to be the empire of men and 
not of laws.” (Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, in Pocock, ed., pp. 9-10.) Harrington cast 
Machiavelli as the figurehead of ancient prudence and Hobbes as the figurehead of modem prudence.
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and property—that to which one was entitled by nature, and that which one acquired 
after compact.40 Where the pursuit of property threatened the liberty of the citizenry, 
it was up to a “natural aristocracy” of wise (and, so, virtuous) “Legislators” to enact 
laws—particularly agrarian laws41—that protected the naturally ‘independent’ man
• • • • 42from the oppression and servitude bom of acquisitive instincts.
The distinction between ‘modem’ and ‘ancient’ prudence provided Harrington 
with a means of narrating the course of English history within the neo-Aristotelian 
context of natural progress. On its premise, he explained the development and 
decline of ‘Gothic’ feudalism and its implications for British history: changes in 
agrarian law had resulted in the more equitable distribution of ‘dominion’—property 
and its attendant authority—, and an attendant class of citizen freeholders; the 
resulting ‘balance’ not only relieved the oppressed by restoring their ‘liberty’, it freed 
one-time oppressors to pursue reason and goodness—the higher “goods of the
For a further discussion, see Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 43-53,185-205,241-244, 
256-257.
40 Harrington conditioned balanced social and political relations on a balance between rights and 
property. See Pocock, introduction, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, pp. xii-
xvi.
41 As Pocock describes it, the demise of feudalism, and the consequent redistribution of arable land, 
marked a pivotal point in the progress towards potentiality. The rise of militias that resulted from the 
decline of feudalism meant the elevation of vassals into landowners—into citizens. The zoon 
politikon—the local citizen—assumed authority by virtue o f “his sword and his freehold,” and the basis 
of political personality became property. In the end, Pocock writes, agrarian law placed dominion “into 
the hands of independent proprietors, freeholders and gentlemen,” the effects o f which “were 
revolutionary because neither monarchy nor nobility controlled them.” (Pocock, introduction, The 
Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, p. xix) Borrowing on Bacon’s History ofKing 
Henry the Seventh, Harrington cited Henry VII as marking the turning point in English history. See 
Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 386; Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth 
o f Oceana, pp. xviii-xix.
42 Harrington’s vision o f the ideal legislator, like Plato’s ‘philosopher prince’, combined the attributes 
of authority (reason) and power (riches). This was the premise of a “natural”—as opposed to 
“hereditary”—elite. The advantage of agrarian law was that it restored the divine balance conducive to 
a natural elite. See Harrington, The Commonwealth o f  Oceana, pp. 13,8, 23; Harrington, A System o f  
Politics, p. 281
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mind.”43 Liberty and virtue were thus entwined. In the end, the vacillating swings of 
progression and regression—from the Ancient constitution to ‘Gothic’ feudalism and 
back again—appeared as a national struggle toward potentiality, an evolution beyond 
the acquisitive instincts of illiberal mechanics towards the reason and virtue of the 
‘natural’ legislator.44
Identity was necessarily implicated in this narrative. Harrington understood 
identity to be a natural consequence of the relationship between rights and dominion 
in the social sphere. Because ‘Gothic’ feudalism had confined dominion to king and 
nobility, it had obstructed the natural right of individuals to acquire property and 
progress themselves towards the higher goods of reason attainable only through 
landed leisure.45 Against this, Harrington advocated legal equality and emphasized 
the authority of the House of Commons.46 Ultimately, then, Harrington’s definition 
of identity was both neo-Aristotelian and Reformed Christian: on the one hand, it 
perceived identity in terms of a single, whole, and natural self; on the other hand, it 
simultaneously recognized both natural equality and the inequality of will.
43 For Harrington’s analysis o f feudalism, see Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 12-13, 
43-47.
44 For a full discussion of this development, see Pocock, introduction, The Commonwealth o f Oceana 
and A System o f Politics, p. xv-xxiv. In general, Harrington viewed the collapse o f monarchy as an 
opportunity to set Britain back on the proper track toward potentiality. As Pocock explains it, “Oceana 
is not a utopia so much as an occasione, a moment of revolutionary opportunity at which old historical 
forms have destroyed themselves and there is a chance to construct new forms immune from the 
contingencies of history (known as fortuna):' (Pocock, introduction to Harrington, Commonwealth o f  
Oceana, p. xvii) Gordon Wood has made a similar argument for the American Revolution—as 
representing an occasione for virtuous progress. (Wood, Creation o f the American Republic, p. 108) 
See Pocock, introduction to Harrington, Commonwealth o f Oceana, p. xvii.; Gordon S. Wood,
Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969), p. 108
45 For a description of Harrington’s model social order, see Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana,
pp. 80-81.
46 The House of Commons being a necessary balance to noble authority and the natural defender of 
individual rights, it was essential to the preservation o f civic virtue. See Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment, p. 407.
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In the end, Harrington’s philosophy conduced to a republic based on 
meritocracy, not democracy. Indeed, Harrington opposed democracy on grounds that 
it placed power in the hands of ignorant mechanics—men without land, education or 
virtue—and, therefore, risked a society based on acquisitive instincts.47 However, if 
inequalities of identity were theoretically understood to derive from inequalities of 
will, they were—in practice—qualified by a definition of independence that rooted
48virtue in land: Harrington’s ‘wise Legislators’ were “gentleman” freeholders. And 
this left room for manipulation. Without the advantage of leveling agrarian laws, 
Harrington’s theory might as conveniently explain the natural claims of a hereditary 
elite as the natural equality of ambitious commoners. Indeed, although Harrington 
rejected hereditary authority (based on birth) as an insufficient substitute for a natural 
aristocracy (based on wisdom), their distinction was readily blurred.49
In addition to articulating a natural identity based on common attributes and 
inequalities of will, Harrington is important for examining the relationship between 
imperial politics and colonial identities.50 Harrington described two types of empires:
47 Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 36-37.
48 As Harrington explained it, as “the leading of her armies... seems to be peculiar unto the genius o f a 
gentleman... [,] so it is in the universal series of history, that if any man have founded a commonwealth, 
he was first a gentleman.” See Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, p. 38.
49 While Harrington defended the ideal o f the citizen-freeholder, he did not advocate social equality; a 
margin of “social differentiation” was necessary to satisfy the Aristotelian complement between 
“political functions” and “social characteristics.” What Harrington endorsed was the replacement of a 
hereditary aristocracy based on birth and custom with a “natural” one based on merit, the latter 
supported by a large class o f citizen freeholders. As he described it, a nobility who need not labor for 
its livelihood—‘“such as live upon their own revenues in plenty, without engagement either unto the 
tilling of their lands or other work for their livelihood’ ”—is “necessary unto the mixture of a well- 
ordered commonwealth. For how else can you have a commonwealth that is not altogether mechanic?” 
(Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 137-138) The principle o f meritocracy continued to inform 
perceptions of social rank through the Revolutionary period. See Harrington, The Commonwealth of 
Oceana, pp. 20, 137-14; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 394-395; Plato, Republic, p. 83.
50 Colonies were groups of people “planted” by the State for their mutual benefit. See Machiavelli, The 
Discourses, Discourse II.6, in Crick, pp. 292-293.
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one ‘internal’ or domestic, the other ‘external’ and expansive; one characterized by 
limited property, the other by acquisitive interests; one capable of a ‘balanced’ 
dominion conducive to stability and the common good, the other subject to instability 
and oppression.51 In being an ‘external’ empire, Britain was vulnerable to the 
influence of interest rather than reason, property rather than good, laws rather than 
rights, power rather than authority.52 The difficulties attendant this circumstance were 
exacerbated by the unequal distribution of legal rights to which external empires were 
likewise prone; according to Harrington, the drive for dominion that motivated 
external empires wrongly inclined them to compromise the natural rights of provincial 
and colonial subjects in the interest of homeland power. The result was an imperial 
social hierarchy informed by proximity to the metropolis. Not only was this 
inconsistent with natural law, it was inherently unstable: on the one hand, the 
isolation of colonial societies made distinctions difficult to enforce and easy to ignore; 
on the other hand, it nurtured the rise of local elites to challenge the authority of 
distant rivals.53
Harrington’s analysis is interesting for what it implies about the rightful 
claims of colonial and provincial subjects. Against Hobbes, Harrington suggested 
that colonists and provincials were entitled to the same legal rights as their homeland 
compatriots.54 By extension, he suggested that colonial and provincial property was
51 Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 11-12.
52 Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 18-19; Harrington, A System o f Politics, pp. 290- 
293.
j3 Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 16-17; St. Thomas Aquinas, The Summa of 
Theology, 1-11, Qu. 97, 3, in Sigmund, p. 57.
54 Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 16-17.
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entitled to the same rights as homeland property. Thus, at least in theory, a colonial 
landowner might claim the same social and political privileges as his homeland 
counterpart. Yet certain questions were left unanswered: could this hold true if the 
land owned by the colonist was employed for commercial purposes as opposed to 
being a medium of rents and leases?55 And, indeed, within the context of
56imperialism, on what grounds might a colonist claim disinterested independence?
For all its theoretical significance, Harrington’s thesis suffered from internal 
weaknesses that left it vulnerable to manipulation. On the one hand, Pocock notes, 
Harrington failed to foresee the need for a professional army. This prevented him 
from reconciling his citizen militia with the need for an imperial military.57 Second, 
because his understanding of feudal dominion located power in land, he failed to 
consider alternative forms of power—for example, the influence of political 
patronage.58 Ultimately, however, it was Harrington’s inability to anticipate the 
overwhelming influence of commercial and financial forces on British politics—and 
the implications of this influence for the definition of power and property—that 
prevented his doctrine from satisfying the needs of a later generation. Harrington 
believed that landed wealth was essential to knowledge, virtue and good, not because
55 As Pocock notes, “to make land a source of rentals is not the same as to make it a marketable 
commodity.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 433-434.) Nonetheless, once land became a 
resource of trade, the modem freeholder no longer appeared as “independent” as his pre-1675 peer.
See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 433-434,450.
56 A commercial plantation did not carry the same connotations and privileges as a multigenerational 
freehold whose income derived from rents and leases. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 
433-434,450.
57 Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System o f Politics, pp. xix-
xx.
58 Pocock, introduction to Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana and A System o f Politics, pp. xx-
xxi.
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other forms of economic self-sufficiency were unavailable, but because other forms 
did not remove the individual from the corrupting influence of private interest. 
Harrington endorsed real property as the foundation of virtue, the basis of citizenship, 
and the premise for bearing arms because he believed that mobile property failed to 
nurture the kind of personal sacrifice essential to common good—“civic personality 
was not a commodity”59—, but this presumed that land itself was not marketable.
That this proved unfounded only complicated his legacy.
III. Reforming the Gap
Harrington and Hobbes were not the only thinkers debating the relationship 
between the individual and society. British writings of the period invoke a number of 
theories, some more influenced by ancient philosophy—the Cambridge Platonists, for 
example—and some more grounded in contemporaiy experience—that of John 
Locke.60 In general, however, despite the force of Hobbes’s writings, most early- 
modern intellectuals were at least minimal realists, conceding at least a modicum of
59 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 390-391. Machiavellian virtu is distinct from virtue: virtu 
is about the temporal, civic force that effects a transformation of power, usually manifest in the sword; 
virtue is about the inherent and eternal qualities o f the individual, manifest in the pursuit o f common 
good or, more privately, in adherence to a Christian life. Virtu gives way to virtue in neo- 
Machiavellian theory. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 405.
60 The Cambridge Platonists included Benjamin Whichcote (1609-1683), John Smith (1616-1652), 
Ralph Cudworth (1617-1688), Nathaniel Culverwel (c. 1618-c. 1651), Peter Sterry (1613-1672) and 
Henry More (1614-1687). In general, Copleston writes, they were Platonists insofar as they drew 
inspiration from the “tradition of spiritualist metaphysics from Plato to Plotinus” and, under the 
influence of Lord Herbert of Cherbury (1583-1648), posited the existence o f certain a priori truths 
“implanted by God and... apprehended by ‘natural instinct’.” (Copleston, V, pp. 53-54) As Copleston 
writes, they shared “a belief in the mind’s power of discerning immutable truths, which bear the 
evidence of their truth within themselves and which are in some sense imprinted on the mind... [,] 
interwove[n...] into the principles of our reason.” (Copleston, V, pp. 62-63) He explains: “They 
believed in the power o f the human reason to attain to objective truth about God and to give us insight 
into absolute and universal moral laws.” (Copleston, V, p. 56) They thus “emphasized the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
75
certain knowledge—a knowledge of God, for example—and endorsing natural reason 
as an instrument of truth consistent with natural or divine law.61
On the more traditional and conservative front, the Cambridge Platonists were 
important less as individual theorists than as a conduit for classicism. As a rule, they 
supported the power of reason, the intelligibility of truth, and the existence of 
absolute and universal moral laws. Moreover, they advocated contemplation in the 
attainment of knowledge and believed benevolence to be an instrument of common 
good. At the same time, they dismissed with the ethic of “ordinary life” and denied 
the authority of empirical methodologies. Their influence is felt, to varying degrees, 
in the writings of George Berkeley and the third earl of Shaftesbury.
On the more contemporary and liberal front, Locke is individually important 
as a spokesman for Restoration (Big) Whigs.62 In general, while Locke accepted the 
existence of moral standards, endorsed the theory of natural law, and deemed nature a 
rational system whose final end was eternal goodness, he simultaneously denied the 
notion of innate ideas and rejected customary authority as imperfect convention. 
Moreover, while he conceded an innate knowledge of God and deemed “morality... 
the proper science, and business o f mankind in general ,”63 thereby endorsing some
contemplative attitude.” (Copleston, V, pp. 56-57) Their position was opposed, most notably, by 
Viscount Bolingbroke. See Copleston, V, pp. 52-65, 164.
61 This was true of both Locke and the Platonists. See Copleston, V, pp. 52-53.
62 As suggested, for example, by A Letter from a Friend, to a Person of Quality (London: printed for T. 
Davies, 1682), attributed to Locke. His writings were largely influenced by important political figures 
like Anthony Ashley Cooper—later the first earl of Shaftesbury—and John Somers—later Lord 
Somers. See Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 37 and 53.
63 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 570. Locke’s denial o f innate moral 
principles was not a denial of moral law and its roots in divine reason. Indeed, An Essay for the 
Understanding o f St. Paul’s Epistles, By Consulting St. Paul himself defended empiricism only in the 
absence of revelation: “Now we see but by Reflection the dim, and as it were enigmatical 
Representation of things.... Now 1 have but a superficial partial knowledge o f things, but then I shall 
have an intuitive comprehensive knowledge o f them, as I my self am known, .. .not by the Obscure and
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rationalist tendencies, he rejected theoretical methodologies in favor of the ‘scientific 
method’ advanced by Robert Boyle (1627-1691) and Sir Isaac Newton (1642-1727) 
that which joined inductive analysis (the compiling of “natural histories” through 
observation and experiment) with deductive synthesis (the use of mathematical laws 
for the deduction of certain opinions).64 Hence his theory of tabula rasa—that blank 
mental tablet progressively impressed by life experience.65
In fact, selective manipulation made numerous combinations of classicism, 
Protestantism, empiricism, rationalism, and individualism conveniently compatible.66 
For example, if Calvinism deemed grace to arise from a voluntary obedience to divine 
laws—piety, temperance, humility, etc.—and the successful fulfillment of one’s duty 
or ‘calling’, thereby endorsing a self-determined identity based on will and industry, 
so, too, did empiricism endorse what Taylor has called a “Baconian Revolution,” “a 
transvaluation of values” in which human industry, “previously stigmatized as lower,” 
was made the standard of human virtue—public heroism being newly “convicted of
Imperfect way of Deduction and Reasoning.” (Locke, An Essay for the Understanding o f St. Paul’s 
Epistle’s, p. 84) The point for Locke was that the truths o f God and revelation will complement our 
natural reason. See Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 77, 93-94, 105-106, 109- 
215, 532; Locke, An Essay for the Understanding o f St. Paul’s Epistles, By Consulting St. Paul himself 
(London: Printed for Awn sham and John Churchill, 1707), p. 84; Copleston, V, pp. 79-127, 171.
64 Woolhouse, introduction to Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. xvii; Copleston, 
V, pp. 71-72, 143-153.
65 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. 109.
66 Indeed, as Taylor writes, “The Puritan theology of work and ordinary life provided a hospitable 
environment for the scientific revolution.... One can even say that the paradigm authority figure 
against which both rebellions were levied was the same[:] Aristotle....” (Taylor, p. 230) This is not to 
suggest a uniformity of thought, but rather a mutual need to identify a secular morality that might fill 
the gap left by the decline o f heroic virtue and orthodox Christianity. This conduced to the ‘ethic of 
ordinary life’. (Taylor, p. 234) See Taylor, pp. 230,234.
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presumption and vanity”.6' Both, in other words, could be understood to endorse a 
self-determined worth based on private industry in pursuit of higher good.68
Nonetheless, while the goals of Lockean empiricism and Aristotelian 
classicism could be compatible, Locke’s emphasis on sense-perception as the only 
medium of knowledge prior to revelation—as opposed to being a mere Aristotelian 
point-of-departure for higher reason—lent empiricism an intellectual significance not 
found in the Aristotelian tradition. In addition, moreover, Locke suggested to his 
readers a natural capacity for independent reasoning and the autonomy to pursue a 
self-determined good.69 This underscored the self-determined nature of reason and 
virtue advanced by the Reformation, undermining the authority of inherited customs 
and power structures.70 But it also obscured the standards of identity and social order 
supporting traditional civic humanism. As the ‘meaning of life’ was made manifest to 
the individual in the amalgam of mental imprints—‘sensations’—accumulated during 
the course of experience and known through ‘reflection’, so identity became a 
byproduct of the relationship between experience and intellect, the effect of which 
was impressed on the individual consciousness. Identity was thus internal and 
psychological (discovered) rather than external and sociological (prescribed).71
67 Baumeister, p. 52; Taylor, pp. 213-214, 218, 227; Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 162.
68 Taylor, pp. 23, 85, 88, 112,230,232, 234, 278-279; Baumeister, p. 56.
69 As Locke explains, “so far as a man has a power to think, or not to think... according to the direction 
of his own mind, so far is a mart/ree.... So that liberty cannot be, where there is no thought, no 
volition, no will.... I think the question is not proper, whether the will be free, but whether a man be 
freer  (Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 223-228) See Locke, An Essay 
Concerning Human Understanding, pp. 220-245.
,0 For Descartes, the self was manifest in the mind, immaterial but perceptive. For Locke, the self 
resided in consciousness, built up over experience. See Canfield, p. 26.
71 Copleston, V, pp. 100-101. As Taylor observes, Locke’s emphasis on self-consciousness offered the 
prospect of self re-making. This distinguished Locke from Hobbes. See Locke, An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding, pp. 297-312; Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 55-57;
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In many ways, Lockean individualism—in which the autonomous and 
determining self seeks the general good through communion and cooperation with 
other autonomous and determining subjects—represented a reconciliation of 
Reformed Christianity with rationalism, empiricism and classicism.72 However, by 
rejecting key provisions in classical theory—the possibility of human access to perfect 
knowledge, the theoretical nature of truth and reality, and the rightful authority of a 
customary elite to determine the parameters of individual improvement and social 
progress—Locke undermined the credibility of Aristotelian classicism. Moreover, in 
shifting emphasis from an external—i.e. sociological—identity to an internal—i.e. 
psychological—one, he reinforced the Reformed emphasis on private virtue as the 
measure of individual worth. This introduced a condition of disengagement—the 
separation and coexistence of individual and society. At the same time, the definition 
of independence was transformed from a privileged disinterest based on educated 
leisure to an autonomous pursuit of a self-determined good. Consequently, the self- 
conscious self-determination, used in Christian doctrine to explain the realization of 
individual virtue and goodness in the eternal sphere, became a means of defending the 
individual’s right to political and social authority in the temporal one.
Ultimately, then, Locke united elements of Christianity and classicism into a 
variation on the classical narrative in which men voluntarily advanced from the state 
of nature to the state of society in order to preserve their property—their “Life,
Woolhouse, introduction to Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, p. ix; Taylor, pp. 
165-172,235-237; Canfield, p. 26.
72 Taylor, p. 233.
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Liberties and Estates.”73 In the process, they relinquished their natural executive 
authority to a communal, public will while retaining a legislative right to
* 75sovereignty.74 They did not, however, relinquish their individual natural rights.
And in this sense, they existed simultaneously as individual private persons—with 
natural rights governed by principles of natural law, the mirror of divine law and 
human reason—and members of a social community—as public persons with 
contracted responsibilities and privileges.76 Significantly, Locke’s vision of equality, 
like Harrington’s, was one of capacity and potentiality.77 As such, it was not a denial
78of inequalities of industry, will or merit. Nor was it an endorsement of democracy. 
Rather, Locke’s equality bore political implications of a functional nature. Equality 
meant equal legal protection for all members of the community, regardless of birth, 
through the general preservation of natural rights. Indeed, if the primary function of
73 Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 367, 395, 428-429. According to Locke, the transformation from 
communal to private property resulted from the ‘mixing’ o f labor with material goods. Over time, men 
joined together to ensure the security of their property, not only for themselves, but for their posterity. 
This guaranteed the right of inheritance. Eventually, the surplus of material goods resulted in the 
introduction of money, which became a recognized alternative to material property. (Locke, Two 
Treatises, pp. 243-248, 327-344, 374-393) See Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 243-248, 327-344, 374- 
393; Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 115-117.
74 For a description of Legislative, Executive and Federative powers, see Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 
401-412,456. As Laslett notes, Locke does not quite argue for the separation of powers found in 
American government. His executive and federative powers likely reside in the same person/ assembly 
and may likewise be part o f the legislative branch—as in the British King-in-Parliament. On the other 
hand, Locke’s insistence on the sovereignty of the people went far to change contemporary perceptions 
of citizenship as a universal responsibility rather than an elite privilege. See Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 
401-412; Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 123-124, 132-135, 395-398.
75 Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 368-369, 374-375, 381-382; Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, 
pp. 120, 127-130.
16 In Locke’s case, Laslett writes, “Natural law was... a part of his rationalism, his conviction that the 
universe is to be understood rationally.. . ,  but at all points it must be compared with, made to fit into, 
the observed, the empirical facts about the created world and human behaviour.” See Laslett, 
introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 93-114; Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 81, 106-110, 309-311, 
350-353; Copleston, V, pp. 128-140.
77 As Locke himself wrote, “By Common-wealth, I... mean, not a Democracy,... but any Independent 
Community.. .”—i.e. one premised on the sovereignty of independent men. See Locke, Two Treatises, 
p. 400.
78 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 346.
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government was to progress the good, Locke suggested that the only means of doing 
so was by preserving natural rights.79 In Locke’s view, when a government failed in 
this regard, or when it exceeded the limits of its power, it entered upon “a state o f 
War” and the people had a right to dissolve it: “Who shall be Judge whether the 
Prince or Legislative act contrary to their Trust?... To this I reply, The People shall be 
Judge...
Locke’s influence is often cited in tandem with the events of the American
Revolution.81 And, certainly, a much-modified version of his essays on government
was reprinted in Boston in 1773 for an audience of increasingly disaffected colonists,
82informing Jefferson’s writing of the Declaration o f Independence. In part, Locke’s
appeal turned, no doubt, on his pragmatism: he seemed to provide answers for 
pressing contemporary questions.83 In the portion of his Treatises to hit the colonies, 
for example, Locke refers specifically to the issue of representation. In this, he argues
79 Locke wrote: “The end of Law is not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve and enlarge Freedom....” 
See Locke, Two Treatises, p. 348.
80 Locke, Two Treatises, p. 476. According to Locke, if  a government fails to uphold the good 
legislated by the people (through their representatives), its authority can be dissolved while society 
remains intact. On this premise, Locke defined two compacts: the first establishing society; the second 
establishing its form of government. See Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 401-412, 454-477.
81 Copleston, V, p. 140
82 According to Laslett, the version “read by Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau” and American colonists 
was based on a translation by David Mazel which omitted the Preface, first Treatise and a portion of  
the second Treatise. Quietly modified to reflect “the Enlightenment and eighteenth-century 
Revolutionism,” it arrived in the colonies as a 1773 Boston reprint of Hollis’s 6th London edition 
(1764). See Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 24-26.
83 Locke’s Two Treatises, for example, while printed at the time of the Glorious Revolution and 
intended, at that moment, to serve as a rationale for William Ill’s rule, were initially responsive to 
earlier controversies, including the notion of divine right advanced by Sir Robert Filmer, and the 
Exclusion crisis, which turned on Whig efforts to exclude the Catholic James o f York from succeeding 
to the throne of his brother, Charles II. The Exclusion Bill faded—James of York became James II—  
but Whigs continued to consult against James II, resulting in the so-called Insurrection Plot (1682) and 
Assassination Plot (1683). In general, then, the Two Treatises were likely written between 1679 and
1683—in three parts rather than two—and only later modified to serve the needs o f the Glorious 
Revolution o f 1688-1689. See Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 59-75, 89-90; Locke, 
Two Treatises, pp. 173-176, 184, 213.
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that it is the responsibility of the Executive power—a subordinate of Legislative 
power—to adjust the balance of representation in accordance with changing times and 
demographic trends.84 In fact, however, like most philosophers grappling with the 
inherent conflicts between ideology and experience, Locke himself was not always 
consistent. Indeed, the ideological differences separating Hobbes, Harrington, Locke, 
and others resurfaced in the subsequent debates between ‘Country’ and ‘Court’.85
86IV. Country and Court
The theoretical disengagement of the internal self from the external world lent 
new agency to the individual, who was increasingly held responsible for his potential 
contribution to—and place within—society. The development of commerce only
84 Locke wrote: “For it being the interest, as well as the intention of the People, to have a fair and equal 
Representative... [;] in time the measures of representation might vary, and those places have a just 
right to be represented which before had none....” See Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 418-420; quoted from 
p. 420.
85 These included: the ‘standing army controversy’ or ‘paper war’ o f ca. 1698-1702, which set 
‘Country’ representatives Andrew Fletcher and Charles Davenant against Courtiers like Daniel Defoe 
and Jonathan Swift; the succession controversy played out in the final four years o f Queen Anne’s 
reign, which pit the Tory Jonathan Swift against Whigs Joseph Addison and (in a switch) Daniel Defoe; 
the South Sea Crisis (1720), which inspired John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon’s Cato’s Letters and 
The Independent Whig; and an opposition movement that pit Lord Bolingbroke’s Craftsman against Sir 
Robert Walpole’s London Journal. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 426-436.
86 The correlation between Country and Court, Tory and Whig is confusing. It was the 1sl Earl of 
Shaftesbury who initially outlined the Whig/ Country cause in his attack on Danby in 1675. By the 
accession o f William III, however, the success of the Big Whigs—such as Shaftesbury—had placed 
them in power, encouraged them to modify their cause, and relegated the Tories to the Country 
position. Some Whigs, however, called ‘Old’ or ‘Independent’ Whigs, opposed the platform of the 
Modem Court Whigs and allied themselves with the Tories, thus forming a Country party made up of 
Tories and Independent Whigs. Under the reign of Queen Anne, however, when the Tories once again 
assumed executive power, the Modem Whigs resumed an Opposition position. By 1714, however, 
with the Tories again in decline, the Independent Whigs faced a choice between the high-church 
interests o f the Tories, which upset their religious sympathies, and the patronage and professional 
armies of the powerful Court Whigs, which upset their political sympathies. In the end, they opted in 
support of the Court Whigs, instigating a long period o f powerful Whig rale under the administration of 
Sir Robert Walpole (1721— 1742). Only with the rise of George III (1760-1820) did the Tories, once 
again, acquire power. At no time, however, did County or Court become marginal. In general, 
however, the Country party represented the old-style, landed civic humanists. See Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 478.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
82
reinforced these changes, putting pressure on the balance-of-influence between social
and political authority. The problem was twofold: a civic humanist narrative no longer
representative of the dramatic changes affecting the social, economic, and political
order;87 and the emergence of a commercial authority whose very existence
• 88contradicted inherited notions of the proper foundation for society.
Essentially, while all sought to retain the purpose of common good, visions of 
the “good” diverged in the face of socioeconomic change.89 On the one hand, a 
Country party continued to stress the means to goodness—the civic virtue bom of 
Aristotelian classicism. Composed largely of freeholders, it likewise persisted in 
basing this means—civic virtue—on land.90 On the other hand, a Court party stressed 
the ends of goodness—the happiness that accmed to individuals and the State.91 
Moreover, composed largely of officials, nobility, and commoners invested in the
87 As Pocock observes: “The Augustan journalists and critics were the first intellectuals on record to 
express an entirely secular awareness of social and economic changes going on in their society, and to 
say specifically that these changes affected both their values and their modes of perceiving social 
reality. They used largely Machiavellian paradigms to articulate and express this awareness.” Pocock, 
The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 458-459, 462; quoted from p. 462.
88 “Solutions were of course to be found in seeking to depict society as an economic mechanism, in 
which the exchange of goods and the division o f labor operated to turn universal selfishness to 
universal benefit,” examples of which can be found in “Addison, Mandeville, and Montesquieu.” Yet 
“there was an important sense in which all this was either beside the point or the admission of a 
necessary evil....” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 460,465) See Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 451,460-461, 465.
89 If, at least initially, all civic humanists supported what Pocock describes as the “paradigmatic image 
of the freeholder founded upon real or landed property which was inheritable rather than 
marketable...[,] protected by the ancient... common law, [and supported by]... membership in the 
related structures of the militia and the parliamentary electorate, thus guaranteeing civic virtue,” the 
influence of new economic circumstances encouraged change and compromise. Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 450.
90 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 408. Around 1675, a ‘Country’ platform can be said to have 
emerged as a result of a growing recognition of the threat to civic humanism, a recognition resonant in 
Shaftesbury’s attack on Danby’s ministry. This platform endorsed “frequent parliaments, exclusion of 
placemen, a qualification in landed property for members o f the House of Commons.” See Pocock, 
The Machiavellian Moment, p. 478.
91 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 403-404.
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pursuit of empire, it was prepared to envision an alternative medium of goodness—an 
alternative to civic virtue.92 In the end, because the ‘Court’—guided by the demands 
of an external empire—was more willing to make compromises conducive to 
commercial expansion and material gain, it appeared to prioritize property and
93interest above land and reason, at the risk of corruption.
While many Britons were willing to adopt Court practices—and its promise of 
happiness—, few were willing to accept Court theory.94 By the late seventeenth- 
century, the struggle to assimilate a modem economy and its market man into a civic 
humanist ideology traditionally opposed to commerce and trade was yielding 
inadequate and ambiguous results. On the one hand, the Country platform became 
increasingly hierarchical and conservative. For example, whereas the principle of 
balanced authority between legal equals mutually engaged in the pursuit of higher 
good was intended by Flarrington as a liberating doctrine, by the 1690s, it had been 
manipulated by a neo-Country ‘Opposition’ who, while defending the authority of a 
landed and liberal elite against the corruptive influence of power and property, blurred 
the line between a ‘natural’ and ‘hereditary’ aristocracy, thereby subverting
92 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 407.
93 Without denying the link between independence and virtue, and while continuing to define virtue as 
the pursuit of common good, the Court denied the existence o f ‘ancient’ principles and rejected the 
necessary correlation between independence and land, at the same time recognizing the influence of 
interest. It also deemed the king’s engagement in the House of Commons—by way of patronage—a 
necessary tool of modem politics. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 406-407, 416-420, 483.
94 The Court ideology “accurately identified the forces making for historical change and explained how 
government must and did work on its new foundations, but which supplied neither polity nor 
personality with a coherent moral structure...; its moral and philosophical theory affirmed that the 
mainsprings of both motivation an perception in human beings were pride and passion, fantasy and 
self-interest. Hard as it was to reconcile the philosophies..., the conditions o f British politics in the 
eighteenth century... commanded that some such attempt be made....” Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment, p. 467.
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Harrington’s vision of merit to one of birth.95 At the same time, Harrington’s vision 
of legal equality was subverted to a more feudal interpretation of Crown and nobility. 
In this “patriotic” vision, the negative content of “Gothic England” was subverted to 
the ideology of an “Ancient English” past. This was made evident in the elevated 
association between Gothic England and Grecian virtue.96 As Henry Fielding 
described it in his novel, Tom Jones, “The gothic style of building could produce 
nothing nobler than Mr. Allworthy’s [—read Mr. Virtue’s—] house. There was an air 
of grandeur in it that struck you with awe, and rivalled the beauties of the best 
Grecian architecture....”97 In this paradoxical twist on ‘ancient’ prudence, ‘modem’
• • 98Gothic feudalism became the national variant on ‘ancient’ Greek classicism. The 
result was a “neo-Country” narrative inconsistent with Harrington’s intentions.99
95 As Pocock explains, “Down to 1688, ...the Whigs were still a near-rebellious opposition.... 
[However, the] amalgam which was Whig ideology in the eighties disintegrated during the decade 
following the Revolution; and the neo-Harringtonian thesis became an instrument of radical reaction in 
an era of devastating economic change.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 421-422)
Following the Glorious Revolution and the ascension o f William HI, England’s engagement in global 
commerce and the Nine Years War (1689-1697) nurtured a distrust of modem interests and the 
wherewithal of republican ideals to contain them. The failure of the Rump Parliament to enact frequent 
elections, and to separate the military from the Executive branch, nurtured dissatisfaction with classical 
republicanism, opening the way for “ideological retrenchment” and a return to monarchy.
Consequently, a neo-Harringtonian Country Party emerged that subverted the mle of law to an 
aristocracy of landed Public Men. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 380-383,406, 414, 
421-422,446; Locke, Two Treatises, p. 287; Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 37-53.
96 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 429-432.
97 Henry Fielding, Tom Jones (1750), ed. Douglas Brooks-Davies (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E.
Tuttle, 1998), p. 28.
98 In a significant departure from Harrington’s doctrine, for example, Andrew Fletcher described the 
decline of “ancient” feudalism as causing two key shifts in the social order: the birth of courtiers 
concerned more with refinement and politeness than military prowess, and the elevation of industrious 
commoners increasingly vested in an expanding marketplace. From this he concluded that culture and 
commerce went hand-in-hand, each a catalyst in the loss of independence and virtue. This required the 
institution o f ‘modem’ prudence. Hence the rise o f “frugality... [:] the surrender of private 
satisfactions... and in short the virtue, which the social order itself no longer guarantees.” See Pocock, 
The Machiavellian Moment, p. 432; Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xvi.
99 As Harrington’s position on real and mobile property came face-to-face with an expanding 
commercial economy, a concern “with virtue as the moral as well as material foundation of social and 
personal life” led to the development of a neo-Harringtonian civic humanism that replaced Harrington’s 
‘natural aristocracy’ with a hereditary nobility. (The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 414, 446) In the
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On the other hand, the Court platform became increasingly individual and 
liberal. If neo-Country advocates subverted ‘ancient’ to ‘modem’ pmdence, the more 
liberal Court dispensed with ‘ancient’ virtue altogether, maintaining that liberty and 
balanced government were modem developments bom of the elevation of the House 
of Commons.100 This served a practical purpose. Once freed from the need for 
‘ancient’ justification, the Court could defend the Bank of England and the 
professional army as necessary consequences of imperial progress. At the same time, 
while acknowledging the traditional distinction between freeholder and market-man, 
men like Defoe—borrowing on the example of Locke—could present cash rather than 
land as the political currency of modem Britain.101
Consequently, however, a different form of virtue was required, one that 
maintained a legal ‘balance’ between power (based on riches) and authority (based on 
reason). Poised on the theoretical threshold between Harrington and Hobbes, men 
like Defoe, Addison, and Fletcher were mutually challenged to fabricate a narrative 
that integrated modem commercial interests into a traditional structure of civic
process, the radical elements of Harrington’s theory were supplanted by an agenda compatible with the 
conservative objectives of the hereditary elite. In the end, Pocock argues, Harrington’s neo- 
Machiavellian Aristotelianism became the basis for a conservative civic humanism responsive to the 
effects o f “Court, corruption, [and] office” unfamiliar to Harrington. (Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment, p. 409.) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 380-383,409,414,416,421-422,446. 
10CI According to Pocock, Defoe’s Court Argument (1698) presented ‘mixed government’ as a modem 
development, not an ancient one. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 435.
101 Locke had argued that the introduction o f money—an arbitrary medium of exchange—nurtured the 
transition from a natural economy based on self-sufficiency and bartering to a political economy of 
property relations. (Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 341-344) Among neo-Country advocates, however, 
“land .. .was understood as the necessary economic foundation of the virtuous citizen... [;] money was 
one of the major dangers to the maintenance of freedom and public virtue.” (Hundert, introduction, The 
Fable o f the Bees, p. xvii.) See Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 341-344; Hundert, The Fable o f the Bees, p. 
xvii; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 435-436,447.
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virtue.102 Yet, their effort to construct an alternative ideology was weakened by the 
dominance of the civic humanist paradigm, which had already taught them that 
commerce was founded on dependence and, hence, was naturally prone to 
corruption.103 It was thus necessary to identify an alternative source of virtue, an 
alternative form of humanism, what Pocock calls a “civic morality of investment and 
exchange,” which injected commerce with compassion and equated “the commercial 
ethic with the Christian.”104 Enter self-control.105
By fabricating a system of credit based on “sympathy and opinion,” 
encouraging a frugality that restored excess to the common stock, and eliminating the
102 Defoe, for one, tried to dampen fears of instability by positing the logic of credit itself. Credit, he 
argued, arose “only where men have confidence in one another and in the kingdom.” (Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 454) Addison likewise argued that credit was the child not of “popery, 
tyranny, and republicanism,” but o f “liberty, moderation, and the Protestant succession,” and that the 
Royal Exchange was “not... a place of dealing in stocks and funds, but... a concourse of solid 
merchants exchanging real commodities through the medium of money.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment, pp. 455,457; Addison, Spectator, 3) By these means, Credit itself might be presented as its 
own brand of virtue. As Pocock observes, “The ideological thrust was constantly toward the absorption 
of stockjobber into merchant: the rentier... into the entrepreneur...; in Locke’s terminology, the 
emphasis is switched from ‘fancy’ to ‘agreement’. The latter, of course, is social, where the former is 
arbitrary and egocentric, and this makes it more rational and virtuous. But the rationality is only that of 
opinion and experience.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 456-457) See Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 454-457; Joseph Addison and Richard Steele, The Commerce o f Everyday 
Life: Selections from The Tatler and The Spectator, ed. Erin Mackie (New York: Bedford/ St.
Martin’s, 1998).
103 While Defoe and Addison aimed to “validate the commercial world by appeal to conceptions of 
public virtue,” they “found themselves confronted by the paradigm of a citizen whose virtue did not rest 
upon a capacity for exchange.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 451, 457-458) Moreover, 
they “knew no theory of civic or moral personality which could easily be applied to the new 
society...[;] the ‘liberal’ or ‘bourgeois’... shift toward privatization [meant]... the admission that in a 
commercial society the individual’s relation to his res publica, could not be simply civic or virtuous.” 
(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 436) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 436, 449- 
451,457-458.
104 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 440-441. As Pocock explains, “the civic or participatory 
ideal had come to be expressed in terms of an agrarian mode of property acknowledged to exist mainly 
in the past... [and] employed a theory of social personality in which virtue was held to be civic and 
was grounded on material bases which could not be bartered away without the loss of virtue itself.” 
(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 436)
105 Plato described self-control as the evidence of reason subduing passion. Frugality was its modem 
guise. See Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xvii-xviii. In 1721, the 
Bishop George Berkeley published An Essay towards preventing the Ruin o f Great Britain , which
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public debt—through, for example, the restoration of the militia, which did not 
require cash pay and, hence, public investment—, interest and speculation might be 
curtailed, the rightful place of the Public Man restored, and the common good 
secured.106 But self-control and frugality were negative virtues—those of restraint 
rather than action. They were thus more social and less heroic.107 This contradicted 
the privileged place of civic virtue in the discourse of civic humanism.108 Indeed, 
against the heroic ideal, the Court posited a socio-economic one, arguing in support of 
a strong executive power to police human passions against the threat of corruption.109 
Hence, as the market man was transformed, ideologically-speaking, into the 
freeholder, a public-minded “civic” humanism gave way, at least in part, to a private-
contained a call to religion, industry, frugality and public spirit in view of the calamities caused by the 
South Sea Bubble.” (Copleston, V, p. 203) For more on Berkeley, see Copleston, V, pp. 203-248.
106 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 445.
10' “Augustan political economics,” Pocock writes, “mark the moment when the trader—and, still more 
pressingly, the financier—was challenged to prove that he could display civic virtue in the sense that 
the landed man could.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 445) See Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment, p. 445; Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xviii.
108 Bolingbroke, for example, was less concerned with locating individual or social virtue and more 
with identifying political virtue. The conservative Opposition leader whose Craftsman waged a verbal 
campaign against Sir Robert Walpole and the Court, Bolingbroke accepted “the constitutional 
implications o f the Glorious Revolution of 1688,” but opposed what he perceived to be the “corruptive 
influences o f the Financial Revolution that had inseparably attended it.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment, p. 479) In an effort to offset the ‘corrupting’ influences of executive power, he sought to 
“restore” the ‘Ancient’ constitution by assimilating the republic-in-monarchy (defined by a king, lords, 
and commons) into the classical paradigm o f three estates (the one, few, and many) and, in so doing, to 
separate their functions—forging an executive, judicial, and legislative—and curtail the seepage of 
influence. As Pocock explains, since he and “conflated the languages of function and morality” and 
viewed independence as a key to moral balance, a separation o f powers might be seen as a means of 
assimilating the English system into a classical paradigm, however unsuited to the British King-in- 
Parliament format, which turned on the processes of “debate” and “result.” In fact, although his 
program failed in Britain, it did influence Montesquieu, and it may well have informed—directly or 
indirectly—the American constitution. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 479-485,488.
109 As Pocock explains, “Since it did not regard virtue as politically paradigmatic, it did not regard 
government as founded upon principles of virtue.” See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 487- 
488.
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minded “commercial” humanism.110 Ultimately, faced with the realities of 
commercial imperialism, more moderate civic humanists rearticulated the standards 
of moral virtue and social good in a language which conduced to the ‘Protestant work 
ethic’.111
i 12Indeed, by 1720, when Trenchard and Gordon were penning Cato’s Letters, 
both Country and Court had acknowledged the commercial conditions of modem 
society.113 Where the Country party diverged was in its insistence that modem 
commercialism be held hostage to the higher ideals of civic humanism.114 Thus 
separate “landed” and “moneyed” interests emerged to distinguish those who 
benefited from a traditional land-based economy from those whose future was vested 
in global commerce and trade.115 Whereas the former was represented by the
110 What Pocock describes as a “bourgeois ideology, a civic morality for market man,” that nurtured 
‘ancient’ prudence in the face of modem commerce. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 429- 
431.
111 “In what scholars have called a ‘Protestant ethic’ o f frugality, self-denial, and reinvestment, trading 
society could even be permitted its own version of that classical virtue which consisted in placing the 
common good... above one’s personal profit. B ut... the ethic... was compelled to take second place 
to the ethic o f self-interest ” Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 464.
112 From 1720 to 1724, John Trenchard and Thomas Gordon published Cato’s Letters in the London 
Journal. Both this and the Independent Whig (1714-1719) were widely read by Britons and 
Americans. Targeting corruption, specifically the “monied interest” held responsible for the South Sea 
Crisis, Cato’s Letters employed a “Machiavellian and neo-Harringtonian” rhetoric to represent England 
as a modified version of the classical polis. The effect was to bring the monarchy and nobility into an 
interdependence typical o f the “Gothic” or feudal past. Within this context, it was the function of 
virtue to protect independence from corruption, largely by barring those invested in public credit from 
serving as public representatives. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 467-470, 473-474.
1 “We find it repeatedly conceded that a trading society possesses a psychology of its own ...[;]
Cato’s vision presupposes no agrarian utopia.... But the transition from unpolished virtue to politeness
must be made, and made with the assistance of commerce ” Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p.
470.
114 In fact, the “passions now appear as the pursuits of private and particular goods” that can 
simultaneously serve the public—a transformation of the Aristotelian ethic in which the defense of the 
public interest simultaneously satisfies a private desire for glory. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 
pp. 471-472.
115 According to Pocock, the origins of the “grand antitheses between the ‘landed’ and the ‘monied’ 
interests” are in Swift and Bolingbroke. (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 447) As Hundert 
writes, the “landed interest” represented families who lived off rental income “and who derived few 
supplementary revenues from office holding, commerce or finance.” On the other hand, the “monied
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conservative Country platform, which dictated rule by an elite group of independent 
patriots, the latter was represented by the more liberal Court platform, which vested 
authority in laws rather than men.116
Thus, Pocock notes, the “Augustan debate did not oppose agrarian to 
entrepreneurial interests, the manor to the market, and cannot be said to have arisen 
from a crude awareness of collisions going on between them.”117 Rather, difficulties 
arose from a common investment in the language and values of civic humanism, and 
the inability to conceive an alternative language or ideology by which to redefine 
contemporary society in equally-appealing terms. In the absence of an alternative 
language, one offering a positive view of modem, commercial society, ideas and 
arguments were often unclear and inconsistent, a condition which explains occasional 
shifts in allegiance.118
interest” represented those who engaged either directly or indirectly in finance, commerce and politics. 
See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 447; Hundert, introduction, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. 
xvii-xviii.
116 Patriots were public heroes like Cincinnatus, “whose virtue was thought to derive from their 
devotion to patriotic principles, and was sustained by an aristocratic, landed independence from 
material need.” (Hundert, ed., in Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. xvi-xvii) In the absence of 
such patriots, the ancient philosophers had contended, the rule of law rather than men. See Hundert, 
introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, pp. xvi-xvii; Machiavelli, The Discourses, Discourse 1.2, 
III-1,111.25,111.34, and Crick, introduction and Notes 2, 8, 14, in Crick, pp. 24-25,27-28, 110, 386- 
390, 475-476,497, 529-531
117 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 448. While the neo-Country Opposition might attack 
creditors and the National Debt, they did not condemn merchants, trade, or the Bank of England, all of 
which were necessary to the health o f Britain. (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 439-441, 447) 
By the same token, while Court Whigs might present the neo-Country Opposition “as enemies o f trade” 
and promote the image of “virtuous and benevolent merchants... as emblems of their cause,” they did 
not condemn landowners and aristocrats. (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 448) Indeed, by 
1776, Adam Smith had defined the “monied interest” as something distinct from the “landed” and 
“manufacturing” interest; it represented those who dealt solely in money—and the interest accrued 
from loans o f money—rather than goods and, therefore, excluded traders, merchants, and 
manufacturers. (Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 451-452) Hundert stresses a more clear-cut 
dichotomy between land and trade interests. See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 439-441, 
447-448; Adam Smith, The Wealth o f Nations (1776), ed. Andrew Skinner (New York: Penguin Books, 
1970), pp. 451-452; Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xviii.
118 Fielding, Defoe and Trenchard are examples of changing party allegiance. As Pocock warns, the 
effects were “highly ambivalent... replete with alternatives, conflicts, and confusions, of which they
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All this affected the definition of independence. On the one hand, Country 
advocates continued to define independence in terms of an intellectual disinterest 
based on landed self-sufficiency—evolving in form from a Harringtonian to a neo- 
Harringtonian narrative. In this version, independence became the preserve of British 
‘patriots’—those “willing both to enjoy no source of income but their estates,”
Pocock writes, “and to eschew either the possession or the pursuit of executive 
power.”119 By contrast, the Court recast independence in the form of inter­
dependence, a clear nod to market relations.
Ultimately, the debate between Court and Country turned on a question of the 
meaning of life and its implications for social and political authority. But behind the 
theoretical issues attendant the demise of the freeholder ideal, there also lurked a 
thorny question: in the absence of landed independence, upon what standard would 
identity be based?120 The landed advocates of the neo-Country narrative faced 
socioeconomic changes whose very nature threatened their social and political 
authority.121 As England made the transition from a landed to a commercial
were very well aware and in which they were to some extent entrapped.” See Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 446, 474-476.
119 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 409.
l2° As Pocock observes, the resulting gap between ideology and experience fostered “the age’s intense 
and nervous neoclassicism. The dominant paradigm for the individual inhabiting the world of value 
was that of civic man; but the dominant paradigm for the individual as engaged in historic actuality was 
that of economic and inter-subjective man, and it was peculiarly hard to bring the two together.” 
(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 466) Ultimately, Pocock writes, “The freeman must desire 
nothing more than freedom, nothing more than the public good to which he dedicated himself; once he 
could exchange his freedom for some other commodity, the act became no less corrupting if that other 
commodity were knowledge itself.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 431) See Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 431,466.
121 As Hundert writes, the Court’s platform “directly threatened its members’ political power, social 
standing and self-esteem.” (Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xviii) He 
explains: Sections o f the established ruling orders ... felt endangered by persons recently propelled into 
power by a mysterious finance capitalism whose imperatives seemed at once to subvert traditional 
morality and threaten their social standing. Most fervently expressed during the financial crises of
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economy, it compromised its emphasis on landed independence as the measure of 
virtue and identity.122 Without this standard, identity lost its footing. As E.J. Hundert 
writes: “The prospect of moveable wealth amongst the newly monied, and of land 
treated as capital in a volatile market of anonymous risk-takers, conjured up the 
specter of public opinion alone as the measure of one’s standing....5,123 As Pocock 
likewise notes, “Once property was seen to have a consensual value, expressed in coin 
or in credit, the foundations of personality themselves appeared imaginary or at best 
consensual: the individual could exist, even in his own sight, only at the fluctuating
124value imposed upon him by his fellows....”
1696,1710 and 1720, [neo-Country] ideas retained their force well into the 1760’s and beyond as the 
vagaeries of fortune initiated by a revolution in public finance loomed as a threat to a landed, antique 
ideal of civic freedom and public personality. (Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable of the Bees, 
p. xviii) See Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xviii.
122 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 426-427.
12j Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xvii.
124 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 464.
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CHAPTER IV
NARRATIVES AND IDENTITIES: THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
According to J. G. A. Pocock, the dominant narrative of eighteenth-century 
Britain was an Anglo-Protestant neo-classicism rooted largely in the legacies of 
Aristotle, Machiavelli and Harrington.1 Harrington, for example, had crafted a realist, 
neo-Aristotelian ideology that presented modem England in terms of a natural 
progress from ignorance, interest and passion to reason, virtue and independence, and 
a variation on this doctrine continued to inform the narratives and identities of 
eighteenth-century Britain, however much modified. Yet the dominating influence 
of classical language has tended to obscure the nuances of compromise and reform 
that characterized the development of British civic humanism and the competing
! According to T. A. Sinclair, Plato dominated thought until the fifteenth century, when the influence of 
Aristotle began to increase. In fact, both Plato and Aristotle provided early modem theorists with a 
body of free-standing principles upon which to draw in the construction of ideological narratives. 
Subsequent theorists selectively blended these principles with others drawn, for example, from 
Christian theology, resulting in the development of neo-Platonic and neo-Aristotelian forms of civic 
humanism. For a discussion of this development, see Ross, Aristotle, pp. 2, 21-22, 26-31, 37-57, 65- 
66, 69, 91, 98, 101, 130; Aristotle, The Politics, translated by T. A. Sinclair, revised and re-presented 
by Trevor J. Saunders (New York and London: Penguin Books, (1962,1981) 1992), pp. 15-17. For a 
discussion of Aristotelian influence on Renaissance and early modem thought, see J.G.A. Pocock’s 
three works: The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican 
Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975); Politics, Language and Time: Essays on 
Political Thought and History (Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, (1971) 1989); and Virtue, 
Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly in the Eighteenth Century 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (1985) 1995).
2 Pocock, introduction, The Commonwealth o f Oceana and A System of Politics, p. xix.
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influence of alternative narratives.3 Bishop Berkeley, for example, was critical of 
deist “free-thinkers” like Shaftesbury and denied the existence of a natural moral 
sense, deeming will and reason the mediums of moral rectitude, and moral law a 
divine—as opposed to natural—standard of human virtue.4 Yet Berkeley’s effort to 
formulate a moral science of mathematical certainty bore inconsistent results: in the 
absence of revelation, how could one know universal, moral laws without looking to 
nature for example?
As in the seventeenth century, when Country and Court advocates were 
marked by their different emphases on means and ends, so the eighteenth century 
witnessed the continuation of differences. Neo-Country advocates of the eighteenth 
century—generally New Tories/ Independent and disaffected Whigs—continued to 
define virtue in neoclassical terms of an absolute Platonic ideal, emphasizing the 
natural motivations and character of the active agent—the Public Man (oligarchic 
descendent of the disinterested freeholder)—in the attainment of common good. By 
contrast, advocates of imperial commerce and trade—generally Walpolean/ Court 
Whigs—defined good in civic terms that emphasized national interest at the expense 
of virtuous motivations and ideals. Whereas the former presumed the existence of a 
virtuous good that transcended the self-love and material satisfactions of the secular 
realm, and located its source in the internal, feeling self—-a narrative at least
3 As Gibson-Wood has rightly noted: “Partly because of Barrell’s important study[, The Political 
Theory o f Painting from Reynolds to Hazlitt (1986)], and partly because of its relevance to discussions 
of both the public sphere and taste, the concept of civic humanism has dominated the ways in which 
early eighteenth-century English art and writings about art have been theorized in recent scholarship.” 
See Gibson-Wood, p. 8.
4 For an outline of Berkeley’s theory, see Copleston, V, pp. 199-200, 253-256.
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theoretically compatible with more traditional Christian dogma—, the latter relegated 
such presumptions to a superior, imperfectly-intelligible reality, making virtue a 
social construct informed largely by public perception. The resulting narratives 
endorsed alternative—and potentially conflicting—models of identity.
In general, three schools of thought emerged: a “moral-sense” school, which 
recognized modem, autonomous and reasoning subjects, each acting with varying 
degrees of internal virtue and vice, within a singular, natural and progressive reality 
based on fixed moral standards resonant in a harmonious natural order and the 
necessary perfection of its divine creator;5 a “utilitarian” school, which recognized 
modem subjects as uniformly guided by their private passions and interests within an 
artificially-constructed social reality based on fluid, legally-enforced standards 
designed to bring happiness to the greatest number;6 and a “common-sense” school, 
which recognized modem subjects uniformly (if not consistently) guided by natural 
reason to support the moral laws empirically (if imperfectly) evidenced by human 
nature, these being properly instituted and enforced by the artificial forms of justice 
undergirding society.7
5 Shaftesbury, for example, joined a Lockean subject—autonomous and reasonable—with “anti- 
Lockean moral views”—akin to those of the Cambridge Platonists—into a single, intelligible narrative 
o f natural progress. In Shaftesbury’s case, as Taylor explains, “The goal o f loving and affirming the 
order of the world could also be described as bringing our particular minds into harmony with the 
universal one....” See Taylor, pp. 244-253; quoted from pp. 252-253.
° Mandeville is the best example o f this school. See The Fable o f the Bees and Other Writings (1723), 
ed. E. J. Hundert (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, Inc., 1997). Others, like William Paley (1743- 
1805), adopted a tempered utilitarian interpretation of virtue. See Copleston, V, pp. 196-199.
7 John Erskine of Camock engaged in a full analysis of natural law—for him a byproduct of divine law 
manifest in our conscience—and its proper role as the foundation of positive or civil laws and laws 
between nations. He distinguished between public laws—those “which hath more immediately in view 
the public weal, and the preservation and good order o f society....”—and private laws—“that which is 
chiefly intended for ascertaining the civil rights of individuals.” (Erskine, An Institute o f the Law of  
Scotland, in Broadie, p. 611) For a full discussion of his analysis, see John Erskine, An Institute o f the 
Law of Scotland (1773), excerpted in Broadie, pp. 600-613.
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The result was three broad standards of identity and social order: a social 
hierarchy of complementary identities descending from the disinterested, benevolent 
and polite Public Man—a member of the landed, leisured, and educated elite—to the 
interested, selfish and vulgar masses, each properly assuming his rightful place; legal 
equality among competing individuals, each qualified by circumstances and 
opportunities to assume varying degrees of social and economic stature; and, finally, 
legal equality among individuals simultaneously conditioned by reason and feeling to 
attain varying degrees of personal happiness (competitive) and make varying 
contributions to the social good (complementary).8
In the end, conflict emerged between advocates of complementary 
sociological identities based on fixed standards of reality and potentiality, and 
advocates of dynamic psychological identities based on the fluid standards attendant 
dual realities and potentialities.9 Broadly speaking, then, how one responded to the 
question of identity was a mark of one’s ideological position: those who held tight to 
natural, fixed and intelligible moral standards operating in the civic realm likewise 
recognized a natural inequality of progress among individuals and the higher virtue of 
Public Men;10 those who deemed society the consequence of convention and interest
8 Of course, the actual divisions were not so tidy. For example, men like Adam Smith straddled the gap
between “moral-sense” and “common-sense,” conceding morality to be a product of feeling rather than 
reason, while making its relationship to divine law a matter of imperfect deduction. See Taylor, p. 259.
9 The result was a face-off between internal/ psychological and external/ sociological identities. 
Suddenly, as Taylor observes, “frameworks” were “problematic” because “no framework [was] shared 
by everyone.” See Taylor, pp. 17-18.
10 For Shaftesbury, for example, the issue was one of moral inequality among men. As Copleston 
writes, although Shaftesbury believed that “all men possess conscience or the moral sense” and, 
consequently, considered every man “capable, to some degree at least, of perceiving moral values, of 
discriminating between virtue and vice,” they were not equally progressed in their capacity to do so.
See Copleston, V, pp. 174-175.
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tended to deny the natural premise of social inequalities and society’s necessary 
foundation in moral order, vesting civic authority in laws rather than men.11
All this affected the presentation of identity.12 Conscious of discrepancies 
between one’s self-determined worth and one’s socially-prescribed place, an 
ambitious commoner might assume an ‘improved’—i.e. ‘polite’ or aristocratic— 
personality consistent with his desired identity. Employing dancing masters and 
private tutors, the ambitious could obscure their “humble origins” through an 
education in social refinement.13 Ultimately, as the classical conflation of knowledge 
and virtue with wealth and birth appeared increasingly oppressive, alternative 
narratives gained footing.14 As Baumeister notes, a “person’s place in society was [no 
longer] defined by a rigid social structure based on birth and heritage” and “identity 
was thus [no longer] predominantly determined by society... .”15 In the end, 
Baumeister continues, “the social identity components (family, lineage, social rank)
11 Shaftesbury derided “modern Reformers” like Hobbes for denying the natural laws and virtues 
essential to common good. (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 97.) Among such men, he wrote, “only 
Force and Power ... constituted Right.” (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 90-91) See Shaftesbury, 
Characteristicks, I, pp. 90-91,97; Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 62.
12 Canfield, pp. 1-10, 35-36; Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 333, 401-402.
13 Once society was freed from customary authority and its armory of fixed standards, the individual 
was freed to fashion an identity consistent with his desires. In keeping with this, Baumeister notes, 
“boarding schools... trained young, middle-class girls to pass for upper-class young ladies.” 
(Baumeister, p. 54) At the same time, theorists like Shaftesbury cautioned against the falsities of self- 
fashioning, drawing a clear line between the effects of fashion—a form of dependence—and Gentlemen 
of Fashion—those guided by good breeding. (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 83) Only the latter 
shared attributes with the philosopher. (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, p. 161.) In the end, as 
Baumeister notes, the social ambiguities attendant self-fashioning resulted in a confusion of identities 
aggravated by intermarriage between the noble and commercial classes. (Baumeister, p. 54) See 
Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 83, 124-125, 129-130,135, and III, p. 161; Baumeister, Identity, 
pp. 54, 154, 256,258-259.
14 Although in theory this distinction was conditioned upon natural attributes, it became, in practice, a 
condition of leisure. See Plato, Republic, pp. 17-23, 30-31.
13 Baumeister, Identity, p. 170.
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began to undergo trivialization and destabilization... as identity became a matter of 
social negotiation.16
I. “Moral Sense ” versus Social “ Utility Shaftesbury, Mandeville and Hutcheson 
As the writings of Hobbes and Harrington served to highlight the ideological gaps 
informing seventeenth-century British narratives, so the writings of Shaftesbury and 
Mandeville suggest the narrative polarities informing the imag[in]ing of identity in 
eighteenth-century Britain. The prospect of divided realities and identities posed by 
disengagement rested uneasily with Shaftesbury, for it undermined the premise of a 
harmonious and natural social order.17 Indeed, if disengagement nurtured individual 
autonomy and self-determination, it had a corrosive affect on early Christian and neo- 
Platonist visions of a fixed social hierarchy in which everyone occupied their 
preordained place. While it conduced to industry and commerce, it likewise effected 
an unstable social order. All of which affected the evaluation of identity. As 
Baumeister explains:
16 Baumeister, p. 154. Beginning in the late mediaeval period, social mobility “transformed a relatively 
fixed and stable basis for identity into a changeable and problematic one,” as “rank ... became ... 
contingent on circumstances other than birth.” See Baumeister, pp. 33-34, 154, 158-159,258-259. In
the end, Taylor adds, “the social order ... is more and more seen as based properly on contract....” See 
Taylor, p. 229.
17 The separation of the individual into objective and subjective selves permitted the detachment of the 
perceiving self from its subjective experience. In conjunction with the internalization o f the gaze, 
however, this allowed for self-examination from “the first-person perspective.” (Taylor, pp. 256-258) 
The result was two variations on disengagement: one based on principles of reason, which argued that 
certain first principles can be abstracted by an emotionally-unencumbered intellect; and one based on 
principles o f sensibility, which argued that certain first principles are perceived by the moral sense. 
Unlike the Cambridge Platonists and other rationalists, who held “that the human reason apprehends 
eternal and immutable moral principles,” Shaftesbury and Hutcheson relied on the “moral sense.” 
(Copleston, V, p. 199) On these grounds, the two theorists could argue for the sympathetic relationship 
between feeling and reason and their mutual engagement in the progress towards virtuous potentiality. 
As Copleston notes, the idea of the self-perfection of man or of the harmonious and complete
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The rise of the middle class during the early modem period gradually eroded 
this [social] stability.... After centuries of accepting the social order as stable 
and legitimate, people began to use violent means to change it. Beneath this 
change in behavior lay a radically altered view of how person and state ought 
to be related.... At issue was the legitimacy of the system of social rank, 
which had for centuries been perhaps the most important basis of identity.... 
The decline of Christianity was not the only reason that the system of identity 
based on social rank became problematic.... Practical and economic trends 
also put it in jeopardy.... Social rank had traditionally been defined by a 
combination of wealth, power, lineage, title, and social connections, all of 
which were intercorrelated. The rise of the middle class disrupted those
correlations.... Some middle-class individuals became quite wealthy... [and]
18some aristocratic families... became poor.
Shaftesbury thus set out to ameliorate the effects of disengagement by 
containing the negative influences of its perceived origins.19 On the one hand, for 
example, blending influences from Aristotle and Harrington, Shaftesbury warned 
against the immoderate pursuit of wealth threatened by commercial imperialism.20 At 
the same time, he approved the commercial ethic of “fair dealing” and the benefits of
refinement and improvement that accrued to society through commerce and
") 1industry. Indeed, in many respects, conversation, “fair-dealing” commerce, and 
correspondence, each being mediums of ‘improvement’, all carried similar meaning 
for Shaftesbury, and one might cautiously conclude that his primary objective was to
development of human nature ... has remained one of the characteristic features of British thought.” 
(Copleston, V, p. 201) See Taylor, pp. 174-175,178-182,254-258; Copleston, V, pp. 199-201.
18 Baumeister, pp. 52-53.
19 As Taylor remarks, moral-sense theorists saw in “Lockean self-disengagement... a sure way of... 
losing contact with... the good. That is why Shaftesbury has to combat the extrinsic theory as an 
abomination. It stands in the way of re-engagement with our own love of the whole.” See Taylor, p. 
254.
20 On the classical premise that luxury begets dependence, Shaftesbury deemed British imperialism 
unwieldy and prone to corruption. See Shaftesbury Characteristicks, I, pp. 108, 111, 113, and II, pp. 
150-151, 161.
21 Taylor, p. 305; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, II, p. 155.
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control commerce in a compromised variation on civic humanism—a commercial 
humanism conducive to individual improvement and social good.
In general, however, Shaftesbury’s narrative reflected new pressures on the
•  « 99  •civic humanist narrative and its corporate meaning of life. Once society became a 
conglomerate of autonomous and self-determined individuals, the only hope of 
securing the classical ideal was by identifying some natural urge within the individual 
that satisfied the classical commitment to natural virtue and progress. Shaftesbury 
thus struggled to free the narrative of social progress from the taint of social 
relativism.24 But even Shaftesbury was forced to make necessary concessions. The 
blurring of public and private that accompanied the demands for legal equality, and 
the emergence of a commercial environment in which virtue was carried out in an 
interdependent community of producers and consumers rather than a landed 
environment of autonomous heroes, could not be ignored.25 They required that virtue 
be recast in social terms, in the liminal space between private and public life: in clubs 
rather than battlefields. As a consequence of this compromise, however, the 
traditional definition of ‘independence’—-a virtuous and objective disinterest bom of 
intellectual and economic autonomy (landed birth and leisure)—-was called into
22 Taylor, pp. 341-342.
23 According to Shaftesbury, the propensity towards goodness is a natural inclination instilled in man 
by a divine being to foster a general social affection for all mankind. See Taylor, p. 255.
24 Shaftesbury’s theory of self-improvement did not always square with the classical doctrine of  
‘nature’ over ‘nurture’, for it allowed education by example. See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, II, p. 
64.
25 Commercial virtue necessarily differed from the Aristotelian heroic ideal in being social rather than 
civic, involving interactive rather than autonomous practices, and industry rather than leisure. The 
conversational manner was based on the polite ease and familiarity o f the club. But ultimately its 
parameters were expanded. For example, Mandeville describes his Fable o f the Bees as being written 
in “as easy and familiar a manner as I am able” and compliments Sir Richard Steele on “the usual 
elegance of his easy style.” (See Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. 20 and 41) See Taylor, pp. 
238-240; Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. 20, 41.
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question: who might claim disinterested independence in a world infused by 
commercial and conversational relations?26
By the eighteenth century, conservative civic humanists like the third earl of 
Shaftesbury were combining the unifying Christian vision of the neo-Platonists—that 
which set out to reconcile Plato with Christianity and Aristotle with Plato in a theory 
more cohesive and consistent than its ancient counterpart—with a neo-Aristotelian 
vision of civil society 27 The resulting narrative endorsed two tenets important to the 
evaluation of identity: a classical theory of natural progress; and a notion of public 
virtue that wed the private attributes of Christian goodness—those affiliated with 
internal feeling—with the heroic attributes of the Public Man—those affiliated with 
external action—in a secular doctrine of moral ethics 28 They were further compelled 
to amend political theory. Whereas Harrington—like Aristotle—had located civic 
good in the balance of virtues attendant a ‘mixed’ government of three estates, relying 
on agrarian laws and annual elections to secure this balance, neo-Harringtonians like 
Shaftesbury located civic good in the moral virtues of Public Men. In the end, the 
“moral theorists” deemed civic virtue a condition of moral ethics, the byproduct of
26 See Copleston, V, p. 184. Plato, like Socrates, believed that conversation—or ‘dialectic’—was the 
medium of philosophy; not only was his “Republic. .. in dialogue form and its style ... conversational,” 
but it was the method of education he endorsed at his Academy. (Lee, introduction to Plato, Republic, 
p. liv) This was more true of Socrates and Plato than their “successors”; Cicero’s dialogues, for 
example, are mostly lectures in philosophical doctrine. See Lee, introduction to Plato, Republic, pp. 
xxxvii, liv-lv.
27 As Taylor notes, Shaftesbury’s neo-Platonism was distinct from traditional Platonism in its attention 
to one’s “inward Nature” as the source of religious and moral feeling, an attention influenced by a neo- 
Augustinianism. Moreover, although contemplation featured prominently as a medium of virtue, it was 
also distinguished by its emphasis on the public actions—as opposed to private contemplations—of 
virtuous men. See Taylor, pp. 242, 251; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 41-42, 54-55.
28 Baumeister writes: “With the transition to the Romantic period, we see a great decline in the power 
and influence of Christianity. Two important consequences of this decline were a serious revision of 
basic political beliefs and a deterioration of the Christian moral scheme. These two consequences
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fixed moral laws resonant in natural sentiments and manifest in individual acts of 
public good.29
One consequence of this development was an emphasis on feeling as the 
medium of virtue, the external evidence of one’s quality, and the proper measure of 
social rank.30 Another was the equation of moral virtue with aesthetic taste.31 
Ultimately, refinement became equated with virtue.32 As Shaftesbury described it, 
“outward Manners and Deportment” parallel “inward Sentiments and Principles.”^  
Moreover, “improvement”—the process of refinement by which the individual 
progressed from ignorance to knowledge, self-interest to social affection—became 
dependent on “the business of Self-dissection”—i.e. the examination of one’s “inward 
Recess” through “magical Glasses.”34 This bore relevance for portraiture.
raised several problems for individual identity, including the search for proper models.” See
Baumeister, p. 58.
29 Copleston writes: “Shaftesbury and Hutcheson had laid emphasis on ‘moral excellence’, on virtue as 
a state of character, on ‘affections’.... But conscience and moral decision are concerned primarily with 
actions. So with [Joseph] Butler we can see a tendency to shift the emphasis from affections to 
actions,... actions as informed by motives....” See Copleston, V, pp. 174, 199-201; quoted from p.
200.
30 In a harmonious social order, each individual fulfilled his naturally-prescribed place according to his 
moral virtue. Although the good is both passive and active—a matter of character or action—, 
Shaftesbury’s emphasis is on character. See Copleston, V, pp. 173-176.
Shaftesbury’s interpretation reflected a Platonic bias. Plato understood style in terms of beauty, 
beauty in terms of uniformity, uniformity and harmony in terms o f virtue, and virtue in terms of 
character—and, so, identity. (Plato, Republic, pp. 102-103) The purpose o f a liberal arts education was 
thus to train individuals in good taste—in the recognition of true beauty—that they themselves might 
also become beautiful and virtuous. (Plato, Republic, p. 106) As Shaftesbury concluded, “the most 
natural Beauty in the World is Honesty, and moral Truth. For all Beauty is TRUTH.” (Shaftesbury, 
Characteristicks, I, pp. 141-142) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 121-122, 135-136, 138-142, 
II, pp. 40, 74-76, and III, 179; Plato, Republic, pp. 102-103, 106, 132, 219.
32 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 68-70, 72, 90.
33 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 121-122, and III, p. 179.
34 Charles Taylor has termed this introspection “radical reflexivity”—a fracturing of the self into 
subjective and objective parts as a means of coming face-to-face with one’s potentiality. See Taylor, 
pp. 174-175, 178-182; Shaftesbury Characteristicks, I, pp. 173-174; Hutcheson, Reflections upon 
Laughter, in Reflections upon Laughter and Remarks upon the Fable of the Bees (Glasgow, 1750), in 
Broadie, pp. 226-227.
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In part, Shaftesbury’s emphasis on feeling reflected the influence of 
Augustinian neo-Platonism, which likewise turned inward to find the source of moral 
virtue.35 As Augustine advocated introspection and contemplation as a means of 
being enlightened to the Word and, by extension, the existence of God, thereby 
improving one’s self and society through a knowledge of His love, so Shaftesbury 
advocated introspection and contemplation as a means of nurturing one’s natural 
affections and, thereby, improving one’s self and society through the love of mankind. 
But Shaftesbury also reclaimed the principle of a progressive self resonant in Plato 
and Aristotle. Indeed, the distinction between a progressive—natural to perfect—and 
a divided—natural versus social—self was a key point of controversy in eighteenth- 
century narratives.
On the one hand, the principle of a progressive self supported the notion of 
natural inequalities and a natural social hierarchy. On the other hand, the principle of 
a divided self—i.e. public or social and private or autonomous—, bom of 
“disengagement,” separated the matter of the secular, social self—legally equal and 
relative—from the matter of the eternal self—divine and fixed.36 To amend the gap, 
and reaffirm the narrative of the progressive self, Shaftesbury subordinated the
35 As Taylor notes, “The ancient theories that Shaftesbury drew on, those of Plato and the Stoics, 
weren’t expressed in the language of inwardness.. . Inwardness, a consequence o f Augustinian 
Christianity, was intensified during the Renaissance, when the self-conscious “I” emerged as an 
expression of one’s “inner” personhood. See Taylor, pp. 255-256.
36 Baumeister defined ‘disengagement’ as the “conceptual separation of the person lfom his or her 
position in the social order.” It was this “separation of public and private domains of life,” and its 
accompanying separation between the public (now problematic) and private (now ‘true’) selves, which 
“laid the foundation for a view of the self as being in conflict with society, a view which became widely 
influential in the nineteenth century.” (Baumeister, pp. 41-42) See Baumeister, pp. 41-42; Taylor, p. 
265.
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divided self to the classical theory of natural progress.37 As he explained it, “our 
Doctrine of Two Persons in one individual S e lf  recognized the ‘natural’ self not as a 
separate, a-social self, but as the point of departure—“the Underparts or Second 
Characters’’—for the potential self.38 Moreover, this potential self was not merely a 
social self bom of compact and convention relevant only in the civic sphere, but the 
“Philosophical Hero . . . in himself a perfect Character” towards which man 
progressed according to divine plan.39 Through self-reflection in one’s “Pocket- 
Mirrour,” he wrote, one might begin to comprehend this relationship and enter upon 
that course of improvement through which the divided self attained its full and unified 
potential.40
Shaftesbury’s defense of an intelligible, harmonious, and fixed moral order 
responded, in part, to the threat of dual realities and divided identities attendant 
nominalist and empirical thinking; as Copleston notes, empiricists denied “objective 
standards of morality and objective moral values.”41 For Shaftesbury, however, only 
a single, fixed, and intelligible moral law could serve as the premise for natural 
progress and a natural and harmonious social hierarchy. Once the marketplace
37 By 1710, the third earl of Shaftesbury had subsumed the concept of a divided self into the classical 
principle of a progressive self. See Shaftesbury, “TREATISE HI.: Soliloquy: or, Advice to an Author”, 
in Characteristicks, I, pp. 158-161, 173-174,179, 185-188,190-191,194-197,200-201,204-207,239- 
240, 250, 277-283,298.
38 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 185. Smith likewise employed a notion of self-improvement 
dependent on the principle of a divided self. “Hence,” Copleston quotes, “‘I divide myself, as it were, 
into two persons.... The first is the spectator.... The second is the agent, the person whom I properly 
call myself, and of whose conduct, under the character of spectator, 1 was endeavouring to form some 
opinion’.” Copleston, V, p. 359.
j9 For Shaftesbury, in other words, the relationship between parts o f the divided self represented a 
relationship akin to ‘Pupil’ and ‘Preceptor’, the complementary components o f the progressive self.
See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 170, 195-196.
40 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 194-196.
41 Copleston, V, p. 177.
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assumed greater authority vis-a-vis the political sphere, once individualism and 
empiricism challenged the necessary correlation between birth and rank, once reason 
was deemed a universal capacity among men, neo-Country advocates were challenged 
to find another attribute by which to distinguish and defend the credibility of Public 
Men and the traditional principles of social hierarchy.42
To this end, Shaftesbury recast the moral rectitude of the Public Man in social 
terms, shifting the emphasis from heroic virtue to friendship and benevolence, from 
the external sword to internal feeling.43 At the same time, he confined this attribute 
to the landed elite. As the neo-Country Public Man demonstrated his natural and 
superior virtue through a platonic love of mankind and an innate desire to advance the 
public good, so his ability to do so continued to turn on his unique capacity for 
leisured introspection.44 By upholding this traditional relationship between 
disinterested leisure and civic virtue, Shaftesbury secured a social order in which only 
the landed bore access to the universal mind conducive to social affection and public 
good.45 In other words, whereas Harrington had argued for a natural equality among
42 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, II, p. 63.
43 Rooted in Enlightenment dialogues on virtue and vice begun in seventeenth century France, 
benevolence filled the gap left by a collapsed religious and social order, serving to Christianize and 
unify the secular sphere. (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 106-107) Indeed, Shaftesbury remarks, 
“Can any Friendship... be so heroick, as that towards Mankind?” (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, II, p. 
238) Plato and Aristotle had likewise correlated friendship with statesmanship. And certainly it 
informed subsequent notions of patriotism. (Plato, Laws, pp. 334-335 and Aristotle, Rhetoric, p. 100) 
According to Shaftesbury, was in its failure to support the political implications o f this principle. See 
Shaftesbury Characteristicks, I, pp. 39-41, 98-99, 104-107, 109-110,117-118, and II, p. 9,15, 78, 86- 
87, 90, 98, 107, 113-114, 126, 136-140, 147-148, 150, 175-176, 238, 246-247, 278; Plato, Laws, pp. 
142, 334-335; Aristotle, The Rhetoric, in Corbett, p. 100; Taylor, pp. 249-254, 256, 26, 305, 311-312; 
Copleston, I, pp. 347-348, and V, pp. 157-170.
44 Shaftesbury wrote: “If there be a general Mind, it can have no particular Interest.” See Shaftesbury,
Characteristicks, I, p. 40.
43 Baumeister writes: “A conceptual connection between personality and social rank already existed by 
the early modem period. Evaluative traits, including moral traits, were thought to derive from physical, 
family heritage (‘blood’). People believed that the aristocracy were innately better people than were
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men based on natural rights and the universal capacity for reason, neo-Harringtonians 
like Shaftesbury, while conceding Harrington’s position with regard to natural rights 
and reason, defended natural inequalities on grounds of man’s unequal propensity for 
benevolence.46
Significantly, however, in equating internal benevolence with external 
politeness, Shaftesbury inadvertently opened the way to an alternative standard of 
identity. While Shaftesbury deemed politeness the attribute of a disinterested, 
liberally-educated elite—those who employed the “free and familiar Style” of ancient 
dialogues and treatises in private, clubby settings—, there was little to prevent others 
from adopting like modes of behavior and, hence, from displaying—however 
falsely—the evidence of moral virtue.47 Indeed, while Shaftesbury might extol 
ancient poetry for educating men in the matter of human potentiality and advancing 
“the business of Self-dissection” by which men were enlightened and, so, ‘improved’, 
while Shaftesbury might, therefore, condition the business of ‘self-dissection’ and 
improvement on leisure and, so, like both Plato and Aristotle, make improvement the 
privilege of a landed elite, others might forego the poetry while donning its effects.48
the common people, with superior moral and personal traits .... By implication, a commoner 
pretending to be an aristocrat did not ‘really’ have those traits, regardless of how he or she acted.” 
(Baumeister, p. 258) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 40,98; Baumeister, pp. 54,258.
46 Eighteenth-century “moralists...,” Copleston writes, “opposed not only Hobbes’s interpretation of 
man as essentially egoistic but also all authoritarian conceptions of the moral law and of moral 
obligation....” (Copleston, V, p. 171) He continues: “As against Hobbes’s idea of man they insisted on 
man’s social nature; and as against ethical authoritarianism they insisted on man’ s possession of a 
moral sense by which he discerns moral values.... They also gave a social interpretation of morality, in 
terms of a social rather than a private end.” (Copleston, V, pp. 171-172) See Copleston, V, pp. 171- 
173.
47 Like Plato, philosophers as varied as Hobbes, Shaftesbury and Rousseau encouraged a “Liberal 
Education” as a means of nurturing virtue; unlike Rousseau, however, Shaftesbury deemed it suited 
only to gentlemen. See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 75.
48 The soliloquy was a particularly potent medium of improvement—one that readily compared with the 
portrait. “By virtue o f this SOLILOQUY,” Shaftesbury wrote, the subject “becomes two distinct
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The result was a confusion of identities. In traditional classical and Christian 
discourse, social harmony resulted when each member of society assumed and 
performed his natural role, advancing society through a complementary network of 
social relations. Because birth was understood to be an index of function, harmony 
was deemed dependent upon ‘keeping one’s place’. By shifting attention from public 
to private virtue, by making private virtue—in the form of benevolence—public, and, 
perhaps most importantly, by allowing for the possibility of a nurtured benevolence, 
conservative civic humanists of the moral-sense school made two significant 
concessions. First, they implied that the stability of modem society relied more on 
inter-dependence than independence, thereby undermining the notion of natural 
hierarchy descending from the leisured and reasoning few (the independents) to the 
working and passionate masses (the dependents). Second, they opened the way for 
‘nurture’ over ‘nature’ and the possibility that any individual might rise above (or fall 
below) his birth ‘place’, thereby conceding a modicum of social fluidity. These 
concessions proved compatible with the arguments of convention theorists, who 
deemed society a compact between autonomous, legal equals motivated by private 
interests to acquire property and “improve” themselves. In the end, extremists like 
Mandeville could dismiss with the principle of natural moral standards as unnecessary 
to the circumstances of modem life: ambition filled the void left by classical virtue.49
Combining his medical studies of human nature with his interest in social 
relations, the physician Bernard Mandeville presented a vision of society in which the
Persons. He is Pupil and Preceptor. He teaches, and he learns.” (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 
158) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 158, 196, and III, p. 155.
49 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xv; Copleston, V, p. 177.
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moral objectives of civic humanism were abandoned as ill-suited to modem 
happiness.50 In “An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue” (1732), Mandeville 
deemed morality a political tool employed by the elite to manipulate the masses.51 So 
successfully ingrained was the principle of morality that even the most oppressed 
were unwilling to deny it.52 Yet, Mandeville argued, the moral ideals advanced by 
Anglo-Protestant civic humanism were unnecessary to stability and happiness in 
modem society. As he described it, the circumstances of modem Britain have made 
man’s “vilest and most hateful qualities ... the most necessary accomplishments to fit
him for the largest and, according to the world, the happiest and most flourishing
^ -2
societies,” one resembling the fabled “hive.”
This had not always been the case. As Mandeville explained, at some point in 
the transition from feudalism to modernism, “an unacknowledged historical 
transformation” had occurred that changed the demands on the individual and society 
and made the narrative of moral virtue obsolete.54 As he described it, the 
transformation of commodities into sources of commercial exchange and profit— 
wealth—shifted the balance-of-influence between real and mobile property, 
expanding the means by which to attain power, reducing the inclination for violent
50 Mandeville’s theory of self-love borrowed from the work o f earlier scholars like Pierre Nicole and 
Pierre Bayle. See Hundert, in Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. 1-18.
51 See Mandeville, “An Enquiry into the Origin of Moral Virtue,” in The Fable o f  the Bees, pp. 36-41; 
Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xxi; Copleston, V, pp. 177-181.
52 Part o f Mandeville’s criticism was directed against the false face o f Christian virtue; his Letter to 
Dion (1732) responded to Bishop Berkeley’s attack on free-thinkers in Alciphron; or, The Minute 
Philosopher (1732). See Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. 1-18, 39-42; Hundert, introduction to 
Mandeville, The Fable o f  the Bees, pp. x, xv.
53 See Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. x. The “hive” metaphor found in 
Mandeville’s Fable o f the Bees had roots in Hobbes’s Leviathan. See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 225-227.
54 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f  the Bees, p. xix. In the end, Mandeville deemed 
pride the basis o f social relations. See Hundert, in Mandeville, pp. xxi, xxxii; Copleston, V, p. 178.
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revolt—that which made necessary a counter-narrative of virtue—, and putting 
pressure on the standards by which individual ‘value’ was measured.55 One 
consequence of these “new mechanisms of exchange” was “the relegation of.. .  civic 
ideals to the realm of nostalgia, and the adoption of an intransigently egoistic 
morality.”56
Ultimately, Mandevillean interest challenged Shaftesburian virtue;57 
Mandeville’s analysis rendered suspect any claims to social virtue and self-sacrifice. 
But it also challenged the ethic of frugality. As Mandeville saw it, commercial 
society depended upon consumption, and consumption depended on the demand for 
goods. To premise a commercial society on frugality was to deny its motivation as 
well as its mode of “happiness.” Unlike his more conservative peers, then, for whom 
the threat of corruption required some element of virtue, Mandeville did not attempt 
to assimilate the demands of commerce into the ideals of civic humanism or make 
commerce compatible with virtue. He did not attempt to make common happiness 
the same as common good.58 It was this rejection of higher good that made his
55 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xxiv.
56 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xix,
57 Significantly, Copleston remarks, “his general idea that private egoism and the public good are not at 
all inconsistent... is an idea which is implicit in the laissez-faire type of political and economic 
theory.” (Copleston, V, p. 178) For a discussion o f its impact on philosophical development, 
particularly in the writings of David Hume, Adam Smith, and Immanuel Kant, see Hundert, in 
Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. xix-xxxii.
58 Mandeville, “An Enquiry into the Origin o f Moral Virtue,” in The Fable o f the Bees, pp. 43-44. 
Shaftesbury and Rousseau also distinguished between a higher, virtuous good and baser forms of 
happiness—what Shaftesbury called “Dreams of Grandure, Titles, Honours, and a false Magnificence” 
that turn men into “the merest Drudges, and most abject Slaves.” See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, 
p. 139.
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argument so radical and helped to nurture his nickname—“Man-devil”—, which, 
according to Hundert, “became a synonym for immorality.”59
As Hundert argues, Mandeville faced head-on “the eighteenth-century ’ s 
intense and prolonged dispute about how to understand and evaluate the liberation of 
acquisitive instincts engendered in modem polities by the infusion of commercial 
relations into the centers of public life.”60 Once awakened to the dramatic 
implications of advancing commercial and financial power on the credibility of civic 
humanism and its corresponding social and political structures, contemporary 
theorists struggled to stretch the parameters of classicism, dispensing with its 
unwieldy ideals while preserving its pursuit of common good. Ultimately, industry 
became the medium of influence and rank, and symbols of industry became signifiers 
of identity.61 As Hundert explains, “outward displays of wealth alone were now 
widely accepted as a direct index of social power...
All this informed the evaluation of identity. Over time, the civic humanist 
identity, as defined by Harrington, adopted by Restoration Whigs, modified by neo- 
Country conservatives, and articulated by the third earl of Shaftesbury, was mutated 
into a standard increasingly guided by the external evidence of internal morality: the
59 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xv. See also Mandeville, “An Enquiry 
into the Origin of Moral Virtue,” in The Fable o f the Bees, p. 43; Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, 
Fable o f the Bees, pp. xiv-xv, xviii.
60 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xi.
61 Hundert writes: “Mandeville claimed that his work for the first time systematically comprehended 
from the perspective of society ... monied wealth [for]... moral and social identities.” (Hundert, p. xxv) 
Indeed, he goes on, Mandeville “showed that the aggressive pursuit of wealth had now to be 
understood... as central to the self-definition o f urban and commercial populations.” (Hundert, p. xxv) 
It was this interpretation of the monied interest that merchants and tradesmen were loath to adopt. See 
Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, pp. xx-xxv.
62 This “render[ed] absurd ... the conventional condemnation of luxury as immoral.” See Hundert, 
introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, pp. xxiv-xxv.
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mask of politeness. As virtue became submerged into industry, as industry became 
the medium of identity, politeness and benevolence were subverted to its influence.63 
As Mandeville suggested, men adopted polite manners and an interest in the social 
welfare because they earned the bearer a reputation for public virtue that enhanced his 
influence—to the benefit of his personal ambitions.64 In other words, the appearance 
of refinement was emphasized at the expense of its proper cause—internal virtue 65 
Thus, Mandeville could write, “in great commercial cities, where strangers are 
regularly encountered, people gain public esteem by their clothes and other 
accoutrements of wealth, ‘not as what they are, but what they appear to be’.”66
This proved a boon to the business of portrait-making. At the same time these 
‘attributes’ became signifiers of public worth, they were readily assimilated into the 
language of portraiture. Costume, gesture, hairstyle, stance: all became signifiers of 
individual progress and identity. In fact, the new emphasis on external modes of 
politeness meant that portraiture became a means not only of recording one’s person,
6j Hundert concludes, “Modem manners thus comprised the last stage in the history of pride, and the 
most efficient way to manage [commercial society].... Once men were able to distinguish themselves 
by mannered social pretense underwritten by the marks of wealth, the stem and self-denying morality of 
virtue which first made communal life possible was effectively reduced to a nostalgic remnant of the 
politically defeated and downwardly mobile....” (Hundert, pp. xxix-xxx) See Hundert, introduction to 
Mandeville, The Fable o f  the Bees, pp. xvi, xxix-xxx.
64 As Pocock notes, ‘“manners’, which had once, in the form of custom and tradition, served to retard 
the wheel of fortune, have now become progressive and corrupting.” Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment, p. 533.
65 As Hundert observes, “civility and politeness” became “regulatory devices governing an 
unprecedented... process of conspicuous consumption” in which “symbols” were appropriated “for the 
promotion of self—a relentless accumulation of emblems that could be acquired by wealth in a 
commercial market of marks of esteem.” He goes on: “men could now indulge themselves in the world 
of commerce because in it they were free to compete in non-violent ways for the most valued ‘tokens’ 
of public approbation.” See Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, p. xxix.
66 Hundert, introduction to Mandeville, The Fable o f the Bees, p. xxv.
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but of constructing and asserting an ‘improved’ personality through the selective 
rendering of a narrative context suited to one’s desired identity.
In the wake of Mandeville’s analysis, the principle of friendship promoted by 
Shaftesbury was adopted and refashioned by his theoretical successor, Francis 
Hutcheson.67 On the one hand, Hutcheson struck a middle chord between the 
competing emphases on means and ends—virtuous causes and good effects—, 
affiliating the formal goods of the internal sense with the virtue of moral 
benevolence.68 On the other hand, Hutcheson suggested that it was moral sensibility, 
not benevolence, that was innate and, further, that, as sensibility was innate to all 
men, benevolence, which “is thoroughly internalized in sentiment,” might be 
cultivated—theoretically speaking—by anyone.69 This was to boost the position of 
‘nurture’ over ‘nature’ and bring the neo-Country platform dangerously close to a
70condition of social fluidity. What saved it was Hutcheson’s interpretation of 
individual will as the complement to social hierarchy: though individual will 
determined the degree to which one’s sensibility might be elevated towards 
benevolence and virtue, will itself was subject to the natural inequalities necessarily
67 While rooted in Shaftesbury’s ‘friendship’, the theory of moral benevolence was perhaps most 
forcefully articulated by his theoretical successor, Francis Hutcheson. Like Shaftesbury, Hutcheson 
deemed morality a social virtue. (Taylor, pp. 259,262 and 280) But he further distinguished between 
its internal and external forms. As Copleston writes, “By external sense the mind receives, in Locke’s 
terminology, simple ideas of single qualities of objects.... By internal sense we perceive relations 
which give rise to a feeling or feelings which are different from the seeing or hearing or touching of 
separate related objects.” (Copleston, V, p. 179) ) “Thus,” Copleston concludes, “Hutcheson tends to 
make virtue synonymous with benevolence... [;] the desire of universal happiness, becomes the 
dominating principle in morality.” (Copleston, V, pp. 180-181) See Copleston, V, pp. 179-182; Taylor, 
pp. 258-259, 261-262,264,280.
68 Taylor, p. 261.
69 Taylor, p. 264.
70 Taylor, pp. 260-261.
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informing the harmonious universe.71
II. Internal Feeling/ Artificial Convention: Jean-Jacques Rousseau and David Hume 
The emphasis on benevolence and sentiment in eighteenth-century ideology is 
significant for what it suggests about the growing influence of private attributes in the 
evaluation of identity.72 By the mid-eighteenth century, feeling, once negatively 
associated with ‘passion’ and ignorance, had become “the touchstone of the morally
* * 73good,” providing guidance to reason, which served to filter emotional distortions.
The full effect of this reversal was felt in the Romantic ethic, which encouraged the 
individual’s internal reunion with his pure potentiality. Through feeling, Rousseau 
argued, man re-engaged with his internal, noble self and was thereby motivated to 
throw off the negative effects of disengagement, reconnect with others, and 
consequently improve and advance both himself and society.74
Rousseau’s analysis, which located the moral self in the “voice within,” served 
to highlight the implications of the divided self: the coexistence of higher (natural) 
and lower (artificial) realms of existence; and the accompanying coexistence of higher 
(virtuous) and lower (social) selves.75 On these grounds, Rousseau rejected the
71 Unlike Locke, Hutcheson regarded one’s place in the social order as already prescribed: one comes 
to know it through one’s internal reengagement with God’s will. Taylor, pp. 264-265.
72 In complement with this development, “human nature” emerged as a primary subject o f eighteenth- 
century philosophy. This was particularly true in the case of David Hume. For a discussion of Hume, 
see Copleston, V, pp. 258-298, 305-317.
73 Previously, although a handful of philosophers, such as Descartes, had credited feeling with the 
power to unite body and soul, reason was still privileged as the medium of virtue. See Taylor, pp. 283- 
284.
74 Whereas Lockean empiricism employed disengagement as a means of examining the general self in 
relation to a representational model o f the world, a second model of individualism employed 
disengagement as a means o f reunion with the particular self. See Taylor, pp. 283-284.
75 Jean-Jacques Rousseau highlighted the gap between the moral and social self and, hence, 
“dramatically and scandalously pointed out a contradiction that others were trying to live with.”
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utilitarian narrative of “organized egoism,” and its emphasis on happiness, as an 
alternative form of enslavement.76 For Rousseau, the meaning of life was not 
happiness, but the good. And the good was manifest not in pleasure, but in freedom 
and, so, morality, for only in our capacity as moral agents do we bear the capacity for 
freedom.77 In part, then, Rousseau sought to reconcile the implications of 
disengagement—the isolation of the individual from society and the consequent gap 
between the moral and social self—by urging a return to nature as the venue of re­
engagement. This return to nature was not a regression to a dependent, primitive state, 
but a progression towards an independent, unadulterated self, the point-of-departure
78for individual and social good.
As Rousseau’s writings suggest, the narrative of internal feeling informed by 
Augustine and advanced by the “moral sense” theorists was expanded during the 
course of the century. As Taylor explains it, the “feeling for nature” expressed first as 
the idealized “virtues of simplicity or rusticity,” became the “sentiments which nature 
awakens in us”—we “return to nature, because it brings out strong and noble feelings 
in us... ”79 This development is resonant in the visual differences between Thomas 
Gainsborough’s John Plampin (Fig. 4-1; ca. 1753-1754; oil on canvas, 19-3/4 x 23-
(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 504) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 503-505; 
Taylor, pp. 174-175, 182, 300-302, 356-358.
76 Taylor, p. 364.
77 Taylor, pp. 364-365.
78 “Goodness is identified with freedom, with finding the motives for one’s actions w ithin oneself.... 
Rousseau is actually pushing the subjectivism of modem moral understanding a stage further.” See 
Taylor, pp. 359-361; quoted from p. 361.
79 Taylor, p. 293, 296-297,299. According to Taylor, the change was resonant in four key aspects of 
English culture: commerce, with its attendant politeness; literature and “the rise of the novel,” with its 
egalitarian language, audience, subject-matter (domestic and particular rather than civic and general), 
and virtues (social rather than heroic, for example, or based on common men doing heroic deeds); 
domesticity and the emphasis on marriage, family and emotional commitments; and the role of
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1/4 inches; National Gallery, London) and Joseph Wright’s Brooke Boothby (Fig. 4-2; 
1781; oil on canvas, 58-1/2 x 81-3/4 inches; Tate Britain).
Fig. 4-2
sentiment. Significantly, all were reflective of social rather than heroic ideals. See Taylor, pp. 286- 
301,361, 380; Baumeister, pp. 60-63.
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In the former, the country subject is seated in a natural landscape, the base of his torso
supported by the base of a weathered tree, his legs extended like roots into the bare
• • 80  *earth, arm draped casually—and possessively—across a low-lying limb. In this 
relaxed posture, garbed in fashionable attire trimmed in gold braid, Plampin meets our 
gaze with a proprietor’s air, his confident ease highlighted by the contrasting rigidity 
of his statuesque pointer. In this image of the country squire, nature is subordinate 
and complementary to the subject, a symbol of rustic values and, more particularly, 
the implications and ideals of property-ownership—of roots in land. In this role, it 
supports—literally and figuratively—the person and pursuits of the sitter.
In Boothby, by contrast, figure bends and flows at one with the landscape, the 
sitter’s left ankle all but rooting beneath the underbrush while his head emerges like a 
sprout of new growth. As Stephen Daniels notes, visual precedent for the reclining 
figure can be found in Elizabethan images, while literary examples include Henry 
Mackenzie’s Man o f Feeling*1 Against the material—artificial—richness of 
Plampin’s dress, Boothby’s costume assumes the tones and shadows of nature, the 
glints of light in the distant sky echoed in the whiteness of stockings, collar and cuff. 
Moreover, against Plampin’s conversational posture, Boothby’s is decidedly 
contemplative, the split of the index finger signaling the sitter’s engagement with his 
internal self, a point reinforced by the volume, marked Rousseau, that rests on the
80 According to Kalinsky, the origins ofPiampin’s pose derived from an engraving of Watteau’s 
Antoine de la Roque, the influence of which had already affected Hayman’s paintings at Vauxhall 
Gardens. See Nicola Kalinsky, Gainsborough (London: Phaidon Press, 1995), pp. 44-45.
81 Daniels, Joseph Wright, pp. 23-24.
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bank in front of him.82 In other words, if Plampin casts nature in economic (property- 
ownership), social (the setting of leisurely pursuits like walking, hunting and 
conversing), and political (landed) terms, Boothby casts nature as the venue of 
metaphysical engagement with the internal self, the site of self-knowledge and moral 
improvement.83 In this guise, Boothby’s reunion with the virtuous matter and 
potentiality found in natural man prior to his adoption of the artificial and pride- 
effecting ‘attributes’ endorsed by ‘civilization’84 recalls Shaftesbury’s “Magical 
Glasses;” quoting Buffon, Rousseau wrote: “it is this [internalized] sense that we 
must use if we wish to know ourselves; it is the only one by which we can judge 
ourselves.”85
Ultimately, Taylor writes, the Romantic narrative subverted “the hierarchical
or
order of reason” to the “providential design of nature.” By mid-century, the external 
disengagement that characterized the first stage of internalization and informed the 
Lockean split between reason and passion in the pursuit of scientific reason, assumed 
new focus on internal self-discovery and re-engagement with the external world.87 In 
the process, feeling, as the conduit of engagement, assumed new stature as the 
medium of virtue; whereas Locke invoked reason as the medium of feeling, Rousseau
82 In feet, Boothby published Rousseau’s bibliography in 1780, and the folio in front of him likely 
refers to this manuscript. See Stephen Daniels, Joseph Wright (London: Tate Gallery, 1998), pp. 22- 
23.
83 Taylor, pp. 362-363, 374-375.
84 Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, Remark O, p. 167.
85 Unfortunately, Rousseau argued, ‘“we seldom make use of that inward sense which reduces us to our 
true dimensions, and separates us from all that is not part of us’.” See Buffon, Histoire Naturelle, 
generate et particuliere, vol. IV (Paris, 1752), p. 151; quoted in Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, 
Remark B, p. 139.
86 Taylor, pp. 283-284.
87 Indeed, there was a shared sense that everything was ultimately reducible to one’s inner self and the 
outer world. See Taylor, pp. 348-349, 351, 353-354.
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invoked feeling as the medium of reason.88 Indeed, that the ‘natural’ , feeling self 
existed prior to the social, reasoning self, that the pursuit of virtuous improvement 
required re-engagement with this natural, feeling self, represented an essential 
component of the “romantic theory of personality.”89 Whereas morai-sense deists like 
Shaftesbury looked externally to locate the evidence of moral laws, and transformed 
the will accordingly, the Romantic personality located the evidence of morality 
internally and, so, looked inward to discover the good.90
In part, Rousseau blamed philosophy for the distorted emphasis on reason that 
had caused the decline in human compassion and nurtured the prevalence of pride 
over pity, interest over benevolence.91 As with the moral-sense theorists, benevolence 
marked the difference between the higher love of amour propre informing natural 
rights and common good, and the lower love of amour de soi informing self- 
interest.92 It was this gap which necessitated the artificial social contract, one 
consequence of which was the subversion of natural pity to social pride, another of 
which was the sacrifice of natural rights for positive laws.93 Ultimately, having 
rejected the premise of a natural general will—i.e. a natural association of men—,
88 Taylor, pp. 366-367.
89 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 401-402.
90 Taylor, pp. 368-375.
91 As he explained it, “all the social virtues ... flow from this quality [of pity] alone.... Benevolence, 
and even friendship, correctly understood, is only the outcome o f ’ pity. (Rousseau, A Discourse on 
Inequality, p. 100) See Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, pp. 100-101; Rousseau, The Geneva 
Manuscript, in Rousseau, The Social Contract, p. 155.
92 Rousseau writes: “One must not confuse pride and self-love.... Self-love is a natural sentiment 
which prompts every animal to watch over its own conservation and which, directed in man by reason 
and modified by pity, produces humanity and virtue.” (Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, Remark 
O, p. 167) See Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, Remark O, p. 167; Taylor, p. 305, 356, 361, 386- 
389.
93 As Victor Gourevitch explains, Rousseau denied that men spontaneously act in conformity with 
common natural rights. And it is this weakness which necessitated the formation o f society and the
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Rousseau endorsed an artificial one, a convention of general laws by which each man 
was freed from the will of another and all were held mutually subject to a single, 
uniform, and just standard, the security of which depended upon an elected 
aristocracy of wise men.94
On the one hand, this required the institution of legal equality.95 On the other 
hand, it required a ‘natural’ aristocracy—a meritocracy of wise men guided by amour 
propre (patriotism)—to secure the general will.96 Indeed, Rousseau’s platform was 
not an endorsement of social parity or a denial of individual merit and virtue, but
07rather a denial of wealth and birth as the necessary foundations of civic virtue.
While he celebrated “enlightened patriotism” as the highest form of virtue and the
institution of positive laws. See Gourevitch, introduction to Rousseau, The Social Contract and other 
later political writings, pp. x-xix.
94 Rousseau defined social compact as that “form of association that will defend and protect the person 
and goods of each associate with the full common force, and by means of which each, uniting with all, 
nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before.” (Rousseau, O f the Social Contract, pp. 
49-50) Within this structure, Rousseau endorsed the common liberty and sovereignty o f all men under a 
self-imposed legislation—the general will—enacted by an executive. (Rousseau, The Geneva 
Manuscript, pp. 156-161) See Rousseau, The Geneva Manuscript, O f the Social Contract and 
Discourse on Political Economy, in Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, 
pp. 6,49-51, 54-60,156-161; Gourevitch, introduction to Rousseau, The Social Contract and other 
later political writings, pp. xx-xxi.
95 Gourevitch, introduction to Rousseau, The Social Contract, pp. xviii.-xix. According to Rousseau, 
“the fundamental pact... substitutes a moral and legitimate equality for whatever physical inequality 
nature may have placed between men... [so] that while they may be unequal in force or in genius, they 
all become equal by convention and by right.” (Rousseau, Of the Social Contract, p. 56) As Taylor 
likewise notes, Rousseau opposed the leveling tendencies of Enlightenment deism. (Taylor, p. 355)
See Rousseau, Of the Social Contract and Discourse on Political Economy, in Rousseau, The Social 
Contract and other later political writings, pp. 3-6, 56-61, 67; Gourevitch, introduction to Rousseau, 
The Social Contract and other later political writings, pp. xviii.-xix.
96 According to Rousseau, morals are the most important impetus to virtue and good government; “the 
mainspring of public authority,” he wrote, “is in the hearts of the citizens, and... nothing can replace 
morals in sustaining government.” (Discourse on Political Economy, p. 13) This is alternately 
described as “patriotism.” See Rousseau, O f the Social Contract and Discourse on Political Economy, 
in Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, pp. 9, 11, 13, 78, 93; Gourevitch, 
introduction to Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, p. xxi-xxv.
97 Rousseau, Considerations on the Government o f Poland, in Rousseau, The Social Contract, pp. 186- 
188.
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ingredient most essential to Public men, he never excluded the common man from 
greatness.98
Rousseau’s vision alternately supported and challenged moral-sense theory.
On the one hand, Rousseau denied the possibility of achieving potentiality in the civic 
realm. He also subverted the universal vision and goals of the Christian religion to 
the goals and interests of the secular, political State; without denying the superiority 
of Christian dogma for the higher objectives of humanity, he denied their feasibility 
for “men as they are.”99 On the other hand, even though he deemed a hereditary 
aristocracy the worst form of government, Rousseau reinforced the objectives of 
moral-sense theory insofar as he privileged an agricultural economy above a 
commercial one—land over money—on grounds that a preoccupation with commerce 
risked liberty and virtue.100 Moreover, while he tempered his landed bias by denying
98 According to Rousseau, “while [aristocracy] ... involves a certain inequality of fortune, ...so  that in 
general the administration of the public business be entrusted to those who can best devote all of their 
time to i t , ... [it is] not, as Aristotle contends, so that the rich always be preferred. On the contrary, ... 
an opposite choice should occasionally teach the people that men’s merit offers more important reasons 
for preference than do riches.” (Rousseau, O f the Social Contract, in Rousseau, The Social Contract 
and other later political writings, pp. 82 and 94) Indeed, he wrote, “It is patriotism that produced the 
many immortal actions whose brilliance dazzles our weak eyes, and the many great men whose antique 
virtues are treated as fables ever since patriotism has been turned into derision.” (Discourse on 
Political Economy, p. 16) See Rousseau, O f the Social Contract, Considerations on the Government of 
Poland, O f the Social Contract and Discourse on Political Economy, in Rousseau, The Social Contract 
and other later political writings, pp. 16, 19-20, 70, 82,94,183, 188-189; Gourevitch, introduction to 
Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, pp. xxii-xxiii.
99 Rousseau did not deny either God or our sense of His presence in us. Rather, Rousseau argued, if the 
philosophical ideal were possible, men would be as one “moral Being” and society would be 
unnecessary (Rousseau, The Geneva Manuscript, p. 155) See Rousseau, The Geneva Manuscript,
Letter to M. de Franquieres, Letter to Usteri, and Of the Social Contract, in Rousseau, The Social 
Contract and other later political writings, pp. 144-151, 155, 266, 273-275; Gourevitch, introduction 
to Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, pp. xxv-xxix and xxxi; Baumeister, 
p. 59.
100 One problem with commercial economies was that they encouraged the institution of representative 
government, which undermined the primacy of participatory politics. But, Rousseau suggested, they 
also served as a damper to virtue. See Rousseau, Considerations on the Government o f Poland and Of 
the Social Contract, in Rousseau, The Social Contract and other later political writings, pp. 113-123, 
224-229.
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the principle of a naturally fixed social order, he nonetheless endorsed public honors 
as a means of enticing heroic virtue and common good.101
Ultimately, as Taylor explains, the Platonism that defined the individual 
according to his reasoned connection “with the order of things” gave way to a new 
“sense of human identity” in which “we are defined by purposes and capacities which 
we discover within ourselves.”102 Consequently, as the individual assumed 
responsibility for his own meaning of life, as the right to identify himself was
•  •  •  103increasingly asserted, he likewise became responsible for knowing himself. It was 
this pursuit of self-knowledge that generated the renewed emphasis on internalization 
and the evolution of nature as the Romantic “Pocket-Mirrour.” Ultimately, identity 
became not a publicly-prescribed face, but the translation of the internal self into a 
persona legible to the public sphere. By these means, Romanticism released the 
individual from his primary responsibility to the ideals of the classical Public.104
By the end of the eighteenth century, the pragmatic approach to art (concerned 
with the end result) was supplanted by what M. H. Abrams terms an “expressive 
theory” of art.105 In the process, the mirror was repositioned to reflect the internal
101 Rousseau, Considerations on the Government o f Poland, in Rousseau, The Social Contract and 
other later political writings, pp. 227-229,244.
102 Taylor, p. 302.
1(b In this environment, Taylor writes, a “new moral culture radiates outward and downward from the 
upper middle classes of England [and] America” characterized by a growing personal “autonomy”, a 
“self-exploration, in particular of feeling,” and “visions of the good life generally involv[ing] personal 
commitment.” (Taylor, p. 305) This also occurred in France. See Taylor, pp. 300, 305.
104 Taylor, p. 346.
105 By “expressive theory” of art, Abrams defines one “in which the artist himself becomes the major 
element generating both the artistic product and the criteria by which it is to be judged....” He goes on: 
“A work of art is essentially the internal made external, resulting from a creative process operating 
under the impulse of feeling, and embodying the combined product of the poet’s perceptions, thoughts, 
and feelings.” (Abrams, p. 22) See M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and 
the Critical Tradition (New York and London: Oxford University Press, (1953) 1971), pp. 21-22; 
Taylor, pp. 183-192, 197-198.
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thoughts of the subject—the ‘mirror’ becomes a ‘lamp’.106 With its physical 
immediacy, pointedly engaging gaze, and dramatic play of light and shadow, Allan 
Ramsay’s David Hume (Fig. 4-3; 1766; oil on canvas, 30 x 25 inches; Scottish 
National Portrait Gallery) is suggestive of this development.
Fig. 4-3
106 Once the balance tilted away from external imitation in favor of internal feeling, the hegemony of 
the neoclassical model was weakened and “the basic orientation of all aesthetic philosophy” 
overturned. In its stead, the heroic figure became—as in Henry Mackenzie’s novel— The Man of 
Feeling (1771), free to discover his meaning of life. See Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, pp. 45, 
52-53, 69.
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On the one hand, Hume’s dependence on the external evidence of human 
merit in the judgment of individual worth is invoked by the physical intimacy 
between sitter and spectator achieved by the sitter’s gaze and his proximity to the 
picture plane.107 As Wind notes, “merit is transformed from a hard-won right based 
on exceptional achievements into a directly perceivable, natural quality which appeals 
to the beholder’s feelings in the same way as physical beauty.”108 At the same time, 
Hume’s emphasis on internal feeling as the site of morality, an emphasis which biased 
him against the pretentious grandeur of heroic imagery, is highlighted by the 
Rembrandtesque illumination of head and heart.109 Indeed, the image appears as a 
metaphorical allusion to enlightenment itself—the emergence from darkness into 
light—attained by way of social virtues.110
In general, Hume followed Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Rousseau in locating 
morality in internal feeling. He likewise privileged feeling above reason.111 But, like 
Rousseau, he departed from moral-sense theory in deeming society the effect of 
human convention rather than nature, substituting particular, subjective standards of
107 According to Wind, “When Hume attacked that view of human dignity which sees an exalted 
existence as the only one fitting for man, and when he rejected the absolute urge to perform heroic 
deeds as a senseless and presumptuous attempt to exceed the limits imposed upon man by Nature, he 
came into conflict not only with moralists like Johnson and philosophers like Beattie, but also with 
painters like Reynolds.” (Wind, p. 2) In fact, Wind continues, Hume’s theory “can be reduced in the 
last analysis to one maxim, that personal merit consists in nothing other than possessing qualities 
‘useful or agreeable to ourselves or others’.” (Wind, p. 6) See Wind, Hume and the Heroic Portrait, p. 
2 , 6 .
108 Wind, p. 6.
109 As Copleston remarks, Hume believed “that moral distinctions are derived ultimately, not from 
reasoning, but from feeling, from the moral sentiment.” See Copleston, V, p. 319; Wind, Hume and the 
Heroic Portrait, p. 6.
110 For Hume, moreover, as for Rousseau, the “end of self-exploration is not disengaged control”—as it 
is for Locke—“but engagement, coming to terms with what we really are....” See Taylor, pp. 344-345.
111 As Hume explained: “first, ...reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will; and 
secondly,... it can never oppose passion in the direction o f the will.” (Hume, Treatise o f Human 
Nature, p. 413) Thus, he concludes: “Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and
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identity for abstract, universal ones.112 This was not to deny either the existence of 
general ideas or their superiority to particular ones, but to deny the possibility of 
abstracting general ideas from properties in nature.113
In fact, Hume’s analysis presented general difficulties for the interpretation of 
morality and identity.114 Having confined human knowledge to the effects of 
observation and experiment, Hume limited the knowledge of morality and identity to 
the evidence of passive observation.115 As the study of identity depended on the 
principle of individuation—on knowing the self as a distinct entity, disengaged from 
its external environment— Hume’s insistence that the human mind cannot distinguish 
real substance, but only the perception of real substance, meant that identity could not
i 1 /- t
extend “beyond what is immediately present to the senses.” Ultimately, as sense- 
perception became the only basis of knowledge, external actions became the only 
evidence of internal feeling, and interpretations of improvement and virtue came to
can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.” (Hume, Treatise o f  Human Nature, 
p. 415) See Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 413-415.
112 According to Hume, because all knowledge stems from subject, because there are no external 
qualities in the object but only a subjective analysis thereof, there is no essential abstract quality to 
serve as the foundation o f universal ideas. Hence, Hume writes: “all general ideas are nothing but 
particular ones, annexed to a certain term, which gives them a more extensive signification, and makes 
them recall upon occasion other individuals, which are similar to them....” (Hume, Treatise o f Human 
Nature, p. 17) See Copleston, VI, pp. 408-415; Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. xiii-xiv, 1, 17- 
20, 66-68, 180-181, 266-268; Taylor, pp. 344-345; Baumeister, p. 58.
llj Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. xv-xix; Hume, O f Commerce, in Broadie, pp. 387-388.
114 Rejecting “the entire providential view of the world,” only partially assimilating the principle of 
disengagement, and adopting the language of sentiment, Hume represents a curious blending of Locke 
and Hutcheson. (Taylor, pp. 343-344) For a discussion of Hume’s importance to the development of 
British thought, see Taylor, pp. 343-344; Copleston, VI, pp. 406-412.
115 Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. xvi.
116 Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 73. Whereas Augustine, following Plato, made form or soul 
the principle o f individuation, whereas Aquinas, following Aristotle, made matter or body the principle 
of individuation. Hume denies both. According to Hume, the individual is not reducible to the simple 
unity and continuity demanded by true identity. Indeed, of the seven philosophical relations Hume 
describes, identity ranks among the three that cannot be known with mathematical certainty, whose 
“necessary connexion” cannot be demonstrated. (Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 69-77) See
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depend on appearance alone.117 Consequently, identity became little more than the
summary character ascribed by the spectator to the subject, according to his composite
• 118perception of various impressions and his interpretation of their cause and motive.
On the surface, Hume’s analysis appeared to support moral fluidity and deny
identity.119 Yet, while conceding the evolutionary nature of moral principles, Hume
denied the principle of moral relativism, defending the natural premise of right and
wrong on the evidence of the immediacy of pleasure and pain.120 A similar argument
informed his defense of natural beauty—the corollary of virtue.121 What Hume did
not presume was that moral and aesthetic feelings affected all men equally. One
man naturally derived more or less pleasure from the evidence of moral good than
1 •another. This difference informed his level of Taste and virtue. As with Rousseau, 
it was this inequality of virtue—evidenced in inequalities of Taste—-that informed the 
need for social compact.124 At the same time, Taste—the external manifestation of
Copleston, V, pp. 302-305; Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 19-20; Hume, Treatise o f Human 
Nature, pp. 69-77, 189, 216-262.
117 Copleston, V, p. 319.
118 Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 216-217,251,253,259-262.
119 Remarkably, Hume argued that the “general principles of taste are uniform in human nature,” but 
that the “case is not the same with moral principles.... They are in continual flux and revolution. The 
son embraces a different system from the father.” (Hume, O f the Standard o f Taste, in Broadie, pp. 259 
and 261) See Hume, Treatise o f  Human Nature, pp. 296, 574-575; Hume, O f the Standard o f Taste, in 
Broadie, pp. 259,261.
120 “Let a man’s insensibility be ever so great,” Hume wrote, “he must often be touched with the images 
of Right and Wrong; and... [know] that others are susceptible of like impressions.” Hume, Theory of 
Moral Sentiments, quoted in Broadie, p. 145.
121 Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 298-299.
122 While all men bear the capacity for sympathy and, so, virtue, few act solely according to its dictates. 
See Copleston, V, pp. 331-333, 336-337.
123 Taste was a measure of one’s love for beauty in all its manifestations, including virtue, as well as a 
measure of one’s ability to judge. As Hume explained: “’Tis only by taste we can decide concerning 
[morality and beauty], nor are we possessed of any other standard, upon which we can form a judgment 
of this kind.” See Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 297.
124 Hume denied both the Tory view of government—based on a natural authority—and the Whig view 
of government—based on contract. Government, he argued, is bom of an interest to protect mind, 
body and property. It is supported by a sense o f obligation and duty. Justice is the artificial means by
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internal sympathy—became the signifier of “moral sense” and the standard of human 
virtue.125 Ultimately, then, one could judge a man—the “right-ness” or “wrong-ness” 
of his character—through the evidence of his politeness—by the way he looked and 
acted.126 Still, Hume could not deny the risks attendant such a superficial analysis of 
human value.127 He consequently reaffirmed the importance of wisdom in discerning
virtue, in distinguishing “great men” from the masses of false pretenders. Reason
128thus reemerged as the necessary brace to feeling.
In the end, Hume, like Rousseau, made access to social rank a matter of merit
rather than birth (at least theoretically), supporting the principle of social hierarchy as
a necessary consequence of human nature, with attendant implications for the
distribution of property and social rank.129 As he explained it:
The skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer are different from those 
of a man of quality. So are his sentiments, actions and manners. The different
which this balance is settled equitably and legally in the interest o f happiness. (Copleston, V, p. 343- 
344, 346, 348) The ideal republic was thus a fiction suited only for the establishment o f civil standards. 
(Copleston, V, p. 352) If government fails to meet its obligation to public liberty, it may be rightfully 
dissolved. (Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 551-564) As Copleston observes, “Hume, therefore, 
will not allow that there are eternal laws of justice, independent o f man’s conditions and of public 
utility.” (Copleston, V, p. 338) See Hume, O f the First Principles o f Government, in Broadie, pp. 507- 
512; Hume, Of the Origin o f Government, in Broadie, pp. 513-518; Hume, OfJustice, in Broadie, pp. 
579-597; Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 477,486-505, 526, 533-538, 551-564, 619-620; 
Copleston, V, pp. 336-338, 343-349, 352.
125 With regard to sympathy, Hume wrote: “Thus it appears, that sympathy is a very powerful principle 
in human nature, that it has a great influence on our taste of beauty, and that it produces our sentiment 
of morals in all the artificial virtues.” See Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, pp. 577-578.
126 Copleston, V, p. 340.
127 As Hume explained: “’Tis evident, that when we praise any actions, we regard only the motives that 
produced them, and consider the actions as signs or indications of certain principles in the mind and 
temper.... We must [therefore] look within to find the moral quality. This we cannot do directly; and 
therefore fix our attention on actions, as on external signs.” (Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 477) 
See Hume, Treatise ofHuman Nature, p. 477; Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles o f Morals, 
in Broadie, p. 147.
128 As Copleston writes, “the more our knowledge is increased, the clearer become the connections 
between character, motive and choice.” See Copleston, V, p. 325.
129 As Hume wrote: “’Tis necessary, therefore, to know our rank and station in the world, whether it be 
fix’d by our birth, fortune, employments, talents or reputation. ‘Tis necessary to feel the sentiment and 
passion of pride in conformity to it, and to regulate our actions accordingly.” See Hume, Treatise of 
Human Nature, p. 599.
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stations of life influence the whole fabric, external and internal; and these 
different stations arise necessarily, because uniformly, from the necessary and 
uniform principles of human nature.130
For Hume, social rank was contingent upon property, itself an effect of government 
jurisdiction.
For all their similarities, Hume and Rousseau departed on their views of 
commerce. Indeed, in his denial of an “ancient constitution” to which England might 
return, in his support for a strong executive power, in his concessions to passion and 
interest, all of which conduced to the progress of commerce, Hume aligned himself 
with a Court narrative at odds with the cause of ‘true’ (Harringtonian/ Common­
wealth) Whig “Patriots” and “republicans.”131 Against Rousseau’s vision of 
agricultural self-sufficiency, Hume cautiously supported the civility bom of controlled 
commerce. To reconcile the inherent conflict between commercial imperialism and 
republicanism, Hume, like Montesquieu, sought to police interest with virtue—to 
assimilate a degree of imperial interest into an otherwise virtuous republic.132 To this 
end, he endorsed the social virtues of benevolence, politeness and frugality.133 It was
130 Hence, Hume concluded: “Men cannot live without society, and cannot be associated without 
government. Government makes a distinction of property, and establishes the different ranks of men.” 
See Hume, Treatise o f  Human Nature, p. 402.
131 “Ideally,” he conceded, “a perfect commonwealth would consist of a one, few, and many of the 
classic type; but in reality, and even in ideality, there must be means of bringing the interests of all 
three into identity, and this involved the presence of a patronage-dispensing authority, which must 
always be in some degree of tension with the forces making for liberty.” See Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 495.
1;>2 Indeed, Pocock claims, Montesquieu opened the way for “commerce, and therefore passion, [to] 
contribute to liberty and civic values,” not in the sense of a republican civic virtue, but in the sense of 
private or social virtues. “Virtue, he laid down, was the principle of republics.... Montesquieu knew 
that virtue in this sense did not necessarily coincide with private values or personal morality.... Like 
Machiavelli, he knew that the Christian ethos made demands to which the civic ethos might refuse to 
give way....” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 491) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 
pp. 490-491.
133 Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 492.
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this position, hinted in the writings of Shaftesbury and advanced by Hume and 
Montesquieu, that was taken up and developed by Adam Smith and common-sense 
theorists into a narrative of commercial humanism.134
III. Adam Smith and the Scottish School o f “Common-Sense ”135
That the cultivation of politeness—the outward appearance of internal moral 
sensibility—was affiliated with a civility bom of conversation and commerce was, if 
latent in Shaftesbury’s theory, an important tenet in common-sense theory and a key 
means by which commerce became assimilated into a narrative of civic virtue and 
social progress.136 Although David Hume assisted in this development, insofar as he 
allowed for a commerce whose language and behavior served to benefit others, it was 
Adam Smith who crafted the narrative into a commercial variation on civic
134 As Pocock observes, the Enlightenment appears to have advanced ahead of itself in England, being 
“already engaged [in] .. .examining the impact of social change on a humanist theory of the social 
personality which was already wholly secular... [; in fact,] the Augustans... were possessed of a 
thoroughly social and secular theory of the civic personality, whose parameters suggested that for some 
centuries social change had been undermining its foundations.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 
p. 477) Indeed, he continues: “the primary threat to social order continued to be understood in terms of 
an “historical dialectic between virtue and commerce.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 497) 
See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 477, 495-499, 504.
135 According to Andrew Skinner, the “Scottish School” included Francis Hutcheson, David Hume, 
Adam Ferguson, Henry Home (Lord Kames), George Turnbull, Thomas Reid and Dugald Stewart.
What united them was a Newtonian methodology—i.e. the ‘experimental method’ of synthesis, “a 
union between the inductive approach associated with Bacon and the more purely deductive tradition of 
which Descartes was the representative.” (Skinner, p. 15) They also “shared a common interest in two 
questions.... First: ‘by what means does it come to pass, that the mind prefers one tenour of conduct to 
another?’ And secondly: ‘wherein does this virtue consist?’ Or what is the tone of temper and tenour 
of conduct, which constitutes the excellent and praiseworthy character?” (Skinner, p. 16) Unlike Hume, 
however, Adam Smith and the common-sense theorists insisted that the “‘propensities’ o f human 
nature... exist independently of our knowledge of them” and are not simply the byproduct of our 
imagination and ideas. (Skinner, p. 16) As Skinner notes, “The School in fact generally adopted the 
position that certain characteristics are implanted in man by the Author of Nature, thus providing the 
means by which a Rational Plan, whose purposes are not always known to man, is unfolded.” (Skinner, 
p. 16) See Skinner, introduction to Adam Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 15-16.
136 Significantly, as politeness became associated with Taste, Taste itself became a measure of one’s 
aesthetic sensibilities. See Gibson-Wood, p. 232.
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humanism.137 As Andrew Skinner writes, "The Wealth o f Nations seemed to lend a 
certain sanctity to the self-interested pursuit of gain, by showing that such activity was
138productive of benefit to society at large....”
Smith’s thesis turned on two assumptions relevant to the interpretation of 
identity. First, against Rousseau and Hume, Smith reclaimed the more traditional 
Aristotelian description of man as a social animal intended for society by nature, not 
by contract. In Smith’s narrative, there is something in man—the “Invisible Hand” of 
conscience—which naturally motivates him towards society. This society serves, on 
the one hand, as a venue of social activity suited to man’s natural ‘sympathy’. On the 
other hand, through instruments of justice, it also serves as a means of protecting man 
from the selfish inclinations of himself and others.139 Hence, for Smith, human 
engagement in society represented the natural unfolding of true happiness—i.e. 
goodness—, a happiness resonant in nature, consistent with reason, manifest in 
general rules of morality, and prescribed by Divine plan.140
Significantly, however, to this Aristotelian narrative, Smith added a
137 Hume distinguished between disinterested and interested commerce, as well as the social—as 
opposed to civic—“promise,” the honor code of commercial men. (Hume, Treatise of Human Nature, 
p. 522) Unlike Rousseau, moreover, Hume accepted the compatibility of individual and social good. 
(Hume, O f Commerce, quoted in Broadie, p. 388) At the same time, he cautioned against great 
disparities of fortune, endorsing the advantages o f a large middle class; “In this circumstance consists 
the great advantage of England above any nation at present in the world.” (Hume, O f Commerce, 
quoted in Broadie, p. 395) See Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 522-523; Hume, O f Commerce, in 
Broadie, pp. 395-396; Broadie, p. 386.
138 Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations (1776; 1789) (New York: Penguin Books, 
(1970) 1974), p. 11.
139 The rules of justice necessarily changed in accordance with developments in man’s socioeconomic 
circumstances. As the propensities of men in a commercial state differed from those in a hunting state, 
so the rules of justice need reflect those differences. (Skinner, introduction to Adam Smith, The Wealth 
of Nations, p. 22) See Skinner, introduction to Adam Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 22-23, 29-31.
140 Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 16-28, 77-80; Smith, Theory o f Moral 
Sentiments, in Broadie, pp. 289-295; Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 286,476-477.
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commercial variant: a description of human progress necessarily informed by 
economic development.141 According to Smith, the priorities and circumstances of an 
agricultural society will naturally conduce to a different social structure than that of a 
commercial society. The degree of human improvement and happiness in a society 
will thus depend on the level of its economic progress. Moreover, whereas a purely 
agricultural society will conduce to a more vertical hierarchy than a purely 
commercial one, so a commercial society will provide more equality, more liberty 
and, hence, more happiness to a greater number of individuals than an agricultural 
one.142 What is interesting about Smith’s analysis is its implied progress from a state 
of dependence to independence to interdependence, a circumstance only tacitly 
suggested by the theory of sympathy found, for example, in Shaftesbury, Rousseau, 
and Hume. Ultimately, Smith wrote, “Every man ... lives by exchanging, or becomes 
in some measure a merchant, and the society itself grows to be what is properly a 
commercial society.”143
As the economic structure of society changed, so too, Smith argued, did the 
political structure. Changes in the nature of wealth and birth necessarily affected 
individual claims to political authority and this, in turn, affected identity and social
141 Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, in Broadie, pp. 621, 626; Broadie, p. 615.
142 As Smith explained: “The difference between the most dissimilar characters, between a philosopher 
and a common street porter, for example, seems to arise not so much from nature as from habit, custom, 
and education... till at last the vanity of the philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any 
resemblance.” (Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 120) See Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 120; 
Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 14; Broadie, p. 433.
143 Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 126, 388. Yet, Smith cautions, there will always be those who 
will become victims of mind-numbing tasks. It is therefore essential that government provide greater 
educational and cultural opportunities for its citizens, not only because it is the right thing to do, but 
because it benefits the state. See Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 179,461; Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 464.
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order.144 On the one hand, the transition from a pasturing (nomadic) to a farming 
(settled) state made land the primary form of wealth and authority, and this lent 
landowners a privileged identity.145 With the development of cities, however, and the 
emergence of a commercial ‘citizen’ class, the authority of landowners was slowly 
eroded.146 At the same time, “liberty” and independence reached a wider 
population.147 Ultimately, as political authority was made to accommodate more 
varied forms of wealth and property—rental income (the wealth of the landowner), 
wage income (the wealth of the laborer) and profit income (the wealth of the 
“capitalist”)—, a new model for social order, based on a structure of interdependence 
and exchange, diluted the value of land.148 On the one hand, the received wealth of 
the landowner continued to suggest a more disinterested condition—his property 
came to him with “neither labour nor care”—, a circumstance that lent him a political
144 Skinner writes: “As before, Smith explained the existence of patterns of authority and subordination 
in terms o f inequalities of wealth and thus birth....” (Skinner, in Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 35)
In all cases, he suggests, wealth—and, so, the circumstances (as opposed to the bloodlines) of birth— 
was the medium of authority guiding the “patterns of subordination and dependence.” (Skinner, in 
Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 34) See Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 
34-35.
145 Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 507-520; Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, 
pp. 34-35.
146 The effects of manufacturing were three-fold: an increased market for agricultural production which, 
in turn, stimulated agriculture and encouraged improvements; the transformation of land from a source 
of power to a source of investment; and the spread o f urban liberty to the country. (Skinner, in Smith, 
Wealth o f Nations, p. 38) The implications were different in Scotland. “In Scotland,” Smith wrote, “... 
as no leasehold gives a vote for a member of parliament, the yeomanry are... less respectable to their 
landlords than in England.” (Smith, Wealth o f Nations, p. 492) See Skinner, introduction to Smith, The 
Wealth o f  Nations, pp. 37-39; Smith, Wealth o f Nations, p. 492.
147 By the reign o f Elizabeth I, English policy was becoming favorable to commerce. Initially, this 
worked to the advantage of the reigning authority. Eventually, however, commerce gave rise to 
“economic, political, and sociological effects o f a broadly liberalizing kind.” See Skinner, introduction 
to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 37,41.
148 As Skinner explains, while “men are generally disposed to admire and respect the great, well bom, 
and wealthy ... [with] the advent of the exchange or ‘commercial’ economy, we ... find society divided 
into three ‘great constituent orders’, landlords, capitalists, and wage labour... linked by a complex 
pattern o f interdependencies, a pattern which is compatible with a considerable degree of personal 
freedom....” See Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 42-47; Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 464.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
131
edge.149 On the other hand, however, the industrious capitalist benefited from a drive 
to improve himself and a consequent propensity to save and invest, a circumstance 
that conduced to the progress of the state.150 The function of government was to 
resolve the resulting tension.
For all the importance he ascribed to economics, Smith’s analysis ultimately 
depended upon the power of social virtues—his “Invisible Hand” of conscience, 
Rousseau’s “voice within,” and Hume’s instinctive pleasure and pain—to curb the 
negative effects of commercialization.151 Although not a moral-sense theorist,
Smith’s Theory o f Moral Sentiments endorsed the importance of human “sympathy” 
to the successful progress of society.152 As Smith explained it, the more aware the 
individual became of his natural sympathy, the more he cultivated his natural virtues, 
the further he advanced the public good.153 But Smith’s was an “active” or 
Aristotelian (as opposed to contemplative or Platonic) sympathy insofar as its benefits
149 Skinner, introduction to Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 64. Indeed, Smith cautioned against the 
political influence of capitalists: “legislative proposals emanating from members of the mercantile 
classes: ‘ought always to be listened to with great precaution.... It comes from an order of men, whose 
interest is never exactly the same with that o f the public, who have generally an interest to deceive and 
even to oppress the public....” (Skinner, in Smith, p. 80) See Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 519; 
Skinner, introduction to Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, p. 80.
150 Smith wrote: “As the capital of an individual can be increased only by what he saves from his annual 
revenue or his annual gains, so the capital o f a society, which is the same with that of all the individuals 
who compose it, can be increased only in the same manner.” (Smith, Wealth o f  Nations, p. 437)
Society thus progressed on the coat-tails of the self-improving commoner. See Smith, Wealth of 
Nations, pp. 429-449; Smith, The Rules o f Morality, in Broadie, p. 293; Skinner, introduction to Smith, 
The Wealth o f Nations, pp. 67, 75.
151 According to Andrew Skinner, Smith’s was a “general philosophy,” one important facet of which 
was economic. See Skinner, introduction to Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, pp. 11, 13, 81-82.
152 As Smith explained it: “How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some 
principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness 
necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it.” (Smith, Theory o f  
Moral Sentiments, in Broadie, p. 157) See Smith, Theory o f Moral Sentiments, in Broadie, pp. 157- 
164; Copleston, V, pp. 356-357.
153 See Smith, The Theory o f Moral Sentiments, in Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment, pp. 159, 164, 
172-173; Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment, p. 155; Copleston, V, p. 359.
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were tied to its effects in the public sphere. There thus re-emerged two standards of 
virtue: the ideal standard of the “impartial spectator”—that of Christianity and the 
“Philosophical Hero;”154 and the human standard—that of “men as they are” or their 
“undercharacter.”155
Smith’s more positive take on commercialism, as an advanced stage of social 
progress, prepared the way for common-sense theorists to endorse reason and industry 
as the conduits of moral virtue and the proper foundations for a narrative meaning of 
life, thereby giving voice to the so-called “Protestant work ethic.”156 In many 
respects, Richard Price (1723-1791) was a bridge to this school and Thomas Reid an 
important contributor.157 Without denying the role of feeling, particularly in the 
judgment of character, action, and aesthetics, Price, for example, deemed reason the 
foundation of moral virtue and public good.158 But there were other influential 
adherents, including the Rev. Hugh Blair, George Campbell, Lord Kames, Sir James
154 What Smith described as “the idea of complete propriety and perfection, which... no human conduct 
ever did... come up to; and in comparison with which the actions of all men must for ever appear... 
imperfect.” See Smith, The Theory o f Moral Sentiments, in Broadie, p. 175. See also Shaftesbury, 
Characteristicks, I, pp. 170, 195-196; Rousseau, Letter to Usteri, dated 18 July 1763, in Rousseau, The 
Social Contract and other later political writings, p. 266.
155 Smith, The Theory o f Moral Sentiments, in Broadie, p. 175; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp.
170, 195-196; Rousseau, Letter to Usteri, dated 18 July 1763, in Rousseau, The Social Contract and 
other later political writings, p. 266.
155 According to Taylor, “A new model of civility emerges in the eighteenth century in which the life of 
commerce and acquisition gains an unprecedentedly positive place.” (Taylor, p. 214) He goes on: 
“commerce is a constructive and civilizing force, binding men together in peace and forming the basis 
of ‘polished’ mores. The [Aristotelian] ethic of glory is confronted here with a fully articulated 
alternative view, o f social order, political stability, and the good life.... The ‘bourgeois’ ethic has 
obvious levelling consequences, and no one can be blind to the tremendous role it has played in 
constituting... the modem identity.” (Taylor, pp. 214-215) See Taylor, pp. 214-215; Copleston, V, pp. 
361,392-393.
157 Copleston, V, pp. 363-364. Reid insisted on the separate existence of qualities in objects that served 
as the source of individual attributes. For a discussion of Reid’s position and excerpts of his writings, 
see Broadie, pp. 73-114, 264-282.
158 Copleston, V, pp. 362, 389-391.
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Steuart, Sir John Sinclair, John Millar, Adam Ferguson, and John Erskine of 
Camock.159
Employing a Newtonian methodology—that which proceeded from effect to 
cause, from the particular to the general, from analysis to synthesis160—, the common- 
sense theorists occupied a middle position between the moral-sense theorists and the 
utilitarians, embracing God as the Author of nature and natural law, but locating 
knowledge in the evidence of particular experience.161 In general, all shared a 
commitment to an internal “common sense”—a sense without intelligible cause—that 
served as the seat of moral principles, guiding the good acts, self-restraint, and 
propriety conducive to common good.162 They similarly shared a classical notion of 
progress in which society served as the natural venue for a prescribed human 
development from ignorance to knowledge, vice to virtue, misery to happiness.163 On
159 A more complete list would include William Robertson, James Dunbar, John Gregory, William 
Smellie, James Hutton, and Colin MacLaurin. For excerpts o f their writings, see Broadie, pp. 675-682, 
715-729, 750-795.
160 For a full discussion of Newtonian methodology, see Colin MacLaurin, An Account o f Sir Isaac 
Newton’s Philosophical Discoveries (1748), excerpted in Broadie, pp. 782-795.
161 Dugald Steward (1753-1828), for example, criticized the moral-sense emphasis on self-love and 
social affection, deeming morality a distinct and separate faculty, and actions—as opposed to 
affections—its proper subject. Moreover, Steward, like Price, held moral judgments to be rational, not 
intuitive. All rejected the authoritarian stance, which deemed the human narrative an arbitrary matter 
of divine will. For a discussion of Steward’s ideas, see Copleston, V, pp. 380-382.
162 Henry Home, Lord Karnes, for example, modified Hume’s position, allowing for the existence of 
“principles implanted in our nature”—our common sense—which permit knowledge without causation. 
(Broadie, p. 345) On such grounds he could argue that morality is reasonable insofar as good acts are 
agreeable and bad acts are not, in accordance with divine plan. (Karnes, Sketches o f  the History o f  Man, 
in Broadie, p. 640) See Karnes, Sketches o f the History o f Man, in Broadie, pp. 640-646; Broadie, p. 
630.
153 As John Millar explained it, “There is..., in human society, a natural progress from ignorance to 
knowledge, and from rude to civilized manners, the several stages o f which are usually accompanied 
with peculiar laws and customs.” (Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in Broadie, pp. 491-492) 
Adam Ferguson shared this position, additionally allowing for a natural standard of human perfection 
based on “the best conceptions of his understanding, in the best movements of his heart... .’’(Ferguson, 
An Essay on the History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 506) The progress of mankind was thus 
conceived to be linear and cumulative, for “the species has a progress as well as the individual; they 
build in every subsequent age on the foundations formerly laid; and, in a succession of years, tend to a 
perfection in the application of their faculties, to which the aid of long experience is required, and to
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this premise, the Reverend Hugh Blair, for one, urged a narrative of progress and 
improvement in which the meaning of life was cast as a pilgrimage away from the 
original state of natural innocence, through the corruption effected by the Fall, 
towards a final, divine state of virtuous happiness.164 In this he supported not only a 
common-sense narrative—i.e. one based on the rationality of moral principles and 
man’s divine end—but a Protestant ethic of ordinary life.165
In addition to advocating a narrative of natural progress and an ethic of 
individual industry, the common-sense theorists also seem to have shared Rousseau’s 
Aristotelian love of patriotism as the most heroic form of public action and the 
highest measure of human virtue.166 Indeed, patriotism served as a barometer of
1 f\1social progress. Inversely, factionalism, tyranny, and luxury were deemed evidence 
of the subversion of public virtue to private interest.168 Commerce, as a conduit of
which many generations must have combined their endeavours.” (Ferguson, An Essay on the History o f  
Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 502) See Broadie, pp. 488-489; Adam Ferguson, An Essay on the History 
of Civil Society, in Broadie, pp. 499-506.
164 As Blair described it, “this life was intended for a state of trial and improvement to man. His 
preparation for a better world required a gradual purification, carried on by steps of progressive 
discipline.” (Blair, Sermons, in Broadie, p. 337) Religion helps to make this process both possible and 
bearable. On the one hand, it provides us with guidelines for a moral life—“the goods of the mind.” 
(Blair, Sermons, in Broadie, p. 196) On the other hand, it encourages our attention to the duties of 
ordinary life and, hence, nurtures the discipline and control essential to virtue. (Blair, Sermons, in 
Broadie, p. 197) As Broadie notes: “The emphasis throughout his pulpit writings is on what lies 
naturally within our power, the exercise of civic virtue, rather than on what is ours by an act of divine 
grace.... We are to be good citizens, faithful friends, and loving to our family.” (Blair, Sermons, in 
Broadie, p. 331) See Blair, Sermons, in Broadie, pp. 185-198, 331.
165 Society, he wrote, “requires every man to do his own business.” (Blair, in Broadie, p. 336) Thus, he 
concluded, “let us carry on our preparation for heaven, not by abstracting ourselves from the concerns 
of this world, but by fulfilling the duties and offices of every station in life... that we may then acquire 
purity and dignity of manners suited to our divine hopes.. . . ” (Blair, in Broadie, pp. 342-343) See 
Blair, Sermons, in Broadie, pp. 335-336, 342-343.
166 Karnes, for example, deemed patriotism the foundation of heroic virtue worthy of the highest social
esteem. “In fact,” Kames wrote, “wherever [patriotism] prevails, the morals of the people are found to 
be pure and correct.” (Kames, Sketches o f the History o f Man, in Broadie, p. 521) See Kames,
Sketches o f the History o f Man, in Broadie, pp. 521-523; Broadie, p. 520.
167 Broadie, p. 520.
168 Kames, Sketches o f the History o f Man, in Broadie, pp. 524-525.
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interest, was necessarily implicated in this narrative.169 Hence, Sir James Steuart’s 
emphasis on the necessary balance between individual interest and public good, and 
his consequent examination of the relationship between subordination, dependence, 
liberty, and commerce.170 Significantly, mutual dependence—i.e. interdependence—
171emerged as the necessary premise of liberty and “the only bond of society....” At
the same time, one’s proper political authority turned on the level of one’s 
independence.172 The difference resided in the definition of independence, which was 
increasingly regarded as a matter of autonomy rather than birth. Consequently, any 
form of government which supported fixed standards of subordination and, hence, 
denied or ignored the rewards of progress that rightfully accrued to individuals
169 Kames, Sketches o f the History o f Man, in Broadie, pp. 526-528.
170 Steuart shared this position with Adam Ferguson and others. “It has been found,” Ferguson wrote, 
“that, except in a few singular cases, the commercial and political arts have advanced together.” 
(Ferguson, in Broadie, p. 548) See Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy 
(1767), in Broadie, pp. 401-402; Ferguson, An Essay on the History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, pp. 
546-552.
171 Steuart, pp. 413-414. He explained: “By a people’s being free, I understand no more than their 
being governed by general laws... for reasons which regard the body of the society, and not through 
favour or prejudice to particular persons, or particular classes....” (Steuart, An Inquiry into the 
Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, pp. 413-414) He consequently defined three degrees of 
dependence to accompany the incremental stages of economic progress: the natural dependence of a 
child on a parent; the political dependence of an inferior on a superior—that of the slave, feudal 
servant, or subject (though slave and subject actually represent different economic phases); and the 
commercial dependence of the industrious worker on the employer. (Steuart, pp. 414-415) Thus, he 
wrote: “He who depends totally upon the sale o f his own industry, stands in the fourth degree: this is 
the case of tradesmen and manufacturers, with respect to those who employ them.” (Steuart, in Broadie, 
p. 415) Nonetheless, by the final stage of commerce, he noted, “liberty [was] extended to the lowest 
denominations o f a people, without destroying that dependence necessary to serve as a band of 
society— ” (Steuart, in Broadie, p. 414) See Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f Political 
Oeconomy, in Broadie, pp. 413-415.
172 “All authority,” he wrote, “is in proportion to dependence, and must vary according to 
circumstances.” (Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f  Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, p. 416)
Thus, he went on, “In proportion... as certain classes, or certain individuals become more dependent..., 
in the same proportion ought their just subordination to increase: and in proportion as they become less 
dependent than formerly, in the same proportion ought this just subordination to diminish.” (Steuart, p. 
415) See Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f  Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, pp. 415-419;
Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in Broadie, p. 534.
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through human industry, was deemed unnaturally oppressive.17^  Thus, Steuart
concluded, it was the nature of progress that industry succeed servitude, that
commerce succeed feudalism and, finally, that wealth succeed birth as the medium of
independence—read “interdependence”—and authority.174
Of course, the nature of Steuart’s “progress” conduced more to political
competition than social equality.175 As the leisured landowner spent more of his
income on luxury goods and less on hospitality and a household of retainers, as his
retainers become wage-earning laborers, artisans, and tradesmen, the landowner’s
vulnerability to increased debts, coupled with the wage-eamer’s opportunity for
increased savings, made the competition for power both more intense and less
relenting.176 As his contemporary, John Millar, likewise described it, the landowner’s
estate therefore, being more and more incumbered with debts, is at length 
alienated, and brought into the possession of the frugal and industrious 
merchant, who, by success in trade, has been enabled to buy it, and who is 
desirous of obtaining that rank and consequence which landed property is 
capable of bestowing.177
173 This included those governments that continued to endorse political dependence—to base authority 
on birth rather than industry—after the economic transition to a commercial economy—i.e. those in 
which “liberty and independence were confined to the nobility.” (Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle 
of Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, p. 420) As Taylor aptly notes, in some respects, the Enlightenment 
was little more than a reactionary movement “defined above all by the aspiration to destroy the 
established order.” (Taylor, p. 343) See Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f  Political Oeconomy, 
in Broadie, p. 420; Taylor, p. 343.
174 As Steuart observed, “industry must give wealth, and wealth will give power.... It was consequently 
very natural for the nobility to be jealous of wealthy merchants, and of every one who became easy and 
independent by means of his own industry....” (Steuart, in Broadie, p. 420) See Steuart, An Inquiry 
into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, p. 420; Sir John Sinclair, The Statistical Account 
of Scotland, in Broadie, p. 467.
173 See Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in Broadie, p. 535; Broadie, pp. 532-533.
176 Adam Ferguson made a similar claim: “The passion for independence, and the love of dominion, 
frequently arise from a common source: There is, in both, an aversion to controul; and he, who, in one 
situation, cannot bruik a superior, must, in another, dislike to be joined with an equal.” See Ferguson, 
An Essay on the History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 553.
177 Millar, Origin o f the Distinction ofRanks, in Broadie, p. 541. See also Millar, Origin o f the 
Distinction o f Ranks; or, An Inquiry into the Circumstances which give rise to Influence and Authority 
in the Different Members o f Society, 4th ed. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood, 1806), pp. 220-242.
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The result was not a mere recycling of the feudal landowner-laborer relationship, but 
an entirely different and more fluid social and political structure.178 In the end, Millar 
wrote, as the nature of property changed, money became, “more and more the only
• • * 179means of procuring honours and dignities....”
Ultimately, the political demands of economic progress aggravated the clash 
between landed and monied interests.180 Completed in 1766 and published in 1767, 
Steuart’s writings appear prophetic in light of the ensuing American Revolution.
Such revolutions, he wrote, “have been owing to the short-sightedness of statesmen; 
who, inattentive to the consequences of growing wealth and industry, foolishly 
imagine that hereditary subordination was to subsist among classes, whose situation, 
with respect to each other, was entirely changed.”181 As Millar likewise recognized, 
“Where-ever men of inferior condition are enabled to live in affluence by their own 
industry, and, in procuring their livelihood, have little occasion to court the favour of
178 As Millar argued, “This fluctuation of property, so observable in all commercial countries,... must 
necessarily weaken the authority of those who are placed in the higher ranks of life. Persons who have 
lately attained to riches, have no opportunity of establishing that train of dependence which is 
maintained by those who have remained for ages at the head of a great estate. The hereditary influence 
of family is thus, in a great measure, destroyed....” (Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in 
Broadie, p. 541) As Adam Ferguson observed, the social order was not at all like the “good order of 
stones in a wall,” but was rather more fluidly composed of “living and active members.” (Ferguson, An 
Essay on the History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 555, note 1) See Millar, Origin o f the Distinction 
o f Ranks, in Broadie, p. 541; Ferguson, An Essay on the History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 555.
179 Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in Broadie, p. 542.
180 Indeed, Steuart warned, in like circumstances, where compromises failed to be enacted, “a wealthy 
populace has broken their chains to pieces, and overturned the very foundations of the feudal system.” 
(Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, p. 421) See Steuart, An 
Inquiry into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, pp. 420-421; Ferguson, An Essay on the 
History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 549; Kramnick, Bolingbroke and his Circle, pp. 55, 80-83.
181 Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, p. 421. As John Millar 
explained it, as the increase in arts provided new forms of employment, giving rise to the trades and 
professions, dependence gave way to a commercial independence—i.e. one based on mutual 
interdependence....” (Millar, in Broadie, p. 540) Significantly, Millar noted, two further consequences 
resulted: “While, from these causes, people of low rank are gradually advancing towards a state of 
independence, [so] the influence derived from wealth is diminished in the same proportion.”(Millar, in
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their superiors, there we may expect that ideas of liberty will be universally 
diffused.”182 In the end, as the implications of commerce tended towards democracy, 
so the need to preserve power tended towards oppression, as the implications of 
commerce tended towards a more inclusive and fluid social hierarchy, so the need to 
preserve conventional modes of political authority and social rank tended to reinforce 
a more exclusive and fixed one.183 As Ferguson aptly notes, the natural progress of
184liberty was readily thwarted by the pursuit of empire.
Broadie, p. 540) See Steuart, An Inquiry into the Principle o f Political Oeconomy, in Broadie, pp. 421- 
423; Millar, Origin o f the Distinction of Ranks, in Broadie, pp. 539-540.
182  ^-phis happy arrangement of things,” he went on, “is naturally produced by commerce and 
manufactures. . . ” See Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in Broadie, p. 545.
183 As Millar explained: “It cannot be doubted that these circumstances have a tendency to introduce a 
democratical government. As persons of inferior rank are placed in a situation which, in point of 
subsistence, renders them little dependent upon their superiors; as no one order of men continues in the 
exclusive possession of opulence; and as every man who is industrious may entertain the hope of 
gaining a fortune; it is to be expected that the prerogatives of the monarch and o f the ancient nobility 
will be gradually undermined, that the privileges of the people will be extended in the same proportion, 
and that power, the usual attendant of wealth, will be in some measure diffused over all the members of 
the community.” Millar, Origin o f the Distinction o f Ranks, in Broadie, p. 542.
184 “Among the circumstances... which in the event of national prosperity, and in the result of 
commercial arts, lead to the establishment of despotism,” Ferguson wrote, “there is none, perhaps, that 
arrives at this termination, with so sure an aim, as the perpetual enlargement of territory.” (Ferguson,
An Essay on the History o f Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 557) See Ferguson, An Essay on the History of 
Civil Society, in Broadie, p. 557; Rousseau, O f the Social Contract, in Rousseau, The Social Contract 
and other later political writings, pp. 106-109.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
PART 2
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
139
PART TWO 
CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY: THE CONTENT 
CHAPTER Y 
THE BRITISH PORTRAIT
.. .while she consulted her glass after what manner she should dress, her eyes, 
the gay, the languishing, the sedate, the commanding, the beseeching air were 
put on, a thousand times, and, as often rejected; and she had scarce determined 
which to make use of, when her page brought her word, some ladies who were 
going to Court desired her to accompany them;... so went immediately, armed 
with all her lightnings, but full of unsettled reflections.
Eliza Haywood, 17191
By the middle of the eighteenth century, empiricism had undermined the 
classical correlation between realism and ignorance, the implications of which were 
felt in portrait painting. The elevation of sensory perception into a recognized 
medium for making—as opposed to recovering—knowledge, meant that realism 
might be understood as a conduit of truth. This undermined classical distinctions 
between particular and general styles.2 It was now possible to argue that the close
1 Haywood, Love in Excess (1719-1720), David Oakleaf, ed. (Orchard Park, NY: Broadview Press 
(1994), 1997), p. 45.
2 On the one hand, Jean-Jacques Rousseau argued that painting (or anything subject to visual 
mediation) could never be truly ‘general’: “All general ideas are purely intellectual; if the imagination 
intervenes to the least degree, the idea immediately becomes particular.... Purely abstract entities .. 
he explained, “are conceivable only by means of words.” (Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, p. 95) 
Thus, Shaftesbury concluded, “A PAINTER, if he has any Genius, understands the Truth and Unity of 
Design; and knows ... that Particulars... must yield to the general Design....” (Shaftesbury,
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observation of nature was the only means to knowledge—that “meaning” and 
“potentiality” began with the particular. By extension, the “mechanical” efforts of 
artists might be understood to advance knowledge. Thus Jonathan Richardson (1667- 
1745) could style himself an art theorist, twisting classical doctrine into an ideological 
formula compatible with his “mechanical” interests.
Yet, the analysis of painting continued to be informed by stylistic categories 
like “grand” and “historical.”4 Likewise, a standard of beauty, distinct from a “sense 
of beauty,” and characterized by natural and intelligible standards of moral perfection
Characteristicks, I, pp. 142-143) Likewise, in his sixth and eleventh Discourses, Reynolds defended 
the superiority o f the general style: “A Hand thus exercised ... will permit the lower painter... to 
exhibit the minute discriminations... ; while he, like the philosopher, will consider nature in the 
abstract, and represent in every one of his figures the character o f the species.” (Reynolds, Discourses 
on Art, p. 50) Nonetheless, the eighteenth-century witnessed a move towards the ‘particular’. As 
Abrams observes, “In the Age of Johnson,... we find standards for art running the gamut from a 
primary emphasis on typicality, generality, and ‘large appearances’, to the unqualified recommendation 
of particularity, uniqueness, and a microscopic depiction of detail.” (Abrams, The Mirror and the 
Lamp, p. 41) He goes on: “Some of Johnson’s contemporaries ... gave greater emphasis to the role of 
particularity in achieving poetic excellence. Thus Joseph Wharton said that ‘the use, the force, and the 
excellence of language, certainly consists in raising, clear, complete, and circumstantial images’.... 
Edward Young’s plea for originality, novelty, individuality, and ‘singulars’ is not qualified by reference 
to the need for contrary qualities....” (Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 42) See Rousseau, A 
Discourse on Inequality, p. 95; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 142-143; Reynolds, Discourses on 
Art, Robert R. Wark, ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press (1959), 1997) p. 50; Abrams, The Mirror 
and the Lamp, pp. 41-42.
3 Richardson was the son o f a silk-weaver, a citizen of London who owned his own loom. His father 
died in 1672, when Richardson was a child. After some grammar school, at the age of 14,
Richardson’s step-father set him up as an apprentice with a scrivener (notary). Following his tenure as 
an apprentice, Richardson began his training as a painter in the studio of John Riley, who practised a 
more realistic or native style of portrait painting—wh ich included “the rendition of individual 
appearance and character”—than his foreign-born contemporaiy, Sir Godfrey Kneller. Moreover, for 
Richardson, Riley also represented the finer qualities o f a liberal artist—modest, educated and genteel. 
Riley and Kneller served jointly as Principal Painter to William and Mary. See Gibson-Wood, pp. 25- 
30.
* For Reynolds, the “historical” style served as a more contemporary and narrative variation on the 
universal and philosophical “grand” style. The demands of the “Historical Style”—compositional 
consistency and unity, the generalization of the subject, the use of “permanent” (i.e. classical) dress—  
occupied much of Reynolds’s fifth Discourse (December 1772). “When a portrait is painted in the 
Historical Style,” he wrote, “as it is neither an exact minute representation of an individual nor 
completely ideal [—i.e. ‘grand’ or ‘great’—], every circumstance ought to correspond to this 
mixture.... [Wjhen this is accomplished to a high degree, it becomes in some sort a rival to that style 
which we have fixed as the highest [—i.e. the grand style].” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 88-89) 
See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 57, 60, 88-89; Broadie, p. 29.
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or “Taste,” continued to support fixed aesthetic ranks.5 Thomas Reid, for example, 
located the quality of beauty, like other qualities, in the object itself, Taste being, 
therefore, a matter of sensibility and judgment.6 Even Hume conceded that “there are 
certain qualities in objects” that naturally predispose the sentiments towards beauty 
and, therefore, naturally distinguish men of superior intellect.7 He thus pursued a 
Standard o f Taste—“a rule, by which the various sentiments of men may be 
reconciled”8—to assist in the making of aesthetic judgments and the nurturing of 
moral improvement.9 Such assumptions predisposed like-minded theorists to conflate 
beauty and virtue into a principle of “Taste”—what Reid described as “That power of 
the mind by which we are capable of discerning and relishing the beauties of Nature,
5 According to Shaftesbury, beauty represented the formal manifestation of absolute truth and 
harmony— Aristotle’s“Grea/ness with Order.” (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 1, p. 143) Hutcheson 
added: “As to the most powerful beauty... we shall shew ... that it arises from some imagined 
indication of morally good dispositions of mind.” (Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original of our 
Ideas o f Beauty and Virtue, in Broadie, p. 214) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 142-143; 
Broadie, pp. 201-202; Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original o f our Ideas ofBeauty and Virtue, Af 
ed (1738; Glasgow, 1772), in Broadie, pp. 207-210, 214,219-220.
0 Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, pp. 270-271. Reid denied Hume’s claim that 
“beauty and deformity ... belong entirely to the sentiment,” arguing instead for qualities in objects. 
(Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, p. 264) Sentiment was thus an effect, rather than 
a cause, o f such qualities. (Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, pp. 270-271) He thus 
distinguished between two types of Taste: “In the external sense of taste, we are led by reason and 
reflection to distinguish between the agreeable sensation we feel, and the quality in the object which 
occasions it.” (Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, p. 266) He continues: “In a like 
manner, our internal taste ought to be accounted most just and perfect, when we are pleased with things 
that are most excellent in their kind, and displeased with the contrary. The ... faculty of discerning ... 
beauty... is what we call a good taste.” (Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, p. 268) 
See Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, p. 266-271.
7 “Though it be certain,” he wrote, “that beauty and deformity... are not qualities in objects, but belong 
entirely to the sentiment, internal or external; it must be allowed, that there are certain qualities in 
objects, which are fitted by nature to produce those particular feelings.” (Hume, Of the Standard of 
Taste, in Broadie, p. 252) He added: “Though men o f delicate taste be rare, they are easily to be 
distinguished in society, by the soundness o f their understanding and the superiority of their faculties 
above the rest of mankind.” (Hume, O f the Standard o f Taste, in Broadie, p. 259) See Hume, Of the 
Standard o f Taste, in Broadie, pp. 251-259.
8 Hume, O f the Standard o f Taste, in Broadie, p. 248.
9 Broadie, pp. 243-244.
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and whatever is excellent in the fine arts... .”10 The objectification of beauty by 
theorists like Reid lent further credence to the empirical aesthetic resonant in the 
Richardsonian—as opposed to Shaftesburian—“abstract.”11 Moreover, for all the 
emphasis on a fixed standard of beauty, acknowledgement was made of its less 
perfect—human—form. Even Hutcheson conceded the merits of “relative beauty”—
the beauty of human experience—at the expense of “original” or perfect beauty. This
12allowed for a modicum of “undercharacter” in the rendering of human identity.
On the one hand, then, modes of painting continued to be informed by fixed 
standards of beauty rooted in ideals of virtue and excellence. On the other hand, the 
failing credibility of a theoretical methodology meant that such ideals might be known 
through more empirical methodologies. The cultivation of virtue and Taste might
1Tthus be effected by looking as opposed to “imagining.” By extension, mediums 
(and makers) of beauty that depended upon “looking” might thereby claim stature as
10 Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, p. 266. See also Reid, An Inquiry into the 
Human Mind on the Principles o f Common Sense and Essays on the Intellectual Powers, in Broadie, 
pp. 266-270; Hume, O f the Standard o f Taste, in Broadie, p. 257; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, p. 
303.
11 On these grounds, Reid encouraged the painter to capture on canvas that which was seen, as opposed 
to that which was thought and, hence, to render visible the abstract signs of the perceived object 
“whereof every man understands the meaning.” By this means, Reid continued, “we pass from the sign 
to the thing signified, with ease, and by natural impulse....” See Reid, An Inquiry into the Human 
Mind on the Principles o f  Common Sense, in Broadie, p. 277.
As Hutcheson explained: “we have more lively ideas of imperfect men with all their passions, than of 
morally perfect heroes such as really never occur to our observation;... we are more nearly touched 
and affected by the imperfect characters; since in them we see represented, ... the struggle between the 
passions o f self-love and those of honour and virtue, which we often feel in our own breasts. This is 
the perfection of beauty for which Homer is justly admired, as well as for the variety of his characters.” 
(Hutcheson, in Broadie, pp. 220-221) Hence, Hutcheson concludes, a painter might achieve beauty not 
by “attainting] the highest perfection o f original beauty separately considered,” but by combining the 
“relative beauty” o f human experience “with some degree of the original kind.... The like reason may 
influence artists, in many other instances, to depart from the rules of original beauty, as above laid 
down.” (Hutcheson, in Broadie, pp. 222-223) See Hutcheson, An Inquiry into the Original o f  our 
Ideas o f Beauty and Virtue, in Broadie, pp. 220-223.
13 In the neo-Platonic narrative informing Reynolds’s Discourses, imagination served as the catalyst for 
higher truth. He takes this up in his ninth Discourse. See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 171.
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mediums (and makers) of virtue. In other words, portrait-painters like Jonathan 
Richardson might claim the stature of liberal artists. Richardson’s theory is thus 
interesting not only because its influence was felt from the highest reaches of the 
Royal Academy to the self-taught painters of the American colonies, but because it 
suggests how a civic humanist methodology might be manipulated to the benefit of 
ambitious commoners.
I. Jonathan Richardson and Eighteenth-Century Portraiture
Active in the founding of the Queen Street Academy, and the first British 
artist to contribute significantly to art theory, Jonathan Richardson provides an 
excellent point-of-departure for exploring the imag[in]ing of identity in eighteenth- 
century portraiture.14 Blurring the lines between landed and learned, nature and 
nurture, his selective reformation of continental theory, coupled with his aspirations 
for English painting—and painters—, earned him a significant following.15 Indeed, 
while borrowing much from Shaftesbury’s civic humanist discourse, while accepting 
the continental hierarchy of painting genres, Richardson, in challenging the
14 Also known as Kneller’s Academy, the Queen Street Academy was a resource for artists in need of 
models as well as a venue for the transmission of ideas. Here, the influence of Sir Godfrey Kneller, 
Richardson, and, in its incarnation into the St. Martin’s Lane Academy (a.k.a. Hogarth’s Academy) 
Hogarlh, Ramsay and others found a feeding ground. According to Gibson-Wood, Richardson ranked 
with Kneller and the Swedish-born Michael Dahl as one o f the three most prominent painters in the 
period. See Gibson-Wood, Jonathan Richardson, p. 36.
15 “The most direct English heir to the substance of Richardson’s Essay on the Theory o f Painting was 
Joshua Reynolds.... Reynolds reiterated and developed in his Discourses many o f the same 
neoclassical principles that Richardson had promoted in his Theory o f Painting.... Most important of 
all is the unprecedented thoroughness of Richardson’s analysis of the sources o f ‘grace and greatness’ 
in relation to Reynolds’ preoccupation with ‘the grand style’ of painting.” See Gibson-Wood, pp. 232- 
233.
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ideological barriers between history and portrait painting, advanced the cause of 
English painting and painters.16
Richardson published three art-theoretical treatises in the course of his career: 
An Essay on the Theory o f Painting (London, 1715; second edition, with revisions,
1725); Two Discourses. I. An Essay on the whole Art o f Criticism as it relates to 
Painting... II. An Argument in Behalf o f  the Science o f a Connoisseur (London,
1719); and An Account o f some o f the Statues, Bas-reliefs, Drawings and Pictures in 
Italy, &c. with Remarks (London, 1722).17 While books on art criticism were not 
new, a number of traits distinguished Richardson’s work from that of his 
predecessors: its author was an artist, not a philosopher or dilettante; its format was 
based on the rational essay; its approach was based on empirical as opposed to 
theoretical reasoning—one that worked from the particular to the general; its purpose, 
as Gibson-Wood notes, was not so much to foster patronage—already giving way to 
the influences of the marketplace—as to elevate the stature of English painting and 
the status of the English artist and, so, to promote “connaissance” (connoisseurship) 
among Englishman; and its intended audience—like that of Addison’s Spectator— 
included a learned (if artistically uninformed) middle class, which he loosely referred
16 Unlike his predecessors, for example, Richardson did not consider invention the unique claim of the 
history painter, but rather heralded the portrait painter’s ‘improvement’ on likeness as another form of 
invention. For a discussion of Richardson’s theory, see Gibson-Wood, pp. 13-14, 87-88, 139-143, 
212-213,222,225-229; Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 42-52, 218-229.
17 Jonathan Richardson outlined a complete program for the rendering of character under the headings 
of Invention, Expression, Composition, Drawing, Colouring, Handling, and Grace and Greatness. 
According to Gibson-Wood, the three treatises represent “a process of increasing radicalization, from 
the acceptance of established continental precepts to the rejection of their authority....” (Gibson-Wood, 
pp. 138-139) For a full discussion of his aesthetic principles, see Richardson, An Essay on the Theory 
o f Painting, pp. 38,43-213; Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 27-30; Gibson-Wood, pp. 138-139.
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to as “gentlemen.”18 In Richardson’s view, the study of art—the establishment of art 
academies and the promotion of connoisseurship—was a ready means by which to 
advance social good.19 Moreover, the makers of liberal art were not excluded from 
the circle of men who might enact such improvement.20 Nor, significantly, were 
portrait painters excluded from the makers of liberal art.
Indeed, whereas Shaftesbury embraced continental theory as both the proper 
standard of English painting and the exemplar for its improvement, Richardson 
emphasized empirical and Reformed influences at the expense of continental theory. 
For example, while supporting a continental technique based on the ‘idealization’ or 
‘improvement’ of the sitter—what Vertue called “the ‘great Manner’”—Richardson 
rejected its loose treatment of likeness.21 Similarly, while embracing the principle of 
‘improvement’ and its manifestation in ‘idealization’, he subverted the continental 
emphasis on theory and birth to the evidence of experience and the effects of industry.
18 Indeed, Gibson-Wood remarks, “Richardson had been calling himself a gentleman since the 
1690s....” (Gibson-Wood, p. 148) See Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 42-52, 218-229; Gibson- 
Wood, pp. 14-17,44-46, 72-73, 88-89, 94,139-142, 148, 180-181,195-196,202-204.
'* By acting the connoisseur, by adopting a scientific approach to art—by learning to distinguish 
similarities and differences and thereby formulate and defend rational ideas (a “Lockean 
epistemology”)—an artist or spectator refined his reason and improved himself. As Gibson-Wood 
observes, “Richardson’s radical assertion, that knowing who painted a picture and how good it was 
could be deduced empirically by all clear-thinking persons who devoted themselves to such study, was 
particularly appropriate for an audience of fledgling English consumers who had little experience of 
painting, but who did have a firm devotion to the principle of self-advancement.” (Gibson-Wood, p. 
184) See Gibson-Wood, pp. 184-185, 193, 198, 200-201, 203.
20 Unlike Shaftesbury, for example, who “views the artist as essentially a mechanic, whose taste and 
aspirations must be guided by informed citizens who have dedicated themselves to the cause of public 
virtue,” Richardson argued for the artist’s authority over the improvement of his subject and spectator. 
See Gibson-Wood, p. 173.
21 Gibson-Wood writes: “In 1731 George Vertue compared the painting styles of some of his 
contemporaries, and characterized Richardson as having ‘a great Manner’ .... By classifying 
Richardson along with Dahl, Kneller, Lely, Riley, Dobson and Van Dyck as having a ‘great’ manner,” 
she continues, “Vertue was referring to the adoption of both idealized forms or figure types, and the 
bold application of paint.” (Gibson-Wood, pp. 60-61) At the same time, Richardson was critical of 
Kneller’s loose brush. See Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 41-42, 161-163,175, 
177; Gibson-Wood, pp. 9, 60-61, 171.
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These principles carried over into his notion of social order. While he 
supported a hierarchical social order, he emphasized industry at the expense of birth. 
As a result, the ideal he set before the portrait painter was based on the potential 
relationship between the sitter’s attributes and social place, as determined by his will. 
In other words, while Richardson’s ideal conceived the potential self in terms of the 
sitter’s social elevation in the ‘great chain of being’, while his theory of “Grace and 
Greatness” reaffirmed the liberal progress from imitation to idealization and the 
necessary transformation of a ‘realistic’ or ‘actual’ subject into a ‘truthful’ or 
‘potential’ likeness—“‘Thus to raise the Character: To divest an Unbred Person of his 
Rusticity, and give him something at least of a G e n t l e m a n .—, his notions of 
improvement and potentiality were themselves informed by an ‘ethic of ordinary life’ 
in which self-determining individuals achieved their potential through industry and 
piety. Hence, in dissent from continental and Shaftesburian tradition, Richardson 
constructed a social order based on merit rather than prescription. And this informed 
his evaluation of portrait-painting.
Eighteenth-century portraits served a number of functions. On the one hand, 
they represented the sitter’s person—and, by extension, his values, beliefs, interests, 
allegiances and history—when he was present, absent or dead.23 At Britain’s Temple 
Newsam house, for example, an imposing wall of family portraits once opposed a
22 Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 175. As Gibson-Wood aptly notes, “In place of 
the view that idealizing a figure essentially amounts to making it look like an antique statue,
Richardson thus posits one that alludes to the visible hierarchy of the English social order”—i.e. one of 
social versus theoretical improvement. (Gibson-Wood, pp. 169-170) See Richardson, An Essay on the 
Theory o f Painting, 161-163,175, 177; Gibson-Wood, pp. 163, 169-171.
Samuel Richardson, “An Apology for Portrait Painting,” Town and Country Magazine (November 
1771), p. 601; also quoted in Michael Rosenthal, The Art o f Thomas Gainsborough: 'a little business 
for the Eye ’ (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 155.
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wall of royal images in the center of a public drawing room.24 The arrangement 
served to assert the family’s lineal heritage and political allegiance to a large and 
varied audience. On the other hand, portraits also served a moral function. As 
Richardson explained it, they “raised” and “improved” their subjects and spectators 
by casting them as models of human potentiality.25 This suited the Aristotelian notion 
of emulation.26 In all cases, however, the function of portraits was to make their 
subjects accessible to a body of spectators in the form of a visual text, the reading of
27which engaged sitter, artist and spectator in a visual conversation. Moreover, by 
employing an established visual language to shape background, setting, costume and 
accoutrements, the portrait painter communicated a context within which the 
portrait’s ‘conversation’ was conducted and the sitter’s identity understood.
The elevation of visual imagery to the elite status of language was an 
important marker in the progress of painting. Whereas the ancients defended the 
superiority of the written word, whereas Shaftesbury esteemed poetry’s superior
24 Based on the original eighteenth-century picture plan of Temple Newsam Picture Gallery. James 
Lomax, Attingham lecture, the Picture Gallery, Temple Newsam House, Leeds, England, July 13,
1997.
Whereas Shaftesbury invoked the improving influence of poetry, Richardson endowed portraits with 
a didactic ability to advance the public good: ‘“tis rational to believe,” he wrote, “that Pictures of this 
kind are subservient to Virtue; that Men are excited to imitate the Good Actions, and persuaded to shun 
the Vices of those whose Examples are thus set before them.. . (Richardson, An Essay on the Theory 
of Painting, p. 16) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 240, 278; Richardson, Two Discourses, II, 
pp. 12, 39-40,42; Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 15-17.
The arts were intended to foster “emulation.” As Aristotle explained it: “Emulation is pain caused by 
seeing ... good things [in other persons]... not because others have these goods, but because we have 
not got them .... Emulation makes us take steps to secure the good things in question.... Further..., 
moral goodness in its various forms must be such an object... : for men honour those who are morally 
good....” See Aristotle, The Rhetoric, in Corbett, pp. 120-121.
27 As Taylor observes, “the self is constituted through exchange in language.” See Taylor, p. 509.
28 As Gibson-Wood notes, Richardson replaced the traditional correlation between painting and poetry 
with “a Lockean conceptual scheme in which visual imagery takes its place alongside verbal language 
as ‘one o f the means whereby we convey our Ideas to each other’.” See Gibson-Wood, p. 147; 
Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 6.
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29merits, contemporary comparisons increasingly blurred their differences. When 
Richardson remarked in 1719 that “Painting is but another sort of Writing,” he went
30so far as to rank visual above verbal in the economy and depth of its expression. By 
the same token, whereas Shaftesbury confined a liberal status to the history painter— 
for “We may conclude,” he wrote, “That in a real History-Painter, the same 
Knowledge, the same Study, and Views, are requir’d, as in a real Poef”—the way 
was opened for a more inclusive analysis in which portrait painters practicing in a 
liberal—i.e. “grand” or “historical”—manner might likewise assume a liberal 
stature.31 In fact, Shaftesbury’s description of ancient poetry’s “Imitation chiefly of
29 Because Shaftesbury’s neo-Aristotelian interpretation of poetry and painting was biased by a Platonic 
demand for the philosophical ideal—one derived from a transcendental or metaphysical experience of 
the ‘imagination’—he could not admit of particularity either in the mind of the philosopher or a true 
‘Likeness’. As a result, he necessarily privileged verbal over visual language and poetry over painting, 
the latter being limited by its objective reference to material form. On these grounds, he dismissed 
portraiture as the superficial manufacture of ignorant mechanics. By contrast, Richardson insisted that 
“We PAINTERS are upon the Level with Writers, as being Poets, Historians, Philosophers, and 
Instruct equally with Them.” (Richardson, Two Discourses, II, p. 42) Though he distinguished between 
its polite and “Vulgar,” liberal and mechanical forms, he explained: “Painting is but another Sort of 
Writing;” “To read it,” he went on, “is not only to know that ‘tis such a Story, or such a Man, but to see 
the Beauties of the Thought, and Pencil; of the Colouring, and Composition; the Expression, Grace, 
and Greatness that is to be found in it; and not to be able to do This is a Sort of Illiterature, and 
Unpoliteness.” (Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 221-222) Hogarth, too, deemed painting a 
language. (Bindman, Hogarth, p. 55) Nonetheless, he considered portrait artists “men of very middling 
natural parts.” (Gowing, Hogarth, p. 42) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 144-145,
Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 42,221-222; Bindman, Hogarth, p. 55; Gowing, Hogarth, p. 42.
30 Both Shaftesbury and Richardson invoked a ‘pragmatic approach’ to art, which, rooted in rhetoric, 
was concerned with ‘ends’ rather than ‘means’—i.e. “Pleasure, and Improvement....” (Abrams, The 
Mirror and the Lamp: romantic theory and the critical tradition, p. 21, and Richardson, An Essay on 
the Theory o f Painting, p. 6, and Two Discourses, II, pp. 39-40-, 42) In this way, Abrams writes, “the 
work of art continues to be regarded as a kind of reflector.... The artist himself is often envisioned as 
the agent holding the mirror up to nature... to invent (in the root sense of ‘discover’) aspects of the 
universe and o f human nature hitherto overlooked....” (Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 42) But 
whereas Shaftesbury privileged words, Richardson privileged imagery. As Gibson-Wood explains, 
Richardson based the superiority of painting on “Locke’s discussion of ‘the imperfection o f words’ in 
Book 3 of the Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Locke had observed that the leading qualities 
of substances are better conveyed by demonstration than description.” (Gibson Wood, p. 147) See 
Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 6, and Two Discourses, II, pp. 17, 39-40, 42. See 
also M. H. Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp: romantic theory and the critical tradition, pp. 15-16,
21, 34, 42, and Gibson-Wood, p. 147.
31 For Shaftesbury, only the well-educated history painter might qualify as a liberal artist; the portrait’s 
concern with material qualities precluded portrait painters from advancing beyond the “merely natural”
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Men and Manners” as “character being wrought to a Likeness” invited the claim that 
portraiture, too, was “a sister to poetry.”32 Hence, Richardson had only to bridge the 
gap between portraiture and history painting to make the link between portraiture and 
poetry: “A Portrait is a sort of General History of the Life of the Person it represents,” 
he wrote, “not only to Him who is acquainted with it, but to Many Others, who upon 
Occasion of seeing it are frequently told, of.. .  their General Character at least;” a 
portrait, therefore, is a type of “Historical Picture.”33 Thus, by 1758, Samuel Johnson 
could remark that “poetry and painting... differ only as the one represents things by 
marks permanent and natural, the other by signs accidental and arbitrary.”34 The same 
held true in America, where Mathew Byles noted in “To Mr. Smibert on the Sight of 
his Pictures”: “’Alike our Labour, and alike our Flame,/ ‘Tis thine to raise the Shape:/ 
‘Tis mine to fix the Name’.”35
to the liberal stature accorded “historical and moral” imagery. Reynolds assumed a similar stance in 
his Discourses. See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, pp. 387-391; Gibson-Wood, pp. 14,20, 182, 
185-186.
Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 196-197. It was widely recognized that paintings were mediums 
for instruction and improvement. (Gibson-Wood, p. 145) But whereas Shaftesbury confined this 
attribute to history painting, Richardson expanded its application to include portrait painting. 
Richardson thus encouraged the portrait painter to study the grace and greatness o f classical 
exemplars—as did the history painter—so as to arrive at a knowledge of the aesthetic qualities 
informing moral improvement. See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 196-197, 206-207; Gibson- 
Wood, pp. 95-96,98-99, 103,144-147.
33 See Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 45-46. In a separate essay, he wrote: “To be a good Face- 
Painter, a degree of the Historical and Poetical Genius is requisite, and a great Measure of the other 
Talents and Advantages which a good History-painter must possess.” See Richardson, An Essay on the 
Theory o f Painting, pp. 23-24.
34 Samuel Johnson, “Punch and Conversation,” in The Idler, 2 vols, 34 (London: Printed for J. 
Newbery, 1761), pp. 190-191. These parallels elicited frequent comment in the eighteenth century. For 
example, Plutarch was often quoted (citing Simonides) as saying “that ‘painting is mute poetry, and 
poetry a speaking picture’.” The popular recitation o f Horace’s “«/ pictura poesis” further linked the 
two arts. See Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 33.
”  Probably first published in the Boston Gazette, January 1729/1730, as quoted in Jessie Poesch, “’In 
just Lines to trace’—The Colonial Artist, 1700-1776,” in Ellen G. Miles, ed., The Portrait in 
Eighteenth-Century America (Newark, DE: University of Delaware Press, 1993), p. 72.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
150
In part, the changing relationship between verbal and visual language reflected 
the growing concession to sense-perception as a necessary point-of-departure in the 
acquisition of knowledge. Once conceded, an artist’s observation of space, gesture, 
posture and gaze might be defended as the visual matter of a narrative ‘meaning of 
life’ informing his sitter’s identity. This empowered both the portrait and the painter. 
For example, by placing his audience in a passive or active role, an artist might 
manipulate the relationship between subject and spectator according to the perceived 
or desired relationship between the sitter and his audience and the degree and type of 
engagement that relationship entailed. Ultimately, then, the success of an image 
turned on the artist’s fabrication of a convincing and complementary ‘reality’, for 
acceptance of the claimed identity presumed acquiescence to its prescribed 
narrative.36
The declining credibility of theoretical methodologies and universal narratives 
informed a significant shift in the interpretation of identity and its representation in 
portraiture. On the one hand, the growing influence of empirical theory challenged 
the premise of “fixity,” freeing identity to become something fluid and ‘negotiated’.
At the same time, visual imagery assumed new authority as a medium for making 
meaning. This lent portraits an import not found in the pre-modem period. Indeed, 
the growing popularity of portraits may have turned, in part, on their capacity to
36 As Juliet Steyn writes: “Judgment is a critical activity, a way of determining the mode of presenting
and establishing ... reality....” See Steyn, “Painting another; other-than-painting,” in Steyn, ed., Other 
than identity: the subject, politics and art (New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), p. 217. 
j7 Whereas Shaftesbury’s more theoretical (neo-Platonic) approach limited the potential role of art to 
one of inspiration, Richardson’s more empirical (neo-Aristotelian) approach made art itself a medium 
of human progress. See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 332; Gibson-Wood, p. 201.
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advance, modify, or undermine the prescribed identities of the civic humanist 
narrative. A close study of portraits might thus reveal not only the standards 
informing identity-making, but, by extension, the perception of artists and sitters vis- 
a-vis the dominant narrative.
II. The issue o f ‘Likeness ’
According to Jonathan Richardson, “to sit for one’s Picture is to have an Abstract 
of one’s Life written, and published.”38 Richardson’s use of the term “Abstract” is 
important, for it suggests a highly selective summary of a subject’s key attributes—
* 39presumably those bearing significance for the portrait’s reading public. It also 
suggests an Aristotelian (non-Humeian) frame of reference—a belief that qualities 
inhere in objects themselves and, hence, that they can be abstracted, rendered, and 
“known” visually through portraiture.40
According to Richardson, the portrait was ideally suited to making legible 
one’s “character”—what Samuel Johnson defined as the public evaluation of one’s 
private attributes according to their social value.41 This was to invoke a sociological 
interpretation of identity. Less clear, however, was the relationship between
38 He explains: “Upon the sight of a Portrait, the Character, and Master-Strokes of the History of the 
Person it represents, are apt to flow in upon the Mind, and to be the Subject o f Conversation: So that to 
sit for one’s Picture, is to have an Abstract o f one’s Life written, and published, and our selves thus
consign’d over to Honour, or Infamy.” (Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 16) See
Jonathan Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 16-17. 
j9 Abrams writes: “Dr. Johnson held that on moral grounds, the mirror must be selective: it is 
necessary ‘to distinguish those parts of nature which are most proper for imitation’....’” (Abrams, The 
Mirror and the Lamp, p. 36) Yet the precise content of this ‘abstract’ has long impeded the 
interpretation of portraiture. Was it a generalization of attributes common to the species or the selective 
blending o f traits unique to the individual? See Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 36; Copleston, I, 
p. 258; Brilliant, Portraiture, pp. 13-14. 
m Gibson-Wood, pp. 168-169.
41 See definitions number four, seven and eight in Samuel Johnson, Dictionary (London, 1786).
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“character” and “likeness,” for interpretations of “likeness” were rarely consistent. 
Plato, for example, understood likeness to be a mimetic copy of sensory perception, 
an ignorant “shadow image” of a “false” reality bearing dangerous implications.42 On 
the one hand, this Platonic correlation between realism and ignorance informed the 
civic humanist bias against portraiture.43 On the other hand, however, Shaftesbury 
differed from Plato in distinguishing between a mimetic portrait and a true “likeness;” 
unlike Plato, Shaftesbury defined “likeness” as “Imitation,” not “Mimickry ”44
Borrowing from Aristotle, who envisioned the “mirror” as a mediating device 
through which the particularities of nature were absorbed by the intellect and 
transformed into general principles—the essential ingredients of Plato’s divine 
Forms—, Shaftesbury equated “likeness” with the “mirrored”—i.e. abstracted— 
qualities of a general style.45 This neo-Platonic—i.e. more Aristotelian than
42 Plato, Republic, p. 79.
** Those who rejected empirical methodologies as a credible basis for knowledge, and privileged 
contemplation above observation, necessarily derided the value of portraiture, the truths of which were 
premised on the effects of sense-perception—“For ‘tis not certainly by virtue of our Face merely, that 
we are ourselves.” See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 279-283; quoted from p. 283.
44 According to Lee, “The Greek word mimesis covers both ‘imitation’ or ‘copying’ and dramatic and 
artistic representation in the widest sense.” (Plato, Republic, footnote 2, p. 90) By contrast,
Shaftesbury extolled “Poetry ... [as] an Imitation chiefly of Men and Manners,” distinguishing between 
“Imitation” and what “in a low [art form] ... we call Mimickry.” (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 
196) As Abrams observes: “In recent criticism (as, to some extent, in the early Renaissance theory of 
painting) the concept that art is imitation, together with its analogy to a mirror, usually signalizes a 
demand for artistic realism, but in neo-classic criticism these concepts were standard components in the 
theory that art is ‘ideal’, in the general sense that it properly represents an improvement upon things as 
we find them.” (Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 36) See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 
144,196; Plato, Republic, p. 90; Abrams, p. 36.
43 According to Abrams, the correlation of the mirror with imitation—as distinct from mimicry—and, 
so, generalization—as opposed to realism—was “a favorite with aesthetic theorists long after Plato. In 
Renaissance speculation the reference to a looking-glass is frequent and explicit.” (Abrams, The Mirror
and the Lamp, p. 30) He goes on: “As late as the middle o f the eighteenth century important critics
continued to illustrate the concept of imitation by the nature of a looking-glass. (Abrams, The Mirror 
and the Lamp, p. 32) By contrast, he concludes, this interpretation was abandoned; “post-Aristotelian 
theories ... almost without exception, reverted to concepts o f mimesis much closer to the attributes o f a 
literal reflector.. . (Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 34) Fora discussion o f this development, 
see Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, pp. 350-353; Abrams The Mirror and the Lamp, pp. 30-36; 
Canfield, pp. 174-179.
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Platonic—interpretation resulted from Shaftesbury’s different understanding of the 
relationship between sense-perception and knowledge. For Plato, external nature was 
but an imperfect allusion to the Forms, whose truth and reality existed only on a 
metaphysical level. Because sensory perception was at two or three removes from 
this metaphysical truth, it was dangerously misleading as a source of knowledge. 
Aristotle, on the other hand, while agreeing that truth was accessible only through the 
intellect, disagreed with Plato’s assessment of the Forms. While he, too, located truth 
in general principles, he held that the essential substance of such principles could be 
known through the evidence of nature. Observation, coupled with intellectual 
abstraction—i.e. with the translation of matter into its “likeness”—, might thus result 
in knowledge.47
In keeping with this Aristotelian analysis, Shaftesbury invoked the trope of the 
mediaeval “mirror” in his evaluation of likeness.48 As the medieval “mirror” 
functioned to transform the imperfect private self into a more noble public character, 
so Shaftesbury’s “Pocket-Mirrour” functioned to transform the imperfect, ignorant 
self into its more perfect philosophical form.49 According to Shaftesbury, the “Pocket- 
Mirrouf ’ “teaches me to distinguish between [Philosophy’s] Person”—the matter of 
sense—“and her Likeness”—the matter of potentiality—, “and shews me her 
immediate and real self, by that sole Privilege of teaching me to know my-self, and
46 Richard Kraut, ed. The Cambridge Companion to Plato (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1992), p. 710.
47 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, pp. 303, 379.
■"* Shaftesbury’s “mirror” was not precisely the same as Aristotle’s insofar as the point of introspection 
conducive to “Mirrour- Writing' represented a higher, Platonic stage of intellectual perfection than that 
invoked by the ancient philosopher. See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 1, pp. 204-205.
49 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 204-205.
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what belongs to me.”50 He thus coined the term “Mirrour-Writinf— "designing after 
the life”—to describe the linguistic process by which one arrived at the 
“Philosophical Hero,” commending “The good Painter...do as the good Poet” in 
adopting this method.51
On the one hand, then, Shaftesbury’s distinction between “Person” and 
“Likeness” paralleled his distinction between one’s lower “undercharacter” and 
higher “Philosophical” self. On the other hand, it was his correlation of portraiture 
with “Person” and “undercharacter,” and “Person” and “undercharacter” with the
'  * 52particular and sensory, that precluded his recognition of portraiture as a liberal art.
As Plato had argued, any likeness taking only the “Person” into account was nothing 
more than a “shadow” image, a characterization of man’s inferior self that 
dangerously obscured the higher good of philosophical virtue as the foundation of 
social order. Among advocates of the Shaftesburian narrative, a true likeness, one 
informed by a liberal understanding of reality and identity, might be attained only by 
way of a “general” style—i.e. by abstracting those virtues conducive to potentiality.53 
It is thus worth noting that Sir Joshua Reynolds, an outspoken opponent of realism, 
employed a mirror in his portrait-making; according to the Duchess of Rutland, he 
would “look at the general effect in a distant glass, chiefly making his picture from 
that.”54
50 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 298.
31 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, p. 375.
52 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, pp. 348-353.
33 Shaftesbury held that a truly general painting was expressive o f“the grand Event," a theme “wholly 
philosophical and moral" in which “the highest Tone ofVoice and strongest Action are employ’d.” See 
Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, pp. 350-353.
54 Quoted in Richard Wendorf, Sir Joshua Reynolds: Painter in Society (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, (1996) 1998), p. 116.
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Yet Aristotle’s analysis also suggested alternative possibilities for the
interpretation of likeness. Aristotle described the mirror as a pre-Socratic or naturalist
device used to mediate between external nature and the internal intellect. A mirrored
likeness might therefore represent the translation of sensory data into general
principles—i.e. the abstraction of external qualities into ideas, made visually manifest
in imagery. An Aristotelian likeness might therefore emphasize not just the
abstraction of ideas but their generalization in material forms. Indeed, according to
Ross, Aristotle’s endorsement of the universal in the Poeticks should not be
misunderstood as a condemnation of particularity. He writes:
There is, of course, danger in this notion of poetry as universal. It easily 
degenerates into the view that poetry should present general types of character 
denuded of the individual traits which make both real people and fictitious 
characters interesting and delightful. But to interpret him so is to think of the 
universal simply as that which ‘can be predicated of more things than one’ and 
to forget that for Aristotle the universal is the necessary.55
In other words, for Aristotle, as distinct from Plato and Shaftesburian civic humanists,
a visual likeness composed of general forms and “necessary” particularities was not of
necessity void of intellectual merit and might even compared with an “abstract”
poem.56 This, I think, was Richardson’s intent when he employed the term
“Abstract.”57
55 Ross, Aristotle, p. 288.
”  As Abrams aptly observes, “the particular and the circumstantial were not employed as simple and 
exclusive contraries of the general and the uniform; as Reynolds puts it, ‘he that does not at all express 
particulars, expresses nothing’; and in many passages, these critics proposed achieving the general by 
the just selection of those particulars which are most widely possessed.... Taken in its M l context, the 
recommendation of the typical, general, and familiar as basic requirements of art usually turns out to be 
accompanied by a statement of the need for the leavening qualities of individuality, particularity, and 
novelty as well.” (Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, pp. 39-40) See Abrams, The Mirror and the 
Lamp, pp. 39-42.
37 Richardson’s concern with this principle of an abstract ideal is interesting for being so closely 
aligned with Aristotle and yet absent in other writings on portraiture. As Gibson-Wood observes,
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Richardson’s interpretation of an abstract likeness was not an endorsement of 
“Mimickry.” While he agreed in principle that realism alone—i.e. analysis without 
synthesis—served little purpose, he did not believe that the inclusion of particularities 
necessarily obscured general truths, or that particularities in portraits rendered them 
necessarily illiberal. For Richardson, it was but a small step from “Mirrour- Writing” 
to portrait-painting and, so, from the true likeness made by the poet, to the true 
likeness rendered by painter. Indeed, Richardson argued, a good portrait served much 
the same purpose as Shaftesbury’s “Magical Glasses”: bringing the spectator face-to- 
face with his potential and thereby inspiring his pursuit of knowledge and virtue. To 
this end, he, like Shaftesbury, encouraged the painter to be as the poet: “the Painter 
must imagine his Figures to Think, Speak, and Act, as a Poet should do in a Tragedy, 
or Epick Poem.. . Ultimately, then, the portrait “Abstract” was for Richardson, as 
the verbal “abstract” was for Aristotle and Shaftesbury, both a product and medium of 
knowledge. It was this which allowed for the liberal merits of portraiture.59
In the end, Richardson’s likeness was one in which the self was recognized to 
be a singular example of a larger species, defined by those principles to which the 
species itself was held universally subject; it was one in which the attributes selected 
were those whose perceived social value made them most representative of mankind’s
“Although classical idealization was frequently upheld as the highest aim of art, no previous writer had 
regarded this as a distinctive and analyzable part of painting.” See Gibson-Wood, p. 141.
38 Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 21. See also Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 
20-21,33.
59 Richardon, Two Discourses, II, pp. 13, 16; Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 47, 
50, 52-54.
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potential and, so, most conducive to inspiring virtue in others.60 In this neo- 
Aristotelian context, the portrait became a philosophical medium for the advancement 
of public good: “The Great, and Chief Ends of Painting,” he posited, “are to Raise, 
and Improve Nature; and to Communicate Ideas;... whereby Mankind is advanced 
higher in the Rational State, and made Better... ,”61 He thus encouraged that “a 
Peasant have more of the Gentleman, and so of the rest.”62 In part, then, where 
Richardson diverged from more conservative, Shaftesburian—i.e. neo-Platonic— 
civic humanists was in his empirical endorsement of “necessary” particularity—that 
which impressed “upon the Mind of him that sees it an Idea of its self, distinguish’d 
from every Other of its Kind.”63
But differences between Shaftesbury and Richardson also turned on their 
perceptions of “nurture.”64 Shaftesbury’s theory turned on a belief in the progressive 
nature of identity towards a perfect self—the “Philosophical Hero.” A similar notion 
of improvement informed the ideas of Richardson. Significantly, however, whereas 
Shaftesbury emphasized the role of nature—i.e. birth—Richardson emphasized the 
role of nurture—i.e. industry; through a close study of nature, he argued, supported by
60 In this way, Richardson reconciled the demand for empirical resemblance with the demand for a 
general form—i.e. with the demand for evidence o f intellectual and moral virtue. See Richardson, Two 
Discourses, II, p. 16.
61 Richardson, Two Discourses, II, p. 12. As he explained, “if my Ideas are raised, the Sentiments 
excited in my mind will be proportionably Improved.” (Richardson, An Essay on the Theory of 
Painting, p. 15) See Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f  Painting, p. 15; Richardson, Two 
Discourses, II, pp. 15, 39-40,42.
Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 164.
63 Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 162.
64 Differences between Shaftesbury and Richardson suggest certain influences on Richardson’s 
philosophy: the reformation ethic, which empowered the individual to determine his own ‘potentiality’; 
empiricism’s penchant for conversation; Locke’s vision of the autonomous reasoner; and the 
transforming influence of commerce on society. These encouraged his endorsement of “ordinary life” 
values. As Gibson-Wood notes, “The traits he is proud to possess include industry, a concern for self-
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readings in philosophy, the individual might cultivate a liberal knowledge and thereby 
determine his own improvement. Richardson’s allegiance to empiricism thus effected 
a modified version of civic humanism: it substituted the autonomy of the empiricist 
for the disinterest of the contemplator as the premise of independence; and it 
substituted “nurture”—learning (by way of industry)—for “nature”—birth (by way of 
wealth)—as the medium of knowledge.65 By these means, Richardson enhanced 
individual control over identity and social order.66
On the one hand, then, Richardson wed classical principles with individual 
self-determination to arrive at an ideological narrative compatible with the interests of
67a landless commoner with intellectual, social and economic ambitions. At the same 
time, his position should not be misunderstood as a rejection of social hierarchy or its 
presumption of inequalities among men. Richardson, too, cautioned against ‘fashion’ 
and ‘flattery’ and the prospect of false identities arising from the absence of fixed 
standards.68 He, too, envisioned the progress of virtue to derive from liberal thinking. 
He likewise supported the subordination of individual interests to the higher ideals of
improvement without ambition, independence, honesty, benevolence, temperance, rationality and 
contentment.” (Gibson-Wood, pp. 42-43) See Gibson-Wood, pp. 1-2, 39-43, 46, 49, 54.
65 Gibson-Wood, p. 42.
06 Indeed, as Gibson-Wood remarks: “his aims as a writer can be meaningfully understood only in 
conjunction with his professional aspirations, which, in turn, cannot be separated from his social and 
intellectual ambitions. Richardson sought to exemplify in the conduct of his own life, I believe, many 
of the central doctrines of his writings: that portrait painters should be as learned as history painters; 
that professional artists o f all types could be ‘gentlemen’; that the English need not succumb to 
continental authority in the arts; that Everyman could be an authority through the exercise of sound 
reasoning and hard work.” See Gibson-Wood, p. 5.
67 Richardson’s social aspirations are suggested by the distribution of his estate; rather than divide it up 
equally among his children, as most middle-class families did, he gave the bulk to his son Jonathan in 
order to set him up as a gentleman. See Gibson-Wood, pp. 39-40,46,49, 54. 
m Although Richardson conceded that “A Painter is allow’d  sometimes to depart even from Natural, 
and Historical Truth” he cautioned against flagrant fabrications: “History must not be corrupted, and
turn’d into Fable, or Romance; Every Person, and Thing must be made to sustain its proper Character,
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social good. But one cannot ignore the implications of his empirical and Reformed 
bias for the civic humanist narrative.
Like Shaftesbury, Richardson believed in the existence of divine plan and its 
manifestation in the moral good. He also believed that, ultimately, this plan might be 
made known to man through the compatibility of reason with nature. Unlike 
Shaftesbury, however, Richardson held that human knowledge prior to revelation was 
necessarily imperfect and, so, unsuited to a paradigm of ‘fixed’ abstract principles. 
Hence, borrowing from Locke, Richardson argued that secular truth was dynamic 
rather than fixed and, so, “purely Relative.”69 It was this which underscored his 
empirical methodology and his rejection of customary authority: the only knowledge 
secular man might hope to acquire was that which might be deduced from the 
application of general principles initially developed from the evidence of external 
nature; since no one man or group of men could shore up the evidence of all nature, 
customary authority was ever imperfect and, therefore, a poor pretext for making 
fixed pronouncements about the individual, society, and larger world.70 In the end, 
while accepting the hierarchy of reason over passion, Richardson granted a privileged 
place to the autonomous, reasoning man.71
and not only the Story, but the Circumstances must be observ’d....” See Richardson, An Essay on the 
Theory o f Painting, pp. 47, 50, 52-53.
69 Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 98 and 117.
0 He writes: “Since all men are perpetually on the wrong side of truth, by virtue of imperfect 
knowledge and reason, we are all part wiseman and part fool. Each o f us—and the whole o f us—can 
only benefit from the opinions of others, that our own ideas might be tested and raised.” (Richardson, 
Two Discourses, II, p. 120) He later added: “nothing should be Borrowed, nothing Supposed, or taken 
for granted.” (Richardson, Two Discourses, II, p. 167) See Richardson, Two Discourses, II, pp. 120, 
167.
71 That men might think for themselves—might claim intellectual independence—was, for Richardson, 
a promise of the Reformation. In this way, he is aligned with the Country narrative. See Richardson, 
Two Discourses, II, p. 231.
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Once freed of theoretical methodologies and a neo-Platonic bias, an abstract 
likeness based on observation and idealization might bridge the gap between 
“mechanical” and “liberal” advanced by the writings of Shaftesbury and others. At 
the same time, common-born artists and sitters might participate in the higher reality 
bom of liberal knowledge and thereby assume a philosophical stature. In the end, for 
all his commitment to virtue and progress, Richardson’s narrative of nurture over 
nature, industry over birth, was more responsive to the experience of British 
commoners than that of Shaftesbury. It also anticipated, in part, the ideas of Ramsay 
and Hume.72
III. Interpreting Likeness
When Shaftesbury spoke of “likeness,” he understood the (primarily) verbal 
expression of those philosophical virtues to which men aspired in common.73 When 
Richardson spoke of “likeness” he understood, in addition, the visual expression of 
those virtues manifest in the individual. On one level, then, likeness was about 
similarity: a means of articulating those attributes that united men and made them 
similar in their potentiality. On the other hand, likeness was about difference: a
72 Significantly, Broadie remarks, Hume’s analysis supported the notion of nurtured progress; “Hume 
plainly believed that we are not glued to the level o f refinement o f sensibility at which we find 
ourselves. One purpose of [his O f the Standard o f Taste]... is to describe what we have to do to move 
to a higher level. In that respect the essay might be seen as contributing to that search for improvement 
that so characterized the Enlightenment in Scotland.” (Broadie, p. 245) A similar theme informed 
Ramsay’s Dialogue on Taste. See Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment, p. 245; Hume, O f the 
Standard o f Taste, in Broadie, pp. 251-259; Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the 
Enlightenment (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992), pp. 224, 226, 270-272.
73 “Although Shaftesbury, like Richardson, maintained that painters should ideally be able to think like 
philosophers in portraying the essential significance o f actions, he clearly felt that painters were not 
actually qualified to command this sort of intellectual authority.” See Gibson-Wood, p. 153.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
means of distinguishing the individual from others of like kind. These varying 
emphases reflected different ways of seeing the world, one of which subordinated the 
individual to a theoretical ideal, the other of which subordinated the theoretical ideal 
to the individual. They likewise conduced to degrees of stylistic generality and 
particularity. In the case of Shaftesbury, who stressed the potentiality of mankind, 
likeness was best rendered in the “general” style, which translated essential matter 
into its potential, universal form.74 But among those who emphasized the potentiality 
of the individual, likeness might best be rendered in a “mixed”—i.e. “historical” or 
even “conversational”—style, one which combined general ideas with the “necessary” 
particularities of the individual. By the same token, those who rejected the classical 
principle of potentiality, and based all knowledge and good on experience, might 
adopt a purely particular style.
Thus the manner in which one rendered a portrait reflected a certain 
perception of reality and its corresponding narrative and identity. Among civic 
humanists, a general style of painting reflected a classical perception of reality based 
on progress and potentiality in which virtue, truth and beauty were affiliated with a 
universal, disinterested and independent mind desirous of public good. In this 
narrative, an excess of particularities was understood to reflect an ignorant mind 
preoccupied with material and sensual interests.73 Hence, those artists who employed 
an abstract or general style were esteemed liberal and virtuous, while those who
74 Shaftesbury Characteristicks, vol. 2, pp. 285-286.
15 As Plato described it, “the particulars are objects o f sight but not of intelligence, while the forms 
[from which generals are abstracted] are the objects of intelligence but not of sight.” See Plato, 
Republic, p. 246.
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employed a particular style were deemed mechanical and interested.76 This informed 
the neoclassical hierarchy of painting, which descended in rank from history painting 
(the only “liberal” genre) to portraiture, animal painting, landscape, and still life.77
By the same token, variations in the visual language of eighteenth-century 
portraiture suggest dissent from the classical perception of reality and the civic 
humanist narrative. Although the superior merits of a general style continued to be 
touted throughout the eighteenth century, the style itself was more loosely and 
variously interpreted. For example, while both Allan Ramsay and Joshua Reynolds 
were versed in grand-manner theory, and while both drew inspiration from the 
writings of Richardson (notably his theory of “grace and greatness”), their varying 
emphases—Ramsay on “grace,” Reynolds on “greatness”—, encouraged different 
narrative ends.78 At the same time, although Reynolds, like Shaftesbury, believed that 
intellectual ideals were attainable only through the “imagination”—a transcendental 
state of contemplation—, and accepted the superior merits of history painting, thereby
76 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 142-144, and vol. 2, pp. 290, 358-359; Abrams, The Mirror and 
the Lamp, pp. 36-38.
77 As Gibson-Wood notes, the hierarchy of painting—and the civic humanist, theory of art—was well 
established in continental theory, and “was in turn premised on the acknowledgement of the supremacy 
of humanist learning over all other forms of knowledge.” She goes on: “The notion that the demands 
of different types of subject matter determined the relative esteem in which genres of painting were 
held had been implicit in Italian Renaissance and baroque art theory. Within the dictates of the French 
Academie Royale it became official doctrine, and was articulated in print in 1669 by Andre 
Felibien....” See Gibson-Wood, p. 11.
/S Ultimately, Richardson defined two sets of rules for the models of grace and greatness: “The 
Contours must be Large, Square, and Boldly pronounc'd to produce Greatness; and Delicate, and 
finely Waved, and Contrasted to be Gracious.... The Draperies must have broad Masses ofLight, and 
Shadow, and noble large Folds to give a Greatness; and These artfully subdivided, add Graces.” 
(Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 181-182) See Richardson, An Essay on the 
Theory o f Painting, pp. 181-182; Gibson-Wood, p. 141.
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basing his “great” style on neo-Platonic ideals, even he demurred from strict
• • 79adherence to Shaftesbunan neoclassicism.
There is no question that Reynolds drew upon Richardson’s theory of “grace 
and greatness” in the formulation of his “grand-style” portrait.80 At the same time, it 
would be misleading to suggest that Reynolds likewise adopted a Richardsonian 
narrative. Richardson’s claims for the intellectual ability of the artist, his intent to 
grant liberal status to a select body of British painters, his defense of the potential 
importance of English painting and the consequent need to establish an academy, all 
find reiteration in the writings of Reynolds. But the influence of Shaftesbury is 
likewise apparent—in the privileging of history painting, for example, and the 
reluctance to confer upon portraiture the status of a liberal art. It was, in fact, 
Reynolds’s shared belief in the neo-Platonic correlation between a general style, a 
general mind and a metaphysical, universal truth attainable only through the 
imagination that underscored his opposition to the particular and prompted his effort 
to reconcile portraiture with the demands of liberal art. These subjects find
79 For example, Reynolds recognized the necessity of balancing universal ideals with more particular 
elements, a concession that may help to explain the oft-cited inconsistencies between his Discourses 
and his pictures. According to Nicholas Penny, Reynolds “repeatedly insisted on the ‘true dignity’ of 
[history] painting ‘which entitles it to the name of a liberal Art, and ranks it as a sister of poetry’.” 
(Penny, “An Ambitious man: The career and the achievements o f Sir Joshua Reynolds” in Penny, 
Reynolds, p. 30) Yet, in his essay on Shakespeare, for example, Reynolds advocated less rigid 
standards of generalization, recalling Dr. Johnson’s praise of the English bard—that he ‘“holds up to 
his readers a faithful mirrour o f manners and o f life’.” (Quoted in Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, 
p. 32) See Penny, in Penny, Reynolds, p. 30; Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 239; Abrams, The Mirror 
and the Lamp, pp. 32, 39-40.
80 See Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 24-30, 161-163, 181-182; Gibson-Wood, 
pp. 166, 168, 173-174.
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expression in his Discourses—a series of annual lectures delivered to students,
81academicians and patrons of Britain’s Royal Academy between 1769 and 1790.
IV. Reynolds’s Discourses
As his first Discourse (January, 1769) makes clear, Reynolds considered painting 
to be a manufactured—“mechanical”—product, but distinguished it from other
•  *  •  82manufactures on grounds that its purpose was more than utilitarian. As the degree 
to which a painting exceeded its mercantile function was, for both Richardson and 
Reynolds, a measure of its intellectual value and liberal status, so the goal of both 
artists was to nurture the educational value of art towards the improvement of English 
“Taste.”83 However, whereas Richardson premised Taste on general principles 
derived from empirical observation, Reynolds premised Taste on a fixed ideal 
accessible only by way of the imagination—a mental transcendence into the
84.metaphysical realm of the ideas. In fact, one purpose of the newly-founded Royal
Academy (1769) was to establish the standards by which high—liberal and good—art
81 Sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses on Art, Robert R. Wark, ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press 
(1959), 1997).
82 Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 13-21.
8j “The value and rank of every art,” Reynolds wrote in his fourth Discourse (December 1771), “is in 
proportion to the mental labour employed in it, or the mental pleasure produced by it. As this principle 
is observed or neglected, our profession becomes either a liberal art, or a mechanical trade.” Reynolds, 
Discourses on Art, p. 57.
84 Imagination represented the highest level of intellectual achievement; it transformed mere 
“generalization”— the process of selective imitation and invention conducive to higher truth—into a 
neo-Platonic manifestation of the ideal. As he argued in his ninth Discourse: “the beauty of which we 
are in quest is general and intellectual...[;] it is an idea that exists only in the mind...: it is an idea... the 
artist... is always labouring to impart, and which he dies at last without imparting; but which he is yet 
so far able to communicate, as to raise the thoughts, and extend the views of the spectator... through 
successive stages of excellence, till that contemplation o f universal rectitude and harmony which began 
by Taste, may, as it is exalted and refined, conclude in Virtue.” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 171) 
See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 17-20, 27, 42-47, 50, 141, 171, 204, 232,235-236, 244, 252.
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was rendered and judged.85 As Reynolds wrote, “the present institution will at least 
contribute to advance our knowledge of the Arts, and bring us nearer to that ideal
* 9 9 8 6excellence which it is the lot of genius always to contemplate and never to attain.” 
Hence, whereas Richardson rejected the principle of received authority, Reynolds
87reinforced it.
All of this affected the analysis of portraiture. On the one hand, Reynolds, 
like Richardson, endorsed painting as a medium for the advancement of human virtue, 
thereby invoking a classical narrative of progress and good. Moreover, to this end, 
both endorsed a variation on ‘grand-manner’ imagery.88 On the other hand, however, 
Reynolds, like Shaftesbury, denied portraiture a liberal stature on grounds of its 
concern with the particularities of matter. This precluded it from contributing to the 
progress of truth and goodness.89 In an effort to remedy this deficiency, Reynolds
85 This program, which endorsed the notion of progress from a mechanical to an intellectual condition 
and supported a hierarchical order descending from the “intellectual dignity” of the liberal artist to the 
ignorance of “the mere mechanick,” was divided into three phases. (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 
42-43) The first two phases represented the student’s mechanical development: the rudiments of 
drawing, color and composition; and the study of old master works. In general, Reynolds advocated 
the serious study of other masters and nature as a means o f learning the rules of art and improving taste, 
a position he asserts in the sixth and twelfth Discourses. The third stage represented the artist’s 
intellectual training: a comparison of art and nature by which one “corrects what is erroneous, supplies 
what is scanty, and adds by his own observation what the industry of his predecessors may have yet left 
wanting to perfection.” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 27) This was further divided into ‘invention’ 
and ‘imagination’. On the one hand, ‘invention’ represented the successful abstraction and 
combination of selected elements into what Reynolds termed a ‘general’ style. On a higher level, 
‘imagination’ represented the successful translation of generalization into the truth o f the perfect ideal. 
See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 17,27-30,42-43, 50, 52, 58-59,93-97, 192,199,232-236,259- 
261,272.
80 Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 14.
87 For example, Reynolds recommended “obedience to the Rules o f Art, as established by the practice 
of the great Masters.” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 17) At the same time, he deemed genius beyond 
“the reach of rules.” (Reynolds, “False Criticisms on Painting,” p. 130) See Reynolds, Discourses on 
Art, p. 17; Reynolds, “False Criticisms on Painting,” in Samuel Johnson, The Idler, II, 76 (London: 
Printed for J. Newbery), p. 130.
88 Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 41-43, 59,62, 70-71,259,270.
89 As the “ornamental” style was inferior to the “grand” style, so portraiture was inferior to history 
painting; whereas history painting was suited to the “grand” style, portraiture was handicapped by its 
subject-matter, which demanded a degree of material realism. Reynolds explained: “A painter of
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sought some means by which a subject might be rendered so as to instruct and 
improve the spectator.90 The result was Reynolds’s “grand-style” portrait. Modeled 
on the example of history painting, and recalling the “historical” styles of earlier 
theorists, the “grand-style” portrait was rendered in a general, heroic and elevated 
manner while being simultaneously located in historic—as opposed to universal— 
time.91 Blurring the line between portrait and history painting, Reynolds formalized 
and institutionalized ideas originating in Shaftesbury and Richardson. In the process, 
portrait and painter were mutually elevated.
The tenor of Reynolds’s Discourses was broadly indicative of his support for 
the principle of ideal form and the merits of a theoretical methodology. This 
philosophy distinguished him from Richardson and aligned him with advocates of 
neo-Platonism.92 At the same time, however, Reynolds, like Richardson, advocated
portraits retains the individual likeness; a painter of history shews the man by shewing his actions.” 
Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 60.
90 Reynolds writes: “no subject can be proper that is not generally interesting.” Reynolds, Discourses 
on Art, p. 57.
91 Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 72-73, 88-89,200. In other words, the “historical style” of the 
Public Man celebrated the universal virtues o f the classical hero in secular time. As he explained it: “It 
ought to be either some eminent instance o f heroick action, or heroick suffering. There must be 
something either in the action, or in the object, in which men are universally concerned, and which 
powerfully strikes upon the public sympathy.” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 57) Moreover, he 
adds, no “defects ought to appear in a piece o f which [the subject]... is the hero.... I call this part of 
the art History Painting; it ought to be called Poetical, as in reality it is.” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, 
p. 60) See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 57, 60, 275.
92 In general, Plato distinguished three modes of poetry: first-person narrative; representation (tragedy 
or comedy); and mixed. The first, “narrative” style was characterized by uniformity and an emphasis 
on the “good man.” Suggestive of “courage, self-control, piety, freedom of spirit and similar qualities,” 
it informed the grand-manner narrative. (Plato, Republic, p. 94) The second, representational style 
boasted unlimited “variety.” Characterized by a third-person perspective that required the spectator to 
assume the position o f the subject, it was deemed dangerous by Plato, insofar it risked the 
impersonation of inferiors by the Guardian class. (Plato, Republic, p. 96) The third, “mixed” style, he 
writes, while “very pleasant,” is unsuitable, for it undermines Platonic principles (Plato, Republic, p.
97) A discussion of Plato’s stylistic analysis can be found in his Republic, pp. 90-97.
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“nurture.”93 This more inclusive interpretation of neo-Platonic theory reflected the 
Reformed subversion of ‘nature’ to ‘nurture’ and the implications of Shaftesbury’s 
concessions to the pressures of contemporary experience. A similar concession 
informed Reynolds’s analysis of trade. In his ninth Discourse (October 1780), 
Reynolds examined the relationship between art and trade within a larger social and 
international context. Here, he, like earlier civic humanists, defended the superior 
merits of intellectual pursuits and the social dangers inherent to the elevation of trade. 
Trade, Reynolds argued, benefited man insofar as it provided economic support for 
intellectual improvement—i.e. ‘progress’—, but it must necessarily be controlled at 
the risk of social degeneration.94
Ultimately, Reynolds’s ninth Discourse—indeed, the Discourses in general— 
signaled the uneasy relationship between civic humanism and modem life. The 
concession to nurtured genius invited self-improvement and social mobility, 
suggesting that the social order was not fixed and, consequently, that universal 
principles did not, of necessity, inform an individual’s temporal identity. This was to 
suggest that historical identities were, at least in part, self-determined and, 
consequently, that the temporal social order was fluid rather than fixed—a stance 
contrary to civic humanist prescription.
93 He writes in the seventh Discourse (December 1776): “success in your art depends almost entirely on 
your own industry;... not the industry of the hands, but of the mind. ...” (Reynolds, Discourses on Art, 
p. 117) See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 35, 117-118.
94 For “a people whose whole attention is absorbed in those means, and who forget the end, can aspire 
but little above the rank of a barbarous nation.” See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 169.
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V. Naturalism and the Conversational Style
On the one hand, Reynolds’s emphasis on “greatness” aligned him with the 
“heroic” ideals informing the neo-Aristotelian narrative of “Great” or Public Men.
On the other hand, while Richardson, too, privileged “greatness” above “grace,” his 
concession to “grace” lent more credibility to a social or ‘conversational’ style based 
on naturalism. This influence is felt, in varying ways, in the work of Kneller,
Hogarth, Highmore, and Ramsay.
Shaftesbury outlined a “natural” style to complement his civic humanist 
objectives. As he explained it, the process by which social affection was elevated to 
civic virtue was one of Taste. Hence, aesthetics—the rules of art (and life) conducive 
to beauty and virtue as informed by natural law—became the science of Taste 
alternately resonant in external signs of politeness. “To live aesthetically,” he wrote, 
“is to conduct oneself in a manner ‘naturally’ responsive to pleasure but governed, 
from within, by law.”95
Wed to this aesthetic correlation between virtue, beauty, politeness and Taste 
was a discourse of “conversation” that united the ideals of contemplation and heroic 
action into a modem model of social behavior. Essentially, “conversation” was the 
modem variation on the Socratic dialectic, the medium and engine of Platonic 
dialogue by which the individual was advanced towards greater self-knowledge and 
society was advanced towards greater good. In other words, it was the group 
variation on Shaftesbury’s “Soliloquy.”96 In aesthetic terms, the ideals of
95 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 125.
96 On the one hand, Shaftesbury endorsed Platonic contemplation—the form of disinterested virtue 
attained through intellectual reunion with nature. On the other hand, he embraced Aristotelian civic
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conversation were best rendered (in Shaftesbury’s opinion), in a natural, neoclassical 
style.
Fig. 5-1
John Closterman’s Maurice Ashley-Cooper and Anthony Ashley-Cooper, 3rd 
Earl o f Shaftesbury (Fig. 5-1; 1702; oil on canvas, 95-3/4 x 67-1/4 inches; National
action—the form of disinterested virtue attained through heroic engagement in defense of public good. 
Bridging the gap between Platonic and Aristotelian virtue was a theory of social affection—  
benevolence—in which individual attained potentiality through engagement in a Platonic-Aristotelian
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Portrait Gallery, London), in which Shaftesbury was directly involved,97 is suggestive 
of his vision of a “conversational” painting, in which nature, conversation and 
neoclassicism all converge in the depiction of Public Men. In ideological terms, two 
neo-Platonic philosopher-types stroll through a classicized “temple” of Nature, the 
younger brother on the left regaling his companion (the 3rd Earl) in the meaning of the 
harmonious cosmos that surrounds them, their resulting ‘elevation’ engendering not
Fig. 5-2
“dialogue” that harkened them to their intellectual and moral capacities and advanced them toward 
their virtuous potentiality.
97 As suggested by his later involvement in a work by Paolo de Mattheis. See David Solkin, Painting 
for Money: The Visual Arts and the Public Sphere in Eighteenth-Century England (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1992), p. 6.
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only their mutual improvement but foreshadowing the friendly improvement they will
98bring back to the Public sphere upon re-entry.
But a natural style could take an alternative form. Sir Godfrey Kneller’s 
Thomas Pelham-Holles, 1st Duke o f Newcastle and Henry Clinton, 7th Earl o f Lincoln 
(Fig. 5-2; ca. 1721; oil on canvas, 50 x 58-3/4 inches; National Portrait Gallery, 
London), captures the Big Whig brothers-in-law seated in a domestic interior beside a 
window-view of Newcastle’s estate, Claremont?9 In this last of the Kit-cat portraits, 
which record the members of this prominent Whig club,100 Kneller has dispensed with 
direct allusion to Platonic contemplation—the classical banyan and robe of the 
Ashley-Coopers gives way, for example, to powdered wigs and be-medaled frock 
coats. Moreover, he has removed his sitters from the realm of Nature and planted 
them in a domestic interior. Indeed, borrowing on Van Dyck’s established convention 
for aristocratic men-at-ease, Kneller further privatizes the effect by reducing the 
barrier between sitter and spectator, one effect of which is to engage the spectator in 
the imag[in]ed conversation.101 In other words, whereas Closterman’s image of the 
3rd Earl and his brother exudes the detached disinterest of Platonic philosophy, 
Kneller’s highlights his sitters’ “interest” through the visual engagement of the
98 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 279; Solkin, Painting for Money, pp. 9-10,15.
99 Solkin, Painting for Money, p. 38-39.
100 As Solkin writes, “here the politics of whiggery and the culture of politeness merged... [among] 
virtually every important Whig potentate of the period....” (Solkin, p. 28) Founded in the 1680s as part 
of the growth of political clubs that thrived on the contest between Tories and Whigs, they initiated a 
cultural propaganda campaign designed to support constitutional change and the new relationship 
between monarchy, lords and commons. This cultural campaign involved “building a broad ideological 
consensus based on ‘social, cultural, and commercial values’.” (J. G. A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce and 
History, p. 235; quoted in Solkin, p. 29) The result was a model o f politeness based on “social and 
moral end[s].” See Solkin, Painting for Money, pp. 28-29.
101 Solkin, Painting for Money, pp. 32, 36.
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spectator’s gaze. This is not the negative “interest” of civic humanist narrative the 
interest of acquisitive pride—but rather the positive “interest” of an alternative,
“conversational” narrative—the social interest in one’s fellow-beings threatened by
102the alienation attendant disengagement.
Fig. 5-3
In other words, between 1702 and 1721, Shaftesbury’s conversation lost its 
civic—Public—edge to a more social—public—one. At the same time, its premise of 
disinterested independence was subverted, in part, to a notion of interested inter­
dependence. This suggestion is compounded by the allusion to equality implied by
102 Solking, Painting for Money, pp. 36-37.
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the seated posture and the hospitality of shared drink, all of which function to engage 
the conversational spectator in the sitters’ image. A similar effect is suggested by 
Joseph Highmore’s Mr. Oldham and his Guests (Fig. 5-3; ca. 1735-1745; oil on 
canvas, 41-1/2x51 inches; Tate Britain), which casts the ‘middling sort’ in a 
similarly “clubby” guise. Yet the image bears closer examination. Here, the striding 
posture and rhetorical gesture of the Ashley-Coopers, which became the upright 
seating and social pleasantries of Newcastle and Lincoln, become the leaning and 
slouching figures of smoking and drinking men. By the same token, the timeless 
classical banyan and robe, which became the public be-medaled frock coats, become 
the modest dress of private commoners. Likewise, La Belle Nature with classical 
temple, which became a baroque interior with view of country estate, becomes a 
simple domestic interior. Aesthetically-speaking, formal symmetry and uniformity 
have given way to informal asymmetry and fluidity, something akin to the nature—as 
opposed to Nature—of Dutch art.
During the course of the eighteenth century, these images suggest, the 
implications of “conversation” grew increasingly social and egalitarian, becoming a 
medium for the elevation of the middle-class sitter rather than a celebration of 
communal soliloquy. Indeed, the three images march in tempered progression from 
landed to propertied, elite to common, Public to public, ending in what Jurgen 
Habermas has described as “a more inclusive public of all private people, persons 
who—insofar as they were propertied and educated—as readers, listeners, and 
spectators could avail themselves via the market of the... objects that were subject to
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discussion.”103 The significance of this development is made dramatically evident in 
the work of Hogarth.
VI. Hogarth
The theoretical descent from Shaftesbury to Richardson to Reynolds was 
paralleled by alternative modes of descent from, for example, Shaftesbury to 
Richardson to Ramsay and, more radically, Mandeville to Hogarth. Mandeville 
suggested in his controversial Fable o f the Bees an alternative mode of nature— 
“abject, low, pitiful and mean”—affiliated with Dutch painting.104 Moreover, in an 
effective allusion to the mute tongue—and Taste—of the common man, he set up the 
alternative as a dialectical opposition to Shaftesburian Nature—that of civic 
humanism— by pitting the marginalized female, Fulvia, against the Shaftesburian 
Cleomenes.105 In the process, he unmasked the pretentious conflation of moral virtue 
with elite Taste as the self-interested drive for money and power undergirding the 
Whig narrative.106
While Hogarth did not endorse Mandeville’s ideological vision for modem 
society, he did share Mandeville’s view of the elite. Recalling Mandeville’s 
distinction between ancient virtue and modem happiness, Hogarth proposed that 
ancient and modem life—and, consequently, ancient and modem art—were premised
103 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation o f the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category 
o f Bourgeois Society (1962), trans. Thomas Burger with the assistance of Frederick Lawrence 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), quoted in Solkin, Painting for Money, p. 3.
,0* Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, II, pp. 32-34, quoted in Solkin, Painting for Money, p. 15.
105 Solkin, Painting for Money, p. 15.
106 Solking, Painting for Money, pp. 16-17, 37.
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on different narrative ends. Because the ancients understood the purpose of life—and 
art—to be the nurturing of natural progress through a knowledge of universal order, 
they advocated instruction in theoretically-fixed standards by which human virtue was 
thought to be advanced.107 On this premise, Shaftesbury, while conceding the 
empirical origins of knowledge and, so, admitting a science of aesthetics,108 had 
perpetuated a theory of art based on fixed standards of beauty and Taste, thereby 
laying the groundwork for the academic prescriptions of Reynolds’s Discourses.109
In theory, however, Shaftesbury’s aesthetics derived from an ancient division 
between what Giovanni Lomazo later described as the “order of training” and “the 
order of nature.” In the former, would-be artists were instructed in those ideal 
standards to which art (and life) were subject. In the latter, the artist worked from the 
particularities of nature in order to arrive at his own generalities—his own standards 
for art and life.110 Although classical biases against autonomous reasoning and
107 Giovanni Lomazzo had called this the “order of teaching,” which worked from established 
principles. See Giovanni Paolo Lomazzo, A Trade Containing the Artes o f Curious Paintinge,
Carvinge & Buildinge (1590), trans. Richard Haydocke (Oxford: printed by Joseph Barnes, 1598)
108 According to Ronald Paulson, “Aesthetics, though it dwelt on the beautiful, was an empiricist 
philosophy based on the sense rather than reason or faith. The first aesthetic treatises were the third 
earl of Shaftesbury’s Charaderisticks (1711, collecting essays that went back as far as the late 1690s) 
and Joseph Addison’s ‘Pleasures of the Imagination’ essays in The Spedator of 1712.” (Paulson, The 
Analysis o f  Beauty, pp. xix-xx) What distinguished aesthetics from previous art theory was not only its 
concession to an empirical methodology, but its consequent attention to the role of the spectator in the 
judgment of beauty. See Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xix-xx.
109 As Paulson argues, Shaftesbury recognized that all knowledge began with a sense-perception, but 
not that all sense-perception resulted in knowledge. Only those who were sensitive to the relationship 
between external nature and divine plan, and esteemed the virtues o f Nature, were capable of making 
knowledge out of sensory information. Moreover, as this esteem was conditioned upon a love of moral 
goodness, it was necessarily confined to those whose leisure allowed for the disinterested 
comprehension of public good. This distinguished Shaftesbury from Locke, for whom experience was 
the only basis of meaning. (Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xx) See Paulson, The Analysis of 
Beauty, p. xx; Reynolds, “The true Idea of Beauty,” in Samuel Johnson, The Idler, II, 82, pp. 166-169.
110 Lomazzo wrote: “There is a two-folde proceeding in all artes and sciences: the one is called the 
order of nature, and the other of teaching. Nature proceedeth ordinarly beginning with the unperfect, as 
the particulars, and ending with the perfect, as the universals. Now if in searching out the nature of 
things, our understanding shall proceede after that order, by which they are brought forth by nature,
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empirical methodologies deemed “the order of nature” beyond man’s capacities, 
modem concessions to an autonomous and reasoning subject opened the way for 
alternative claims.
Supported by the individualist biases informing empirical methodologies, as 
well as the Reformed “ethic of ordinary life,” Hogarth rejected the inaccessibility of 
the “order of nature,” devising a theory of art based on the evidence of formal 
properties in material things.111 At the same time, he denied the necessary correlation
between beauty and morality, a definition of “grace” without foundation in reality,
* • • • 112 •and the superiority of a technique based on the copying of received ideas. Against
the classical model of beauty, for example, Hogarth argued for a form of beauty 
enhanced not by symmetry and simplicity, but by variety, color, and light made 
pleasing through intricacy, quantity, novelty and asymmetry—his serpentine line of 
beauty.113 Indeed, against the classical (Shaftesburian) ideal of ancient Hercules,
doubtlesse it will be the most absolute and ready method that can bee imagined. For we beginne to 
know things by their first and immediate principles, &c. and this is not only mine opinion but 
Aristotle’s also’, ... [though] ‘he resolves to follow the order of teaching’, which all the writers on 
painting have in like manner since done.” See Lomazzo, A Trade Containing the Artes o f Curious 
Paintinge, Carvinge & Buildinge (1590), quoted in Hogarth, “The Analysis of Beauty: Written with a 
view of fixing the fluctuating IDEAS of TASTE,” in The Analysis of Beauty, pp. 12-13.
111 Hogarth’s empiricism was more Lockean insofar as it located knowledge in the formal properties of 
nature prior to their transformation into ideas. Consequently, Lawrence Gowing writes, Hogarth sought 
‘“to make formal values both the starting point and basis o f a whole aesthetic theory’.” See Gowing, 
Hogarth, p. 74. See also Paulson, Hogarth, p. xxiii; Hogarth, “The Analysis of Beauty,” in Paulson, 
The Analysis o f Beauty, p. 18; Bindman, Hogarth, p. 86
112 Hogarth, “The Analysis of Beauty,” in Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. 1,2, 10; Paulson, The 
Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxv; Gowing, Hogarth, p. 42.
113 “The principles I mean, are FITNESS, VARIETY, UNIFORMITY, SIMPLICITY, INTRICACY, 
AND QUANTITY;—all which cooperate in the production o f beauty, mutually correcting and 
restraining each other occasionally.” (Hogarth, “The Analysis of Beauty,” in Paulson, p. 23) See 
Hogarth, “The Analysis of Beauty,” in Paulson, pp. 27-28, 30,32, 35-36,41-42,45, 48, 83, 87.
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Hogarth advanced a modem alternative—the ‘natural’ ideal of the English street-
114walker—, invoking the contemporary euphemism of sexual ‘conversation’.
In fact, Hogarth’s portraits reflect a compelling manipulation of the “natural” 
style and “conversational” discourse advanced by Shaftesbury. Whereas Shaftesbury 
confined “conversation” to polite, Public Men, the way was opened for a more 
inclusive interpretation. Hogarth’s expansion of the “Public” to include not only the 
disinterested elite—Hercules—but the marginalized body politic—the Harlot—meant 
that the “conversational” model set forth by Shaftesbury might be expanded to 
embrace the “dialogue” of the masses—the “conversation” of the coffee house (as 
opposed to the club), novels (as opposed to poetry), and the marketplace (as opposed 
to the assembly). In fact, Bindman writes, Hogarth’s “modem moral progresses” 
were also called “novels in paint.”115 Hence his endorsement of the “natural” 
style.116 As Reynolds later articulated, whereas Nature in the Italian school “attends 
only to the invariable, the great and general ideas which are fixed and inherent in
114 Against Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Paulson writes, “His version of Addi sonian aesthetics is the 
surprising discovery o f the utmost variety within apparent uniformity.” (Paulson, The Analysis o f  
Beauty, p. xxxiv) It is interesting to note Mandeville’s similar use of a female subject to convey the 
trope of the outsider. According to Solkin, this was common practice in early eighteenth-century essay- 
periodicals. See Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 154, 158, 162; Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xxii, 
xxvii, xxiv; Solkin, Painting for Money, p. 14.
115 Bindman, Hogarth, p. 55. As Taylor notes, “The new modem novel stands out against all previous 
literature in its portrayal of the particular. It... breaks with the classical preference for the general and 
universal. It narrates the lives of particular people in their detail... [;] its characters have ordinary 
proper names....” Moreover, Taylor adds, the story is no longer ‘received’ but ‘discovered’; “its 
meaning is seen as something that unfolds through the events.” See Taylor, pp. 287-288; Paulson, The 
Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xlix-1.
116 Hogarth’s concern with an individualistic record of common human traits and the “thinking and 
feeling” aspects of humanity were not conducive to the civic humanist model on the Shaftesburian 
example of naturalism. See Gowing, Hogarth, pp. 77, 79.
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universal Nature; ... Dutch [naturalism], on the contrary, [attends] to literal truth and
1 1 Ta minute exactness ... [and hence to a] naturalness... of a lower order....” 
Indeed, Hogarth’s naturalism, which supplanted the theoretical ideal with a
118“representational” alternative, marked his dissent from modem classicism. 
Assisted by an uncanny ability to memorize and record the features of everyday life, 
Hogarth’s empirical approach to his subject-matter tended to the socialization—rather 
than the veneration—of the sitter.119 A similar intent informed contemporary
• 1 2 0literature, which likewise played out in the “representational world.” In Tom Jones 
(1745), for example, the paradigm icons of classicism and Christianity—-the Classical 
narrative, represented by Mr. Square, and the Christian narrative, represented by 
Reverend Thwackum—are dismissed in favor of a more natural, social narrative 
invoked by the persons of Squire Allworthy—i.e. Country Virtue—, Sophia Western, 
and the fallible—Harlot-like—Tom.121
117 Reynolds, “Grand Stile o f Painting,” in Samuel Johnson, The Idler, II, 79 (London: Printed by J. 
Newbery, 1761), p. 150.
118 See Bindman, Hogarth, p. 98, and Gowing, Hogarth, pp. 77-79.
119 As Gowing writes: “The drive that made Kneller a connoisseur o f egotism was transformed in 
Hogarth into a solid appreciation of the social and sociable solidity of a man.... He showed the aspect 
that a man presented to his fellows and the place that he occupied in his world with a completeness that 
invented what was virtually a new kind of image.” (Gowing, p. 42) As Bindman notes, however, “only 
a minority o f  patrons wanted to be painted with Hogarthian directness, not so much because his 
portraits were thought to be unflattering but because their assertiveness offended the prevailing sense of 
decorum.” (Bindman, Hogarth, p. 126) Moreover, in conveying the various nuances of everyday life, 
Hogarth leveled his subjects, making them equally valuable and accessible. See Bindman, Hogarth, 
pp. 30, 125-126; Gowing, Hogarth, pp. 42, 51; Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xxvii-xxviii. With 
regard to the French influence on Hogarth’s work, see Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 47-48, 111.
120 In lieu of the ‘internal’/ ‘external’ dichotomy, Hogarth’s modem subject seems to occupy what 
Joseph Sandler has termed the ‘representational world’, which “has the advantage of recognizing the 
relational function of representation, [without opposing],.. inner to outer....” See Sandler, “From safety 
to superego” in Selected Papers o f Joseph Sandler (London: Kamak Books, 1978); quoted in 
Pajaczkowska, “The ecstatic solace of culture: self, not-self and other; a psychoanalytic view,” in Juliet 
Steyn, ed., Other than identity: the subject, politics and art (New York: Manchester University Press, 
1997), p. 103.
m  Henry Fielding, Tom Jones (1750), Douglas Brooks-Davies, ed. (Rutland, Vermont: Charles E. 
Tuttle, 1998)
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Hogarth’s penchant for naturalism likely encouraged his expansion into 
“conversation” pieces.122 In part, his preference for this more intimate and informal
Fig. 5-4
mode of group portraiture probably turned on its more social bias. On the one hand, it 
provided a suitable format for his representational talents. On the other hand, it also
122 “Dissatisfaction with engraving, Hogarth explained, ‘made him turn his head to painting portrait 
figures from 10 to 15 inches high, often in subjects of conversation. It had some novelty... [and] it 
gave more scope to fancy than the common portrait... See Gowing, Hogarth, p. 19. For a discussion 
of the development of the English conversation piece, see David Piper, The English Face (London: 
National Portrait Gallery, 1978), pp. 130-139.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
180
provided a narrative format conducive to unmasking social pretensions about family 
life, political stability, and social order.123 Ultimately, the discourse of “conversation” 
and Hogarth’s natural style merged in his compelling portraits of the late 1730s and 
early 1740s.124
In George Arnold (Fig. 5-4; ca. 1738-1740; oil on canvas, 35-2/3 x 27-7/S 
inches; Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge University), for example, the self-made man 
is captured in an informal, seated pose, hat in hand, but there is a crowding to his 
figure and a deference to the gesture that precludes a sense of ease. While he is well- 
(if conservatively) attired in slate wool and white linen, he appears a bit constrained 
by his trappings. At the same time, there is a warmth to his face and an openness to 
his posture that invites the addresses of the spectator. It is as though he has stopped to 
listen to an adjacent viewer, displaying his “interested” capacity for “conversation.” 
But the conversation he intends is of a ‘bourgeois’ type, defined by Addison as one of 
intimate “particulars:” “that which passes between two persons who are familiar and 
intimate friends.”125
123 These pictures appealed to men of taste who were coming to terms with the Rococo style. Hogarth 
never enjoyed such an elegant patronage again. But there was also something innocent in his 
expectation that he could both satirise the establishment and serve it. Having allied himself with 
Thornhill, he necessarily shared in Thornhill’s defeat. The double rebuff to his ambition as a court 
portraitist in 1733 marked a turning-point in his career. Henceforward the patrons for his paintings 
were bourgeois or eccentric. His distrust of fashionable cosmopolitan taste was confirmed and the 
sardonic independence of his view developed unchecked.” See Gowing, Hogarth, p. 19. See also 
Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 41, 45.
124 As Bindman observes, the “early single-figure portraits employ essentially the same conventions as 
the conversation pieces of the 1730s.” (Bindman, Hogarth, p. 128) By the late 1730s, however, 
“Hogarth’s interest in a grander and more ambitious type of portrait began to grow..., perhaps 
stimulated by his experiments with History painting, as well as by a desire to present himself as the 
leader and spokesman o f his profession.” (Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 130-131) See Bindman, Hogarth, 
pp. 128-131.
125 Quoted in Solkin, Painting for Money, p. 40. As David Piper notes, “Hogarth himself insisted... on 
the fundamental difference between his art, which he called that o f character, and that o f caricature....” 
(Piper, The English Face, p. 133) Hogarth may have influenced a similar development in the work of
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Like Shaftesbury, Richardson, and Mandeville before him, Hogarth’s art 
theory was imbedded in a social and political narrative.126 Having rescued his 
“liberty” as an autonomous and reasoning individual from the hands of a landed elite, 
he worked both within and against the civic humanist paradigm.127 Whereas 
Richardson’s dissent from customary authority turned on a desire to make the 
privileges and prestige of higher ranks more accessible to deserving commoners, 
Hogarth’s more radical intent turned on unmasking the interested relationship 
between modem aesthetics and elite politics.128 Whereas Shaftesbury’s philosophy— 
part aesthetic, part political, part social, part religious—sought to rationalize the 
replacement of religious and royal authority—h igh church Toryism—with a
Highmore and Gainsborough. Indeed, although he never set up a painting factory or took on 
apprentices, Hogarth did have his adherents, among them Gainsborough, Zoffany, Joseph Wright of 
Derby and George Stubbs. As Bindman observes, “Hogarth inevitably tended to emphasize his 
differences from other painters of portraits and to contrast his own independence with the servility of 
the ‘ face painters ’ of his time. Recent reconsideration of English portraiture in the first half of the 
eighteenth century has, however, .. .revealed that many others were capable o f a high degree of 
individuality.” (Bindman, Hogarth, p. 144) See Piper, The English Face, p. 133; Bindman, Hogarth, 
pp. 125, 144; Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xlix.
126 This would have appealed to Hogarth; “Hogarth... came from a dissenter family, joined the 
anticlerical wing of the Whig opposition to Sir Robert Walpole, was a Freemason of the freethinking 
sort, and invoked the deist Thomas Woolston in A Harlot's Progress, shortly after the publication of 
which he showed his scorn for organized religion by relieving himself against the door of a church in 
Kent.” See Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxii.
127 Like Hume, Paulson notes, Hogarth looked to his own capacities to make sense o f what appeared in 
life experience. See Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxxviii.
,2S According to Paulson, “In practical terms aesthetics served as an aspect of the Whig reaction to 
Stuart absolutism and High Church Anglicanism. It was introduced by Shaftesbury in the empiricist, 
anticlerical, and Whig context of the 1690s.” (Paulson, The Analysis o f  Beauty, p. xx) However, he 
adds: “As Hogarth ... recognized, Shaftesbury’s aesthetic disinterestedness had a political underside: 
the alliance of monarch and church is corrected by a government of gentlemen; royal patronage of art is 
corrected by similarly disinterested connoisseurs (the same persons). The only people who can afford 
to appreciate virtue and beauty are the Whig oligarchs....” (Paulson, The Analysis o f  Beauty, p. xxiii)
In fact, neither circumstance suited Hogarth, whose “bull-dog patriotism” opposed anything that denied 
Englishmen their rightful liberties. (Gowing, Hogarth, p. 82) Ultimately, then, in the process of 
undermining the authority of civic humanist aesthetics, Hogarth tampered with the broader political 
agenda with which they were concerned. (Gowing, Hogarth, p. 26) See Paulson, The Analaysis o f  
Beauty, pp. xx-xxiii; Gowing, Hogarth, pp. 26, 82.
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‘disinterested’ elite—a landed oligarchy— Hogarth’s Analysis aimed to curtail the
129authority of the landed elite by reclaiming the liberties of the English people.
To this end, Hogarth subverted the “high” art and ideology of the oligarchs, 
symbolized by the ancient virtue of the “straight-and-narrow” Hercules, with the 
“low” art and ideology of the people, symbolized by the modem virtue of the “curvy 
and commercial” Harlot. At the same time, he linked the lust for political power 
affiliated with the “conversational” Public Man with the lust for sexual power 
affiliated with the “conversational” Public Woman. Mandeville had made a similar 
point, but whereas Mandeville had sought to expose the anachronism of social 
morality as a mode of social cohesion, Hogarth sought to expose moral declension
130and, indeed, the dangers of modem politics to art and society. In other words, 
Hogarth’s Analysis aimed to expose the failings that had accrued to modem England 
as a result offoreign influences, which subordinated the ideals of tme English 
classicism to the aesthetic and ideological degeneracy of a continental-style ruling 
elite.131
129 By extension, as Gowing writes: “It was Hogarth, more than anyone, who identified the right o f the 
artist, ...as a right to resist the tyranny of the instituted idea of art.” See Gowing, Hogarth, p. 56.
130 As Paulson observes, “In the 1724 edition of his Fable o f the Bees Mandeville’s strategy was to 
expose the desire, economic and sexual, under the supposed disinterestedness of Shaftesbury’s civic 
humanism....” (Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxiv) Hogarth undertook a similar strategy. 
However, Gowing notes, “Below politics and patronage, underlying the dilemma of the styles, 
Hogarth’s criticism dealt most forcefully with the moral constitution of society.... English life at a 
crucial juncture was seen as greedy, merciless, sanctimonious, improvident and treacherous, with the 
privileged oligarchy presiding in its blindness, at once noble, pathetic and deeply frivolous.” (Gowing, 
Hogarth, p. 82) See Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xxiv-xxv; Gowing, Hogarth, pp. 16, 82.
131 Paulson writes: “In the eighteenth century Elizabeth [I] was a symbol of the Country Party, the 
opposition to Sir Robert Walpole which had in many ways shaped Hogarth’s relationships to aesthetic 
theory as one of opposition satire with an anti-authoritarian and anticlerical bias. In the discourse of 
opposition, Elizabeth was one of the ideals of the past to which the English were urged to return....” 
(Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xlii) See Paulson, The Analysis ofBeauty, p. xlii; Bindman, 
Hogarth, pp, 17, 26; Gowing, Hogarth, p. 82.
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Ultimately, Hogarth’s serpentine “line of beauty” became the metaphorical 
equivalent of an expanded Public—the body politic—and the will and authority of the 
English people.132 Implicit to this presumption was a shift in the balance-of-authority 
between the political (civic and elite) and commercial (social and common) spheres. 
Indeed, Hogarth’s Analysis, with its allusions to ancient English liberty, equality and 
virtue, bore the radical imprint of modem “Patriots” and British freemasonry.133 This 
may explain contemporary objections to Hogarth by Reynolds and others.134 On the 
other hand, it is precisely this concern with the relationship between man and 
society—what Gowing describes as “the aspect that a man presented to his fellows 
and the place that he occupied in his world”—that makes his Analysis so relevant to a 
study of eighteenth-century portraiture.135 Despite his general disregard for portrait
132 According to Paulson, “Hogarth’s aesthetics is based on the human body and a political model—the 
body politic, as represented in the frontispiece of Hobbes’s Leviathan. The Tory-Jacobite model 
subordinated the many to the one (the monarch); the Whig model replaced the one with the oligarchic 
few; but Hogarth, while invoking the familiar topos of concordia discors, defines it as the pleasure of 
discovering the greatest variety in uniformity, or the greatest number of parts within a whole. He might 
have called this formula... an aesthetics of the crowd....” (Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xli-xlii) 
See Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xli-xlii; Hogarth, “The Analysis of Beauty,” in Paulson, p. 11; 
Gowing, Hogarth, p. 54.
133 Hogarth’s commitment to English liberties and a “patriot” king allied him with Harrington and 
Bolingbroke’s Country party. (Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxxiv) Borrowing on the example 
of Addison and Toland, Paulson writes, he reacted “against the aristocratic fraternity of civic humanists 
[whom] Toland had adapted as a counter [to] the model of Freemasonry, which claimed to be 
democratic, capable of including members o f the artisan classes as well as the aristocracy.
Freemasonry, of which Hogarth was an observing member at least in the mid-1730s... may have been 
the ultimate source of his serpentine Line of Beauty.” (Paulson, The Analysis of Beauty, pp. xxxv- 
xxxvi) See Bindman, Hogarth, p. 189; Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. xxxiv-xxxvi.
134 In his Apology for Painters, Hogarth concluded that Greek art was unsuited to a “trading” nation. 
(Bindman, Hogarth, p. 150) Reynolds’s counter-position resulted in his attacked on Hogarth’s theory in 
the Idler essays of 1759, which laid the foundation for his later Discourses. (Paulson, The Analysis of 
Beauty, p. xlix) See Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 150-151, Paulson, The Analysis o f  Beauty, pp. xlviii-xlix, 
Sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 47-49,61, 69, 277; Gowing, Hogarth, p. 39.
135 Gowing, Hogarth, p. 42.
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painters,136 Hogarth’s contemporaries were programmed, he tells us, to know the
•  137individual by reading his face.
VII. Ramsay
As Bindman notes, “it is perhaps indicative of the limitations of artistic theory 
in the eighteenth century that Hogarth and Ramsay could to such a large degree share 
a similar theoretical position.”138 To very different ends, Ramsay likewise borrowed 
on the “natural” style of Shaftesburian ‘conversation’, uniting it with Richardsonian 
“grace.”139 Ultimately, however, whereas Hogarth used a “natural” style to counter 
the ideologies and tastes of an elite, employing an empirical methodology to 
emphasize the private (common) qualities of his individual English subjects, Ramsay 
used it as a means of redressing traditional civic humanism so as to highlight the good 
that accrued to society by way of politeness, “often depicting,” as Bindman observes,
136 Gowing, Hogarth, p. 42.
s’7 As he explained it, “the face is the index o f the mind....” (Hogarth, “The Analysis of Beauty,” p. 95) 
Consequently, Hogarth proposed a two-part method for reading identity in portraits: a methodical 
comparison of facial lines—cautious physiognomy; and the examination of bodily motions. See 
Hogarth, “The Analysis of Beauty,” in Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, pp. 95-96, 106.
138 Bindman, Hogarth, p. 147. In addition to his aesthetic and political writings, Ramsay was active in 
the administration o f his profession. He held the position o f Principle Painter in Ordinary to the King 
jointly with John Shackleton until the latter’s death in 1767, when he became the sole Principle Painter, 
providing a mass of coronation portraits for offices, ambassadors and foreign dignitaries around the 
globe. He was also Vice President of the Incorporated Society of Artists. For a further examination of 
Ramsay’s work, see Allan Ramsay, Dialogue on Taste (London, 1755) and Alistair Smart, Allan 
Ramsay: Painter, Essayist, and Man of the Enlightenment (New Haven and London: Yale University 
Press, 1992).
139 In the example of John Sargent (1753; Holbome Museum, Bath), Smart wrote, there is clearly some 
influence of Hogarth, “a realism o f presentation, together with a breadth of handling, that would have 
been unthinkable apart from Hogarth’s example.” See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man 
of the Enlightenment, p. 101.
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“people who saw naturalness as a rejection of pomp and who sought to combine ease
140of manner with intellectual seriousness.
In fact, Ramsay’s variation on the “natural” style drew from a number of 
sources.141 Significantly, however, it joined Shaftesbury’s correlation between the 
natural and the polite with Richardson’s theory of “grace,” their combination effecting 
a suitable framework for examining the private individual as a medium of 
improvement and social good. This attention to the private, social self distinguished 
Ramsay from traditional civic humanists, whose emphasis on “greatness” reflected a 
preoccupation with the “public” man.142 But in fact, Ramsay’s style provided a 
much-needed bridge between the standards of identity invoked by Shaftesburian civic
140 Bindman, Hogarth, p. 147. As Bindman explains, Ramsay’s “paintings are refined, with a 
brushwork in the contemporary Roman manner [of Pompeo Batoni], concealed under a smooth surface 
(in Vertue’s words, ‘rather lick’t than pencilled’).... His conception of naturalness is, however, quite 
different from Hogarth’s; his best works are ‘natural’ in the cultivated sense of the French and Scottish 
Enlightenment....” See Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 146-147.
141 In addition to the influences o f Shaftesbury and Richardson, Ramsay’s work appears to reflect the 
narrative interests of Scottish painting—what Smart describes as “that primary concern with the 
individual personality which distinguishes the art of Aikman and the Scottish tradition as a whole.” 
(Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 20, 110) It also reveals the technical influence o f Pompeo Batoni and the 
compositional intimacy of French painters like Chardin. (Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 192-193) See 
Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 20, 110, 192-193.
142 Whereas Ramsay privileged a conversational model of moral sensibility—the social ideal of 
individual gentility and politeness—, Reynolds, for example, privileged the grand-manner model and 
its Aristotelian heroic ideal. In fact, Ramsay returned to England and enrolled at St. Martin’s Lane 
Academy during the height of Richardson’s theoretical influence. As Richardson was retiring, the 
informal, polite portrait was on the rise. In general, Richardson’s “grace and greatness” represented 
two modes of idealization, the former based on the selective presentation of nature’s best parts, the 
latter on their theoretical improvement. That Ramsay was likewise versed in the “great” style is 
suggested by his portraits Mead and MacLeod, which have been credited has introducing the “grand 
style” to England. (Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 83-84) As Smart concludes: “on the one hand no portrait 
painter of the period was more deeply concerned with the evocation of individual character,.. .while on 
the other hand a retrospective survey of his artistic development reveals the single-mindedness of his 
quest of a mode of portraiture capable o f containing feeling within an ordered and rational whole.” 
(Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 3) See Alistair Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 3, 83-84.
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humanism and the demands of a commercial people intent on assuming greater 
authority yet unwilling to accept a landed model of virtue.143
Alistair Smart has divided Ramsay’s career into two periods, according to his 
stylistic progress away from the grand-manner towards more individuality and 
naturalism.144 This development was accompanied by an increasingly empirical 
approach to knowledge and likeness.145 But it also suggests the influence of a 
‘commercial humanist’ ethic. Indeed, as the political platform of the Augustan Whigs 
turned increasingly towards a broad-based combination of landed and commercial 
interests, way was made for a more inclusive interpretation of virtue based on the 
social interaction of the commercial sphere. Blurring the lines between public and 
private, general and particular, civic and social to accommodate the demands for an 
alternative narrative of social—rather than civic—virtue, Ramsay’s “second style”
543 As Lord Chesterfield implied, the social ideal of the conversational individual embraced a broader 
sector o f the community than the civic ideal o f the heroic public man, permitting individuals to define 
themselves “not... with regard to their birth; but with regard to their merit....” (Chesterfield, p. 17. 
Borrowing on Shaftesbury, Chesterfield wrote: “Good-breeding... does not consist in low bows, and 
formal ceremony, but in an easy, civil, and respectful behaviour.” (Chesterfield, p. 37) He continued: 
“In short,.. .politeness and good-breeding are equally necessary to render us agreeable in conversation 
and common life....” (Chesterfield, pp. 141-142) Like Shaftesbury and Hutcheson, Chesterfield 
emphasized the correlation between character and virtue: “virtue makes us pity and relieve the 
misfortunes of mankind; it makes us promote justice and good order in society; and, in general, 
contributes to whatever tends to the real good o f mankind.” (Chesterfield, pp. 113-114) See 
Chesterfield, Advice to his Son, pp. 17, 37, 102,113-115, 141-142.
144 As Smart observed, “henceforth the ideal at which he aimed was the expression of ‘the graceful in 
nature’.” (Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 100) Indeed, Smart continued, “The ‘natural’ idiom of Hogarth and 
La Tour now becomes the foundation of Ramsay’s radical rethinking of the art of portraiture, as he 
discards the conventions of Italianate Baroque and creates a new style capable on the one hand of 
reflecting his refined sensibility and on the other of doing justice to that ideal of unaffected truthfulness 
....” (Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 102) See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man of the 
Enlightenment, pp. 52,102.
145 See Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 100 and 102. According to Smart, by the late 1740s, Ramsay had 
embarked upon his “second style,” which culminated in his mature work of the 1760s. These images 
are characterized by a growing sense of individuality, informality, and a richness of color that combines 
the grace o f well-bred politeness with the selective handling of French and Italian painting. As Smart 
wrote: “He was to forge this new manner during a long absence from London between 1753 and 1757, 
first in Edinburgh and thereafter in Italy....” (Smart, p. 91) See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist 
and Man o f the Enlightenment, pp. 84, 88, 91-92.
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marks the culmination of the “conversational” portrait whose inklings were earlier felt 
in the work of Kneller, Highmore, and Hogarth.
Once again, the seated, facing posture and engaged gaze of Lord Drummore 
(Fig. 5-5; 1754; oil on canvas, 50 x 39-1/2 inches; Scottish National Portrait Gallery)
Fig. 5-5
highlights the mutual engagement between sitter and spectator, each simultaneously 
assuming the posture of “Pocket-Mirrour” and friend. Left hand raised slightly in the
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tense promise of gesture, the intensity ofDrummore’s concentration—highlighted by 
the pierce of his left eye and the vertical line that marks his brown—is palpable while, 
at the same time, his person remains in polite control. The commanding presence of 
the sitter is reinforced by the absence of unnecessary color and detail. The splash of 
red is but a spark of ignition, the relief of the pilasters a mere surface undulation, 
while the black of his corpulent frame anchors the image and calls attention to the 
lightness of his face and hands. At the same time, the subtle allusions to classicism 
remain, reminding us that the ideals of classical virtue and progress have not been 
sacrificed to the intimacy and sociability of the image. Rather, they have 
converged.146
As Drummore suggests, the ‘conversational’ style of Ramsay’s work—as 
distinct from that of Hogarth—did not dismiss with the classical ideals of virtue and 
goodness, but rather stressed their social—as opposed to heroic or aristocratic— 
merits.147 In keeping with this emphasis, Ramsay rendered his sitters in private, 
domestic settings, their informal gestures and visual engagement with the spectator 
offset by a controlled use of line and color and the inclusion of classical details. The 
result was something entirely removed from Reynolds’s “greatness” and Hogarth’s
146 Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 52, 105-106, 128-129.
147 From the earlier versions of his ‘second style’, Ramsay further developed the ‘natural portrait’ in the 
late 1750s, following his return from Italy, 1754-1757, when he addressed the issue of how to anchor 
“the informal portrait within an appropriately unpretentious but firmly structured design.” (Smart, p. 
128) In complement with this burgeoning interest in moral sense and politeness, books like Nivelon’s 
Rudiments o f Genteel Behaviour provided a visual vocabulary from which artists might draw in the 
formulation of models of grace. See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the 
Enlightenment, pp. 128-129,174. See also Francis Nivelon, The Rudiments o f Genteel Behaviour 
(London, 1737).
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naturalism.148 On the one hand, against the classical aesthetic of the general, he 
advances the superior merits of the particular.149 At the same time, his notion of the 
particular is less concerned with the rendering of individual novelty than with 
conveying the intimacy of social relations and their dependence upon individual
150virtues.
Much of Ramsay’s ideological intent was suggested by his Shaftesburian 
Dialogue on Taste, published two years prior to Hume’s Of the Standard o f Taste and 
likely informed by conversations between the two friends.151 In general, the 
Dialogue between Colonel Freeman and Lord Modish sets the Lockean free-thinking 
and free-speaking Englishman (Ramsay or Hume, presumably) against the arbiters of 
Augustan taste—i.e. Shaftesbury.152 According to Smart, “The central thesis—that 
taste cannot be measured or judged by any absolute standard, being merely a matter of
148 As Smart observed, Ramsay’s “unprecedented view of the ‘negative’ value of the classical ideal 
goes wholly against the accepted canons o f eighteenth-century aesthetics.... [As Reynolds] was to 
declare years later in his Fourth Discourse, ‘If a portrait-painter is desirous to raise and improve his 
subject, he has no other means than by approaching it to a general idea’. Ramsay’s Dialogue reflects 
an exact opposite viewpoint, which corresponds precisely to the new direction of his art.” (Smart, Allan 
Ramsay, p. 141) Consequently, there is marked intimacy and naturalness to Ramsay’s domestic 
interiors absent in Reynolds’s more dramatic settings. And yet, clearly Reynolds was not immune to 
his influence, as the intimate examples of Samuel Johnson and Laurence Sterne suggest. (Smart, Allan 
Ramsay, pp. 182-183). See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man of the Enlightenment, pp. 
141, 182-183,192-193.
149 As Smart observed, “Especially from the year 1754 onwards, the beauty of Ramsay’s portraits is the 
beauty of the particular....” (Smart, p. 141) He goes on: “In every sense his portrayals of his sitters 
have as little in common with the ideal generalizations of Reynolds as with the glancing brilliancies of 
Gainsborough.” He explains: “Ramsay’s concern for Truth is as much a leading feature of his art as of 
his Enlightenment philosophy, and it is only on exceedingly rare occasions that we may suspect any 
departure from his obedience, in his father’s phrase, to the ‘justice of the eye’.” See Smart, Allan 
Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the Enlightenment, pp. 141, 278.
150 Ramsay’s ideas may have been influenced by George Turnbull’s Treatise on Ancient Painting, 
which revised Shaftesbury’s more “heroic” and civic model into one more “social” and suited to the 
demands of a commercial society. See Solking, Painting for Money, pp. 171-172.
151 Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 139.
152 Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the Enlightenment, p. 139.
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• 153individual preference”—invokes a Lockean program of autonomous reasomng. In
fact, Ramsay’s ‘conversational’ style sat comfortably with his developing political 
and social opinions, which stressed tolerance and individual liberty.154 In these, he 
(once again) distinguishes his interests from those of Hogarth. Rejecting the notion of 
Magna Carta as the source of English liberty, and equating its ‘ancient’—i.e. ‘Gothic’ 
origins—with the absolutism and popery of a Catholic monarchy, Ramsay argued, 
instead, that English liberty owed its origins to subsequent reforms, notably those of 
the Glorious Revolution, and to William Hi’s ‘“being a Dutchman, and not.. .a 
philosopher...’.”155
Ramsay’s success in refining the conversational mode is suggested by its 
extensive influence. Until the late 1750s and the growing prominence of Reynolds— 
signaled by his role as first President of the Royal Academy and his influential 
institutionalization of an English “grand-manner”—, even the latter was affected, as 
Samuel Johnson (Fig. 5-6; 1756-1757; oil on canvas, 50-1/4 x 40 inches; National
153 Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 140. See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the 
Enlightenment, pp. 140-141.
134 Conveniently, Ramsay complemented his writings on taste with political essays. His best-known 
work, Essay on the English Constitution, published in 1765, was followed by his Thoughts on the 
Origin and Nature o f Government. Occasioned by the late Disputes between Great Britain and her 
American Colonies (1766; not published until 1769). Significantly, in Thoughts on the Origin and 
Nature o f Government, Ramsay defended Britain’s right to tax the colonies on grounds that the 
colonists were not Englishmen and, therefore, could not invoke the rights of other Englishmen. In 
general, Ramsay defended free thought and religion and opposed restrictions on non-Anglicans, 
arguing in his essay, On Ridicule (1753): “We can never be said to be altogether in that state of liberty 
and common sense, to which the constitution of this kingdom has been verging for this hundred years 
past, while there is any law in force to punish those who differ in opinion from their rulers in matters 
merely speculative.” (Ramsay, On Ridicule-, quoted in Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and 
Man of the Enlightenment, p. 99) For a further discussion o f his political views, see Smart, Allan 
Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man o f the Enlightenment, pp. 99,224,226,270-272.
153 Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 213. See Smart, Allan Ramsay: Painter, Essayist and Man of the 
Enlightenment, pp. 212-213.
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Portrait Gallery, London) suggests.156 Here, slouched in a boldly-checked, slip­
covered chair, lips slightly parted, left hand contorted in an awkward gesture, right- 
handed poised with quill, the mental giant seems caught mid-thought, while the
Fig. 5-6
spectator perches in anxious anticipation. All pretense at elegance is sidelined. 
Indeed, in an ironic twist, it seems to defy the Shaftesburian claim that “outward
156 While Reynolds’s style matured into a different direction, the significance of Ramsay’s theory may 
be generally underestimated. For example, “In Gainsborough’s case,” Smart writes, “the influence of 
Ramsay’s new manner may be said to have been more dramatic, since it occurred at the very moment 
when he was turning from the painting of exquisite conversation pieces (comparable with the work of 
Hayman) to full-scale portraiture. That decisive event in his artistic development has been illuminated 
by Hayes, who has demonstrated Gainsborough’s interest in the 1750s in Ramsay’s portrait style as a 
model worthy of emulation; and it is significant that Gainsborough adopted at the same time the kind of 
free brush work which Ramsay had learned from La Tour.” (Smart, p. 110) See Smart, Allan Ramsay: 
Painter, Essayist and Man o f the Enlightenment, pp. 110, 170,239,278.
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Manners and Deportment” parallel “inward Sentiments and PrinciplesA157 At the 
same time, it likewise suggests the sitter’s own form of heroism—what Wind 
describes as “a desperate struggle of the spirit to free itself from the shackles of the 
flesh.”158 And this makes it all the more intimate and revealing in a way unusual in 
Reynolds’s oeuvre, though peculiarly suited to the likes of Johnson, who, for all his 
support of heroic imagery, exclaimed: “He only will please long, who, by tempering 
the acid of satire with the sugar of civility, and allaying the heat of wit with the 
frigidity of humble chat, can make the true punch of conversation.”159
VIII. The Liberal Artist-Commoner
Ultimately, dissent from the civic humanist tradition was likely due to a 
modem gap between ideology and experience.160 As John Barrell has convincingly
137 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 121-122, and III, p. 179.
158 Wind, p. 11.
139 Samuel Johnson, “Punch and Conversation,” The Idler, II, 34 (London: Printed for J. Newbery, 
1761), p. 194.
160 In her analysis of Richardson, Gibson-Wood gives repeated emphasis to the influence of Locke. She 
writes: “It was the philosophy of John Locke, not Lord Shaftesbury, that most powerfully shaped 
Richardson’s thought, and which makes his divergences from the doctrines of both Shaftesbury and 
continental academic theory particularly significant. As Neal Wood [in The Politics o f Locke’s 
Philosophy (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1983)] has demonstrated, Locke’s writings, notably his Essay 
concerning Human Understanding o f 1690, were ‘a vehicle for the conveyance, of the values and 
sentiments, of the emergent bourgeoisie’. Its two central doctrines, of the empirical origins of 
knowledge (versus the presence of innate ideas) and the need to re-examine critically all beliefs based 
on authority and/or received opinion, both opposed the idea o f a ‘natural’ inequality and ruling order in 
society. Knowledge was acquired through experience and reflection; hence, actual ability was 
determined by education and environment, not birth, and this could partially be self-determined through 
industry and the practice of reason.” (Gibson-Wood, pp. 8-9) While I would not disagree with her 
overall evaluation of Richardson, her reading of Locke’s influence leaves her open to criticism.
As Laslett notes, Locke is often “called... the spokesman o f a rising class, the middle class, 
the capitalists, the bourgeoisie.... But at the same time Locke profoundly mistrusted commerce and 
commercial men... and though he approved the Bank of England, there is [a deep suspicion]... o f the 
capitalists who floated it.... [Moreover,] he despised medical men... [as] a profession and he shared 
Shaftesbury’s contempt for lawyers.” (Laslett, introduction, Two Treatises, pp. 55-56) Nonetheless, 
Locke was one of a rising “order of free individuals.... He is perhaps best described as an independent, 
free-moving intellectual, aware as others were not o f the direction o f social change. This is evident in 
the central issue of the Two Treatises, which is primarily concerned with the structure o f the family and
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argued, Reynolds’s version of the ‘general’ style made art the handmaiden of 
politics.161 But this very concern to defend and institutionalize grand-manner 
imagery signals unease. Under such circumstances, compromising variations on the 
general style suggest changing perceptions of reality and a growing uncertainty about 
the principles informing the classical narrative—notably, the universal ideal and its 
theoretical premise. A number of conditions converged to make this possible: a 
Reformed separation of the temporal and eternal spheres and its effected division 
between the internal and external self; a resulting elevation of the individual vis-a-vis 
society and an emphasis on self-determination that was augmented by empiricism and 
its endorsement of autonomous reasoning; the rhetoric of liberty invoked by 
Commonwealth Whigs, advanced by Harrington, assumed and modified by 
Restoration Whigs and revived through Patriot and republican ideologies; and, along 
with the development of commerce, the emergence of the marketplace as a sphere of 
engagement and authority distinct from the Assembly. Effected by these influences 
was the elevation of portrait painting and the portrait painter. Whereas Shaftesbury, 
like Aristotle, deemed an artist’s ability to render truth—and thereby advance the 
common good—to be necessarily conditioned upon his natural (birth-related) 
capacities—the proper measure of his progress towards potentiality—and, 
consequently, all but excluded the common-born painter from a liberal status, the 
ideological variations advanced by Richardson and others offered hope to the portrait
its relevance to social and political authority.” (Laslett, introduction, Two Treatises, p. 57.) See 
Gibson-Wood, pp. 5, 8-9, 153-154,230; Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 197; 
Laslett, introduction to Locke, Two Treatises, pp. 55-57.
161 See John Barrell, The Political Theory of Painting from Reynolds to Hazlitt, particularly his 
introduction, “A Republic of Taste,” pp. 1-68.
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painter. A common-born artisan bold enough to publish his own theories on art, 
Richardson insisted that the aptitude for producing a general style and, by extension, 
the aptitude for liberal knowledge, might be acquired through industry. He therefore 
implied that an ambitious commoner of any rank might raise himself to the level of a 
liberal man.
The implications of Richardson’s argument—and its legacy in the work of 
Ramsay and others—thus went beyond painting. Once a portrait painter could bridge 
the gap between a particular likeness and a ‘true’ one—once he could bridge the gap 
between cultivated reason and intellectual independence, private industry and public 
good—, on what grounds could one defend civic authority as the birthright of a 
landed elite? The principle of ‘improvement’ that informed Richardson’s ‘grace and 
greatness’ thus bore specific implications for narrative and identity. First, by 
transforming the portrait painter, for example, into an empirical scientist, one 
studying, recording and improving upon the evidence of human nature, Richardson 
invested him with the intellectual significance requisite to a liberal artist.162 In so 
doing, he placed portrait painting on a level with history painting.163 But he also 
removed the taint of commerce from the virtues of industry. Whereas Shaftesbury’s 
insistence on the “interest” of labor precluded the commoner from claiming 
“independence,” Richardson’s correlation between independence and industry denied 
the necessary link between industry and interest. In Richardson’s view, earning an
162 See Gibson-Wood, pp. 148, 169-172.
163 In fact, Richardson gives the edge to portrait painting. “Richardson’s account of grace and 
greatness in portraits registers his conviction that it is actually more difficult for the face painter than 
the history painter to succeed in this, the most honourable part of painting.” See Gibson-Wood, p. 171.
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honest wage to support oneself and one’s family was very different from being paid to 
represent someone’s interest—the bane of patronage. The former was virtuous as 
long as the individual remained autonomous, living by his own industry and his own 
conscience; the latter, by contrast, was always dependent and, so, always corrupt. 
Moreover, as Gibson-Wood explains: “What determines the honourableness or 
otherwise of an occupation is not the acceptance of money, but ‘the Kind, and Degree 
of Abilities’ required, and its usefulness to mankind.”164
Indeed, Gibson-Wood observes, Richardson’s novelty rests, in part, on his 
timely defense of the respectability of paid employment.165 This provided an 
ideological middle-ground between the disinterested leisure of civic humanism and 
the interested acquisitiveness of Mandevillean utilitarianism. On such grounds, 
successful commoners could construct a credible meaning of life suited to their 
experience and desired identities, to which end, Richardson asserted: “I hope it will
See Gibson-Wood, pp. 148-149.
1(0 He wrote: “But perhaps, tho’ for a Gentleman to paint for his Pleasure without any Reward is not 
unworthy of him, to make a Profession of, and take Money for his Labor of the Head and Hand is the 
dishonourable Circumstance, this being a sort of letting himself to Hire to whosoever will pay him for 
his Trouble. Very Well! And is it more unbecoming for a Man to employ himself, or be more Useful 
to his Family, or to whomsoever else he sees fit, than so as it shall turn to less account, or none at all? 
... if this has something Low and Servile in it, we ... have good Company, that is, all those that receive 
Money for the Exercise o f their Abilities o f Body or Mind.” (Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f  
Painting, pp. 31-32). As Gibson-Wood observes: “In Augustan England, especially in London, 
distinctions between the levels of the social hierarchy were becoming increasingly blurred. Many 
younger sons of country gentry were entering a profession or trade, and intermarrying with the 
middling classes, while members of the commercial classes like Richardson himself acquired the 
material trappings o f the gentry and sought to improve their family’s station by entering their sons into 
more genteel occupations. This confusion of the social ranks challenged accepted definitions of what 
constituted a gentleman, including the fact that gentlemen did not need to work for their income.” 
(Gibson-Wood, p. 148) See Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 31-32; Gibson- 
Wood, p. 148.
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appear that they may be placed amongst those whom all the World allow to be 
Gentlemen, or of Honourable Employments, or Professions.”166
Ultimately, although Richardson’s ideological commitment to classicism 
supported natural progress and a hierarchical social order based on intellectual and 
moral virtue, he stopped short of endorsing the landed interest, transforming the 
freeholder-citizen into the industrious commoner.167 In other words, Richardson 
aimed not to overthrow the dominant order or level the social hierarchy, but to expand 
its accessibility and the conditions upon which its privileges were said to depend—i.e.
from landed birth to educated industry. In the process, he asserted the individual’s
•  •  * 168 liberty—as an autonomous and self-determining subject—to attain potentiality.
While placing the burden for identity on the individual, he granted the opportunity for
social mobility through self-improvement, thereby making the virtues of classical
theory—and their manifestation in art—accessible to the common man.169
166 Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 33.
167 In other words, while Richardson continued to subscribe to an Aristotelian version of the ideal in 
nature and to the primacy of classicism in general, while his ideas about self-improvement, refinement, 
and politeness—the “Social Virtues”—were indebted to the theories of moral sentiment articulated by 
Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and others, while his vision of self-improvement stemmed from an 
understanding of a goodness or self-love that found happiness in contributing to the common good, 
while he deemed virtue and the common good complementary, Richardson’s omission of land as the 
basis o f virtue and good marked a significant departure from the civic humanist narrative. Richardson, 
Two Discourses, II, pp. 172- 173, 175-176; Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 364.
168 Richardson’s opinion of women and economically-dependent men precluded their autonomy and, 
hence, their participation in Lockean reason. See Gibson-Wood, pp. 39-40, 46, 49, 54.
169 By the same token, as Gibson-Wood remarks, “it is the private virtue of the artist, not the public 
virtue of the ruling elite that Richardson identifies as the source of England’s potential greatness in 
painting.” (Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 211-212; quoted in Gibson-Wood, p. 
173) “Richardson’s loathing of subservience re-emerges in two of the poems published in Morning 
Thoughts. In one he declares how glad he is to have escaped ‘curs’d dependence on another’s will’, to
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IX. Imag[in]ing Identity
Insofar as the mirror was both a metaphor and a tool for the construction of 
identity, it shared similarities with the portrait: both relied on the demand for likeness; 
both presented a ‘representative’ or ‘objective’ self for public view; and both 
transformed the ‘unrepresented’ self into a spectator. By the same token, while both 
mirrored and painted images invoked, at least in part, ‘received’ identities, both were 
likewise understood to present the spectator with an ‘improved’ interpretation of the 
subject—his physical features, values, beliefs, and allegiances.
Yet, portraits harbored a notable advantage. Whereas reflected images forced 
upon their subjects a likeness prescribed by the standards of an extant narrative, 
portraits presented—indeed, ‘imposed’—upon the spectator narrative standards 
conducive to a desired likeness. Hence, if one could not remove oneself entirely from 
the particularities of bad skin or an unfashionable house, one could mask them by 
generalizing flesh and adopting an imaginary setting, thereby visually emulating—and 
thus claiming right to—‘superior’ attributes or environments suited to a desired 
identity.170
The portrait’s ability to impede the influence of social contingencies thus gave 
it an edge in the negotiation for identity. Portraits had the ability not merely to record 
identity, but to shape and, therefore, to claim it—and hence to claim alternative 
identities. This meant that eighteenth-century portraits could assume for their sitters
which his son added the footnote, ‘Perhaps there never was a man who had a more rooted aversion to 
dependence’.” See Gibson-Wood, pp. 44-46, 72-73, 173, 184.
170 Indeed, as Baumeister notes, instead of subverting the individual to society, “Romantic writing 
emphasized the assertion of the individual self against society as never before.” (Baumeister, p. 65)
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identities that denied social convention, that trespassed on the privileges and 
responsibilities of others, that contested not only social prescription, but the 
ideologies that shaped them and (perhaps more compel lingly) the authority of those 
who formulated them. Controlling public perception of one’s attributes became a 
means by which to control one’s place in the social order. This reduced the sitter’s 
vulnerability to the spectator’s own interest and improved his defense against less 
desirable interpretations, thereby enhancing his balanee-of-power against the
171community o f ‘others’ invested in his image’s meaning.
On the one hand, then, portraits empowered their sitters in ways that reflected 
images could not; rather than obsessing over her daily ritual before the mirror, the 
Wicked Queen might have commissioned a portrait that presented her identity as 
“fairest of all,” perpetually laying claim to an otherwise contested title. On such 
grounds, it could be argued, whereas ‘reflected’ images should be understood within 
the context o f  the social sphere, ‘constructed’ images should be understood in
179response to the social sphere. On the other hand, the audience for portraits was not 
only larger than that for mirrored images, it was more heavily invested in the effected 
meaning; family and friends, neighbors and servants, tradesmen and colleagues, 
tenants and constituents: the audience of the portrait might include a broad cross-
And this had bearing on identity. “If the identity that society offered you was unacceptable, you battled 
to get society to offer you something better....” (Baumeister, p. 66) See Baumeister, pp. 65-66.
171 Patrick Coleman raises a similar point in “Property, politics, and personality in Rousseau,” in Early 
Modern Conceptions o f Property, John Brewer and Susan Staves, eds. (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1996), pp. 256-257.
172 According to Richard Brilliant, “Portraits reflect social realities. Their imagery combines the 
conventions of behaviour and appearance appropriate to the members of a society at a particular time, 
as defined by categories of age, gender, race, physical beauty, occupation, social and civic status, and 
class.” See Brilliant, Portraiture, p. 11. While this is true, it seems, too, that portraits “conceive” social
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section of the community, each of whom was implicated in the assessment of the 
sitter’s claims.
Highlighted by the writings of Haywood, Hobbes, Mandeville, and Hogarth is 
the degree to which eighteenth-century identity was a contest played out between rival 
parties mutually invested in a collective personality.17J Navigating contingencies 
became a contest of wit and influence in which the interests and identities of one or 
more parties became subordinate to the interests and identities of others—“in a 
word,” Rousseau writes, “there is competition and rivalry on one hand, conflicts of 
interest on the other, and always the hidden desire to gain an advantage at the expense
J
of other people.”174 Ultimately, this meant that, for all their freedom to manipulate 
the narrative context of identity, portraits could not protect the individual from public 
critique; portraits could advance the interests of their sitters and patrons by involving 
them in the construction process, but they could not protect them from the effects of 
competition: the success or failure of the image, and the credibility of its claims, 
turned on acceptance by the spectator.175 Indeed, as the very act of imag[in]ing 
identity suggested a need for social approval, so each new spectator presented a
realities, insofar as they wed individual perceptions of extant reality with a reality thought conducive to 
their social aspirations.
173 The collective identity or personality is used here to suggest the total social hierarchy to which a 
community o f individuals belongs. It is conceived as being divided into identity types that are assumed 
by individuals as manifestations of their ‘place’ or rank. The collective identity, then, is the cumulative 
total of all such ranks.
174 Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, p. 119.
n'J Indeed, Greg Dening uses the term “Closure” to distinguish the point at which the completed 
portrait becomes “the platform for somebody else’s critique.” (Dening, “Texts of Self,” p. 159) As 
Rousseau explained it, “social man lives always outside himself; he knows how to live only in the 
opinion of others, it is, so to speak, from their judgement alone that he derives the sense of his own 
existence.” (Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, p. 136) See Dening, “Texts of Self,” in Through a 
Glass Darkly: Reflections on Personal Identity in Early America, Hoffinan, Ronald, Mecha! Sobel, and 
Fredrika J. Teute, eds. (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of
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challenge to the sitter because each was necessarily interested in securing his own 
related identity.176
Hence, as more inclusive and fluid standards of identity freed the individual to 
assert himself, so competition grew increasingly fierce, perpetually suspending the 
attainment of a stable identity. By the same token, as individuals scrambled to 
assume the ‘polite’ attributes of their peers, Rousseau noted, “it soon became 
necessary either to have them or to feign them.”177 In the end, Rousseau concluded, 
“Being and appearance became two entirely different things.,.,”178 and identity 
became ever subject to re-negotiation.
Ultimately, aesthetic differences between Shaftesbury, Richardson, Hogarth, 
Ramsay, and Reynolds turned on their perception and reception of numerous 
contemporary developments: the mass commercialization of a previously agrarian 
society, which initiated a shift from individual to market relations, patronage to 
clientage, and the isolation of producer from consumer; the corresponding shift from 
independent/dependent (patron/ artisan) to interdependent (buyer and seller) relations; 
a shift in the balance-of-influence between political and economic forces; a 
consequent shift in emphasis from the political to social realm and, by extension, a 
blurring of civic and social authority; the resulting influence of more egalitarian and 
“conversational” (“plain-speaking,” commercial and polite) modes of interaction in
Early American History and Culture, 1997), p. 159; Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, p. 136; 
Brilliant, Portraiture, p. 14; Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 151.
176 As Bushman reminds us, “Provincials paid heed to the English upper classes... because so much 
power was focused in their persons... [;] they exercised that most compelling o f human authorities, the 
power to confirm identity.” See Bushman, Refinement o f America, p. 405.
177 Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, pp. 118-119.
178 Thus, he adds: “It was necessary in one’s own interest to seem to be other than one was in reality.” 
Rousseau, A Discourse on Inequality, pp. 118-119.
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the public sphere; the private nurturing of individual potentiality and autonomy—in 
complement with Reformed Christianity—and, hence, the perceived expansion of a 
‘middling sort’ distinct from the lower class in its economic autonomy, yet removed 
from the upper class in its economic interdependence; the growing recognition of 
differences between this middle class and the ‘vulgar’ masses; the elevation of the 
private man as the active agent in the social sphere and the consequent imposition of 
individual identity onto the public domain; the resulting tension between social— 
relative—and political—fixed—identities, as individuals assumed the authority of 
self-determination. Combined, these developments undermined the fixed and stable 
order fundamental to civic humanism. Increasingly, modifications to the classical 
narrative appear to have turned on a perception of liberty in which independence was 
the acquired privilege of self-sufficient intellectuals, merchants, and artisans—the 
modem freeholders of a commercial humanism. The implications of these 
developments were likewise felt in the American colonies.179
179 In his thirteenth Discourse, Reynolds drew a parallel between the slavish copying of the mechanic 
and barbarism and the truth-seeking of the liberal artist and civility. In this, he employed the example 
of the American colonies: “Painting .. .ought to be as far removed from the vulgar idea of imitation as 
the refined civilized state in which we live, is removed from a gross state of nature; and those who have 
not cultivated their imaginations... may be said... to continue in this state of nature. Such men will 
always prefer imitation to that excellence which is addressed to another faculty that they do not 
possess; but these are not the persons to whom a Painter is to look, any more than a judge of morals and 
manners ought to refer controverted points upon those subjects to the opinions of people taken from the 
banks of the Ohio, or from New Holland.” See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 232-233. It is worth 
noting that Reynolds has dismissed with the Shaftesburian definition of “imitation” in favor of one 
comparable to “mimicry.”
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CHAPTER VI
JOHN SINGLETON COPLEY’S MAJOR HUGH MONTGOMERIE
F i g ,  6 4
High against a turbulent backdrop of dark, billowing smoke, Major Hugh 
Montgomerie (Fig. 6-1; 1780; oil on canvas, 94-1/2 x 59-3/4 inches; Los Angeles
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County Museum of Art) of the 77th Regiment poses before his troops in a 
commanding posture. Right foot forward, left arm extended, right hand grasping his 
basket-hilted sword, Montgomerie rises above the fray, the tiered tassels of his 
leopard-skin sporran neatly keeping their line, while twelve feet of Black Watch 
tartan cascade in well-ordered pleats around him. Below his elevated position, a 
tangle of Indians on hands and knees make a last-ditch effort to thwart his soldiers’ 
pistols.1 Victory, for the Major, appears imminent.
This 1780 portrait by John Singleton Copley (173 8-1815)2 is a dialogue of 
contrasts: against the muted palette of the background, Montgomerie appears in clear,
1 Indians might be depicted as ignorant barbarians or ‘noble savages’. Reynolds’s thirteenth Discourse 
emphasized the barbarism of America. (See Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 232-233) But, ass 
Saunders writes, “We may also note the belief, common in the ancient world, that primitive man, being 
untouched by civilization, was morally ‘better’.” (Saunders, in Plato, Laws, p. 118) A similar position 
was held by Rousseau insofar as primitive man was uncorrupted by pride. See Reynolds, Discourses 
on Art, pp. 232-233; Saunders, introduction to Plato, Laws, p. 118; Plato, Laws, p. 122; Rousseau, 
Considerations on the Government o f Poland and Of the Social Contract, in Rousseau, The Social 
Contract and other later political writings, pp. 113-123,224-229.
2 Copley (1738-1815) was the son of Irishman Richard Copley and his wife, Mary Singleton Copley, 
who emigrated to Boston in 1735. Following the death of Richard Copley in the mid-1740s, Mary 
Copley remarried Peter Pelham in 1748, an artist-schoolmaster best known for his engravings. From 
Peter Pelham, Copley received his first artistic instruction. After Pelham’s death in 1751, Copley 
assumed a more professional stature, working largely from prints to produce his own mezzotints, 
portraits, historical pictures and miniatures. By 1763, he had set up his first studio. In 1765, Copley 
exhibited for the first time in London, sending his now-famous Boy with a Squirrel to the Society of 
Artists exhibition. The picture was well-received, and Copley was encouraged to exhibit regularly.
Copley married Susanna Clarke, the daughter o f the English-born merchant, Richard Clarke, 
in 1769. With war pending, he left his family in 1774 to study in London, Paris and Rome. By 1775 
he had settled in London and was joined by his family. The following year, he was made an Associate 
Member of the Royal Academy; he was granted full membership in 1779. Overall, Copley’s career 
was peppered with mixed reviews—the negative reception of The Copley Family (1777) and the 
Family o f George 7/7(1785) was balanced by absolute sensations like Watson and the Shark (1778) 
and The Siege o f Gibraltar (1791). By 1783, he was charging 100 guineas for a full-length portrait.
He died o f a stroke in 1815. For information about Copley and his work, see Werner Busch, “Copley, 
West, and the Tradition of European High Art,” in Gaehtgens and Iekstadt, eds., American Icons: 
Transatlantic Perspectives on Eighteenth- and Nineteenth-Century American Art (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press for the Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1992), pp. 35-59; 
Wayne Craven, Colonial American Portraiture: The Economic, Religious, Social, Cultural, 
Philosophical, Scientific, and Aesthetic Foundations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986); 
Emily Neff, John Singleton Copley in England (Houston, TX: Museum of Fine Arts, Houston, 1995); 
Jules Prown, John Singleton Copley, 2. vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1966); Carrie 
Rebora and Paul Staiti, et. al., John Singleton Copley in America (New York: The Metropolitan 
Museum of Art, distributed by Harry N. Abrams, 1995).
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bold color; against bare-skinned Native Americans, his rich ivory waistcoat, ruffled 
cuffs, bold red coat, and rhythmically-patterned plaid sing with the material richness 
of color and texture; against the frenzy of tomahawks, the zig-zag of smoldering 
flames, and the barely-contained tension of protruding muscles and outstretched 
fingers, Montgomerie stands erect, his balanced pose and authoritative gesture 
achieved with the grace of a dance master. Directing the actions—and, so, the 
opinions3—of his subordinates, Montgomerie’s posture and gesture suggest a 
classical vocabulary with civic humanist objectives.4 As Shaftesbury prescribed, the 
principal figure, set apart from his subordinates, unites the accoutrements of battle, 
the stance of the orator, and the self-restrained hero’s “Majesty and Superiority,” all 
in keeping with “Decorum.”5
The choice of military theme recalls the heroic virtue of the neo-Aristotelian 
Public Man; as a military Major, Montgomerie bears arms in defense of his state and 
inspires his inferiors to defend the common good. These neo-Aristotelian elements 
are complemented by Montgomerie’s landed status and corresponding leisure, the 
combination of which entitled him to claims of disinterested independence and 
positions of leadership. Such claims distinguished Montgomerie not only from the
3 As Shaftesbury explained it, “outward Manners and Deportment' parallel “inward Sentiments and 
Principles." See Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, 1, pp. 121-122, and III, p. 179.
4 Against earlier references to the Apollo Belvedere, recent research by David Mannings suggests that 
Montgomerie’s pose derives from a French bronze statuette of Apollo, after Legros. (Mannings, 
Reynolds, I, p. 288) Regardless o f its origins, the gesture served not so much to recall the original as to 
express the meaning the lifted feature had come to assume within contemporary visual conventions: 
the authority of the Public Man. See David Mannings, Sir Joshua Reynolds: A Complete Catalogue of 
his Paintings, 2 vols. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), p. 288; Neff, John 
Singleton Copley in England, p. 114.
3 As Shaftesbury described it, the principal figure “being plac’d in the middle... shou’d by a skilful 
Master be so drawn, as ... it shou’d appear by the very Turn... that this young Hero had not wholly 
quitted the balancing or pondering part.” (Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, III, p. 358) In Aristotelian 
terms, virtue was the harmonious balance or ‘mean’ between two extremes. Shaftesbury, 
Characteristicks, III, pp. 358, 361, 366.
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ignorant and uncivilized men who fall in a tangle around him, but from the line of 
dependents who rightfully follow their elevated commander.
Indeed, color, posture, gesture, accoutrements, composition: all serve to 
reaffirm a natural, hierarchical social order, from the impassioned physicality of the 
American ‘savages’ to the rational civility of the British Major. This is no 
coincidence. As Hobbes observed, the clearest means of establishing one’s own 
identity was by comparison with someone else’s.6 By subjecting the ‘other’ to a 
cultural narrative in which one’s own self assumed the defining role—in which one’s 
own interpretation of reality became the standard against which others were judged-, 
visual imagery provided a ready means by which to impose upon an ‘other’ those 
traits that best demonstrated—often through contrast—the attributes with which one 
wished to be identified.7 According to Homi K. Bhabha, this was a common practice 
of colonialism, which aimed to rationalize the superior identities of British colonizers 
by ‘fixing’ the rank of non-British ‘others’.8 Of course, the success of this 
undertaking was dependent upon two things: the audience’s belief in a ‘fixed’ natural 
order; and the credibility of the visual narrative.
In addition to illustrating the role of narrative in the imag[in]ing of identity, 
the portrait of Montgomerie is interesting for its Shaftesburian interpretation of the 
divided self. As a foil for articulating Montgomerie’s own progress towards a higher 
and more virtuous self, the savages represent the ‘undercharacters’ to Montgomerie’s
6 “For let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves as the highest Value they can,” Hobbes wrote, “yet 
their true Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.” See Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 151.
7 Pajaczkowska, “The ecstatic solace of culture: self, not-self and other; a psychoanalytic view,” in 
Steyn, ed., Other than identity: the subject, politics and art, p. 110.
8 He writes: “colonial discourse produces the colonised as a fixed reality which is at once an ‘other’ 
and yet entirely knowable and fixible....” See Homi K. Bhabha, “The other question,” Screen, 24 (6), 
Nov.-Dee. 1983, p. 23; quoted in Gange, “Beyond Identity? The Beyond in Beyond Japan,” in Steyn, 
ed., p. 209.
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‘Philosophical Hero’.9 As Shaftesbury might describe it: “In this, there were Two 
Faces which wou’d naturally present themselves to our view: One of them, like the 
commanding Genius, the Leader and C h i e f t h e  other like that rude, undisciplin’d 
and head-strong Creature, whom we our-selves in our natural Capacity most exactly 
resembled.”10
Significantly, Montgomerie commissioned this image twenty years after the 
depicted event, on the eve of what became his successful bid for Parliament.11 In this 
he followed the recommendations of Aristotle: “In political oratory there is least 
opening for narration; nobody can narrate what has not yet happened. If there is 
narration at all, it will be of past events, the recollection of which will help the hearers 
to make better plans for the fixture.”12 That Copley should render the now middle- 
aged man in the events of his youth signals Montgomerie’s particular interest in 
exploiting the correlation between military command and political leadership—
9 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 170, 185,195-196. Equally evident is Montgomerie’s superiority 
to his own troops, as indicated by his compositional placement above his soldiers, the stronger colors 
of his dress, and his commanding pose and gestures. Copley reiterates this superiority in the inferior 
placement of the spectator—it is as though we, too, numbered among Montgomerie’s soldiers.
10 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, p. 194.
11 Exhibited at the Royal Academy in 1780 as Portrait of a Highland Officer. Montgomerie is shown 
leading his uncle Archibald’s regiment (Montgomerie’s Highlanders) against the French and Indians in 
the Seven Years War (1756-1763). Archibald Montgomerie was the 11th Earl of Eglinton and it was to 
his title that Montgomerie succeeded in 1796. The son of Alexander Montgomerie of Coilsfield in 
Ayrshire, and his wife, Lilias Montgomerie, daughter of Sir Robert, 11th Baronet of Skelmorlie, Hugh 
Montgomerie joined the 77th Regiment in 1756 and was engaged in battle at Fort Ticonderoga, Fort 
Duquesne and elsewhere, earning a reputation for distinguished action, “in the destruction of the 
Cherokee Settlements...” (see Artist 1780, no. 172, p. 26; quoted in Neff, p. 116, fii. 12). He was 
repeatedly elected to Parliament as Member for Ayrshire between 1780 and 1796, when he assumed 
the title of 12th Earl of Eglinton. In 1806 he became a peer of Britain (as opposed to just Scotland), 
assuming the title Baron Ardrossan. See Emily Ballew Neff, John Singleton Copley in England, exh. 
cat. (London: The Museum of Fine Arts, Houston, in association with Merrell Holberton, 1995), p.
116, fit. 12; William L. Pressly, “The Challenge of New Horizons,” in Neff, p. 48. For a full summary 
of the portrait, see Neff, pp. 114-117.
12 Aristotle, The Rhetoric, in Corbett, p. 17. Unlike Plato, Aristotle emphasized the positive potential of 
rhetoric—notably, its endorsement of “good sense, good moral character, and goodwill.” See Aristotle, 
The Rhetoric, in Corbett, pp. 17, 91, 164; quoted from p. 91.
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patriotism and statesmanship—in the promotion of his public identity.13 Clearly, 
Copley and his patron felt the most effective means of conveying Montgomerie’s 
credibility as a political figure resided in his one-time identity as a military Major 
conquering a ‘savage’ people.
On the one hand, then, Copley presented Montgomerie as a detached, 
controlled and elevated figure—a member of the disinterested elite. On the other 
hand, he borrowed on the Aristotelian narrative of public action—a narrative that was 
supported and developed in the eighteenth century by Rousseau and the Scottish 
common-sense theorists—, thematically subverting the contemplative virtues of the 
philosopher to the heroic virtues of the patriotic statesman. Copley thus advanced a 
neo-Aristotelian social hierarchy descending in rank from the intellectually 
disinterested and socio-economically independent citizen-hero to the interested and 
dependent man.
Yet there is more to this image. Aristotelian pragmatism suggested that 
individual Public Men were motivated by honor to achieve virtue. An autonomous 
individual displayed his military abilities in the public arena and was consequently 
rewarded with public glory. Aristotle’s brand of heroism, then, required the overt 
display of courage—physical engagement with the enemy, for example. But 
Copley’s portrait balances this heroic attribute with the tempering influence of private 
contemplation. Although present in the field of battle, Montgomerie is not in the 
trenches, nor is he engaged in combat. Indeed, situated above the conflict,
13 As Lord Kames wrote, “Patriotism ... is the great bulwark of civil liberty.... Those actions only that 
flow from patriotism are deemed grand and heroic; and such actions, above all others, rouse a national 
spirit.” See Kames, The Rise and Fall o f Patriotism, in Broadie, pp. 522-523.
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Montgomerie’s sword appears more emblematic—suggestive of military authority— 
than aggressive, a point reinforced by his unlatched pistol.
Copley’s background reinforces this nod to contemplation. The parting 
smoke and glint of light that frame Montgomerie’s calm and intelligent face act to 
highlight his inner strength and intellectual prowess. While alluding, on the one 
hand, to his reasoning powers, this also suggests the influence of ‘internalization’—a 
departure from Aristotelian tradition. In the end, Copley’s emphasis appears not 
courage in pursuit of glory, but inner strength in pursuit of virtue—the conquest of 
barbarism by personal fortitude and public duty. While this, too, honored the agent 
and benefited the state, the shift in emphasis suggests Platonic modifications to the 
Aristotelian ethic. As Taylor writes: “Strength, firmness, resolution, control, these 
are the crucial qualities, a subset of the warrior-aristocratic virtues, but now 
internalized. They are not deployed in great deeds of military valour in public space, 
but rather in the inner domination of passion by thought. ...”14
Copley’s portrait illustrates the influence of internalization on the civic 
humanist narrative. The civic humanist commitment to heroic virtue was tempered 
by the internalization of moral rectitude and the consequent privileging of internal 
attributes as the primary mediums of common good. This suggests a perception of 
reality akin to that of either Shaftesbury or Smith—what Taylor calls a non-utilitarian 
blend of classical and Christian principles in which “dignity and esteem [are located]
14 Taylor, pp. 152-153.
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at the heart of... moral vision,” and external actions are perceived as the mirror of
internal sentiments.15
Ultimately, the shift in emphasis from glory to sympathy resulted in 
modifications to the definition of Public Man. On the premise that social 
benevolence was the medium of civic virtue, the act and appearance of benevolence 
assumed new relevance as a measure of one’s identity. Hence, virtue was submerged 
into a principle of politeness in which the appearance of social affection—symbolized 
by decorous dress, behavior and conversation—became the measure of one’s merit 
and social rank. In the case of Montgomerie, the resulting identity is that of a rational 
and moral man who risks his life in order to conquer—and thereby to reform—an 
infidel people for the common good.
By employing a Reformed, civic humanist narrative as the context for 
Montgomerie’s identity, by constructing a composition that positioned the viewer to 
receive Montgomerie as a public leader—we are before and beneath him—, Copley 
imposed upon his audience a cultural narrative that simultaneously urged their 
complicity in Montgomerie’s bid for a public status—a Member of Parliament— and 
perpetuated the ideology that made it legitimate. In other words, Copley 
simultaneously negotiated and imposed a specific identity and ideology for receipt by 
both sitter and spectator. By these means, he visually affirmed and advanced the 
credibility of Reformed civic humanism for a varied audience of contemporary 
Britons.
15 Taylor, p. 155. Whereas medieval Christians sought grace and salvation in the sacred sphere through 
a devotion to God and his ‘Word’, autonomous Reformed Christians sought salvation through 
obedience to moral laws active in the secular sphere. If the winning figure in orthodox dogma was the 
Christian hero, who sacrificed his life for the glory of God, the winning agent in Anglo-Protestant civic 
humanism was the civic hero, who sacrificed his interests for the common good.
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Fig. 6-2
A comparison of works by Copley, Reynolds, and others serves to highlight 
the ways in which classical vocabulary might be used—or not—to endorse civic 
humanist objectives. Visual precedent for Montgomerie can be found among works 
by Van Dyck—Mountjoy Blount, Earl o f Newport (Fig. 6-2; ca. 1637-38; oil on 
canvas, 85 x 51 inches; Yale Center for British Art, New Haven), for example, 
similarly blends the attributes of the citizen-soldier with those of the contemplative
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philosopher—as well as those by Copley’s slightly-older contemporaries, Allan 
Ramsay (1713-1784) and Sir Joshua Reynolds (1723-1792).16 Like Hugh
16 Sir Joshua Reynolds (1723-1792) was the son of a Devon schoolmaster. Apprenticed to Thomas 
Hudson from 1740-1743, he worked both in Devonshire and London between 1743-1749. As the 
guest of his patron and friend, Commodore Augustus Keppel, Reynolds traveled to Algiers, Port 
Mahon and Minorca en route to Italy in 1749 before settling in Rome from 1750-1752. There he 
studied the old masters, notably Titian and the Venetian colorists, before returning to London by way 
of Florence, Bologna, Parma, Mantua, Venice, and Paris in 1753. Settling permanently in London, 
Reynolds began painting his important portrait of Augustus Keppel, which became his catalyst to 
fashionable status. He set up a studio, employed assistants and exhibited regularly. In 1768, under the 
patronage of George III, he was selected the first President of the newly-established Royal Academy 
and knighted in 1769. Although he had previously published ideas on art in Samuel Johnson’s Idler 
(September-November, 1759), his career as president of the RA initiated a series of formal writings 
that significantly influenced subsequent art criticism. He continued to travel, making journeys through 
northern Europe in 1781 and 1785. By 1783, however, his eyesight had begun to suffer, and by 1791 
he was nearly blind. Following the death of Allan Ramsay in 1784, Reynolds was made Painter in 
Ordinary to the King. Despite a near-rupture with the RA, he continued in his capacity as President 
until his death in 1792. His experimentation with pigments and glazes has sadly resulted in the poor 
condition of many of his works. For more information about Reynolds and his work, see A. Asfour and 
P. Williamson, “On Reynolds’s use of de Piles, Locke and Hume in his Essays on Rubens and 
Gainsborough,” Journal o f the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 60 (1997) pp. 215-229; John Barrell, 
The Political Theory o f Painting from Reynolds to Hazlitt (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986); 
John Hayes, “Reflections on Reynolds at the Royal Academy: Two Hundred Years On,” Apollo 124 
(April 1986): 246-253; David Mannings, “Reynolds, Hogarth and Van Dyck,” The Burlington
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Montgomerie, Ramsay’s Norman, 22nd Chief o f MacLeod (Fig. 6-3; ca. 1747; oil on 
canvas, 88 x 54 inches; Collection of John MacLeod, Dunvegan Castle, Skye)17 and
fig, 6-4
Magazine, 126 November 1984), 689-690; David Mannings, Sir Joshua Reynolds: A Complete 
Catalogue o f his Paintings, 2 vols. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000); David 
Solkin, “Great Pictures or Great Men? Reynolds, Male Portraiture, and the Power of Art,” The Oxford 
Art Journal 9 (1986): 42-49; Nadia Tschemy, “Reynolds’s Streatham Portraits and the Art of Intimate 
Biography,” The Burlington Magazine 128 (1986): 4-11; James Northcote, Memoirs o f Sir Joshua 
Reynolds: Comprising original anecdotes of many distinguished persons, his contemporaries, and a 
brief analysis o f  his discourses. To which are added, varieties on art (London, 1813); Nicholas Penny, 
Reynolds, exh. cat. (London: Royal Academy of Arts, 1986); Sir Joshua Reynolds, Discourses on Art, 
Robert R. Wark, ed. (San Marino, CA, 1959); Sir Joshua Reynolds, “False Criticisms on Painting,” 
“Grand Stile of Painting,” and “The True Idea of Beauty,” in Samuel Johnson, The Idler, nos. 76,79, 
and 82,2 vols. (London: printed for J. Newbery, 1761), pp. 130-136,148-154, 165-173; Sir Joshua 
Reynolds, The Letters of Sir Joshua Reynolds, John Ingamells and John Edgcumbe, eds. (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2000); Richard Wendorf, Sir Joshua Reynolds: the Painter in Society 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, (1996), paperback ed. 1998).
17 According to Alastair Smart, “There can indeed be no real doubt that Reynolds’s great full-length of 
Commodore Augustus Keppel, probably painted in 1753..., was partly inspired by Ramsay’s 
composition,” a chalk copy of which he likely saw in Van Aken’s studio. See Smart, Allan Ramsay: 
Painter, p. 81.
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Reynolds’s John Murray, 4th Earl ofDunmore (Fig. 6-4; 1765; oil on canvas, 93-3/4 
x 57-3/4 inches; Scottish National Portrait Gallery, Edinburgh) belong to the ‘tartan’ 
tradition. However, comparison of Reynolds’s Dunmore portrait with Copley’s 
Montgomerie reveals some compelling differences.
Perhaps the most obvious similarity between Montgomerie and Dunmore is 
the theme of the tartaned figure in an austere landscape, and the most obvious 
difference the absence of battle in the image of Dunmore. But there are also more 
subtle similarities and differences. For example, there is far more movement in 
Copley’s image; the direction of Montgomerie’s gaze, his arms, and his stride all 
contribute to a criss-cross motion that echoes the action of the background figures and 
the zig-zag of ascending smoke. The Dunmore is decidedly quieter. The dark clouds 
that fracture the sky, the muted palette, the sparse vegetation and the shattered oak: 
these features give the image a doleful aspect not found in Copley’s Montgomerie. It 
is as though we face the same landscape, only after the battle, now wizened by its 
effects. While the small bits of blue that pepper Dunmore’s sky signal promise for 
the isolated figure, this landscape evokes a tension different from that of 
Montgomerie.
In fact, differences between Dunmore and Montgomerie suggest the disparate 
functions their respective landscapes served. In Montgomerie, the landscape 
assumed a narrative function, providing the venue for a historic military event in 
which the sitter participated. It was expressive only insofar as its technical devices 
heightened the drama of the event. The real tension derived from the physical contest 
between the men and their allegorical correlation with concepts of civilization and
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savagery. Indeed, more important than the physical setting was the relationship 
between Montgomerie, his soldiers, the Native Americans and the spectator. It was 
this human network, and its hierarchy of social relations, that earned for Montgomerie 
a civic persona.
Like Montgomerie, Dunmore served as an officer during the French and 
Indian War,18 but if the landscape he occupies was also intended to signify the 
American wilderness, its implications for the sitter’s identity were likely different.19 
Notice the way the clouds absorb the wisps of his hair, the earth absorbs his shadow, 
and the vegetation absorbs the colors of his kilt. By contrast, notice his upright 
bearing, his steady gait, and the easy cast of his head. Here, the landscape serves a 
psychological function; tension derives not from any physical action, but from the 
relationship between man and nature. Whereas Copley employed an inter-human 
relationship to convey Montgomerie’s identity, Reynolds employed an inner-human 
one. As a result, as a metaphor for the emotional and disordered state of nature, 
Reynolds’s landscape served as a foil for Dunmore’s reason, highlighting the 
intellectual domination of his natural, inner self. Inversely, it likewise alludes to the 
passions he controls. Ultimately, in other words, the landscape becomes not a passive 
recipient of human action, but a force with which Dunmore—and, more broadly,
Man—must contend.
18 John Murray, 4th Earl of Dunmore, was the son of William, the 3rd Earl (d. 1756), and his wife 
Catherine. In 1759 he married Lady Charlotte Stewart, daughter of the Earl of Galloway. In this 
portrait he wears the dress of the 3rd Regiment of Foot Guards, which he joined, according to the 
inscription on the lower left edge of the portrait, in 1755. He served as the unpopular Governor of 
Virginia in 1771. Sittings for the portrait are recorded by Reynolds in April of 1765, but the picture 
was never paid for; it was acquired by the family in the nineteenth century. See Mannings, Reynolds,
I, p. 347.
19 If it were intended to be the American wilderness, the success of the image is even more pointed. 
Dunmore’s confidence translates not merely as his successful subordination of passion to reason, but 
his successful subordination—metaphorically speaking—of Americans to Britons.
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Despite these contextual differences, both Copley and Reynolds depict Public 
Men. Both invoke the inner strength required for public rule. Two additional 
features mediate this intention: the use of ‘public’, military costumes; and the visual 
disengagement of subject from viewer. In Montgomerie, the viewer is forced into a 
position of passive subordination like a soldier awaiting command. In Dunmore, he 
is acknowledged not at all. And yet the success of both images necessarily depended 
upon the spectator. Copley, for one, relied upon the viewer to intellectualize the 
contrast between the well-heeled, calm, and slightly elevated Major and the un­
heeled, frantic and subordinate ‘others’. And he depended upon his audience’s ability 
to correlate that contrast with principles of social order: as rational and virtuous order 
descended from the reasoned rule of an independent and civilized elite, so chaos and 
corruption arose from the impassioned fists of savage masses. Dunmore is equally 
dependent, but in a different way. Dunmore’s self-absorption translates into an act of 
contemplation, the observation of which achieves two ends: by adopting the external 
gaze, Reynolds alludes to the Platonic gaze of the truth-seeking philosopher-king, 
transforming Dunmore, metaphorically-speaking, into a virtuous leader; at the same 
time, by compositionally subjecting the spectator to this act of contemplation, not 
only is the viewer made to receive Dunmore as a philosopher-ruler, he is prevented 
from engaging in his own act of contemplation and, hence, from assuming the role of 
philosopher-king himself.
There is precedent for such tactics. Take, for example, Thomas 
Gainsborough’s John Campbell, 4th Duke o f Argyll (Fig. 6-5; 1768; oil on canvas, 92-
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1/2 x 60-3/4 inches; Scottish National Portrait Gallery, Edinburgh).20 Standing full- 
length in peers’ robes ornamented by the Order of the Thistle, one hand bearing the
F l l »  <S»S
20 Thomas Gainsborough (1727-88) was bom at Sudbury, Suffolk, and attended Sudbury Grammar 
School. He began his studies in London in 1740 under the influence of Hubert Gravelot, the French 
engraver, and Francis Hayman (primarily at Hogarth’s St. Martin’s Lane Academy). His early works 
show the influence of seventeenth-century Dutch landscape painters. Following his return to Suffolk, 
ca. 1746 or 1748, he married Margaret Burr, the natural daughter of the Duke of Beaufort, whose 
annuity brought him some financial independence. Combining landscapes and portraits into 
diminutive conversation portraits, he painted for a local clientele until his move to Ipswich (1752- 
1759) and then Bath (1759-ca. 1774). Once in Bath, Gainsborough set up a highly fashionable portrait 
practice. He was also introduced to the works of Van Dyck hanging in west country homes.
Gainsborough began exhibiting in London in 1761 and was elected a founder-member of the 
RA in 1768. By 1774, when he settled in London permanently, he was enjoying a fashionable portrait 
career. A favorite of the Royal family, he was distinguished from Reynolds not only in temperament, 
but in practice, adopting a wholly individual style. He died in 1788, probably from cancer. For more 
information on Gainsborough and his work, see A. Asfour, and P. Williamson, “Splendid Imposition: 
Gainsborough, Berkeley, Hume,” Eighteenth-century Studies 31 (1998) pp. 403-432; D. Cherry and J. 
Harris, “Eighteenth-century Portraiture and the Seventeenth-century Past: Gainsborough and Van 
Dyck,” Art History 5 (September 1982): 287-309; Malcolm Cormack, The Paintings o f Thomas 
Gainsborough (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991); John Hayes, Thomas Gainsborough 
(London: Tate Gallery, 1980); Nicola Kalinsky, Gainsborough (London: Phaidon Press, 1995); 
Michael Rosenthal, The Art of Thomas Gainsborough: ‘a little business for the Eye ’ (New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press, 2000).
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baton of the Hereditary Master of the King’s Household, while the other rests on his
coronet, the Duke of Argyll presents himself as the consummate Public Man.21 The
tight curls of his powdered wig, the ermine of his cloak, the glint of metal and gold
threads, the sheen of velvet, silk and satin: this is a formal image of a man whose
material riches are intended as signifiers of his public, noble status. Even the
22placement of his feet is indicative of his ‘politeness’.
As in the case of Montgomerie and Dunmore, the setting reinforces 
Gainsborough’s intentions. Incorporating a classical arch in an undefined, liminal 
space—a popular emblem of noble greatness alternately characterized by a column 
and swag23—Gainsborough effected a sense of timelessness that both universalized 
his subject and distanced him from the particular and familiar spectator. As 
suggested by Harrington, classical and historical time were alternately understood as 
the spheres of ‘ancient’—the rule of reason—and ‘modem’—the rule of fortune— 
prudence.24 Moreover, like Montgomerie and Dunmore, Argyll assumes a 
disengaged gaze. By so detaching the sitter from the spectator, by so presenting him
as a contemplative member of the philosophical elite, Gainsborough forced the
21 John Campbell was a professional soldier who defended western Scotland during Prince Charles 
Edward Stewart’s campaign to restore his monarchy in 1745. A year later, he was named commander 
in Scotland. It was not until he was sixty-seven that he inherited the dukedom from his cousin. See 
Companion Guide to the Scottish National Portrait Gallery (Edinburgh: National Galleries of 
Scotland, 1999), p. 70.
22 Books like Nivelon’s The Rudiments o f Gentile Behaviour provided artists with stock poses—based 
on ancient gestures and classical dance “positions”—for the signifying of politeness. See Francis 
Nivelon, The Rudiments o f Genteel Behaviour (London: s.n., 1737).
2’ Walter Hippie, The Beautiful, The Sublime, & The Picturesque in Eighteenth-Century British 
Aesthetic Theory (Carbondale, IL: University o f Illinois Press, 1957), pp. 16, 18.
24 As already noted (see Chapter Three), whereas ancient prudence guarded against the corruptive 
forces of self-interested men through the balanced influence of three estates, whereas ‘ancient 
prudence’ ensured that all ‘independent’ commoners were granted the rights of citizenship supportive 
of “LIBERTAS”, ‘modem prudence’ (and its alternative government) was “an art whereby some man, 
or some few men, subject a city or a nation, and rale it according unto his or their private interest; 
which... may be said to be the empire of men and not o f laws.” (Harrington, The Commonwealth of 
Oceana, pp. 9-10) For a further discussion, see Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 9-10, 
43-53, 185-205, 241-244, 256-257.
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spectator, literally and metaphorically, to look up to him: to esteem him. Once again, 
compositional devices preclude the viewer from engaging in his own act of 
contemplation, thereby forcing him into a subordinate—private—position.
In general, the conventions employed by Copley, Reynolds and Gainsborough 
drew on a classical visual language that dominated Academic portrait-painting for 
most of the eighteenth century. This language included: the superior placement of the 
subject, achieved through an elevated composition and a disengaged gaze; the formal 
display of the figure, usually achieved by upright stature and public dress (be it noble, 
military, judicial or religious); the overt display of intellectual or rational powers, 
signaled by posture, gesture, or technical effects (light, for example); the inclusion of 
symbols or accoutrements referencing public service (these might be particular, as in 
political or military orders, or general, as in classical columns or swags); and the 
linking of the subject to a universal time-scheme through the symbolic manipulation 
of costume and/or setting.
But the language could be employed to varying ends. For example, the 
concern with a universal time-scheme seems to have eased as the eighteenth century 
wore on. Although classical costumes and settings continue to appear in eighteenth- 
century portraits, the use of ancient costume seems to have waned by mid-century. 
Even Shaftesbury conceded a modem dress: “Let his Garb and Action be of the more 
modish sort, in order to introduce him better, and gain him Audience” among his 
contemporaries, without yet forgetting that he enacts a role comparable to that of the
25ancients. By contrast, Reynolds defended the superiority of ancient dress for the
25 Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, I, pp. 204-205.
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general style.26 Ultimately, while the question of dress remained unsettled, the 
controversy itself suggested changing ideas about the importance of philosophical 
versus historical pursuits—the pursuit of universal truth versus the pursuit of civic 
good. For example, ‘acceptable’ modifications to the ‘Grand’ style included the 
substitution of official costume for classical dress, and landed property, the assembly, 
the battlefield, or the court for a classical liminal space.27 Copley’s Montgomerie 
may thus be understood as a “historical” variation on the “grand-style” type.
In fact, Copley’s image provides compelling evidence of the influence of 
modem ideas. Changes to Montgomerie during the course of the commission suggest 
he consciously opted for the historical style and a more active composition.
According to Emily Neff, Montgomerie’s original gesture served a didactic 
function;28 it indicated the events occurring behind the Major rather than guiding the 
actions of his unseen soldiers. One effect of this change was to demonstrate 
Montgomerie’s leadership abilities as opposed to merely alluding to them. But, 
without denying the allegorical reference to the battle between civilization and 
savagery that satisfied the demands of grand-style painting, it also served to locate 
Montgomerie in historical time. This shift in narrative emphasis—from allegorical 
reference to historical record—was a measure of Montgomerie's departure from more 
conservative agendas and, indeed, from the more contemplative and neo-Platonic 
Dunmore. Further comparisons between works by Copley, Reynolds and others
26 Reynolds, Discourse III, pp. 48-50; Wind, pp. 88-89.
21 Reynolds, Discourses on Art, pp. 57, 60, 88-89.
28 Neff writes: “In an earlier preparatory drawing, Copley positioned Montgomerie closer to the stance 
of the Apollo Belvedere, with an arm gesturing back into space, as if to display the background action. 
In a subsequent drawing and the finished painting, Copley sprang the figure into action by depicting 
him with his left arm stretched in front of him.” See Neff, John Singleton Copley in England, p. 114.
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suggest that such visual modifications were informed by important shifts in the social 
narrative.
F ig ,  6-6
Consider, for example, Commodore Augustus Keppel (Fig. 6-6; 1753-1754; 
oil on canvas, 94 x 58 inches; National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, England), 
produced by Reynolds more than a decade prior to the artist’s official endorsement of 
the academic Grand Style.29 Here, hand on sword hilt, the striding commodore
29 Augustus Keppel was the second son of William Anne Keppel, the second Earl of Albemarle, and 
Lady Anne Lennox. Between 1740 and 1744, he served as a midshipman on Commodore George 
Anson’s world voyage. In 1749, already a well-seasoned commodore, he transported Reynolds to Italy 
for the artist’s study. His illustrious career earned him the position of commander of the Channel fleet 
in 1778 during the War of American Independence. Sympathetic to the American cause, however, he 
was the target of a court-marshall brought on by his less competent second, Admiral Palliser, who
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ventures into the landscape, undeterred by potential hazards.30 Directing the action of 
his unseen attendants, Keppel’s pose and gesture seem to echo those of 
Montgomerie.31
According to David Mannings, the Keppel portrait served Reynolds like a
• 32diploma piece, marking the artist’s ascension into the ranks of professional painters. 
More intriguing, however, are the changes Reynolds made while the work was in 
progress.33 These changes transformed the piece from a conventional civic humanist 
icon into a dramatic, historical variation on the civic humanist type. Mannings 
writes:
Recent X-rays have confirmed that Reynolds originally placed Keppel slightly 
further to the left against a classical column... with his head at a different 
angle.. .lit from the left.... [This first effort] was taken to an advanced stage 
of completion before the artist decided that the effect was wrong and 
reworked the entire passage, altering the position of the hands at the same 
time and overpainting the column with a stormy coastal view.34
employed this tactic as a means of retaliation for blame that was accumulating to himself. Acquitted of 
all charges, Keppel retired from his military duties in 1780 and entered Parliament as a Member for 
Surrey. In 1782 he was made a viscount and served briefly as First Lord of the Admiralty during the 
Rockingham administration. See Mannings, Reynolds, I, pp. 287-288; Treasure, Who’s Who in Early 
Hanoverian Britain (London: Shepheard-Walwyn Ltd., 1992), p. 284.
j0 According to Northcote, a studio assistant to Reynolds, this is the coast o f Brittany where Keppel 
and his crew were temporarily shipwrecked while in pursuit of a French privateer in 1747. Mannings, 
Reynolds, I, p. 288
31 The pose of the striding, downward-gesturing Commodore Augustus Keppel (1753-1754) was 
compared by Ellis Waterhouse with the earlier tartan portrait, Norman, 22 Chief o f MacLeod (ca. 
1747) by Allan Ramsay, the latter of which was noted as a possible source (Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 
288). He later dismissed this claim as an impossibility. Alistair Smart restored the point on grounds of 
a chalk drawing of MacLeod by Joseph Vanhaecken located in Vanhaecken’s studio. This drawing 
was thought by Smart to have informed both Keppel and Thomas Hudson’s Charles Douglass. (Smart, 
Allan Ramsay, 1992, pp. 112-113; also cited by David Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 288) See Smart, Allan 
Ramsay, pp. 112-113; Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 288.
32 As one writer recalled in 1794, it was “the first thing that distinguished him after his return to his 
native country” and was the catalyst for his subsequent rise to fame. (Edmond Malone(?), The 
European Magazine and London Review, Feb. 1794, p. 91; quoted in David Mannings, p. 287) In his 
1797 essay for Reynolds’s Works, Malone noted that the portrait o f Keppel “attracted the publick 
notice” and positioned Reynolds to become “the greatest painter that England had seen since 
Vandyck.” (Quoted in Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 288) See Mannings, Reynolds, I, pp. 287-288.
j3 Davies writes: “’With this picture, says Farington, in his Memoir o f Reynolds published in 1819, ‘he 
took great pains; for it was observed at the time that after several sittings he defaced is work and began 
again’.” Quoted in Davies, Reynolds, pp. 20-21.
34 Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 288.
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What was Reynolds thinking when he dismissed the traditional column for the rugged 
landscape? What prevented him from employing—as he later did in Frederick 
Howard, 5th Earl o f Carlisle (Fig. 6-7; 1769; oil on canvas, 94-7/8 x 59 inches; Castle 
Howard Collection, Yorkshire, England)—the classical emblems with which his 
audience was familiar?
Fig. 6-7
Lifelong friends of Reynolds,35 both Keppel (1725-1786) and Howard (1748- 
1825) were noble-born. Against KeppePs “second-son” military career, however, 
Howard was a “first-born” politician: the eldest son of the 4th Earl of Carlisle, he held 
the title of Lord Morpeth until he succeeded his father as the fifth earl in 1758; from
35 In fact, Howard was a pall-bearer at Reynolds’s funeral. See Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 265.
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1780-1782, he served as Lord-Lieutenant of Ireland. Here, a similar stride, posture, 
gesture and gaze—even a comparably monochromatic color scheme—are employed.
• 36Although military dress is replaced by robes signifying the Order of the Thistle, the 
effect is essentially the same: the donning of official uniform by a public man. What 
makes the comparison so striking is the difference in their settings.37
While the Aristotelian ethic acknowledged both the battlefield—patriotism— 
and the assembly—statesmanship—as proper venues for the exercise of virtue, the 
display of public virtue in the battlefield was obviously different from that of the 
assembly. By the same token, neither image gives particular attention to an actual 
battle or an actual assembly. Indeed, that Reynolds opted for a classicized liminal 
space in the image of Howard suggests that his ideal of statesmanship transcended 
historical time and, hence, that it was more theoretical than particular.
While the decision to modify Keppel seems, on first view, to contradict the 
grand-manner prescriptions of his later Discourses, the changes actually represented 
modem variations on the civic humanist model. In the case of Dunmore and Keppel, 
for example, if not for Montgomerie, the landscape is notably sublime.3* In 
referencing the sublimity of nature—in presenting its rugged, impassioned force—, 
Reynolds only revised the context of greatness with which his sitters were identified. 
According to Walter Hippie, the sublime was representative of “the great,” appealing
36 Howard assumed this honor in 1768. See Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 266.
37 A setting which John Woodward aptly termed “in the manner of Veronese.” See exhibition 
catalogue, Birmingham, 1961, no. 45; quoted in Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 266.
38 “Indeed, the ‘tempestuous sea and stormy shore’ in the background were cited by Henry Fuseli as an 
example of that favourite aesthetic category of the later eighteenth century, the Sublime... See 
Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 288.
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to the spectator’s “higher faculties” of “genius and imagination.”39 This squared with 
Reynolds’s demands for the grand-style image.40
Still, that Montgomerie, Dunmore and Keppel all employ natural 
environments instead of classical spaces and, consequently, locate their sitters in 
historic time is compelling, for it suggests that Reynolds (and/or his sitter) was less 
concerned with the issue of timelessness than with attributes of publicness. This shift 
in emphasis may well reflect an urgent desire to reclaim for the Public Man a 
contemporary significance—and, hence, continued viability—in the face of dissenting 
political trends. In other words, it may signal a contemporary movement to restore 
the classically-defined aristocrat to his ‘rightful’ place.
What, then, of the country landscape? James Latham’s provincial portrait, 
Charles Tottenham (Fig. 6-8; 1731; oil on canvas, 87 x 57 inches; National Gallery of 
Ireland, Dublin), suggests the pervasive use of classical architectural motifs as a 
means of affiliating the sitter with the discourse of civic humanism: the sitter’s 
identity is correlated with a classical social order informed by Aristotelian civic 
leadership symbolically conveyed by the ‘pillar-of-the-community’ metaphor. And 
yet consider the differences between Tottenham and Howard. Reynolds’s image 
engages the sitter in an Italian forum, garbed in his noble robes, instructing the 
spectator who stands beneath him, passively observing his intellectual contemplation.
39 Hippie, pp. 142-143.
40 Though often conveyed by way of classical (noble) architecture, the “great” could also be conveyed 
through “the sublime.” Hugh Blair argued, for example, that the “sublime... produces ‘an effect 
extremely similar to what is produced by the view of grand objects in nature; filling the mind with 
admiration, and elevating it above itself.” (Blair, quoted in Hippie, p. 126) As Hippie observes, ‘“It 
must be remembered’, says Reynolds, ‘that this great style itself... presupposes in the spectator a 
cultivated ... state of mind.” (Hippie, p. 144) For Reynolds, then, “It is an absurdity... to suppose that 
we are bom with this taste, though we are with the seeds o f it, which, by the heat and kindly influence 
of... genius, may be ripened in us’.” (Reynolds, quoted in Hippie, p. 144) See Hippie, pp. 16,18,71- 
72, 126, 144.
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By contrast, Tottenham is depicted in a private, domestic setting, his boots and crop 
suggestive of leisurely country pursuits. Moreover, Tottenham engages the spectator 
with his gaze; he meets him, literally and figuratively, on the same level.
The everyday clothes, the polite doff of the cap, the engaged eyes: these 
elements suggest a more informal and egalitarian relationship between subject and 
spectator, a relationship conditioned by conversational rather than courtly models of 
behavior. There is no evidence of the philosophical contemplation that subordinated 
Reynolds’s spectator to his sitter. Indeed, emphasis has shifted from intellect to land. 
Certainly, property was assumed to undergird all civic humanist prescriptions for a 
public man—it was the foundation of independence, both intellectual and
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socioeconomic. But by emphasizing property—and more specifically land—Latham 
drew attention to precisely that element of neo-Aristotelian ideology forging a rift 
among civic humanists—and precisely that element missing in the other portraits. 
Indeed, we confront here two different visions of the public man: the aristocrat whose 
birth isolates him from the people and invests him with the intellectual virtues of 
independence and disinterest; and the landed gentleman whose property invests him 
in the good of the state and its people. In other words, against the neo-Country 
directives of Shaftesburian civic humanism, Latham invokes a Harringtonian 
‘Country’ principle: that the land itself is the foundation of public virtue. Tottenham 
becomes the visual translation of Fielding’s ‘Squire Allworthy’, and one is compelled 
to ask: in the absence of title, amidst expanding definitions of property and the 
commodification of land, how was the squire to assert his virtue?
On the one hand, then, an artist might revise the civic humanist model without 
radically altering its civic humanist objectives: informal poses might replace formal 
ones; public spaces might replace classical ones; sublime landscapes might replace 
classical architecture. On the other hand, however, selective manipulation of civic 
humanist conventions might likewise work to the detriment of its narrative. If, for 
example, classical accoutrements imbued the sitter with a public stature, as they did, 
for example, in the 4th Duke o f Argyll, or invoked attributes affiliated with the landed 
nobility, as they did in the 5th Earl o f Carlisle, even among aristocratic women—as 
suggested, for example, by Reynolds’s Georgiana, Duchess o f Devonshire (Fig. 6-9; 
ca. 1775-1776; oil on canvas, 94-1/4 x 58-1/16 inches; Huntington Library, Art 
Gallery and Botanical Gardens, San Marino, California)—, what of portraits of
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Fig, 6-9
com m oners and merchants, two ‘private’ types that went largely unrecognized in the 
public discourse of civic humanism? What, for example, were the implications 
attendant Copley’s companion portraits of Mr. and Mrs. Jeremiah Lee (Figs. 6-10, 6- 
11; 1769; oil on canvas, 95 x 59 inches (each); Wadsworth Atheneum, Hartford)? 
Whereas Georgiana Spencer was the daughter of John Spencer, the 1st Earl Spencer, 
and the wife of William Cavendish, the 5th Duke of Devonshire, and might therefore 
claim title to the noble—if female—attributes affiliated with a classical setting, 
Martha Swett Lee was the daughter and wife of colonial merchants John Swett and
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Jeremiah Lee. As such, she bore no claim either to the classical attributes accorded 
aristocratic birth or the public virtues accorded heroic actions. Similarly,
Fig* WO Fig* M l
although Jeremiah Lee served as justice of the peace, he was neither noble-born nor 
landed—indeed, the son of a merchant, he was a radical Whig.41 The images thus 
represent a rather paradoxical conflation of ideological elements—public and private, 
traditional and modem, exclusive and inclusive, Country and Court.
That civic humanist emblems were employed by individuals like the Lees, 
whose social place was a byproduct of money rather than land, suggests that they had 
evolved to assume an alternative meaning for their colonial contemporaries. As
41 Prown, John Singleton Copley, pp. 109; Paul Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, et al, John Singleton 
Copley in America, pp. 258-262.
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symbols of certain ‘qualities’ traditionally associated with the aristocracy—those of 
character, Taste, intellect, and land, for example—, they were understandably 
desirable to a broader audience, but they were also clearly thought to be more readily 
accessible. Patrons like the Lees—and artists like Copley—evidently felt safe in 
assimilating these symbols into their portraits and, by extension, in claiming their 
signified attributes as aspects of their identities. This is compelling, for it suggests 
that, at least in the American colonies, private individuals felt free to claim those 
virtues traditionally denied them by the civic humanist narrative. The question 
naturally arises, then: to what further ends was the language and meaning of civic 
humanism modified? Might not the same individuals have felt free to assume the 
corresponding privileges of those attributes: the social rank and political authority of 
the landed elite?
A conventional vocabulary of postures, gestures, costumes, poses, gazes, and 
settings provided a visual language from which artists might draw in the construction 
of portrait identities. How the artist employed that language—what he chose to say— 
was up to him, but the resulting identity necessarily implied a supporting ideology. In 
general, modifications to the civic humanist portrait suggest the coexistence of 
various standards and narratives, thereby suggesting the coexistence of alternative 
perceptions of reality.
This paper has proposed that the eighteenth-century portrait functioned, at 
least in part, to locate its subject—and secure his place—within a larger community. 
Portraits thus serve, at least in part, as evidence of the standards informing 
contemporary identity and the narrative context within which those standards
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assumed meaning.42 That portraiture witnessed an eighteenth-century boom among 
the upper and middle classes is thus compelling.43 On the one hand, if limited control 
over a changing cultural narrative was one disadvantage facing the individual, 
portraits provided a ready answer: they presented their patrons with the power to 
construct cultural narratives supportive of specific standards and identities suited to a 
desired identity. By participating in the construction of his own narrative context, a 
patron helped to stage the interpretive framework within which his identity was 
judged. On the other hand, the deconstruction of portraits might thus advance our 
understanding of the values, beliefs and aspirations informing the imag[in]ing of 
identity in eighteenth-century Britain and, more particularly, colonial America.
42 As Locke aptly—if inelegantly—noted: “the way to discover something’s nature is to find out what 
standard governs identity judgments about it.” Quoted in Canfield, The Looking-Glass Self, p. 99.
43 The quantity and availability of portraits was argued by Carol Gibson-Wood in “Furnishing with 
Faces,” talk delivered at The Huntington/ The Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art 
Conference, Facing the Eighteenth Century: New Approaches to British Portraiture, October 25, 2002.
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CHAPTER VII 
FACING INDEPENDENCE
Fig, 74
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A quarter-century prior to Major Hugh Montgomerie, when still only 
dreaming of a future in the metropolis, Copley hinted at his grand-style aspirations in 
one of the most brow-raising images of colonial American origin. Standing before an 
architectural landscape of balustraded Romanesque arches regimented by Doric- 
topped pilasters and graced by classical figures in ancient dress, Nathaniel Sparhawk 
(Fig. 7-1; 1764; oil on canvas, 90 x 57-1/2 inches; Museum of Fine Arts, Boston) 
occupies a liminal position on the landing of a classical portico, his figure a human 
plinth to the fluted column that rises from his shoulders. One might presume from 
this interlude that Sparhawk is a pillar of the realm—itself a general and universal 
space. And the suggestion is supported by other aspects of the image. For example, a 
grand powdered wig boasts fashionable curls that cascade in a whisper behind his 
coral velvet suit. Moreover, while the bent knee, jutting hip, and casual placement of 
arms and hands—one resting across a columned plinth, the other suspended from his 
right pocket—suggest the informal stature of a man “at ease,” so the placement of his 
feet recalls the open “third” position of a dance master. The civic humanist 
undertones of the classical landscape are thus augmented by a “conversational” 
attitude reminiscent of Shaftesbury. And one is tempted to read in Copley’s grand- 
manner portrait a colonial interest in—and support for—a neo-Country narrative and 
identity.1
Although Reynolds had yet to formulate the academic model for the British 
grand-style portrait, the manner was well-documented in continental imagery, 
allusions to which were resonant in Richardson’s writings as well as the public
1 Carol Troyen alludes to this when she writes: “the resulting work brought a new level of grace and 
informality to an august Grand Manner formula.” See Troyen, “John Singleton Copley and the Grand 
Manner: Colonel Nathaniel Sparhawk,” Journal o f the Museum ofFine Arts, Boston, 1 (1989), p. 97.
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images and retail prints that found their way to the colonies. It was already apparent, 
for example, in the work of John Smibert and Robert Feke, two colonial painters 
whose heroic portraits honoring the victors at Louisbourg (1745) were likely familiar 
to Copley.2 Indeed, while Reynolds’s Discourses, which codified and modified into 
an aesthetic framework many of the ideological tenets informing Shaftesbury’s 
narrative, became the English model for grand-manner painting, one could also argue 
that the Discourses represented a reactionary response to alternative models and 
narratives and the need to snuff their growing influence. This possibility returns us to 
the portrait of Sparhawk.
Fig, 74 Fig, 74
Unlike Copley’s portrait Major Hugh Montgomerie (Fig. 6-1), and his later, 
even grander, George John, Second Earl Spencer (Fig. 7-2; 1799-1806; oil on canvas,
2 Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, p. 204.
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104 x 67 inches; Collection of the 9th Earl Spencer)—itself an echo of Reynolds’s 
William Augustus, Duke o f Cumberland (Fig. 7-3; 1758; oil on canvas, 100 x 74-3/4 
inches; The Devonshire Collection, Chatsworth House Trust, Derbyshire)—, 
Sparhawk records (however inadvertently) elements inconsistent with grand-manner 
convention. On the one hand, Sparhawk suffers from an inelegance of features: an 
expansive forehead crowns small brown eyes, bulbous nose, thin upper lip, and 
plump chin. This suggests the privileging of likeness over grace for which Ramsay 
criticized Addison.3 But it also recalls contemporary literary descriptions of self-made
4men.
In Frances Burney’s Camilla (1796), a retired wig-maker, Mr. Dubster,
presumes the stature of a country gentleman on grounds of money alone.
Subsequently, he is unable to disguise his natural meanness. For all his pretensions,
Camilla can identity Mr. Dubster by his “language and... voice,” through which, “no
longer stiff, starched, and proud, as when full dressed, [he] was sunk into the smallest
significance.”5 When asked to identify himself by an Irish officer (Macdersey) of
“ancient and respectable” family, Dubster replies:
“Who am I, sir? I am a gentleman, if you must needs know.”
“A gentleman! who made you so?!”
‘“Who made me so? why leaving off business! What would you have 
make me so?”6
3 Ramsay criticized Addison, “for ‘not establishing a constant attachment to Truth as the leading and 
inseparable principle of all... works of art’.... ‘The agreeable.. [Ramsay] insists, ‘cannot be 
separated from the exact; and the posture, in a painting, must be a just resemblance of what is graceful 
in nature, before it can hope to be esteem’d graceful'." Ramsay, “On Ridicule,” 1753; quoted in 
Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 100.
4 What Clarissa Harlowe calls “the upstart man” in reference to Mr. Solmes. See Samuel Richardson, 
Clarissa, or the History o f a Young Lady (1747-1748), Angus Ross, ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 
1985), p. 81.
5 Burney, Camilla, pp. 276-277.
6 Burney, Camilla, p. 431.
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To this interchange he later adds: “I’m turned gentleman myself, now, as much as the 
best of ‘em; for I’ve nothing to do, but just what I choose.”7
Not only has Dubster confused money with birth, he has confused idleness 
with leisure, play with improvement, a point confirmed by his “slow and solemn” 
literal thinking; on being called “a little dirty fellow,” he exclaims: “If I’m little or 
big, I don’t see that it’s any business of his. And as to dirty, I’d put on all clean linen 
but the very day before....”8 Mr. Briggs, of Burney’s Cecilia (1782), likewise 
highlights the nuances of politeness that distinguished the gentleman of birth from the 
monied commoner. A “short, thick, sturdy man with very small keen black eyes, a 
square face, a dark complection, and a snub nose,” he removed his wig and wiped his 
head in the public company of “gentlefolk” to their “universal horrour.”9
In fact, the contrast between the polite gentleman and monied commoner 
illustrates the narrative dissonance between the classical premise of the neo-Country 
identity and the English premise of its Country cousin. Against the lean elegance of 
Macdersey, Briggs is short and sturdy, against the former’s “conversational” 
pastimes—women, wine, hunting, gambling and a natural “disdain” for money—, 
Dubster tauts “beef steaks and onions” at “the Globe,” a direct allusion to his English 
and mercantile identity.10 Moreover, whereas gentlemen (Shaftesbury) equated 
politeness with the external evidence of internal virtue, commoners, Burney suggests, 
equated it with a mode of consumption—“a round of toast and butter and a few
7 Burney, Camilla, p. 478.
8 Burney, Camilla, pp. 431,470.
9 Burney, Cecilia, pp. 94, 324.
10 Burney, Camilla, pp. 281,479-480. As Adam Smith likewise noted, “A merchant, it has been said 
very properly, is not necessarily the citizen of any particular country. It is in a great measure 
indifferent to him from what place he carries on his trade.” See Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 519.
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oysters, fresh opened....”11 Finally, whereas Macdersey embraces a code of honor, 
Dubster invokes the rule of law—the former a celebration of individual discipline, the 
latter a supplement for its absence.12 Ultimately, the contrast effects two value 
systems, one based on birth (family/ name), education (abstract thought), leisure, 
honor, rank, and politeness (of language and behavior), the other on money, training
13(literal/ pragmatic thinking), play (work), law, equality, and freedom.
In Sparhawk, the “common” absence of natural grace—in Ramsay’s sense of 
absent elegance—is compounded by an egalitarian address. Contrary to 
Montgomerie, Spencer, Dunmore and Argyll, Sparhawk engages the viewer’s gaze. 
Indeed, insofar as his gaze demands reciprocity from the viewer, the spectator’s role 
is an active, intellectual one. For all the grandeur of setting, accoutrements, costume 
and stance, the subject does not presume to subordinate the spectator, but rather to 
impress him with material riches and social polish. This urge to impress implies a 
vulnerability not found in grand-manner imagery. It also presumes the viewer’s 
capacity for judgment.14 The suggestion of interdependence is further affirmed by 
optical differences. Copley’s failure to achieve the convex illusionism by which 
Montgomerie and Dunmore are visually ‘elevated’, becomes a measure of
11 Burney, Cecilia, p. 745.
12 Burney, Camilla, p. 433-434.
13 For a literary exemplar of this dichotomy, see Burney, Cecilia, pp. xxiv-xxv, 118, 186,409-410,
431, 659, 745-746, 883-884. As Clarissa Harlowe explains in a letter to her brother, “the principal end 
of a young gentleman’s education at the university is to learn him to reason justly, and to subdue the 
violence of his passions.” See Richardson, Clarissa, p. 137.
14 This, Skinner notes, was a key component o f the commercial ethic, which turned on the reciprocity 
of social relations. “It is precisely because the individual regards the opinions of the spectator as 
important,” he writes, “and because he seeks approval, that he imposes upon himself a degree of 
restraint or self-command.... ” (Skinner, in Smith, pp. 20-21) As Pocock likewise observes: “Once 
property was seen to have a consensual value, expressed in coin or in credit, the foundations of  
personality themselves appeared imaginary or at best consensual: the individual could exist, even in his 
own sight, only at the fluctuating value imposed upon him by his fellows....” (Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 464) See Skinner, in Smith, Wealth of Nations, pp. 20-21; Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 464.
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Sparhawk’s distance from their superior rank. And, indeed, Sparhawk was not a 
member of the landed elite.15 In fact, the tradition of a landed elite cast in formal 
dress, graced with classical accoutrements and distinguished by references to landed 
stature, a tradition that surfaced as early as the Renaissance—as demonstrated by 
Robert Peake’s Henry, Prince o f Wales (Fig. 7-4; ca. 1611-1612; oil on canvas, 68 x 
44-3/4 inches; National Portrait Gallery, London)—has undergone a paradoxical twist 
in the hands of the colonial painter.
Fig. 7-4
15 As Troyen notes, Sparhawk was the son of a Bristol, Rhode Island minister whose death altered the 
course of Sparhawk’s career. Following his mother’s remarriage to a Boston merchant, the path to 
Harvard veered to his stepfather’s countinghouse. Prosperity won him the hand of Elizabeth 
Pepperrell and her significant family connections. However, in 1758, a lag in business and increased 
taxes combined to effect his financial ruin. It wasn’t until 1759, when his father-in-law died, that 
Sparhawk’s circumstances were restored. See Troyen, “John Singleton Copley and the Grand 
Manner,” p. 99.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
238
Nathaniel Sparhawk (1715-1776) was forty-nine when this portrait was
painted. A resident of Kittery, Maine, he earned his keep through a successful trade
in wood and molasses.16 But Sparhawk’s greatest socioeconomic leap came upon his
marriage to Elizabeth, daughter of Sir William Pepperell. The death of Sir William in
1759 won Sparhawk a substantial estate and propelled him into the ranks of the
colonial social and political elite.17 By 1764, when this image was painted, Sparhawk
was comfortably ensconced in Sparhawk Hall, his colonial counterpart to the English
estate. One is reminded of Adam Smith’s subsequent insight (1776):
In our North American colonies, where uncultivated land is still to be had 
upon easy terms, no manufacturers for distant sale have ever yet been 
established.... When an artificer has acquired a little more stock than is 
necessary..., he does not... attempt to establish with it a manufacture for more 
distant sale, but employs it in the purchase and improvement of uncultivated 
land. From artificer he becomes planter, and neither the large wages nor the 
easy subsistence which that country affords to artificers can bribe him rather 
to work for other people than for himself. He feels that an artificer is the 
servant of his customers...; but that a planter who cultivates his own land, and 
derives his necessary subsistence from the labour of his own family, is really a 
master, and independent of all the world.18
Copley was not the first to subject grand-manner conventions to a narrative 
context that paradoxically undermined its ideological intentions. William Hogarth’s 
Captain Coram (Fig. 7-5; 1740; oil on canvas, 94 x 58 inches; Coram Family, in care 
of the Foundling Hospital, London) stands as compelling evidence of the influence of 
commerce—and the social and ideological progress of the monied interest—on the 
aesthetic standards of civic humanism. A seated composition that (yet) measures
16 Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, p. 204.
17 According to Jules Prown, Sparhawk was a moderate Tory whose annual income ranged in the upper 
bracket—between 500-1000 pounds. In addition to this economic leap, Sparhawk assumed his father- 
in-law’s seat on the Court o f Common Pleas of York County, Maine. Even more telling, his son, 
William Pepperrell, bore the honor of being first in his Harvard class—a sign of his social rank. See 
Prown, John Singleton Copley, p. 114; Troyen, “John Singleton Copley and the Grand Manner,” p. 99.
18 Smith, The Wealth o f Nations, p. 482.
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even larger than Sparhawk, the portrait of Thomas Coram provides visual testimony 
to the reforming force of economics and industry.
Fig. 74
On first glance, the composition of Coram recalls Sir Godfrey Kneller’s 
George I  (Fig. 7-6; 1716; oil on canvas, 97-1/4 x 59-3/4 inches; National Portrait 
Gallery, London, Beningbrough Hall)—even down to the pinkie ring. But the
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Fig. 7*6
comparison is largely a superficial one. In Kneller’s image, gold-banded velvet 
hangings, a fine oriental carpet, and a richly-carved baroque armchair locate the 
subject in a grand and fashionable interior. Within a shallow recess to the sitter’s 
right, canopied by an ornately-carved shell that foreshadows the growing influence of 
Palladianism—“foreign” tastes—, a draped table displays the trappings of monarchy: 
crown, orb and scepter.19 Within this grand and formal context, King George I sits
19 As early as the 1720s, the influence of the English Baroque was giving way to Palladianism—the 
neoclassicism patronized by Lord Burlington and celebrated in works of William Kent. Determined
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atop an elevated dais in layers of official dress, the velvet and satin of his endless 
robes cascading in folds beyond the picture plane. Yet, his relaxed right hand, the 
cock of his bewigged head, and the “easy” placement of his satin-slippered feet betray 
a natural confidence and politeness made all the more pointed by his condescending 
engagement of the spectator’s gaze. One might recall Mrs. Selwyn’s remark to 
Evelina:
chancing... to be bom of a noble and ancient family, [he] thinks 
proper to be of opinion, that birth and virtue are one and the same 
thing.... Fortunately for the world in general, [he] has taken it into 
[his] head, that condescension is the most distinguishing virtue of high 
life.
In a compositionally-similar arrangement, classical pillar and swag, gray stone 
flooring, and a brass nail-headed and leather-upholstered chair locate Coram in a 
domesticated liminal space. Against an architecturally-framed seascape that recalls 
earlier portraits of Elizabeth I (Fig. 7-7; ca. 1588; oil on panel, 38-1/2 x 28-1/2 
inches; National Portrait Gallery, London), a walnut pedestal table displays the 
rewards of his economic success: a scroll marked “The Royal Charter” and the seal of 
the Foundling Hospital. Within this context, Coram is likewise supported by an 
elevated dais. But in keeping with the economic premise and stature of his identity, 
the clothing he wears is private—a great coat, suit and gloves—and the powdered hair 
is his own. Moreover, against the ease of the king’s courtly politeness, Coram 
appears neither confident nor relaxed: his right hand pointedly labors to give proof of 
his success, while his left grasps gloves a bit tightly; his disheveled hair veils an
advocates o f the English Baroque defended its merits on nationalist grounds. Bindman notes: “The 
attack on the Palladians and a tendency to invoke the English rather than the classical past shows that 
Hogarth was already allying himself with a [particular political] point of view.. . See Bindman, 
Hogarth, pp. 17,26.
20 Burney, Evelina (London, 1778), p. 284.
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awkward tilt to his head; and, left foot dangled, his legs fall crudely toward the floor. 
Nonetheless, the image casts him as a merchant-prince, his empire “the Globe” at his 
feet.
Fig. 7-7
In fact, Thomas Coram was an English-born ship-builder whose self-made
stature turned on the success of his Boston ship-building firm. This earned his return
to London in 1719 and his eventual self-fashioning as an urban philanthropist.
Significantly, philanthropy, which witnessed a boom in mid-eighteenth-century
Britain, was regarded as a form of patriotism conducive to the material and moral
0 1advancement of society. This would have appealed to Hogarth, whose emerging 
commitment to the “Patriot” cause turned on a support for “English-ness” manifest as 
a dissent from foreign—i.e. Palladian—tastes, Walpolean corruption, and a devotion
21 Paul Langford, A Polite and Commercial People: England 1727-1783 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1989), pp. 485-489.
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to the “ancient”—i.e. Elizabethan—liberties of “true” Whiggism.22 Twenty-years 
after Coram’s return, upon the establishment of The Foundling Hospital, Hogarth 
commemorated his friend’s greatest legacy with an image that simultaneously
23propelled the artist into the ranks of grand-manner portrait-painters.
Significantly, however, the image of the commoner-cum-prince conveyed by 
Coram suggests not a rejection of social hierarchy or public greatness—indeed, the 
“Patriot” cause endorsed a “Patriot King”—but rather, as with Sparhawk, a pressure 
to expand the accessibility of social ranks that the honors afforded the traditional elite 
might be open to the deserving (propertied) commoner.24 As Burney suggests and 
Paul Langford confirms: “tradesmen did not want to think of themselves as tradesmen 
but as gentleman.”25 Thomas Coram and Nathaniel Sparhawk might thus be 
understood as statements of social fluidity and the empowering and progressive 
influence of commercial industry accorded by the principles of a variant narrative.
As such, they would seem to advance the narrative and aesthetic ideals of Jonathan 
Richardson. A similar claim might be made of more modest colonial portraits by 
Copley and others. John Hancock (Fig. 7-8; 1765; oil on canvas, 49-1/2 x 40-1/2
22 As Bindman describes it: “when culture flourished under a benevolent and patriotic monarch, 
surrounded by a court o f public-spirited gentleman.” He goes on: “The 1740s saw Hogarth emerge as 
a self-consciously English artist, and in this he reflects the emergence of opposition ‘patriotism’ and its 
eventual adoption by all political interests....” (Bindman, Hogarth, p. 46) See Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 
46-50.
23 As Bindman aptly notes, the portrait presents a blending of the French grand-manner brush and 
stateliness with English naturalism. However, Hogarth had attempted the “Great Style without a proper 
academic training or the experience of an apprenticeship to a practitioner of the genre. The problems 
of such painting were not just technical, of making a convincing illusion on a large scale: they also 
required an approach to the theoretical question of the depiction of the realm of ideal moral action.” 
(Bindman, Hogarth, p. 98) See Bindman, Hogarth, pp. 98,131, 133.
24 Bindman, Hogarth and his Times, pp. 45-50.
25 Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, p. 65. According to a House of Commons survey of the 
parish of Whitechapel in 1734, “Tradesmen o f Good Credit, Great Dealings, and, most commonly, of 
good Understanding” could be numbered among the “polite.” (Langford, p. 75) See Langford, A 
Polite and Commercial People, pp. 65-68, 75.
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inches; Museum of Fine Arts, Boston), for example, captures a Boston merchant at 
his desk, an account book and quill in hand, before a column and swag cleverly 
formed by the shadow of drapery above plinth-like books. Yet the image of Hancock 
bears still broader implications.
John Hancock (1737-1793), son of the unremarkable Reverend John Hancock 
of North Braintree, Massachusetts, was left poor and fatherless at age seven until 
adopted by his merchant-uncle, Thomas Hancock, the highly successful owner of
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Boston’s House o f Hancock.26 By age twenty-six, after years of social indoctrination 
and a Harvard education, young Hancock was made a full partner. In 1764, following 
his uncle’s death, he succeeded to the ownership of House o f Hancock and his uncle’s 
Beacon Hill estate. The portrait by Copley marks his new consequence.
And yet the portrait itself is hardly grand. An avid consumer of English 
decorative arts and Madeira wines, “King Hancock” was known to cruise Boston in
27ostentatious carriages, decked out in costly finery, to the neglect of his business.
But none of this is suggested by this image. Nor is reference made to his political 
aspirations. And it is this combination which makes Hancock’s portrait so 
compelling. On the one hand, the depiction of Hancock as a hardworking and 
successful businessman defies grand-manner conventions, casting the common-born 
man in the guise of an ignorant and interested dependent. Inversely, it removes 
Hancock from any affiliation with the English upper classes, an affiliation which his 
income and lifestyle may well have allowed.28 In other words, Copley presents one 
of the wealthiest men in the American colonies, an anchored member of the colonial 
elite, in an inferior socioeconomic station; he casts a man who enjoyed the leisurely 
pursuits and privileges of inherited wealth as a man dependent on the labors of 
industry. In so doing, Copley reversed the conventions of his Sparhawk portrait and, 
while borrowing on the language of civic humanism, manipulated its symbols for 
alternative ends. The consciousness of this effort is made all the more certain by the 
evidence of Hancock’s familiarity with grand-style imagery: shortly before sitting for
26 According to Staiti, House of Hancock was “the largest transatlantic shipping firm in Boston.” See 
Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, p. 213.
27 Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, p. 213.
28 According to Jules Prown, Hancock’s wealth topped the charts, exceeding 1000 pounds per year.
See Prown, John Singleton Copley, p. 108.
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29his own portrait, Hancock commissioned a grand-manner image of his Uncle. The 
question is: why?
Copley’s presentation probably had more to do with Hancock’s political 
leanings than his religious ones.30 The year of Hancock’s portrait marked the year of 
the Stamp Act, which, following the Seven Years War, served both practical— 
revenue—and political—control—ends. That it set off a train of ardent political 
protests, paraded as patriotic assertions of independence and self-sufficiency, 
confirmed British fears about growing colonial autonomy,31 as suggested by a letter 
from David Hume:
... They voted that the Parliament of England had no Right to impose on them 
any Taxes whatsoever; that they had no Right to make any Laws for them 
without their Consent; that the Colonies had a Right to trade freely to any Part 
of the World where they found their Advantage; that they were determined to 
maintain these Principles to the last Drop of their Blood; and that the whole 
Militia and Arms be carefully inspected, in order to maintain the Colonies in a 
State of Defence against all Invaders.... If this Intelligence hold to the Extent 
here related, there will certainly be a considerable Revolution in the Ministry. 
Mr. Pitt will be sent for.... He seems the only Man, who can either bring the 
Americans to submit peaceably by his Authority; or subdue them by his 
Vigour. It does not seem probable that the Repeal alone of the Stamp Act will 
suffice.32
As political tensions against the empire mounted, Hancock assumed the
29 Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, p. 213.
30 Staiti compares Wayne Craven’s interpretation of the image—as one “expressive of Calvinistic 
virtues, especially the idea that material rewards in life are the tangible proof of God’s divine 
blessing”—with Gordon Wood’s savvy reminder of contemporary colonial displeasure with 
“flamboyant elites.” See Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, pp. 213-214.
31 Jack P. Greene, “An Uneasy Connection: An Analysis o f the Preconditions o f the American 
Revolution, in Kurtz and Hutson, eds., Essays on the Making o f the Constitution (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1987), p. 80. In fact, Hancock used one of his own ships to bring the repeal to 
Boston, where he made the announcement to the local public. See Staiti, “Character and Class,” in 
Rebora and Staiti, p. 73.
32 Letter from David Hume to Lord R ... (indecipherable), dated May 8, 1766 (Huntington Library 
Manuscript Collection). As Langford notes, “No self-respecting Whig could lightly disregard the 
legislative supremacy ofWestminster.” See Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, p. 539.
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stature of a radical Whig.33 In this capacity, he maneuvered for political influence 
and authority in colonial Massachusetts, building up a network of political dependents 
and, ultimately, serving as President of the Continental Congress (1775-1777).34 This 
may explain why, after only a one-year interlude, Hancock departs so significantly 
from Sparhawk: the elaborate, highly “public,” architectural landscape with distant 
parkland, has given way to the shadowy backdrop of a domestic interior; the 
conversational stance of a polite, velvet-clad,35 man-of-leisure has given way to an 
industrious, wool-clad,36 businessman; scrolled architectural plans, suggestive of 
grandeur and expense, give way to account books, the evidence of investment and 
savings. Indeed, whereas Sparhawk recasts the merchant as a member of the landed 
elite, implying the exclusive nature of grand-manner imagery and, by extension, the 
exclusive stature of the Public Man, whereas Sparhawk thereby conformed to the 
neo-Country imperative that commercial affiliations be shed in the assumption of a 
public identity, Hancock, while not denying certain ideals within the neo-Country 
narrative, suggests that the attributes of the industrious merchant are more worthy of 
public esteem than those of the leisured gentleman—that a businessman might be 
better received as a Public Man than a member of the leisured elite—, a significant 
modification to the civic humanist narrative bearing major implications for identity.
33 According to Komblith and Murrin, the Sugar, Stamp, and Currency Acts of 1764-1765 “represented 
a direct attack on both the elites’ economic interests and their political authority.” See Komblith and 
Murrin, “The Making and Unmaking of the American Ruling Class,” in Alfred F. Young, ed., Beyond 
the Revolution: Explorations in the History o f American Radicalism (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois 
University Press, 1976) p. 46.
34 Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, p. 214.
35 Most certainly an imported cloth.
36 Possible made in the colonies.
37 Notably the suggestion o f public good signified by the column and swag.
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Gordon Wood has argued that industry was recognized neither as a social 
benefit nor a qualification of the would-be elite but was, rather, urged on the 
commoner as a corrective to idleness.38 Yet Hancock suggests otherwise. In part, it 
could be argued, the presentation of an industrious commoner reflected contemporary 
criticism about the moral degeneracy of an ostentatious elite.39 But as Langford 
observes, the failings of the elite gave inverse influence to the virtues of a middling 
sort.40 In fact, as Wood himself suggests, weaknesses within the elite provided the 
opportunity for social advancement and occasioned the remodeling of political 
relationships on the example of social ones.41 This invited the inclusion of 
commercial attributes—such as industry and ‘fair-dealing’—into the narrative of 
public good. Accoutrements like quill and ink, letters and papers, are thus potentially 
emblematic of the sitter’s engagement in a larger network of social conversation. 
What the portrait of John Hancock suggests, then, is that, by 1765, social engagement 
and economic industry had begun to inform an alternative colonial narrative and its 
language of visual imagery.
Copley was not alone in celebrating the potentiality of the industrious 
individual or in making him a pillar of the classical narrative of public good. Charles
38 Wood writes: “industriousness and hard work were everywhere extolled and the Puritan ethic was 
widely preached but only for ordinary people, not for gentlemen, and not for the sake of increasing 
society’s productivity.” He goes on: “Hard, steady work was good for the character of the common 
people: it kept them out o f trouble; it lifted them out o f idleness and barbarism; and it instilled in them 
the proper moral values; but it was not thought to expand the prosperity of society.” See Wood, The 
Radicalism o f the American Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1993), p. 33.
39 Langford explains: “the new pageantry o f urban, bourgeois England was developing fast, subtly 
transforming the role o f nobleman as principal gentleman, without their realizing it. Ostentatious 
display was still permissible, but display which suggested commitment to an open, equal society rather 
than one which savoured of lordly superiority.... When aristocrats ... diverged from the patterns of 
conformity required by the society around then, they were punished....” See Langford, A Polite and 
Commercial People, p. 600.
40 As Langford notes, “Bourgeois respectability and prudery were rising stocks in the 1760s and 
1770s....” See Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, p. 582.
41 Gordon Wood, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, pp. 136, 140, 170-174, 225.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
249
Willson Peale’s allegiance to radical Whiggism has been convincingly argued by a 
number of scholars and is made visually evident in John Beale Bordley (Fig. 7-9; 
1770; oil on canvas, 84-7/16 x 58-1/2 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington).42 
Here, a contrast of backgrounds punctuated by a brewing storm suggests an 
allegorical landscape meant to be read, like a weathered text, from left-to-right—west 
to east. This translates, alternately, into a narrative progress from “what has been” to 
“what will be.” On the one hand, a skewed oak tree (a metaphorical reference to 
England gone wrong?) frames an image of a British soldier leading a pack-laden 
beast (British piracy of colonial goods?)43 On the other hand, the prosperity of fruit- 
bearing peach trees frames an image of the pastoral ideal (the uncorrupted virtue of 
independent self-sufficiency). In the same vein, a paper marked “Imperial Civil/ Law 
-  Sumary / proceeding” (an allusion to trial without jury),44 lies tom and rejected at
42 For further information about Peale and his work, see Theodore Bolton, “Charles Willson Peale, an 
Account o f His Life and Work,” The Art Quarterly, vol. I and Supplement, vol. II (Autumn, 1939; 
reprint 1989): 354-385,417-445; David R. Brigham, Public Culture in the Early Republic: Peale ’$ 
Museum and its Audience (Washington and London: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1995); Brandon 
Brame Fortune, “Charles Willson Peale’s Portrait Gallery: persuasion and the plain style,” Word & 
Image 6,4 (October-December 1990): 308-324, and “From the World Escaped: Peale’s Portrait of 
William Smith and his grandson,” Eighteenth-Century Studies 25,4 (Summer, 1992): 587-615; Sidney 
Hart, “Charles Willson Peale and the Theory and Practice of the Eighteenth-Century Family,” in 
Lillian B. Miller, ed., The Peale Family: Creation o f a Legacy, 1770-1870, exh. cat. (New York,
1996), pp. 100-117; Ellen Miles and Leslie Reinhardt, “’Art conceal’d’: Peale’s double portrait of 
Benjamin and Eleanor Ridgely Laming,” The Art Bulletin, LXXVIII, 1 (March 1996): 57-74; Lillian B. 
Miller and David C. Ward, eds. New Perspectives on Charles Willson Peale: A 250th Anniversary 
Celebration (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh for the Smithsonian Institution, 1991); Charles 
Willson Peale, et al. The Collected Papers o f Charles Willson Peale and his Family, 1735-1785, 
Lillian B. Miller, ed. (Millwood, NY: Kraus Thomson, Inc., 1980); Edgar P. Richardson, Brooke 
Hindle, and Lillian B. Miller, Charles Willson Peale and His World (New York: Harry N. Abrams, 
Inc., 1983); Charles Coleman Sellers, Charles Willson Peale (New York, 1969); Horace Wells Sellers, 
“Charles Willson Peale: Artist-Soldier,” The Pennsylvania Magazine o f History and Biography, v. 38, 
n.3 (1914): 257-286; David Steinberg, “Charles Willson Peale Portrays the Body Politic,” in Lillian B. 
Miller, ed., The Peale Family: Creation of a Legacy, 1770-1870, exh. cat. (New York, 1996), 119-133, 
and “’A Rough and Unhewn Virtue’: Charles Willson Peale’s John Beale Bordley,” paper presented at 
the Omohundro Institute o f Early American History and Culture, October 1997.
43 Cynthia Mills and Ellen Miles, in Miles, American Paintings o f the Eighteenth Century, pp. 114- 
116.
44 According to David Steinberg, the vice-admiralty courts established in Halifax and elsewhere in 
1764 and 1767, were instituted according to Roman civil laws which, unlike common law, operated by
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Bordley’s feet. By contrast, the ‘natural’ premise (rock podium) of mixed 
government is precariously reclaimed as a corrective to tyranny and the foundation of 
English law upon which justice and liberty depend.45 But Peale’s image also suggests 
a looming threat to this natural progress metaphorically rendered as a brewing storm 
and a British soldier who moves back into darkness.
summary proceeding—i.e. without juries—, a circumstance which colonists deemed inconsistent with 
their rights as British citizens. As Steinberg also notes, however, the confusion plaguing notions of 
common (unwritten, by tradition), statutory (written), imperial, natural and divine law complicated the 
monographic use of related emblems, though more so in England than the colonies. See Steinberg, “A 
Rough and Unhewn Virtue: Charles William Peale’s John Beale B o r d le y paper presented at the 
Omohundro Institute of Early American History and Culture, October 28, 1997, pp. 3, 8-12.
45 The open book reads “Nolumus Leges Angliae mutari”—we are unwilling that the laws o f England 
be changed. As Mills and Miles aptly observe, the words harkened back to the Commonwealth 
emphasis on mixed government to which Charles I responded in his Answer to the Nineteen 
Propositions (1642). Four years after Bordley’s portrait, John Dickinson invoked the phrase in his 
Essay on the Constitutional Power o f Great Britain Over the Colonies. See Cynthia J. Mills and Ellen 
G. Miles, in Miles, American Paintings o f the Eighteenth-Century, p. 114.
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Within this context, standing full-length in unadorned brown homespun, the
Maryland lawyer-politician turned gentleman-farmer directs our vision to the pastoral
image that visually and metaphorically backs English law. In so doing, he persuades
our engagement in a political controversy that ultimately turns on a single question;
as Burney’s Cecilia puts it: “Is then this great secret of happiness ... nothing, at last,
but total seclusion lfom the world?” To which Bordley, in the words of Belfied,
might have replied: “No, madam..., it is Labour with Independence.”46 In other
words, while Bordley metaphorically alludes to classical progress and common good,
his version of its landed populace appears more industrious than leisured, more
defensive of the benefits of agricultural activity than the heroic actions and
contemplations afforded noble wealth. One is reminded of Harrington’s Oceana, in
which, quoting Francis Bacon’s essay, “Of the True Greatness of Kingdoms and
Estates,” Harrington wrote:
in making farms and houses of husbandry of a standard; that is, maintained 
with such a proportion of land unto them as may breed a subject to live in 
convenient plenty and no servile condition, and to keep the plough in the 
hands of the owners and not mere hirelings;... you shall attain unto Virgil’s 
character which he gives of ancient Italy... .47
As alternately expressed by the Patricians (1773), “birth alone has no pretence, to
Truth, or honour, dignity, or sense’.”48
46 Burney, Cecilia, p. 659. According to Mills and Miles, Bordley retired from public life “determined 
to become a self-sufficient patriot farmer and develop a model plantation. He believed that America 
needed to establish economic independence from England. While he, like most colonists, had long 
imported many luxuries from Britain, he now substituted homemade beer for London ale and porter, 
and grew wheat instead of tobacco, the staple of Anglo-American commerce. His farm included its 
own carpenter and blacksmith shops, as well as looms and spinning wheels that he supplied with his 
own fleeces, hemp, flax, and cotton.... In the background graze the sheep from which Bordley 
produced his wool in an effort to reduce dependence on British textiles, a major export to the 
colonies.” See Mills and Miles, in Miles, American Paintings o f the Eighteenth Century, pp. 113-114; 
Richardson, Hindle, and Miller, Charles Willson Peale and His World, p. 38.
47 Harrington, The Commonwealth o f Oceana, pp. 3-4.
48 Quoted in Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, p. 590.
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This visual rendering of a Harringtonian narrative recalls the “Patriot” cause 
of Hogarth and Coram. By 1770, it had found literary parallel in the contemporary 
work of English ‘republican’ Whigs.49 Indeed, while Peale was putting paint to 
canvas, Catherine Sawbridge Macaulay, whose brother, John Sawbridge, founded the 
Bill of Rights Society, was dressing down the Rockingham Whigs for their betrayal 
of ‘true Whig’ principles.50 Significantly, radical Whigs were unwilling to forego the 
narrative link between land and virtue, seeking rather to void it of birth-related 
connotations. Like the “Patriot” cause of earlier years, they disassociated the 
freeholder from the hereditary elite without disassociating his virtues from 
independence and progress. This had particular resonance in the colonies. As Wood 
notes, in contrast to their English compatriots, the majority of colonial Americans 
were still farmers.51 Indeed, against the elite monopoly on land in England, land was
49 Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, p. 528.
30 Langford writes: “In politics there was always an undercurrent o f republican distaste for the House 
of Lords, which surfaced in times of turbulence. Catherine Macaulay in her onslaught on the 
Rockingham Whigs in 1770, treated the vested interest of great noblemen as an affront to the 
Harringtonian values at least as great as that represented by the corruption at the command of the 
Crown.” (Langford, pp. 590-591) As Langford explains, during the reign o f Walpole Whiggism—i.e. 
the Court Whigs of 1727-1742—, the freeholder ideals originally affiliated with the Restoration Whigs 
of the Glorious Revolution, which celebrated the rights and liberties of ‘ancient’ England, were being 
promoted by the Opposition or Country party under the leadership of the old Tory, Viscount 
Bolingbroke. The ideals continued to find resonance among various groups throughout the eighteenth 
century, surfacing again in the guise of William Pitt. With the accession of George III, and the return 
of Tories to court, old ideological divisions became convenient means by which to rally support for 
one political group or another. In 1768, for example, John Wilkes borrowed on the rhetoric of Country 
liberty to defend a more radical version o f Whiggism incompatible with Court politics. When 
Catherine Macaulay published her History o f England (1763-1783), she gave shape to a Whig 
narrative that, according to Langford, “resembled those of generations of Commonwealth Whigs and 
Country Tories who had resisted the oligarchical tendencies of early Hanoverian government. This 
link,” he goes on, “between old style ‘patriot’ ideology, even old Toryism, and the new ‘patriotism’ of 
the 1760s and 1770s was important. It was to provide the reformers of the late eighteenth century with 
a fund of arguments and a sense of continuity.” (Langford, p. 528) See Langford, A Polite and 
Commercial People, pp. 25-27, 230-234, 333-338, 519-529.
51 Wood, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, p. 59.
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more widely dispersed in the colonies, 60% of American colonists owning 70% of the 
land.52
On the one hand, then, that Bordley and Coram—freeholder and merchant— 
could draw on similar ideological roots in the construction of their “English” 
identities suggests a point-of-departure for reconciling the differences between 
Bordley and Hancock. Yet, Coram, like Sparhawk, had “retired” from business prior 
to claiming his identity. And this suggests the possibility of unresolved tensions 
between the ideological foundations informing the two images—between the 
freeholder ideal and a society bom on the coat-tails of commerce. Indeed, the 
potential ideological inconsistencies are made all the more pronounced by the striking 
contrast between Bordley and Elijah Boardman (Fig. 7-10; 1789; oil on canvas, 83 x 
51 inches; The Metropolitan Museum of Art). In fact, painted almost twenty years 
later, Ralph Earl’s portrait signifies the influence of post-War developments on the 
modeling of American identity.
Elijah Boardman (1760-1823) was the third son of the Connecticut colonists 
Sherman Boardman and Sarah Bostwick. Tutored by the local minister, Boardman 
served as an apprentice-clerk before setting up as a Connecticut shopkeeper in 1781. 
The success of his undertaking was evident in 1792, when he married, bought out his 
business partner, and built and outfitted a substantial new home and shop.53 But it is 
also resonant in this remarkable image. Here, dispensing with the classical allusions
52 This as opposed to 5% owning 70% in England. See Komblith and Murrin, “The Making and 
Unmaking o f an American Ruling Class,” in Alfred F. Young, ed. Beyond the American Revolution, 
pp. 43-45.
Komhauser, Ralph Earl: Face o f the Young Republic (Hartford, CT: Wadsworth Atheneum, 1991), 
p. 155.
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of grand-manner imagery/4 Earl opted instead for the presentation of a shop interior 
whose visible storeroom displays stacks of fashionable foreign and domestic
Fig. 74©
textiles.55 Visually and metaphorically, the storeroom “backs” the foreground 
image—the rows of account books, the richness of Boardman’s silk and muslin
54 These would have been familiar to Earl from his London period. Earl studied under West—and 
possibly Reynolds—, exhibiting at the Royal Academy from 1783 to 1785. See Brian Stewart and 
Mervyn Cutten, The Dictionary o f Portrait Painters in Britain up to 1920 (Suffolk, England: Antique 
Collector’s Club, 1997),p. 181; James Thomas V\qwst, History o f American Painting. Volume II: The 
Light of Distant Skies (1760-1835) (New York: Dover Publications, (1954) 1969), p. 68.
55 According to Ribiero, the inventory includes silks, wools, linens, printed cottons and blends, some of 
American manufacture. The bottom bolt is marked with a British stamp. See Ribiero, in Komhauser, 
Ralph Earl: the Face o f the Young Republic, p. 156; Komhauser, Ralph Earl, p. 155.
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costume, the gold watch and accoutrements, the volumes of literature and, ultimately, 
Boardman himself.56 But it does more than finance his material riches.
In Sparhawk—as in Spencer (Fig. 7-2) and Cumberland (Fig. 7-3)—, a 
classical liminal space frames a generalized landscape, their combination alluding to 
the timeless, ancient virtues of public good bom of the disinterested independence 
affiliated with the landed elite. By contrast, Boardman projects a particular and 
contemporary architectural interior that frames an individual merchant’s private 
storeroom, the combination of which might suggest—in the neo-Country narrative—- 
the selfish and fleeting benefits accrued to the merchant as a result of his ambitious 
interests. Yet such would not seem to be Earl’s intent. For all its differences of 
setting, the posture of Boardman virtually mirrors that of Sparhawk, the same elegant 
ease informing Sparhawk’s “politeness” likewise informs the image of Boardman,
en
suggesting a comparable degree of virtue.
According to Paul Langford, while the phrase “polite and commercial” may 
have originated in William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws o f England 
(1765-1769), “similar terms were commonplace in the 1760s and 1770s, and suggest 
something of a consensus about the central characteristics of mid-eighteenth-century
58 • •England.” On the one hand, commercialism had come to be widely accepted as the 
“fourth stage” in the progress of civilization. At the same time, its necessary 
concession to widespread consumption demanded alternative methods for keeping 
corruption at bay. To this end, “politeness” was simultaneously invoked as a medium
56 Ribiero, in Komhauser, Ralph Earl, p. 156.
57 It is interesting to note that Englishmen considered politeness a uniquely English trait, lost on the 
rustics of the provinces and colonies. See Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, p. 329.
58 Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, pp. 1-6, quoted from p. 1.
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for social elevation and individual regulation.59 The result was a paradoxical 
convergence of “landed” (neo-Country) and “monied” (Liberal) influences. By the 
same token, while the balance-of-influence between land and money shifted in favor 
of money, the scramble to enhance one’s public stature resulted in the grasping after 
minor—but conventionally landed—identities.60
In some respects, Hogarth’s portrait of Thomas Coram, with its similarly 
framed view of a merchant’s life-blood, helped to mediate the visual translation of 
private merchant into Public Man.61 A similar narrative was subsequently echoed in
59 Langford explains: “In a sense politeness was a logical consequence of commerce. A feudal society 
and an agrarian economy were associated with an elaborate code of honour designed to govern 
relations among the privileged few.... But a society in which the most vigorous and growing element 
was a commercial middle class, involved both in production and consumption, required a more 
sophisticated means o f regulating manners. Politeness conveyed upper-class gentility, enlightenment, 
and sociability to a much wider elite whose only qualification was money, but who were glad to spend 
it on acquiring the status o f gentleman. In theory politeness comprehended, even began with, morals, 
but in practice it was as much a question of material acquisitions and urbane manners.... Though it 
involved much emulation and admiration of aristocrats, it did not imply an essentially aristocratic 
society.” (Langford, pp. 4-5) See Langford, A Polite and Commercial People, pp. 4-6, 60, 648.
60 Langford writes: “Much significance was attached to the matter of title. The Leicestershire 
clergyman Aulay Macaulay remarked on the extraordinary increase in the second half of the eighteenth 
century, in the numbers who described themselves as ‘Mr’, ‘Mrs’, and ‘Esquire’. In principle, the term 
‘Esquire’ continued to be restricted to men of property or professional standing. It was considered 
incompatible with trade, though retired businessmen commonly assumed it as soon as they had 
invested their profits in property or an annuity.... The depreciation of the currency of title proceeded 
still more rapidly with the ‘rank’ of gentleman, thanks to its wider connotations. Technically it 
continued to be a particular rung on the ladder. Small country squires who did not presume to count 
themselves among the county gentry used it with pride. Substantial tradesmen and merchants felt free 
to resort to it where their courage failed them in regard to ‘Esquire’.... In the countryside a new term 
had to be invented to describe the pretensions of men who owned little or no property of their own but 
enjoyed a measure of opulence. Henry Fielding used the expression ‘gentleman farmer’ in Tom Jones 
in 1749 and Charlotte Lennox did so in The Female Quixote three years later. During the following 
decade it was to become commonplace. Agrarian improvement seemed to be raising a new breed of 
rural capitalists who demanded equality of status with their landlords.... By the reign of George III 
‘Mr’ and ‘Mrs’ were widely accepted in towns, and increasingly in the countryside, as the automatic 
entitlement of anyone who owned property, hired labour, or simply laid claim to a degree of rank and 
respectability.” (Langford, pp. 65-66) He goes on: “This debasement of gentility is one of the clearest 
signs of social change in the eighteenth century, the mark of a fundamental transformation....” In the 
end, Langford writes, England “was not a nation o f gentry, but a powerful and extensive middle class. 
This class rested on a broad, diverse base of property, by no means restricted to land.” It was this 
class, he continues, which “decided the framework of debate and the terms of tenure on which the 
traditional politics of monarchy and aristocracy were conducted.” (Langford, p. 66-68) See Langford, 
A Polite and Commercial People, pp. 65-68.
61 Indeed, having acquired significant property and inherited his father’s interest in public life, 
Boardman assumed the position of United States Senator. See Komhauser, Ralph Earl, p. 155.
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grand-style variations like Peale’s William Stone (Fig. 7-11; 1774-1775; oil on 
canvas, 100 x 61 inches; Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore) and John 
Trumbull’s Patrick Tracy (Fig. 7-12; 1786; oil on canvas, 91-1/2 x 52-5/8 inches;
Fig, 741   Fig, 742
National Gallery of Art, Washington). But only in Earl’s portrait are the “goods” of 
commerce projected as mediums of virtue and a mode of interdependence
fryadvantageous to social good. As the Reverend Mr. Tyrold put it in Burney’s 
Camilla, “That species of independence which proudly flies at all gratitude, is
62 Commercial virtue necessarily differed from the Aristotelian heroic ideal in being social rather than 
civic, “easy” rather than formal, involving interactive rather than autonomous practices. As Taylor 
remarks, “A key feature of it is that our service of self takes productive form, as against the ... 
aristocratic, caste-conscious pursuit of honour and glory through self-display and the warrior virtues.” 
(Taylor, pp. 238-240) See Taylor, pp. 238-240,286-301; Mandeville, Fable o f the Bees, pp. 20, 41.
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inimical to the social compact of civilized life, which subsists but by reciprocity of 
services.”63
Historians tend to agree that the colonial American narrative was informed 
by both ideology and interest.64 However, whereas Bernard Bailyn and Gordon 
Wood give emphasis to the influence of Opposition rhetoric in the years preceding 
the Revolution, Joyce Appleby has endorsed a more liberal interpretation.65 As she 
sees it, the economic policies and practices of the seventeenth-century became the 
foundation for a more liberating outlook that, while undermining aspects of the 
classical narrative, was encouraged by the Court as complementary to imperial 
interests.66 Against “the constitutional ideal of the disinterested citizen,” she writes,
63 Bumey, Camilla, or A Picture o f Youth (London, 1796), p. 232.
64 The colonial elite, they concede, drew on republican and liberal ideals, both Country and Court as 
needed, in the fashioning of a narrative that satisfied colonial experience. As Bailyn observes, “it is 
the flexibility o f their ideas... that has proven the most impressive product of the later studies of 
Revolutionary ideology.” (Bailyn, p. vi) See Bailyn, The Ideological Origins o f the American 
Revolution (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1967), particularly pp. 
v-vi, 19, 21, 35, 55, 77, 79, 86, 94, 124, 161, 230, 376; Wood, The Creation o f the American Republic, 
1776-1787 (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1969), pp. 15-17,45, 50, 53, 65,70-71, 75, 81-83, 
91, 108, 114, 117, 123-124.
In his more recent work, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, Wood gives stronger 
emphasis to the liberal component, particularly as it emerged during the Constitutional era, ca. 1776- 
1789. Americans were becoming, he argues, “the most liberal, the most democratic, the most 
commercially-minded, and the most modem people in the world,” a circumstance he attributes to the 
effect of Revolution, which “altered their understanding o f history, knowledge and truth. Most 
important, it made the interests and prosperity of ordinary people—their pursuits o f happiness—the 
goal of society and government. The Revolution ... released powerful popular entrepreneurial and 
commercial energies that few realized existed and transformed the economic landscape o f the 
country.” See Wood, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, p. 7.
65 Appleby, “The Social Origins of the American Revolutionary Ideology,” The Journal o f American 
History, LXIV (March 1978): 935-958. See also Appleby, Liberalism and Republicanism in the 
Historical Imagination (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992).
66 Opposition aversion to commercial men turned, in part, on the corruptive influence of profit, which 
allowed interested men to influence dependents and thereby subvert the public good. Even Thomas 
Paine blamed England’s demise on commerce. (Paine, Common Sense, p. 55) But the Opposition 
platform was also largely reactionary. See Wood, The Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787, 
p. 15; Appleby, “The Social Origins of the American Revolutionary Ideology,” p. 952.
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imperialism urged industry, wooing the ambitious instincts of common men with the
• • 67promise of profit, social status, and political authority.
Yet, as Appleby likewise notes, the “qualities of the liberal model of society 
that attracted intelligent but uncultivated men and women on the make” were likewise 
sanctioned by a Protestant ethic that lent acquisition-by-industry a modicum of 
respectability.68 Hence, the ambitions of profit might be ideologically cloaked in the 
guise of virtuous piety. But independence-through-industry might be additionally 
perceived as complementary to the promise of English liberty, as variously articulated 
by Commonwealth and Restoration Whigs and revived by “Patriots” and 
“republicans.” On the one hand, then, the pursuit of profit and rank was attained by 
way of imperial policy. On the other hand, the colonial defense of industry and 
improvement was premised on an Anglo-Protestant radicalism perversely grounded in 
the ideals of an “ancient” constitution—i.e. monarchy. In America, where the 
availability of land and the absence of a hereditary elite made advancement by profit 
and the ownership of land possible, these variant ideologies appear to have 
converged.69 By uniting selective elements of competing ideologies, colonists appear 
to have subsumed the “pursuit of happiness” into a narrative of “ancient rights and
67 Appleby, “The Social Origins o f the American Revolutionary Ideology,” p. 939.
68 As Appleby explains it, the Opposition “evoked the classical theory of mixed government to stay the 
course of modernization and to forestall an economic development that would undercut the values they 
esteemed and the social order that supported those values.” See Appleby, “The Social Origins of 
American Revolutionary Ideology,” p. 952.
69 As Wood observes, so absorbed were the Americans in the Commonwealth tradition of English 
radicalism that even the destruction of monarchy and the institution of republicanism did not clearly 
signify a repudiation of the ancient constitution; for the spirit o f republicanism, the spirit o f the great 
men of the seventeenth century, was “so far from being incompatible with the British constitution, that 
it is the greatest glory of it.” See Wood, The Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787, p. 45.
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liberties” in which Harrington, Locke and Anglo-Protestantism featured 
prominently.70 Within this context, British policy of the 1760s appeared tyrannical.
In other words, differences between Bordley and Boardman may reflect 
ideological disparities bom of geographical differences—an agricultural South versus 
a commercial North—but they also likely reflect temporal ones.71 In 1770, when 
Bordley’s image was painted, the colonial narrative was focused on principles 
immediately relevant to the imperial conflict—those which made the case for British 
tyranny and American liberties. By 1789, the imperial crisis had passed, and 
Americans were celebrating the ratification of a national constitution. In the 
meantime, a considerably ideological gap had been breached.
After the Revolution, issues resonant in colonial resistance—particularly the 
issue of representation—precipitated the examination of specific ideological tenets— 
the notion of the people’s sovereignty, for example—in the formation of the
•  T 7American political structure. According to Wood, in the process of examining and
70 Edmund Morgan writes: “During the years of controversy from 1763 to 1776 the colonists studied 
Locke and Harrington closely (along with subsequent writers like Thomas Gordon, John Trenchard, 
and James Burgh...).” (Morgan, pp. 74-75) If the recommendations of Thomas Jefferson are any 
indication, the Country ideology o f Harrington was received in the form of its Opposition variation, by 
way of the writings of Lord Bolingbroke. The combined influence of Liberal and Opposition thought 
is reflected in Jefferson’s recommendations to Robert Skipwith for the outfitting of his library in 1771. 
In addition to works by Locke and Bolingbroke, Jefferson suggested Montesquieu, Hume, Smith and 
common-sense theorists like Karnes, Reid and Steuart. Various novels by noted English authors, as 
well as works by Pope, Dryden, Milton, Addison and others are also mentioned. Notably absent are 
the writings o f Shaftesbury. Notably present is Hogarth’s Analysis o f Beauty. SeeA Virginia 
Gentleman’s Library. As proposed by Thomas Jefferson to Robert Skipwith in 1771 and now 
assembled in the Brush-Everard House, Williamsburg, Virginia, introduction by Arthur Pierce 
Middleton (Colonial Williamsburg, 1952); Morgan, The Birth o f the Republic, 1763-1789, 3rd ed. 
(Chicago: University o f Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 74-75. See also Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in 
Common Sense, The Rights o f Man, and Other Essential Writings o f Thomas Paine, introduction by 
Sidney Hook (New York: Penguin Books, 1969).
71 Wood, The Radicalism o f the American Revolution, pp. 30-33.
72 Bailyn, The Ideological Origins o f the American Revolution, pp. 77-79; Wood, The Creation o f the 
American Republic, 1776-1787, p. ix. To some extent, Greene argues, the groundwork was laid in the 
decades preceding the Revolution, insofar as economics had already infiltrated the political sphere and 
local government was manned by an established, stable and more inclusive elite. As he explains it, the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
261
redressing these tenets, the definition of individual liberty was clarified and 
expanded, and the perception of social association was modified.73 On the one hand, 
the right to happiness was distinguished from the public good. On the other hand, the 
individual was recognized as an autonomous entity whose relationship to society was 
based on contract. The result was a two-part program embracing happiness (interest) 
and good (progress towards potentiality), according to a narrative of natural law— 
what Jefferson described as “a free people claiming their rights, as derived from the 
laws of nature.”74
Hence, it was not until the post-War period that the full implications of 
colonial perceptions of liberty were brought to bear on the American narrative. In the 
process, Boardman suggests, the gap between agricultural and commercial industry, 
agricultural and commercial benevolence, agricultural and commercial politeness 
began to blur as emphasis shifted from the economic means—agricultural or 
commercial—to the ideological ends—happiness and goodness—of the American 
cause. In complement with this development, the individual was re-modeled 
according to moral standards of industry, benevolence, and politeness. By the same
beginning to colonial dissent dates from 1748, when Walpole’s policy of accommodation was 
abandoned in favor of stricter regulations undertaken by Halifax at the Board of Trade. By this point, 
colonial and British perceptions of their respective rights and responsibilities had diverged. Following 
the Seven Years War, when Britain resumed its enforcement of stricter trade regulations, the colonies 
had already attained a level of self-sufficiency incompatible with imperial demands. See Greene, “An 
Uneasy Connection,” in Stephen G. Kurtz and James H. Hutson, eds., p. 32-80.
73 According to Merrill Jensen, within the larger framework of the Revolution there occurred a 
secondary internal revolt against classical republicanism to which the traditional elite responded with a 
counter-rebellion in 1787. One unintended effect of this internal revolt was the dissemination of 
liberal ideals to the populace. See Jensen, The American Revolution within America (New York: New 
York University Press, 1974), pp. 2 ,6-7 ,18,27, 39,49,113,166,173-175,207,219.
74 Wood, The Creation o f the American Republic, 129-133; Wood, The Radicalism o f the American 
Revolution, pp. 7-11, 129, 162-164, 183-189, 217-218; Thomas Jefferson, A Summary View o f the 
Rights o f British America (1774; reprinted by Colonial Williamsburg, n.d.), p. 22.
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token, government became a Rousseauian corrective to individual imperfection— 
what Paine termed “the badge of lost innocence.”75
Setting, costume, accoutrements, posture and gaze: all seem to have 
contributed to the imag[in]ing of identity in eighteenth-century portraiture, their 
combined influence suggesting that colonial emulation of the grand-manner portrait 
was increasingly modified at some point in the 1760s, reflecting emerging 
sensibilities about the nature of liberty and its implications for the American 
narrative. But the use of technique in the work of Copley and others invites further 
consideration. Copley’s portrait of John Hancock, for example, is all the more 
compelling for the clarity and crispness of his method. Indeed, the enamel-like 
surface recalls Vertue’s criticism of Ramsay’s “rather lick’t than pencilled”
7 f \conversational technique. In the language of Reynolds, Hancock is more 
“mechanical” than Sparhccwk and, so, more suggestive of the artist’s ignorance. Yet 
neither Copley nor Hancock would have brooked such slander. Moreover, the 
technique appears to have been employed consciously and purposefully, for a similar 
development informs Charles Pelham (Fig. 7-13; ca. 1753-1754; oil on canvas, 36 x 
28 inches; Private Collection) and Paul Revere (Fig. 7-14; 1768; oil on canvas, 35 x 
28-1/2 inches; Museum of Fine Arts, Boston): in the former, earlier image, a 
common artisan is transformed into a literate gentleman; in the latter, later image, the 
attributes of an artisan-silversmith are celebrated with an overt—indeed, defiant— 
clarity.
75 Paine, Common Sense, p. 24. As Paine explained it, “Society is produced by our wants, and 
government by our wickedness, the former promotes our happiness positively, by uniting our 
affections, the latter negatively by restraining our vices. The one encourages intercourse, the other 
creates distinctions.” See Paine, Common Sense, p. 24.
76 Bindman, Hogarth, p. 146.
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The qualities of Copley’s colonial technique are commonly attributed, at least 
in part, to the influence of mezzotints on colonial painting.77 And certainly, the 
linearity of colonial portrait painting likely owes much to the linearity of imported 
prints. But there is a curious coincidence between the developing influence of 
empirical modes of analysis and Copley’s technical interest in the material quality of 
his subject-matter, the expanding influence of individualism and Copley’s growing 
emphasis on the singularity of his subjects. Indeed, that Copley should paradoxically 
progress from the soft, painterly brush and muted tones of Epes Sargent (Fig. 7-15; 
ca. 1760; oil on canvas, 49-7/8 x 40 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington)—a 
technique, Spencer (Fig. 7-2) suggests, he re-employed in England,—to the hard, 
enamel-like colors and finish of Hancock, a progress which belies conventional civic
77 Carrie Rebora, Paul Staiti, Theodore Stebbins and Marjorie Shelley all note this influence in Rebora 
and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, pp. 15, 33, 41, 66, 79, 129-130. Indeed, Rebora traces 
its long-standing history in “Copley and Art History,” in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in 
America, p. 15.
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Fig. 74S
humanist assumptions about the intellectual and technical prowess informing general 
and particular styles of painting, is suggestive of alternative aesthetic influences.
As already suggested, there was in fact precedent for Copley’s style, most 
notably in the work of Allan Ramsay, whose “natural” style likewise evoked the 
clarity and intimacy found in Copley’s work.78 In addition to the Drummore portrait 
(Fig. 5-1), Ramsay’s Mrs. William Adam (Fig. 7-16; 1754; oil on canvas, 37 x 28 
inches; Yale Center for British Art) betrays a concern for individual realism enhanced 
by clean lines, a limited palette, a shock of color, and an inescapable engagement 
between subject and spectator. Thirty years later, Raeburn was still employing a
78 As Smart notes, the wife of the architect William Adam and mother of Robert Adam is “presented in 
widow’s weeds, with a book and a pair of spectacles in her hands, and once more the colour-scheme is 
largely one of black with a restrained note o f red. It would be hard to find a parallel in British 
portraiture of the period to the intimate realism of this picture.” See Smart, Allan Ramsay, p. 106.
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“lick’t” technique and like palette in his Lady in a Lace Cap (Fig. 7-17; ca. 1785; oil 
on canvas, 36-1/4 x 28 inches; National Gallery of Scotland, Edinburgh).79 It is
Fig, 746 Fig.'747
thus interesting to note the supposed influence of common-sense theory on Raeburn’s 
80work. Might not Copley, too, if only inadvertently, have been influenced by the 
same paragons of empiricism, individualism, and patriotism—Hume, Locke, 
Bolingbroke, Karnes—, the same advocates of industry, education and progress—
79 For a discussion of this image, see Duncan Thomson, Raeburn (Edinburgh: Scottish National 
Portrait Gallery, 1997), pp. 48-51.
80 Broadie writes: “Raeburn... produced strongly evocative portraits of major figures of the 
Enlightenment, such as Robertson, Reid, Ferguson, Hutton and Dugald Stewart. He not only painted 
the philosophers; he knew them personally and was familiar with their writings, including their 
writings on perception. There is evidence that his art was influenced by those writings, particularly 
Reid’s... concerning the painter’s need to paint not what is signified by the various patterns of light 
and shade, but instead the light and shade themselves and to leave it to the spectator to interpret the 
patterns that the painter has put on canvas.” See Broadie, The Scottish Enlightenment, p. 31.
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Smith, Reid, Stewart—, that Jefferson was urging in 1771 for inclusion in Robert 
Skipwith’s library?81
Considered in this context, Copley’s portraits of Hancock and Revere seem to 
privilege the material qualities of subject and object at the expense of theoretical 
truths He seems to suggest that knowledge depends on the external evidence of 
internal forms and, hence, that the artisan might employ his mechanical powers to 
advance the rational good, a point driven home by the dramatic illumination of 
Revere’s head and hands. This represents a contradiction of Reynolds’s seventh 
Discourse (December 1776), which argued: “success in your art depends almost 
entirely on your own industry; .. .not the industry of the hands, but of the mind. .. ,”82
Fig, 748
81 A Virginia Gentleman’s Library. As proposed by Thomas Jefferson to Robert Skipwith in 1771 and 
now assembled in the Brush-Everard House, Williamsburg, Virginia, introduction by Arthur Pierce 
Middleton (Colonial Williamsburg, 1952)
82 Reynolds, Discourses on Art, p. 117.
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In fact, the use of dramatic lighting is characteristic of Copley’s mature 
colonial work. It is found, for example, in Samuel Adams (Fig. 7-18; 1770-1772; oil 
on canvas, 50 x 40-1/4 inches; Museum of Fine Arts, Boston), where the effect is 
augmented by a monochromatic palette. Here, the merchant-politician is depicted in 
sturdy brown homespun, his starched white linen and powdered hair the only escape 
from an otherwise-monotonous color scheme. And yet, it is by these means that the 
effect of illumination is made all the more successful, for little distracts us from the 
enlightened face and hands—the engaging eyes and emphatic gesture—that 
metaphorically convey the complementary union of education and industry—the 
pillars of self-sufficiency—in the person of this sitter. Behind Adams, almost 
obscured by shadow, is the classical column that confirms his public stature, but its 
very faintness suggests redundancy: we can recognize Adams as a Public Man on the 
evidence of his “enlightenment” alone. A like effect is achieved in Gilbert Stuart’s 
“Vaughan” portrait of George Washington (Fig. 7-19; 1795; oil on canvas, 29 x 23-
Fig. 7-19
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3/4 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington). In this image, such a force is 
Washington’s mind—and, so, his virtue—that it casts a halo behind him.
Fig, 7-20
According to the evidence of Copley’s Nicholas Boylston (Fig. 7-20; 1767; oil 
on canvas, 49 x 40 inches; Harvard University Portrait Collection), costume provided 
an alternative means for conveying intellectual agility. Here, seated in a rococo side 
chair beside a covered table topped with thick ledgers, fronting a view of Boston 
harbor, the Boston merchant dons the banyan and robe of the humanist thinker. One 
might recall the words of Machiavelli:
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When evening comes, I return to my home, and I go into my study; and on the 
threshold, I take off my everyday clothes, which are covered with mud and 
mire, and I put on regal and curial robes; and dressed in a more appropriate 
manner I enter into the ancient courts of ancient men...; and there I am not 
ashamed to speak to them, to ask them the reasons for their actions; and they, 
in their humanity, answer me...: I become completely part of them.8 J
Although not absent in British painting, such allusions were usually reserved 
for more noted intellectuals. Reynolds’s portraits, Samuel Johnson (Fig. 5-6) and 
Laurence Sterne (Fig. 7-21; 1761; oil on canvas, 50-1/8 x 39-1/2 inches; National 
Portrait Gallery, London), serve as examples of a model that may have originated
with Kneller—note John Locke (Fig. 7-22; 1704; oil on canvas, 30 x 25-1/2 inches;
Virginia Museum of Fine Arts, Richmond)—before adoption by Richardson, William 
Hoare, and others—note Richard Boyle, Third Earl o f Burlington (Fig. 7-23; ca. 
1717-1719; oil on canvas, 57-1/2 x 46 inches; National Portrait Gallery, London) and 
83 Machiavelli, Letter to Vettori; quoted in Grafton, introduction, The Prince, p. xix.
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Alexander Pope (Fig. 7-24; ca. 1738; pastel, 23-7/8 x 17-3/4 inches; National Portrait 
Gallery, London). Moreover, while such claims were conventionally deemed a
privilege of leisure, Boylston rests his title, literally and figuratively, on his ledgers. 
Once again, the virtues of intellect are supported by the virtues of industry, 
paradoxically redressing the neo-Country correlation between intellect and birth.
Significantly, precedent for Copley’s breach of the civic humanist narrative 
can be found among the works of Kneller, whose kit-kat portrait of Jacob Tonson I  
(Fig. 7-25; 1717; oil on canvas, 36 x 28 inches; National Portrait Gallery, London) 
depicts the successful tradesman-printer in similar dress. That Tonson bears a copy 
of Milton’s Paradise Lost serves as a cleverly deceptive double-entendre: the overt 
reference to Tonson’s intellectualism obscures the equally-relevant reference to 
Tonson’s business and the financial benefits he reaped from the book’s copyright. 
But it also masks the political undertones resonant in Milton’s work. As Paulson
Fig. 7-23 Fig, 7-24
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notes, the “antimonarchical and revolutionary (indeed, regicidal) politics” in Milton’s 
work were “repoliticize[d]” by Hogarth, who highlighted “the Protestant-Whig
Fig, 7-25 Fig, 7-26
element” of “the ‘great English poem’,” most notably its emphasis on “the liberty of 
human choice.”84 Ultimately, Tonson suggests, Copley’s Boylston captures the 
merchant’s rights to claim for himself the Englishman’s liberties—in this case, the 
autonomous intellect of the landed elite. The same point is made in Richardson’s 
own Self-Portrait (Fig. 7-26; 1729; oil on canvas 29 x 24-3/4 inches; National Portrait 
Gallery, London), which captures the aspiring intellectual in his own banyan and 
robe.
84 Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxvii. Paulson adds: “It was the Miltonic association with 
liberty (vs. tyrannous confinement) that Addison invoked in his ‘Pleasures o f the Imagination’.... 
Toland, a more radical Whig, celebrated Milton the apostle of liberty.... Toland argued that ‘to 
display the different Effects of Liberty and Tyranny, is the chief design o f his Paradise Lost See
Paulson, The Analysis o f Beauty, p. xxvii.
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Increasingly, an expressive handling of light and darkness seems to have 
supplanted a representational use of costume and accoutrements. Copley’s 
illumination of the human head as a metaphorical reference to the human intellect 
suggests the growing influence of internalization on eighteenth-century portraiture. 
Henry Raeburn presents another case in point. His representational image of the 
enlightened farmer-scientist, James Hutton (Fig. 7-27; 1787; oil on canvas, 49-1/4 x 
41-1/4 inches; Scottish National Portrait Gallery, Edinburgh), serves as a point-of-
comparison for his later and more expressive works, David Anderson (Fig. 7-28; ca. 
1790; oil on canvas, 60 x 46-1/2 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington) and Sir 
John Clerk and Lady Clerk o f Penicuik (Fig. 7-29; 1792; oil on canvas, 57 x 80-1/2
85 For a discussion of this image, see Thomson, Raeburn, pp. 66-69.
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inches; National Gallery of Ireland, Dublin), each of which explores the technical 
properties and effects of light as a means of conveying, at least in part, an otherwise
invisible, internal process.86
nill
Fig. 7-21
Fig. 7-29
86 With reference to Penicuik, Thomson writes: '''Contre-jour portraits [are those in which]... the 
principal forms are placed against a strong light source so that they are essentially dark by contrast, 
their outlines clearly defined and their inner forms verifiable mainly by the ambient light that travels 
back by weakened reflection....” (Thomson, Raeburn, p. 75) See Duncan Thomson, Raeburn, pp. 74- 
76, 116-117.
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As the inward-looking self-examination of the early eighteenth century— 
intended, as Shaftesbury explained it, for the advancement of human understanding— 
gave way to the impassioned self-discovery of the later eighteenth century—intended, 
as Rousseau described it, as a medium of human re-engagement with the meaning of 
life—, the affects on portraiture became even more pronounced. Images like 
Wright’s Brooke Boothby (Fig. 4-2), of 1781, which located their subject in natural 
settings as a means of metaphorically re-uniting them with their natural, moral selves, 
became images like Mather Brown’s provocative William Vans Murray (Fig. 7-30; 
1787; oil on canvas, 30-1/8 x 25 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington), a
Fig, 7-30
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transition visually mediated by the likes of Ramsay’s David Hume (Fig. 4-3), in 
which a Rembrandtesque use of cast light intensifies the emphasis on internal 
character.87
In William Vans Murray, the empirical, enamel-like realism of Samuel Adams 
has given way to an intense, imaginative and impassioned brushwork that visually 
translates the internal workings of the subject’s mind onto canvas through the 
plasticity of pigment and the manipulation of brush.88 In such imagery, the 
representative gives way to the expressive—to the act of discovery, the internal 
pursuit itself.89 And yet, for all its painterly boldness, for all the resulting appearance 
of a classical swag-cum-fiery backdrop, for all the blurred delineations between 
figure and background, Murray’s countenance remains paradoxically controlled. It is 
as though Brown has provided us with the two halves of the divided self: the 
impassioned, natural and internal self and the controlled, civilized and external 
persona. A similar intent appears to inform Copley’s John Quincy Adams (Fig. 7-31; 
1796; oil on canvas, 30 x 25 inches; Museum of Fine Arts, Boston) and John
87 Smart, Allan Ramsay, pp. 206-208.
88 In art, revelation leads to articulation leads to manifestation; art becomes a medium for expressing 
nature and the artist becomes a surrogate creator. As Taylor explains it: “Manifesting reality involves 
the creation of new forms which give articulation to an inchoate vision....” (Taylor, p. 379) Thus “In 
the perfect work of [Romantic] art, the ‘matter’—the language... or the material—should be entirely 
taken up in the manifestation; and reciprocally, what is manifested ought to be available only in the 
symbol, and not merely pointed to as an independent object whose nature could be defined in some 
other medium.” (Taylor, p. 379) As Abrams likewise observes, the increasingly “expressive” mode of 
Romantic art was manifest in “the internal made external, resulting from a creative process operating 
under the impulse of feeling, and embodying the combined product of the poet’s perceptions, thoughts, 
and feelings.” (Abrams, p. 22) ). Or, in Coleridge’s words, ‘“to make the external internal, the internal 
external, to make nature thought, and thought nature,—this is the mystery o f genius in the Fine Arts’.” 
(Hazlitt, quoted in Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 53) By the late eighteenth century, Taylor 
adds, verbal and visual languages had “come to be seen not only or mainly as directed to the correct 
portrayal of an independent reality but also as our way of manifesting through expression what we are, 
and our place within things.” (Taylor, p. 198) See Taylor, pp. 198, 379; Abrams, pp. 22, 52-53.
89 Taylor, pp. 376-379.
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Trumbull’s Alexander Hamilton (Fig. 7-32; ca. 1792; oil on canvas, 30-1/4 x 24 1/8 
inches; National Gallery, Washington).90
Fig, 7-31 Fig. 7-32
Portraits of women were not exempt from the visual manipulations of the neo- 
Country narrative resonant in Revolutionary portraits of American men. As the 
classical attributes of the landed peer were stretched to fit the propertied man, so the 
sister attributes of the leisured lady were stretched to redress the colonial mistress. 
Take, for example, Copley’s companion portraits Ezekiel Goldthwait and Mrs.
Ezekiel Goldthwait (Figs. 7-33, 7-34; 1771; oil on canvas, 50 x 40 inches (each); 
Museum of Fine Arts, Boston). In the case of Mr. Goldthwait, Copley’s use of a 
monochromatic palette with white highlights—a tactic he employed in Samuel Adams 
a year earlier—draws the viewer’s attention to Goldthwait’s head and hands: the
90 Here, the significance o f the “lamp” metaphor—the casting of light—becomes apparent. See 
Abrams, The Mirror and the Lamp, p. 52.
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instrument and medium of his progress. Similarly, a tassel and swag allude to the 
sitter’s public merits. But the same holds true for the portrait of his wife. Indeed,
differences in the two images turn on the potentiality of their respective genders: if 
esteem comes to Ezekiel Goldthwait by virtue of his commercial and political roles, it 
arises to Mrs. Goldthwait by virtue of her domestic one—her role as wife and mother; 
whereas he bears the conversational accoutrements of quill and correspondence—, 
she grasps the domestic emblems of her fertility. Moreover, both engage the viewer’s 
gaze.
A similar allusion to the complementary and interdependent nature of public 
(male) and private (female) life, public (male) and private (female) attributes, is made 
by Copley’s Mr. and Mrs. Thomas Mifflin (Fig. 7-35; 1773; oil on ticking, 60-1/2 x 
48 inches; Philadelphia Museum of Art). Once again, Copley highlights the mediums 
of human progress—education (signified by the book) and industry (signified by the
Fig, 7-33 Fig, 744
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fringe-making).91 At the same time, he clearly indicates that this is Mrs. Mifflin’s 
sphere of influence: it is she who occupies the foreground, to her that Mr. Mifflin 
defers his gaze, it is she who commands the spectator, and her chair that anchors the 
classical pillar.
Fig. 7-35
Precedent for this concession to women in portraits may be found throughout 
the oeuvres of major British painters; Reynolds, Gainsborough, Romney, Raeburn 
and Hogarth all recorded the female virtues and the public benefits of domestic life. 
What stands out, however, are the varying types of attributes British artists chose to
91 Neff, John Singleton Copley in England, p. 108.
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render. On the one hand, the attribute of fertility—as evidenced directly by the 
inclusion of children or metaphorically through the use of emblems (such as fruit)—
Fig, 7-36 Fig, 7-37
Fig, 7-38 Fig, 7-39
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Daughter Mary (Fig. 7-36; Unknown artist; ca. 1671-1674; oil on canvas, 42-1/2 x 
36-3/4 inches; Worcester Art Museum) to Stephen Slaughter’s A Lady and Child 
(Fig. 7-37; 1745; oil on canvas, 51-1/6 x 41 inches; National Gallery of Ireland), from 
George Beare’s An Elderly Lady and a Young Girl (Fig. 7-38; 1747; oil on canvas, 
49-1/16 x 40-1/4 inches; Yale Center for British Art), to Earl’s Mrs. Elijah Boardman 
and Son (Fig. 7-39; ca. 1796, oil on canvas, 85-1/4 x 56-1/4 inches; Huntington 
Gallery). The same may be said of references to female youth, modesty, grace, and
beauty, be they emblematic—note the swag of flowers in Benjamin West’s Jane 
Galloway (Fig. 7-40; ca. 1757; oil on canvas, 49-3/4 x 39-1/4 inches; Historical
Society of Pennsylvania)—or descriptive—as in Joseph Blackburn’s Mrs. James Pitts 
(Fig. 7-41; 1757; oil on canvas, 50 x 40 inches; Detroit Institute of Arts) and George 
Romneys’s Mrs. Thomas Scott Jackson (Fig. 7-42; ca. 1770/1773; oil on canvas, 94-
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1/8 x 57-7/8 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington). What varies over time 
and place are references to education, industry and even politics, allusions to which
F I | S 7 - 4 1  Fig. 7-43
may be found even among the most mechanical images—note the backdrop of books 
in Winthrop Chandler’s Mrs. Samuel Chandler (Fig. 7-43; ca. 1780; oil on canvas, 
54-3/4 x 47-7/8 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington). A good example of this 
is Sarah Mifflin’s fringe-making.
John Wollaston’s Miss Rebecca Beekman (?) (Fig. 7-44; 1749-1752; oil on 
canvas, 52-1/2 x 42-3/8; Art Institute of Chicago) gives evidence of the early use of 
gaze and industry in female imagery, with which Reynolds’s portrait, Anne, Countess 
o f Albemarle (Fig. 7-45; 1759; oil on canvas, 49-2/3 x 39-3/4 inches; National 
Gallery, London) might be readily compared. In all three images—Mifflin, Beekman, 
and Albemarle—, a seated female is interrupted in her work—be it fringe-m aking or
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“knotting”—to monitor the trespass of voyeur-spectators, an action which requires
ocular engagement with the (potentially male) viewer. The effect of this engagement 
is to place subject and spectator on a visually-equal footing while granting the female 
subject the psychological edge. On the one hand, such boldness on the part of a
% m m  w'-1*1 —
Fig, 7-44 Fig, 7-4S
female subject contradicts traditional interpretations of female modesty and 
acquiescence. On the other hand, it invokes the authority of women in the domestic 
sphere.
There is some disagreement about the role and experience of women during 
the eighteenth century. The patriarchal premise of Christian hierarchy which 
informed settlement patterns in New England endorsed a communal view of society 
in which the family served as a micro-unit and the head of household (potentially a
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widow) operated as the lowest rung of the political ladder.92 Familial and political 
structures were thus entwined. Different settlement patterns in the Chesapeake South, 
where immigrants were commonly unmarried Anglican men driven by economic 
motivations—many of whom were indentured servants (unmarried and unlikely to 
become so during the term of their indenture)—discouraged any political emphasis on 
family.93 There—perhaps even more so than in England—, familial and political 
structures were distinct entities, one being a “private” realm of male and female, the 
other a “public” realm of men.94
The division between private and public spheres informing Chesapeake 
settlement patterns echoed the development of classical republicanism in sixteenth- 
and seventeenth-century England. As Mary Beth Norton and Linda Kerber have each 
noted, classicism resolved the private-public tensions of patriarchal order by 
separating the spheres of private (family) and public (political) life and subverting the 
former to the latter, the private realm becoming a base of support for the public one.95 
Eventually, Locke drew on this separation to explain the transition from a natural 
(familial) to an artificial (political) society—from a community of families to the
92 As Mary Beth Norton explains, early Puritan settles envisioned a hierarchical sociopolitical order 
based on a divinely-imposed inequality o f functions. While all souls were deemed equal, secular 
society was thought naturally hierarchical and complementary—interdependent—in which “each 
person ‘might have need o f other’ [that]... ‘they might be all knitt more nearly together in the bond of 
brotherly affeccion’,” as John Winthrop wrote in “A Modell of Christian Charity” (1630). Quoted in 
Norton, Founding Mothers and Fathers: Gendered Power and the Forming o f American Society (New 
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1996), p. 9.
93 Norton, Founding Mothers and Fathers, p. 13.
94 Norton, Founding Mothers and Fathers, pp. 21-22.
95 Norton, Founding Mothers and Fathers, pp. 10-11, and Linda Kerber, Women o f  the Republic: 
Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America (Chapel Hill: University ofNorth Carolina Press, 
1980), p. 7. As T. A. Sinclair notes, this money-earning, extralegal class of private men was sizable, 
even in Aristotle’s time, yet they were virtually absent from the public sphere; “he has little to say 
about them except that they are a possible source of discontent and a danger to the established order.” 
See Sinclair, in Aristotle, The Politics, p. 23.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
284
community of the State—as one of contract between male heads-of-household.96 
However, one consequence of this structural separation was a formal gendering of 
politics: whereas the private sphere of the family was of mixed gender, the public 
sphere of politics was decidedly male.
In Wollaston’s Beekman, a young lady sits in an imagined, architecturally- 
framed liminal space, an open view of a wooded landscape, and a portion of a 
marble-topped pier table, gracing the space behind her. Costumed in a rich and shiny 
satin dress adorned with delicate lace, Rebecca casts the viewer a pleasant smile 
before demurely returning to her knotting. Fingers gently curl around a marquis­
shaped shuttle and delicately grasp the taut thread. There is no reference to column or 
swag.
Ten years later, Reynolds captured the “ancient peeress” and grand-daughter 
of Charles II in a more sophisticated version of a similar composition.97 Donning a 
blue and white floral damask dress with applique ruching, topped by a black silk 
mantle spattered with floral sprigs, Lady Anne Lennox occupies a domestic setting 
emblematically augmented by classical drapery. Despite the swag, a modest side 
table supports a wicker work-basket and open scissors beside the upholstered and 
brass nail-headed chair she occupies. Significantly, Reynolds’s portrait of Lady Anne 
preceded his formal commitment to the grand-style portrait and the political 
developments of the Revolution. Like Johnson (Fig. 5-6) and Sterne (Fig. 7-21), it 
suggests the influence of Ramsay’s conversational manner while simultaneously
96 Norton, Founding Mothers and Fathers, p. 11.
97 Mannings, Reynolds, I, p. 287.
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alluding to the Anglo-Protestant virtues of industry and domesticity. And like
Rebecca Beekman, she engages in “knotting.”
According to William Pressley, “knotting was a favored pastime for ladies,
acceptable even at court, as it avoided the appearance of idleness while allowing the
practitioner to display feminine grace and dexterity.”98 As suggested by Beekman
and Albemarle, respectively, he goes on, with “younger sitters it is the coquettish
aspects that are emphasized, while with older women it is industriousness that is
celebrated.”99 In this latter usage, the act of knotting (as opposed to rosary-telling)
bore Protestant (as opposed to Catholic) political connotations. As Pressly explains:
“The second stanza of the poem The Royal Knotter, first published in 1704, makes
this point when praising [the Protestant] Queen Mary [II]:
‘Bless’d we! Who from such Queens are freed,
Who by vain Superstition led,
Are always telling Beads;
But here’s a Queen, no, thanks to God,
Who, when she rides in Coach abroad,
Is always knotting Threads.. .’.”100
In the imag[in]ed identity of Sarah Mifflin, the two functions of feminine 
grace and Protestant industry appear to converge. Instead of knotting, however, 
which, while emblematic of industry bore no immediate correlation with dutied 
imports, Mrs. Mifflin is engaged in fringe-making: the production of household 
trimmings which, like more intricate textiles, were generally imported from
98 William L. Pressly, “The Challenge ofNew Horizons,” in Neff, John Singleton Copley in England, 
p. 48.
Pressly, “The Challenge ofNew Horizons,” in Neff, p. 48.
100 Pressly, “The Challenge ofNew Horizons,” in N eff fh. 67, pp. 49-50.
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England.101 And this recalls the political purposes that knotting metaphorically 
served. While displaying her grace and dexterity to full advantage, Copley uses the 
medium of fringe-making not only to assert Sarah’s support for nonimportation, but 
to make the proper correlation between nonimportation and the virtues of industry 
inform ing the Anglo-Protestant narrative.
Fig, 7-46
Once again, precedent for more politicized female imagery can be found in 
the work of Hogarth. Indeed, Miss Mary Edwards (Fig. 7-46; 1742; oil on canvas, 
49-3/4 x 39-7/8 inches; Frick Collection, New York) stands as a female counterpart to 
the freeholder image of John Beale Bordley. Like Bordley, she draws on the 
materials of English history—materials affiliated with the causes of English
101 Staiti, in Rebora and Staiti, John Singleton Copley in America, pp. 318-321.
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patriotism and liberty—to address contemporary political and ideological questions. 
For example, bearing a copy of an address delivered by Elizabeth I to her troops, she 
urges:
Remember Englishmen the Laws the Rights The generous plan of power 
deliver’d down from age to age by your renown’d Forefathers[,] So dearly 
bought [at] the price of so much contest[.] Transmit it carefully to Posterity[;] 
Do though great Liberty inspire their Souls And make their lives in they 
possession happy or die glorious in thy Just defence.
In this image, surrounded by a blending of classical accoutrements and 
domestic furnishings, Mary Edwards receives and returns the male gaze. On the one 
Iwiff in casting Miss Edwards’s domestic influence as a classical attribute—note the 
column and swag—, Hogarth conveys her public significance as a guardian of the 
private sphere. That she can engage the male gaze without loss of decorum only 
reaffirms her proper authority. But he also alludes to her political significance as a 
defender of English virtue. Through emblematic references to Elizabeth I and Alfred 
the Great, Hogarth aligned Mary Edwards with the native virtues and fortitude of 
England’s “Virgin” Queen and “Patriot” King.103 Decades before the Revolution, 
then, there is visual precedent for the allegiance of female colonists with the “ancient 
rights and liberties” of English Protestantism.
102 Bindman, Hogarth and his Times, p. 47.
1<b Bindman adds: “Such neo-Elizabeth ideals are unmistakably present in Hogarth's grand portrait of 
Miss Mary Edwards of 1742 (fig. 11). She is depicted with the busts of Queen Elizabeth and King 
Alfred in the background, reading from Elizabeth's defiant address to the English troops as they went 
out to fight the Spaniards at Tilbury....” (Bindman, p. 47) He continues: “Though the paintings 
iconography probably owed more the patron's desires than to the painter, it confirms Hogarth's 
familiarity with Patriot ideology....” (Bindman, p. 47) Indeed, Hogarth’s Election series would seem 
to confirm his Opposition bias, as “expressed in Bolingbroke’s Letters on the Spirit o f Patriotism, 
published in 1749 but written some years before,... [in which he] argues for an end to opposing 
parties in favour of a 'Patriot King' to trascend factionalism, as the great British monarchs Alfred and 
Elizabeth I had done before him.” (Bindman, p. 50) See Bindman, Hogarth and his Times, pp. 45-50.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
288
According to Kerber, a peculiar feature of the mid-century rebellion against 
British policy was the need to engage women in politics. “Although consumer 
boycotts seem to have been devised by men,” she writes, “they were predicated on the 
support of women, both as consumers... and as manufacturers.”104 Mifflin’s fringe- 
making might thus be understood as an individual variation on the communal 
“spinning bee,” which, according to Gary Nash, transformed domestic industries 
“into a patriotic activity and a symbol of defiance against England.”105 In this guise, 
Sarah Mifflin’s image recalls the 1774 agreement signed by fifty-one women in 
Edenton, North Carolina, which, according to Norton, “declared their ‘sincere 
adherence’ to the resolves of the provincial Congress and proclaimed it their ‘duty’ to 
do ‘everything as far as lies in our power’ to support the ‘publick good’.”106
Significantly, the needs of rebellion laid the foundation for post-Revolutionary 
social change within the family and between the familial and political spheres. On 
the one hand, the private, domestic realm of family life became the recognized sphere 
of female authority.107 By the same token, however, the solidification of the female 
domestic role inversely affected her political one: for all their influence in the social
104 Kerber, ‘“History Can Do It No Justice’: Women and the Reinterpretation of the American 
Revolution,” in Hoffman and Albert, eds., Women in the Age o f Revolution (Charlottesville: University 
Press of Virginia, 1989), p. 18.
105 Nash, quoted in Kerber, ‘“History Can Do It No Justice’,” in Hoffman and Albert, eds., Women in 
the Age o f Revolution, p. 19. Kerber explains: “The boycotts were an occasion for instruction in 
collective political behavior, formalized by the signing o f petitions and manifestos. In 1767, both men 
an dwomen signed the Association, promising not to import dutied items.” By these means, Kerber 
adds, “men and women devised a political ritual congruent with women’s understanding of their 
domestic roles and readily incorporated into their daily routines.” See Kerber, “‘History Can Do It No 
Justice’,” in Hoffman and Albert, eds., Women in the Age o f Revolution, p. 19.
106 Norton, Liberty’s Daughters: The Revolutionary Experience o f American Women, 1750-1800 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press (1980), 1996),p. 160.
107 This is supported by Kerber, who argues that the nature of female authority was expanded and 
solidified during the Revolutionary period, although women did not breach the political barrier to 
citizenship. See Kerber, “‘History Can Do It No Justice’,” in Hoffman and Albert, eds., Women in the
Age of Revolution, pp. 31-33, 38-39.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
289
community, women became more certainly non-public.108 Indeed, Kerber argues, the 
standard of female identity came to turn on a model of “Republican Motherhood,” 
which united traditional female virtues with the political demands of republican 
ideology.109 In this role, as “custodianjs] of civic morality,” one hundred women 
from Hartford, Connecticut, joined in 1786 to form a “Patriotic and Economical 
Association” encouraging “industry, frugality, and neatness” at home.110 The 
influence of this role was likewise felt in contemporary debates over female 
education.111
108 According to Susan Juster, republican politics engaged a monastic fraternity that celebrated 
manliness against the effeminacy o f a Courtly England. Although women played an active role in the 
rebellion, their political use was temporary; after the War, they were consciously marginalized. (Juster, 
pp. 135, 138-143) As Linda Kerber likewise notes, “Even the most radical American men had not 
intended to make a revolution in the status of their wives and sisters.” (Kerber, Women o f the Republic, 
p. 9) See Susan Juster, Disorderly Women: Sexual Politics and Evangelicalism in Revolutionary New 
England (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), pp. 135, 138-143; Linda Kerber, Woman o f the 
Republic: Intellect and Ideology in Revolutionary America, pp. 7-9.
109 Republican Mothers “would devote their efforts to... raising sons and disciplining husbands to be 
virtuous citizens o f the Republic.” (Kerber, p. 285) Mary Beth Norton has likewise noted the “new 
stress on the household as the source o f virtue and stability in government.” (Norton, p. 243) See 
Linda Kerber, Women o f the Republic, p. 285; Mary Beth Norton, Liberty’s Daughters, p. 243.
110 Kerber, Women o f the Republic, p. 11; Norton, Liberty’s Daughters, pp. 245-249.
111 Norton, Liberty’s Daughters, p. 255. Judith Sargent Murray described the female ideal in The 
Gleaner: “a sensible and informed woman—companionable and serious—possessing also a facility of 
temper, and united to a congenial mind—blest with competency—and rearing to maturity a promising 
family of children.” (Murray; quoted in Norton, Liberty’s Daughters, p. 271) As Kerber explains: “A 
revolution in women’s education had been underway in England and America when the Revolution 
began; in postwar America the ideology o f female education came to be tied to ideas about the sort of 
woman who would be o f greatest service to the Republic.... On the one hand, republican political 
theory called for a sensibly educated female citizenry to educate future generations of sensible 
republicans; on the other, domestic tradition condemned highly educated women as perverse threats to 
family stability.” (Kerber, Women o f the Republic, p. 10)
The notion of female education conflicted with traditional notions of femininity. Jonathan 
Richardson thought his wife better kept “Ignorant of what is best unknown.” As Gibson-Wood notes, 
“Whereas Richardson steadfastly maintained the importance o f thinking through issues like religion for 
oneself, he, like many of his contemporaries, believed that this applied only to men. He clearly 
regarded as ideal his wife’s supportive but subordinate role in his life.” (Gibson-Wood, Jonathan 
Richardson, pp. 39-40,46, 49, 54) The two positions are taken up in Burney’s Evelina (1778), in 
which Villars, on the one hand, encourages Evelina’s development of “discretion” and “thought” 
towards “virtue in action,” “gentleness and modesty” as well as “fortitude and firmness,” whereas Lord 
Merton, on the other hand, deems “beauty and good-nature” the only requirements of women, “every 
thing else [being]... either impertinent or unnatural.” (Edward A. and Lillian D. Bloom, introduction to 
Burney, Evelina, p. xxii, and Burney, Evelina, pp. 217 and 361) By 1796, however, Burney had 
written with regard to Miss Maryland: “though a passion for beauty was still as fashionable as it was 
natural, the time was past when the altar of Hymen required no other incense to blaze upon it.”
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The significance of the Mifflin portrait for the interpretation of female identity 
is thus fourfold: it links the attributes of women with industry and industry with 
Anglo-Protestant virtue; it bridges the gap between private attributes and public good 
not only by way of a classicized setting, but by making the domestic sphere and its 
female agent the source of public virtue; by extension, it transforms the female
subject into a political agent; and, in the process, places her on an equal footing with
112the male spectator.
In Copley’s British work, Mrs. Seymour Fort (?) (Fig. 7-47; ca. 1776-1780; 
oil on canvas, 49-1/2 x 39-5/8 inches; Wadsworth Atheneum, Hartford), a domestic 
interior augmented by a classical swag frames a seated subject engaged in “knotting.”
(Burney, Camilla, p. 747) See Norton, Liberty’s Daughters, pp. 255,263-294; Kerber, Women o f the 
Republic, pp. 10-11; Gibson-Wood, Jonathan Richardson, pp. 39-40,46,49, 54; Edward A. and 
Lillian D. Bloom, introduction to Burney, Evelina, p. xxii; Burney, Evelina, pp. 217, 361; Richardson, 
Camilla, p. 747.
112 In the end, Kerber writes, “virtue would become for women what honor was for men: a private 
psychological stance laden with political overtones.” Kerber, “‘History Can Do It No Justice’,” in 
Hoffman and Albert, eds., Women in the Age o f Revolution, p. 39.
Pig. 7-47 Fig. 7-48
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A decade and a half later, Gilbert Stuart’s Mrs. Richard Yates (Fig. 7-48; 1793/4; oil 
on canvas, 30-1/4 x 25 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington) dispensed with 
the classical swag while retaining the image of the industrious subject. Both portraits 
present the sitters as arbiters of the (male) gaze. Against such images of female
industry and authority, grand-manner portraits asserted a more traditional model. 
Reynolds’s Duchess o f Devonshire (Fig. 6-8), of 1775-1776, and The Ladies 
Waldegrave (Fig. 7-49; 1780; oil on canvas, 56-1/2 x 66 inches; National Gallery,
Scotland), suggest neither the industry nor the authority of his Albemarle portrait. 
Indeed, both highlight the passive role of women as private objects of display and
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acquisition. Whereas Duchess o f Devonshire celebrates the grace and beauty of an 
aristocratic wife, for example, The Ladies Waldegrave appears like a P.R. poster for 
prospective suitors: health (read fertility), beauty (undoubtedly genetic), modesty, 
refinement (literacy, artistry, and domesticity): all this (and more) can be yours; only 
the qualified (well-born, well-bred, well-endowed) need apply. Through images such 
as these, female figures became passive recipients of a consuming male gaze for 
which they tacitly displayed a virtuous package of private benefits.
By the same token, whereas the Mifflin portrait subordinated the male 
spectator to the female subject, thereby alluding to female authority in the domestic 
sphere, Reynolds’s group portrait of the Temple family, George Grenville, Earl
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Temple, Mary, Countess Temple, and their son Richard (Fig. 7-50; 1780-1782; oil on 
canvas, 94-3/4 x 72 inches; National Gallery of Ireland, Dublin), places emphasis on 
the male progeny arising from domestic relations. In this pyramid composition,
Mary, Countess Temple, takes a subordinate role to her husband and son, ranking 
somewhere between the white male heir and the black male servant—a measure of 
her place in the traditional social hierarchy. By the same token, the classical column 
arises from the shoulders of the family patriarch, as do the roots of the family tree, 
metaphorically suggested by the clever layering of oak tree, classical urn, and male 
torso.
In the end, then, the evidence of colonial portraits suggests that American 
painters modified—and, in so doing, contradicted—basic tenets of the neo-Country 
narrative in the interest of satisfying both the realities of colonial experience and the 
principles of its developing narrative. The replacement of universal landscapes and 
spaces with simple backdrops and private settings, the subversion of a general style to 
material realism, the use of simple costumes without public adornments, the 
unconventional—even paradoxical—use and blending of established signifiers, and 
the presentation of individuals in their singular potentiality, aligned artists and sitters 
with alternative narratives that drew on associations between liberty and identity 
imbedded in Reformed, Liberal, Restoration, Opposition, Patriot and republican 
ideologies.
As the imag[in]ing of identity necessarily engaged in the narrative context- 
making of artist and sitter, so, too, did it necessarily bear ideological and political 
implications for society at large. Indeed, images which endorsed alternative
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narratives posed an ideological challenge to the established political order. In the 
case of American Revolutionary portraits, the challenge appears to have turned on the 
elevation of industrious commoners to positions of esteem on the evidence of virtues 
like intellect and industry—head and hands—, evidence which the portraits sought to 
provide.
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CHAPTER Vffl 
CONCLUSION: PORTRAITS AND POLITICS, CIRCA 1776
The late-medieval split between the internal and external self, resonant in the 
example of the Wicked Queen, was important, first, for its allusion to individual 
duality, second, for its distinction between the individual and secular society, third, 
for its consequent separation of eternal and secular spheres and, fourth, for its 
contradiction of the classical narrative. The narrative of natural progress considered 
the relationship between the natural and social self to be symbiotic and, consequently, 
looked upon the self as a unified extension of one’s form and matter. But the image 
of the Wicked Queen suggested a contrary narrative and, hence, a different model of 
identity, based on a distinction between the natural, internal self of the eternal world 
and the external, social self of the temporal one. The resulting identity, informed by 
the selective manipulation of Haywoodian ‘lightnings’—those attributes deemed 
momentarily useful'as a public signifier for the self—functioned less to express one’s 
natural self than to manipulate the ‘others’ at whose expense one claimed social 
privileges.
The possibilities which attended the “divided” self, and their implications for 
the construction of identity, inform the principle of imag[in]ing used throughout this
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2paper.1 But their accompanying difficulties have set philosophers at odds. For 
example, Hume’s rejection of a unified self came at the expense of a ‘true’ identity; as 
he described it, “the identity, which we ascribe to the mind of man is only a fictitious 
one.”3 This sat uneasily with his contemporaries. In an effort to reconcile Hume’s 
claims with persistent demands for a credible identity, Immanuel Kant distinguished 
between the nonmenal, ‘perceiving’ or subjective (internal) self, and the phenomenal, 
‘perceived’ or objective (external) self—an effect of the collision between internal 
self and external world. Because this “phenomenal” self could be “known” through 
its affect upon observable experience—and, hence, objectified—, Kant was able to 
restore some matter to identity.4
The eighteenth-century explications of Hume and Kant suggest that the 
inconsistencies arising from the convergence of Mediaeval and Renaissance,
Christian and neoclassical, thinking, continued to plague the narratives of the 
Revolutionary period: was society a natural or an artificial construct, bom of divine 
plan or human interest; was man innately motivated towards improvement and,
1 Ultimately, as Baumeister concludes, an “adequate view of identity” must analyze “both... the inner 
self and the outer context.” He explains: “Each approach, by itself... neglects some identity issues. If 
identity exists mainly within the individual mind, why are identities so dependent on society? And if 
identity is mainly a set o f social roles, what is identity crisis apart from role conflict?” See Baumeister, 
p. 247.
2 As Richard White observes: “self as a concept cannot stand alone. In terms of our current academic 
categories, it is connected with the categories of individual and person. These three terms are distinct 
but linked; they resemble a holy trinity of subjectivity. There is a move in anthropology to be more 
rigorous in drawing distinctions between human beings as biological entities (bodies, individuals), as 
self-conscious subjects (selves), and as socially constructed identities (persons, subject positions).” See 
‘“Although I am Dead, I am not Entirely Dead. I have Left a Second of M yself: Constructing Self and 
Persons on the Middle Ground of Early America,” in Through a Glass Darkly: Reflections on Personal 
Identity in Early America, Ronald Hoffman, Mechal Sobel, and Fredrika J. Teute, eds. (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press for the Omohundro Institute of Early American History and 
Culture, 1997), pp. 409-410.
J Baumeister, pp. 12-14 261-262,265; Canfield, pp. 1-10, 32.
4 Baumeister, pp. 12-14.
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indeed, was there anything like an ideal potentiality; if so, was society a natural venue 
in its achievement or was potential confined to the sphere of revelation; moreover, 
could men be said to be naturally equal and what bearing had inequality on claims to 
identity and political authority; finally, to what degree was identity—the appellation 
of the self—and social rank—its perceived social value—self-determined and, so, 
fluid, or prescribed and, so, fixed? At the same time, the variety of ideas effected by 
this divergent thinking provided colonists with a pool of intellectual resources for 
rationalizing their dissent when the dominant narrative failed to serve them.
While subject to this confusion of influences, portraits simultaneously gave 
evidence of their conflicting consequences. For example, in yet another image of a 
Queen before her looking-glass, Johann Zoffany employed a mirror to shape, frame 
and process identity on the one hand, while underscoring its problematic complexity 
on the other. Indeed, Queen Charlotte and her two eldest Sons (Fig. 8-1; 1764; oil on 
canvas, 44-1/4 x 50-7/8 inches; Royal Collection) suggests the challenges which 
attended the depiction of identity. On the one hand, incorporating a “mirrored” public 
image within a “painted” domestic narrative, Zoffany captured Charlotte’s public 
“character” as “queen”—conveyed by the regal, “coin-like” profile publicized in the 
dressing mirror.5 On the other hand, he underscored its limitations as an index of her 
identity, for the public “character” that Zoffany “mirrors” does not square with his 
behind-the-scenes glimpse of Charlotte’s “person.” Yet, we cannot escape the fact
5 Marcia Pointon, Hanging the Head: Portraiture and Social Formation in Eighteenth-Century 
England (London: Yale University Press, 1993), p. 166. This, too, was prescribed by Richardson: 
“Painters should take a Face, and make an Antique Medal, or Bas-Relief of it, by divesting it of its 
Modem Disguises, raising the Air, and the Features, and giving it the Dress of those Times, and
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that the painted image, too, is a dramatic construction, a point driven home by the 
children’s theatrical dress and the allusion to the domestic “training” of Frederick’s 
“public” self.6 In the end, Zoffany’s image conveys the mutable and relative nature of 
identity, recalling Hobbes’s human ‘Mask’ and Plato’s “impersonation” of 
“character.”7
Fig. 8-1
suitable to the Character intended.” See Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, pp. 12, 198- 
212.
5 Telemachus was described by Plato as a man of the first or Guardian-Ruler class, one whose “path, so
to speak, has been marked out for him and he must go on his way confident that the poet’s words are 
true: “‘Some this, Telemachus, your native wit will tell you, And Heaven will prompt the rest. The 
very gods, I’m sure, Have smiled upon your birth and helped to bring you up’.” (Homer, The Odyssey, 
HI; quoted in Plato, Laws, p. 292) In encouraging her son to play Telemachus, Queen Charlotte helps 
prepare him for the responsibilities of monarchy. See Marcia Pointon’s compelling deconstruction of 
this image in Hanging the Head, pp. 162-168; Plato, Laws, p. 292.
7 Kraut, Plato, p. 310.
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Zoffany’s image points to the confusion that dogged the evaluation of modem 
identity. In the absence of a digestible alternative, the classical presumption about 
necessary unity between an internal-psychological self and its external-sociological 
persona, continued to dominate the interpretation of identity for most of the 
eighteenth century. This is suggested by Samuel Johnson, whose definition of 
identity invoked a complementary relationship between the internal and external self: 
“A representation of any man as to his personal qualities;” “Personal qualities; 
particular constitution of the mind;” “Adventitious qualities impressed by a post or 
office.”8 At the same time, frequent reference to “character” in eighteenth-century 
novels, as an evaluative reference for the tangible self (particularly popular for 
domestic servants), suggests its continued conflation with perceptions of social 
value.9 In other words, a complementary relationship between internal qualities, 
external persona and perceived social value, the whole constituting a public signifier 
of a singular, unified self, continued to hold sway even after the principles of 
individual autonomy and self-determination—implied by Christian dogma—were 
articulated (notably by Locke) and acknowledged (even by Shaftesbury) among the 
wider public.10 The resulting dynamic between inherited narratives and modem
8 Johnson, Dictionary, definitions four, seven and eight.
9 Samuel Richardson’s Pamela wrote to her mother “that every body gave me a very good character....” 
(Richardson, p. 47) She likewise referred to “the characters and persons o f ... four ladies,” describing 
their physical features, “airs,” mind, and family connections. (Richardson, p. 83) See Richardson, 
Pamela, pp. 47, 83.
10 Though Pocock warns: “The conventional wisdom among scholars who have studied [the] growth [of 
myths] has been that the Puritan covenant was reborn in the Lockean contract, so that Locke himself 
has been elevated to the status of a patron saint of American values and the quarrel with history has 
been seen in terms of a constant attempt to escape into the wilderness and repeat a Lockean experiment 
in the foundation of a natural society. The interpretation put forward here stresses Machiavelli at the 
expense of Locke....” See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 545. It appears to have been Locke 
who highlighted the disengagement arising therefrom.
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identities paralleled an emerging emphasis on negotiation: on the one hand, the 
principle of autonomous self-determination permitted individual assertions of 
imag[in]ed identities; on the other hand, the necessary concession to social judgment 
meant acquiescence to a dominant narrative.11
In effect, the continued demand for a credible identity—one based on 
legitimate, reciprocal standards—, and the resulting concession to traditional models 
of identity, compromised the influence of empirical and Reformed ideas on eighteenth 
-century narratives, despite the experience of social change arising from economic 
developments.12 Ultimately, the consequent gap between ideology and experience, 
reflecting an inconsistent progress from a “stage three” (landed) to a “stage four” 
(commercial) society, nurtured the coexistence of overlapping ideologies. On the one 
hand, for example, an inherited model of independence might premise identity and 
social rank on the natural capacity for disinterested wisdom affiliated with the leisure 
afforded a landed elite. On the other hand, a model of independence based on the
11 As Hobbes explained: “men measure, not onely other men, but all other things, by themselves.” He 
goes on: “let a man (as most men do,) rate themselves as the highest Value they can; yet their true 
Value is no more than it is esteemed by others.” (Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 87, 151-152) Thus, as 
Charles Taylor has likewise argued, “One is a self only among other selves... [;] A self can never be 
described without reference to those who surround it....” (Taylor, p. 35) This socially-relative, ‘other’- 
oriented identity represents what some modem philosophers call “identity-thinking ” a ‘negative’ 
relativism premised on “Other-ness” versus “Same-ness.” See, for example, Juliet Steyn, ed., Other 
than identity: the subject, politics and art (New York: Manchester University Press, 1997), 
particularly: Andrew Benjamin, “Figuring self-identity: Blanchot’s Bataille,” pp. 9-31; Claire 
Pajaczkowska, “The ecstatic solace of culture: self, not-self and other; a psychoanalytic view,” pp. 101- 
112; John Gange, “Beyond identity? The beyond in Beyond Japan,” pp. 198-210; and Juliet Steyn, 
“Painting another; other-than-painting,” pp. 211-220. See Hobbes, Leviathan, pp. 87, 151-152; Taylor, 
pp. 15, 27, 35.
12 The persistence of civic humanism is evident in the “modem tension between individual self- 
awareness on the one hand and consciousness o f society, property, and history on the other.” See 
Pocock The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 462-463, quoted from p. 462.
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evidence of real experience might premise identity and social rank on a self- 
determined capacity for autonomous reasoning and a potentially nurtured virtue.
In part, the persistent influence of traditional standards of identity was enabled 
by the strategic concessions of neo-Country conservatives. For example, in response 
to the implications of individualism and Newtonian empiricism, and seeking to 
resolve the inherent tension between the unified and progressing self of classicism 
and the divided self of Liberalism and Reformed Christianity, Shaftesbury contained 
the implications of the divided self—the coexistence of natural and self-determined 
selves—by subverting them to an Aristotelian progressive self—  form and matter 
developing from actuality to potentiality. On this foundation, he prescribed a fixed 
model of social order, one which conformed to the classical doctrine of human 
intellectual and social progress, in which the social ranks of autonomous, reasoning 
subjects was premised on a comparative analysis of individual progresses. This 
model came to inform a neo-Aristotelian bias in the neo-Country narrative: as 
Aristotelian progress suggested individual advancement from a lower to a higher 
state, from a state of passion to a state of reason, as all individuals were held subject 
to the same standards of improvement, so a cumulative summary of all progressing 
subjects would effect a naturally hierarchical social order.
In this narrative, the “mirror” became a convenient metaphor for the process 
of self-reflection requisite to an “improved” identity.13 On the one hand, it conceded
13 What Canfield has aptly described as the “duality of self as object to itself.” See Canfield, pp. 173, 
205.
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
302
the intellectual separation between an internal and external self and the necessity of 
their being made “known.” On the other hand, it subverted the practice of the 
“Pocket-Mirrour”—the process of engaging with the internal self in the advancement 
of “potentiality”—to an overriding natural order. Such is suggested by Clarissa 
Harlowe’s lamentations to her friend, Anna Howe: “I would so conduct myself as not 
to give reason even for an adversary to censure me; and how shall so weak and so 
young a creature avoid the censure of such, if my friend will not hold a looking-glass 
before me to let me see my imperfections?”14 This provided a convenient context for 
the elevation of portraiture; at least for Jonathan Richardson, portrait-painting became 
a visual counterpart to “Mirrour-Writing”: the metaphorical means by which one’s 
mental reflection was transcribed and improved through visual imagery.15
II. The American Revolutionary Portrait
A visitor to the National Gallery of Art in the spring of 2002 might have been 
drawn by the proximity of two portraits gracing adjacent rooms in the American and 
British galleries. The similarities between Reynolds’s portrait, Squire Musters (Fig. 
8-2; 1777/80; oil on canvas, 93-7/8 x 58 inches; National Gallery of Art,
Washington), and Earl’s portrait, Daniel Boardman (Fig. 8-3; 1789; oil on canvas, 81- 
5/8 x 55-1/4 inches; National Gallery of Art, Washington) seemed to compel the 
visitor into their visual comparison. For the hearty looker, the reward was a telling
14 Richardson, Clarissa, p. 73.
Shaftesbury, Characteristicks, vol. 1, pp. 196,204-205. As Jonathan Richardson noted, “Painting 
gives us not only the Persons, but the Characters of Great Men. The Air of the Head, and the Mien in 
general, gives strong Indications o f the Mind, and illustrates what the Historian says more expressly 
and particularly.” See Richardson, An Essay on the Theory o f Painting, p. 12.
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insight into the narrative differences informing British and American identities of the 
Revolutionary era.
Fig. 8-2 Fig, 8-3
Standing full-length in their respective British and American landscapes, 
Squire Musters and Daniel Boardman serve as striking examplars of their time and 
place. On the one hand, the two figures clearly subscribed to similar notions of 
decorum: as Squire Musters stands supported by his left leg, an angled walking stick 
artfully grasped in his right hand, so Boardman stands supported by his left leg, an 
angled walking stick artfully grasped in his right hand; as the bend of Musters’s right 
elbow, and the triangular effect of his right hand-on-hip, is echoed in the bend of his 
right leg and the triangular effect of his crossed foot (right-over-left), so the same is
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effected by Boardman; as Musters’s left arm rests aside the torso in parallel with his 
left leg, so a like complement of lines informs the posture of Boardman; moreover, 
both men don comparably fashionable attire. In sum, Daniel Boardman shares with 
Squire Musters a comparable politeness and, so, a comparable level of virtue.
But equally telling are the visual differences between the images. First and 
foremost, Musters’s figure takes pride-of-place in the center of the canvas, a 
sophisticated use of convex illusionism functioning to elevate him vis-a-vis the 
spectator. The resulting subordination of spectator to subject is reaffirmed by the 
sitter’s averted gaze, which forces the viewer into a passive position. By contrast, 
Boardman is placed to the side of the canvas, suggesting a more egalitarian 
distribution between subject and setting. This suggestion of interdependence extends
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beyond the picture plane, where a compositionally-level, extraspatial audience is met 
by Boardman’s gaze. The effect is more “conversational” and less “grand.”
Differences in the two landscapes are also revealing. On the one hand,
Musters locates the subject in a general, natural setting in a manner akin to 
Gainsborough’s Dr. Ralph Schomberg (Fig. 8-4; ca. 1770; oil on canvas, 91-3/4 x 60- 
1/2 inches; National Gallery, London) and Sir Benjamin Truman (Fig. 8-5; ca. 1773- 
1774; oil on canvas, 93-3/4 x 59-9/16 inches; Tate Britain). In all three images, 
country subjects enjoy the leisurely privileges of gentry life. Indeed, only in Truman 
is reference made to labor, and this of a theoretical kind: allusion to the pastoral 
ideal—note the shepherd tending his flock—invokes the natural and complementary 
relationship between Country life and Virgilian virtues, the combination of which 
supports—visually and metaphorically—the distant country estate nestled in the copse 
of trees.
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By contrast, Boardman suggests a rather different narrative. Recalling 
Gainsborough’s early portrait, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Andrews (Fig. 8-6; ca. 1748- 
1749; oil on canvas, 27-1/2 x 47 inches; National Gallery, London), Boardman steps 
aside in deference to his property and community. As in Andrews—in which the 
identity of the newlyweds is literally and metaphorically embedded in the economic 
and social attributes of the farm (fertility being signified by the sheaves of com, for 
example, politeness with the ownership of land)16—, Boardman’s economic and 
social successes are specifically located in New Milford, Connecticut. Against the 
Musters, Schomberg, and Truman images, which allude to general attributes (land and 
leisure) and a theoretical context (the discourse of civic humanism), Boardman and 
Andrews appear more “agricultural” than “landed,” more “industrious” than 
“leisured,” more “particular” than “general.” Moreover, as each records a subject 
recently “landed,” so each conflates his social virtues with the function of land as an 
economic resource.17 As Rosenthal puts it with regard to Andrews, it “attempts to 
demonstrate that one can farm and still be polite.”18 In this way, images like 
Boardman highlighted the gap between the neo-Country ideals of civic humanism and 
its more empirical and Reformed variation.
This emphasis on industry and engagement as the basis of identity, progress, 
and good appears to inform American portraiture until at least the Federal period,
16 John Hayes, Gainsborough, p. 76; Rosenthal, The Art o f  Thomas Gainsborough, p. 18.
17 Andrews, like Boardman, “was new to the land, for he ‘actually succeeded to the ... estate in 1750’.” 
(Rosenthal, p. 18) Hence, the imag[in]ing of identity: “Gainsborough assists in creating a fiction that 
his sitter is long established in living the moral country life.” (Rosenthal, p. 17) See Rosenthal, The Art 
o f Thomas Gainsborough, pp. 17-19.
18 Rosenthal, The Art o f Thomas Gainsborough, p. 17.
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when portraits by Stuart suggest a heightened emphasis on internal attributes. From 
the 1760s to the 1790s, American portraits appear to assert the complementary 
relationship between head and hands—intellect and industry—, together with the 
virtues of interdependent social relations, as mutually conducing to the public good. 
One is reminded of Hume’s observation: “Thus industry, knowledge, and humanity, 
are linked together by an indissoluble chain, and are found, from experience as well as 
reason, to be peculiar to the more polished, and, what are commonly denominated, the 
more luxurious ages.”19 Supporting this narrative was a specific body of personal 
attributes—education and industry based on honesty, frugality, politeness, social 
engagement and civic commitment—celebrated in portraiture.
m. A Question o f Liberty
Ultimately, the evidence of Revolutionary portraits suggests that Britain’s 
territorial and economic expansion was experienced differently in the American 
colonies than in England.20 This different experience effected a comparable gap in 
their perceived reality and a like pressure towards narrative reform. Most pointedly, 
they suggest a pressure to revise the necessary correlation between landed birth and 
civic virtue, a pressure which ultimately turned on the more inclusive and expansive 
Public. They also suggest a desire to reaffirm the principle of self-determination and 
its supporting virtues of intellect (education) and industry (labor)—the premise of 
Belfield’s “Labour with Independence.”
19 Hume, “On Luxury” (1752), quoted in Solkin, Painting for Money, p. 157.
20 Baumeister, p. 54.
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Justification for such revisions borrowed on a combination of ideologies: the
Harrington/Country notion of virtuous self-sufficiency ascribed to the industrious
freeholder; the Protestant promise of autonomous self-determination; the Liberal
rhetoric of social contract; the Whig guarantee of certain “rights and liberties.” All of
these complemented the classical emphasis on progress and good, as long as the
individual was the recognized medium o f potentiality and liberty was recognized as
the natural right o f the individual?1 In other words, on the one hand, the narrative of
American identity turned on a belief in natural liberty and the consequent
independence afforded individual will (as opposed to birth). On the other hand, it
also recognized the implications of a market-born self—a dependence on contract, a
vulnerability to social fluidity, and the challenge of inter-individual competition and
* • 22the necessity of containing the inclinations towards vice. As Hume aptly observed, 
the modem Public man derived his greatness from two sets of qualities, the public 
qualities of his “good and benevolent character”—i.e. “generosity, humanity, 
compassion, gratitude, friendship, fidelity, zeal, disinterestedness, liberality”—and the
21 In fact, Locke’s support for a “free, disengaged subject” and a “society ... made up o f and by the 
consent of free individuals and, corollary to this, ... bearers of individual rights” marked the shift from 
a traditional classical and early Christian narrative, which encouraged “Rightful submission” to a 
‘natural’ social and political order, to a modem narrative encouraging autonomous self-determination. 
As Taylor explains: “As against earlier contract theories, the one we find with Grotius and Locke starts 
from the individual.” (Taylor, p. 82) This shift, Taylor argues, informed a key rift between traditional 
civic humanism and its more individualist variations. It also affected the definition of liberty. In an 
aristocratic sense, the liberty of ‘ruling and being ruled’ turned on a principle of equality in which only 
those of equal virtue participated. In a democratic sense, by contrast, the liberty o f“ruling and being 
ruled” turned on a principle of equality in which those equal in freedom might rale and be ruled in turn. 
This democratic interpretation lent credence to a second definition of liberty, ‘to live as you like’—i.e. 
to be ruled not at all. See Taylor, pp. 82, 106; Aristotle, Politics, pp. 362-363.
22 As Pocock notes, “his only means of self-discovery lay in conforming to everybody else’s notions of 
what he ought to be and was....” Tocqueville’s “critique of egalite des conditions,” he goes on, “is 
basically Aristotelian: it is pointed out in the Politics that when men are treated as all alike, we fail to 
take account of them in those respects in which they are not alike;... a society in which every man is
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private qualities of his interested person—“prudence, temperance, frugality, industry,
9*23assiduity, enterprise, dexterity.”
Hence liberty and independence became conflated.24 As the claim to 
independence implied a claim to liberty, so (and this was the tricky part) the claim to 
liberty implied a like claim to independence.25 Moreover, once the perception of 
independence was altered, the entire narrative was pressured to reform—as Aristotle 
observed: when ideological standards changed, “not only the quality of the democracy 
altered..., but also its identity.”2* That conditions were ripe for reform is suggested 
by Burney:
‘And what is this independence,’ cried Mr. Monckton, ‘which has thus 
bewitched your imagination? A mere idle dream ...; one part of a community 
must inevitably hang upon another, and ‘tis a farce to call either 
independent....’
‘M a n .a n s w e re d  Belfield,... ‘considered merely with respect to his 
bodily functions, may indeed be called dependent, since the food by which he 
lives... cannot wholly be cultivated and prepared by his own hands: but 
considered in a nobler sense... as a being of feeling and understanding..., may 
he not claim the freedom of his own thoughts?
‘But who is there in the whole world,’ said Mr. Monckton, ‘.. .that can 
pretend to assert, his thoughts, words, and actions, are exempt from controul?
subservient to every other man, because dependent on him for any means o f judging his own existence, 
is corrupt within....” See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 537-544, quoted from pp. 537-538.
23 Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, p. 587. Hence, “we may observe, that whatever we call heroic 
virtue, and admire under the character of greatness and elevation of mind, is either nothing but a steady 
and well-establish’d pride and self-esteem, or partakes largely o f that passion.” (Hume, Treatise o f  
Human Nature, pp. 599-600) See Hume, Treatise o f Human Nature, pp. 323,257, 365,407-409, 456- 
475, 574-578, 584, 587, 596-610, 616-619; Hume, An Enquiry concerning the Principles o f Morals, 
quoted in Broadie, p. 151.
24 According to Harrington, “where a people can live upon their own”—a nation of independent 
“citizens”—“the government may be democracy;” by contrast, “Where a people cannot live upon their 
own”—where they are dependent subjects/ servants—“the government is either monarchy or 
aristocracy.” See Harrington, A System o f Politics, p. 270.
25 As Taylor describes it, liberty had, by the seventeenth century, assumed a “modem notion of 
freedom... portrayfed]... as the independence o f the subject, his determining his own purposes without 
interference from external authority.” See Taylor, Sources o f the Self, pp. 82, 86. For a discussion of 
the relevance of ‘independence’ as a political principle, see Jack P. Greene, “Empire and Identity from 
the Glorious Revolution to the American Revolution,” in The Oxford History o f British Empire, vol. II, 
The Eighteenth Century, ed. P.J. Marshall, pp. 208-230, particularly 208-210.
26 Aristotle, The Politics, p. 360.
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even where interest... interferes not,—though where that is I confess I cannot 
tell—are we not kept silent... by the fear of offending? and made speak .. .by 
the desire of obliging...?’
'All these,’ answered Belfield, ‘are so merely matters of ceremony.... 
The bow is to the coat, the attention to the rank....’
‘Where, then, do you draw the line...?
‘I hold that man,’ cried he, with energy, ‘to be independent, who treats 
the Great as Little, and the Little as Great, who neither exults in riches nor 
blushes in poverty, who owes no man a groat, and who spends not a shilling 
he has not earned’.”27
Somewhere in this exchange lives the Court-Country balance between 
interdependence—social engagement—and independence—individual liberty— 
reflected in Revolutionary portraits.
In part, the American Revolution stands as evidence of the ideological 
difficulties which attended the assimilation of the autonomous individual into the 
paradigm of the natural State.28 On the one hand, the persistent insistence on the 
necessity of virtue as a corrective to interested vice suggests the continued influence 
of civic humanism.29 Indeed, considering the formative influence of commerce on the 
colonies, the “Mandevillian” identity is surprisingly absent, suggesting that the 
legitimacy of the Revolutionary narrative depended on the credible assimilation of 
commerce and interest into a classical narrative of progress and virtue.30 By the same
27 Frances Burney, Cecilia, pp. 733-736. It is interesting to note that Burney conducts this analysis in 
the conversational mode that characterized the writing o f Addison and Mandeville.
28 As Pocock notes, the “Court ideology... was based not on a simple antithesis between virtue and 
commerce, but on an awareness that the two interpenetrated one another as did land and currency, 
authority and liberty;... as far back as 1698, the founders of ‘Country’ ideology admitted this truth,
while drawing different conclusions from it [—] the country gentlemen never [being] as radically
independent as they liked to pretend....” See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 486, 506, 508- 
509, 548-552; quoted from pp. 508-509.
29 Ultimately, Pocock writes, “eighteenth-century attempts to construct a bourgeois ideology contended 
none too successfully with the primacy already enjoyed by a civic ideology....” See Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 550.
30 See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 507-508. Against the Federalist (Court) vision of the 
influence of commerce and, hence, culture, for example, Jefferson posed an agrarian ideal; yet even he
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token, the accompanying emphasis on individual autonomy and self-determination
31suggests an associated pressure to revise the definition and accessibility of virtue. 
Difficulties thus turned on the construction of a credible structure for accommodating
32these divergent ideals.
Bernard Bailyn, Gordon Wood and others thus seem right to suggest the 
potency of the Country/ Opposition ideology for rebel Americans. But they are also 
right in suggesting that a great deal of revision was required in order to render it 
compatible with the American experience.33 Significantly, for example, as the 
American version of the republican paradigm never quite condemned a ‘monied 
interest’ as the source of modem corruption—the distinction between a ‘monied
acknowledged its limitations—land and, hence, virtue were finite. Banking on the American 
opportunity for westward expansion that culminated in the Louisiana Purchase. See Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 533.
31 Thomas Paine, Common Sense, in Common Sense, The Rights o f Man, and Other Essential Writings 
o f Thomas Paine, intro. Sidney Hook (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), p. 55. See also Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 467, 525.
32 Without an established ‘natural elite’, for example, the legitimacy o f colonial virtue—and hence its 
claim to independence—appeared more fragile. In compensation, a cadre of propertied men—the 
Sparhawks, Lees, Bordleys and Boardmans of American society—were elevated to positions of 
political prominence. For a discussion of this development, see Rousseau, O f the Social Compact, 
Discourse on Political Economy, and Considerations on the Government o f Poland, in The Social 
Contract and other later political writings, pp. 16, 70, 82, 94, 188; Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment, pp. 514-523; Richard Beeman, “Deference, Republicanism, and the Emergence of Popular 
Politics in Eighteenth-Century America,” The William and Mary Quarterly (July 1992), 401-430; 
Robert Gross, The Minutemen and their World, pp. 65-66, 133, 153-155,169.
3j On the one hand, there remained an uneasy tension between America’s origins in modem 
imperialism and the republican ideology it assumed; “were not Americans,” Pocock writes, “even in 
their own eyes, a system of colonies extending an empire, and not a republic at all?” (Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 510-511) To resolve these tensions, Americans crafted an originating 
myth—one that borrowed, for example, on the classical and Christian traditions of translatio imperii 
and Elizabethan apocalyptic—that lent them a legitimate and credible narrative. (See Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 511-513, 523-533) For a discussion o f these issues, see Bailyn, 
Ideological Origins o f the American Revolution, pp. v-vi, 19, 21, 35, 55, 77, 79, 86, 94, 124, 161, 230, 
376; Wood, The Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787, pp. 15-17,45, 50, 53, 65, 70-71, 75, 
81-83, 91, 108, 114, 117, 123-124; Joyce Appleby, “The Social Origins of the American Revolutionary 
Ideology,” The Journal o f American History, LXTV (March 1978): 935-958; Richard Beeman, 
“Deference, Republicanism, and the Emergence of Popular Politics in Eighteenth-Century America,” 
The William and Mary Quarterly (July 1992): 401-430. Appleby and Beeman suggest that Americans 
were moving towards a more liberal narrative even before the Revolution. See also Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 510-513, 523-533; Saunders, in Aristotle, The Politics, p. 151, fit. 2.
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interest’ and a commercial people being likely too narrow to admit , so portraits de­
emphasized the distinction between real and mobile property, each serving as a 
potential medium of independence, progress and good. They were afforded this 
contradiction through the subtle recasting of ‘landed’ into ‘agrarian’—the former 
being affiliated with a well-born leisure, the latter with the industrious freeholder—
34and America’s unique potential for westward expansion.
It thus seems that the primary goal of rebelling colonists was to promote the
• • 35promise of English liberty while ameliorating the negative effects arising therefrom. 
In this sense, the American Revolution may be viewed as a continuation of the 
struggle to assimilate the demands of “happiness” into a discourse of “good.” But it
34 As Pocock explains, Jefferson, in 1785, was “as committed as any classical republican to the ideal of
virtue, but saw the preconditions o f virtue as agrarian rather than natural; he was not a Cato, seeing the 
relation of natural aristocracy to the natural democracy as the thing essential... so much as ... seeing 
the preservation of a yeoman commonwealth as the secret of virtue’s maintenance. At the same time, 
we see, he doubted whether agrarian virtue could be preserved forever; but neither his faith nor his 
doubts separate him from the tradition o f classical politics, or from the new liberalism of Madisonian 
Federalism.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 533). As Pocock observes, “So long as the 
partnership of expansion lasts, the plunge into nature can be described simultaneously in pastoral and 
industrial terms.. . (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 539) According to Pocock, the concession 
is present in the writings of Noah Webster, who argued “that freehold land was a more stable 
foundation than commerce, but that a predominantly agrarian society could absorb commerce without 
essential loss of virtue.... We are on the verge o f a theory in which frontier, not constitution, is the 
‘soul of the republic’...[;] a purely agrarian republic had to be a commonwealth for expansion.” 
(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 534-537) By contrast, Pocock continues, “Alexander 
Hamilton... looked east, not west, saw America as commercial empire rather than agrarian republic, 
and proclaimed that corruption was inescapable, that the cycle was closed and the end had come, before 
the covenant was fairly sealed or the experience in escaping corruption had begun.” (Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, p. 544) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 533-544. 
j5 What “was involved,” Pocock writes, “was a flight from modernity and a future no less than from 
antiquity and a past, from commercial and Whiggish Britain... no less than from feudal and popish 
Europe....” See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 546.
36 On these grounds, Pocock has described the American Revolution as “the last act o f the civic 
Renaissance.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 462) As he explains it, “The civil war and 
revolution which disrupted the English-speaking Atlantic after 1774 can be seen as involving a 
continuation, larger and more irreconcilable, of that Augustan debate which accompanied the Financial 
Revolution in England and Scotland after 1688 and issued after 1714 in the parliamentary oligarchy of 
Great Britain... .’’(Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, pp. 546-547) Conflict ensued because “the 
forces o f change and modernity had crossed the Atlantic somewhat in advance of the governmental 
imperative that compelled their recognition....” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 467) Hence, 
he argues, “the republic—a concept derived from Renaissance humanism—was the true heir of the
R eproduced  with perm ission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without perm ission.
313
might also be recognized as an intensely modem moment, for it was a certainty about 
their capacity as individuals—and, perhaps as essentially, about the potential risks to 
their autonomy— that propelled and united the colonists.37 In this sense, the balance- 
of-influence between the individual and society would appear to have shifted in favor 
of the former, a sign of more liberal tendencies. Thus a new narrative was crafted 
from the language of the old—Bailyn’s “transformed as well as transforming 
force”38—, borrowing on once-conflicting ideas to arrive at a narrative meaning of 
life that simultaneously liberated Americans and assured them of their virtue.39
[Puritan] covenant and the dread of corruption the true heir of the jeremiad... [;] the foundation of 
independent America was seen, and stated, as taking place at a Machiavellian—even a Rousseauan—  
moment, at which the fragility o f the experiment, and the ambiguity of the republic’s position in secular 
time, was more vividly appreciated than it could have been from a Lockean perspective.” Pocock, The 
Machiavellian Moment, pp. 462,467, 506-507, 545-548; quoted from p. 545.
37 “The greater their apparent independence,” Pocock writes, “the greater their sense that their virtue 
was their own; but the more active a government in which they did not directly participate, the greater 
their sense that their independence and virtue were threatened by a force they could only call 
corruption.... As we now see it,” he goes on, “modem and effective government had transplanted to 
America the dread o f modernity itself, of which the threat to virtue by corruption was the contemporary 
ideological expression.” (Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 509) Wood adds: “it was the 
pervasive fear that they were not predestined to be a virtuous and egalitarian people that in the last 
analysis drove them into revolution in 1776. It was this fear... that made them so readily and so 
remarkably responsive to Thomas Paine’s warning that the time for independence was at hand and that 
delay would be disastrous.” (Wood, Creation o f the American Republic, p. 108) For a brief period, 
then, internal colonial conflicts were largely masked by the external conflict with England. (Wood, 
Creation o f the American Republic, pp. 81-83) See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, p. 509;
Wood, Creation o f the American Republic, 1776-1787, pp. 81-83, 108.
Bailyn, Ideological Origins o f  the American Revolution, p. 161. Indeed, Pocock adds, for all of 
Bolingbroke’s influence, the American Revolution resulted in: “a drastic rearticulation of the language 
and outlook of English opposition thought... [, according to which] the experience of the War of 
Independence and the constitution-making which followed it necessitated a further revision o f the 
classical tradition, and in some aspects a departure from it.” See Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment, 
pp. 486, 506.
39 As Pocock observes, “it was in those vocabularies and within the ambivalences of those cultures that 
American self-consciousness originated and acquired its terminology.” See Pocock, The Machiavellian 
Moment, pp. 546-547; quoted from p. 546.
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